Introduction

In State v. Humphrey, the Kansas Supreme Court clarifies two significant preservation questions in the criminal-restitution context and insists on evidentiary rigor when courts award restitution. After Adam Drew Humphrey pleaded no contest to aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer stemming from a 2020 vehicle chase during which an officer was shot in the foot, the district court ordered $40,762.44 in restitution “for the medical bills incurred by” the officer, payable to the City of Salina. The State supported that figure with a one-page claim summary showing expenses spread across five categories—only one of which, “MEDICAL,” totaled $17,193.19. Humphrey did not challenge that discrepancy at sentencing, objecting only that restitution was unworkable.

On appeal, Humphrey argued the evidence did not substantially support the full amount. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits, holding the challenge unpreserved under Kansas’ contemporaneous-objection statute (K.S.A. 60-404) and general preservation principles. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) K.S.A. 60-404 does not bar appellate review when the defendant challenges whether properly admitted evidence sufficiently supports a factual finding; and (2) a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting restitution on appeal without objecting at sentencing because the State bears the burden of proof. On the merits, the Court vacated the award and remanded for a restitution hearing.

Summary of the Opinion

• Preservation: A sufficiency challenge to a restitution amount is reviewable on appeal even absent an objection at sentencing. K.S.A. 60-404’s contemporaneous-objection rule—governing the admissibility of evidence—does not apply when the question is whether properly admitted evidence supports a factual finding. Nor does the general preservation rule bar a sufficiency challenge where the State bears the burden of proof.
• Merits: Substantial competent evidence did not support the full $40,762.44 award for “medical bills.” The State’s claim summary labeled only $17,193.19 as “MEDICAL.” The balance—spread across “EXPENSE,” “IND.PPD,” “IND.TTD,” and “LEGAL”—was not explained or tied to “medical bills.”
• Remedy: The Court vacated the restitution order and remanded for a restitution hearing, noting that although the State typically gets “one bite at the apple” to prove restitution, here there was no meaningful hearing because the defense acquiesced at sentencing, forestalling development of the record.
• Disposition: Court of Appeals reversed; district court’s restitution order vacated; case remanded with directions.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Smith, 317 Kan. 130, 526 P.3d 1047 (2023):
  • Key holding: Every restitution award must be supported by substantial competent evidence, and a defendant’s failure to object at sentencing does not bar appellate review; mere acquiescence is not invited error.
  • Influence: Humphrey leverages Smith in two ways. First, it confirms that sufficiency challenges to restitution are cognizable on appeal even without sentencing-stage objections. Second, it anchors the merits: a court must tether the restitution figure to substantial competent evidence. Smith also supplies the “one bite at the apple” framework that the Court applies with nuance here—permitting a remand because no actual restitution hearing occurred.
• State v. Collins, 320 Kan. 211, 564 P.3d 393 (2025):
  • Key holding: A defendant is not responsible for carrying the State’s burden of proof (there, on knowledge of the right to appointed counsel), and preservation does not bar review where the State bears the burden on a dispositive factual issue.
  • Influence: The Court analogizes Humphrey to Collins to underscore that preservation rules do not bar appellate review of whether the State met its burden to prove a required factual finding—in this case, the amount of restitution.
• State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 564 P.3d 744 (2025):
  • Key principle: The State bears the burden to prove restitution.
  • Influence: Younger is the doctrinal anchor for placing the evidentiary onus on the State and for framing the sufficiency question.
• State v. Dailey, 314 Kan. 276, 497 P.3d 1153 (2021):
  • Key principle: “One bite at the apple”—ordinarily the State gets one meaningful opportunity to prove restitution.
  • Influence: The Court reconciles Dailey with Smith to allow a remand where the State never got that meaningful “bite” because no hearing occurred due to defense acquiescence.
• State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 175 P.3d 221 (2008):
  • Key holding: Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to convictions need not be preserved by an objection at trial.
  • Influence: The Court analogizes restitution sufficiency challenges to conviction sufficiency review—both involve whether the State carried its burden—supporting review without a contemporaneous objection.
• State v. Sinnard, 318 Kan. 261, 543 P.3d 525 (2024):
  • Key definition: “Substantial competent evidence” is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
  • Influence: Supplies the evidentiary yardstick used to conclude the claim summary failed to support the full award for “medical bills.”
• State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, 413 P.3d 787 (2018):
  • Key principle: Restitution damages must be proximately caused by the crime (cause-in-fact and legal causation).
  • Influence: While the Court does not decide whether the non-medical categories were compensable, Arnett frames the universe of potentially recoverable losses on remand if the State proves proximate cause and ties them to the court’s restitution directive.
• State v. Slusser, 317 Kan. 174, 527 P.3d 565 (2023) (invited error); State v. Shank, 304 Kan. 89, 369 P.3d 322 (2016); State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 204 P.3d 585 (2009); State v. Hunziker, 274 Kan. 655, 56 P.3d 202 (2002):
  • Influence: The Court distinguishes these cases. Slusser does not bar review because Humphrey merely acquiesced; he did not invite error. Shank, King, and Hunziker involve “unworkability” challenges—where the defendant bears the burden—which implicate preservation differently than sufficiency challenges where the State bears the burden.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court addresses preservation first, because it controls whether the merits can be reached.

• Contemporaneous objection under K.S.A. 60-404: This statute restricts appellate challenges to the erroneous admission of evidence absent a timely, specific objection. Humphrey did not challenge admissibility; he accepted the claim summary into the record and argued it did not prove what the district court found. Because the evidence was properly admitted, 60-404 does not apply. A sufficiency challenge to factual findings based on admitted evidence is not an evidentiary-admission challenge.
• General preservation rule: Kansas generally requires issues to be raised below. But where the State bears the burden on a dispositive factual point, preservation does not bar an appellate sufficiency review. The Court analogizes to sufficiency-of-conviction review (Farmer) and relies on Smith and Collins, emphasizing that defendants have “no responsibility to carry the State’s burden.” Thus, Humphrey could argue, for the first time on appeal, that the evidence did not substantially support the restitution amount.
• Merits—substantial competent evidence: The district court ordered restitution specifically “for the medical bills incurred by” the officer. The State’s sole proof—a single-page claim summary—showed $17,193.19 categorized as “MEDICAL,” with the rest ($23,569.25) in four unexplained categories: “EXPENSE,” “IND.PPD,” “IND.TTD,” and “LEGAL.” Even acknowledging that some non-medical sums might be crime-related and potentially compensable under a properly framed restitution order, the record here did not show that the entire $40,762.44 constituted “medical bills.” The Court therefore concluded the evidence did not meet the low—but real—threshold of substantial competent evidence for the award as entered.
• Remedy and the “one bite” principle: Ordinarily, the State gets one opportunity to prove restitution. But because no restitution hearing occurred—defense acquiescence at sentencing prevented it—the State never had that “one bite.” Following Smith, the Court vacated and remanded to provide a meaningful opportunity for the State to prove the restitution amount with appropriate evidence, and for the district court to make findings matched to the scope of any award (e.g., “medical bills” versus broader economic damages).

3) Likely Impact on Kansas Restitution Practice

• Preservation clarified:
  • Defendants may raise on appeal, without prior objection, that the State’s evidence is insufficient to support the amount of restitution. This aligns restitution with conviction sufficiency review and will likely increase appellate scrutiny of restitution awards.
  • K.S.A. 60-404 does not bar such challenges; it remains limited to evidentiary-admission errors.
• Burden and proof tightened:
  • Prosecutors must present clear, itemized, and explained proof linking each dollar requested to the category of loss the court intends to award. If the order is for “medical bills,” the State must show that each component qualifies as a medical expense.
  • Ambiguous claim summaries, unlabeled totals, or unexplained shorthand will not suffice. If categories like “EXPENSE,” “IND.PPD,” “IND.TTD,” or “LEGAL” are pursued, their nature and causal connection must be established, and the restitution order should be framed to encompass them (e.g., broader “economic losses” caused by the crime), consistent with Arnett’s proximate-cause requirement.
• Trial court practice:
  • Courts should align the scope of the restitution order with the evidence presented. If the State proves broader compensable losses beyond medical bills, courts should say so and make specific findings.
  • Expect more remands where sentencing courts adopted summary figures without an evidentiary hearing or without explicating how the evidence supports the amount.
• Remedial nuance preserved:
  • When the State had a meaningful evidentiary opportunity and failed to carry its burden, the “one bite” rule (Dailey) may preclude a remand. But where, as here, no hearing occurred due to defense acquiescence, remand is appropriate.
• Defense strategy:
  • Defense counsel should still raise unworkability (ability to pay) and other defendant-burden issues at sentencing; those remain subject to ordinary preservation rules.
  • But even if no objection is made, counsel can challenge, on appeal, whether the State proved the amount awarded.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial competent evidence: Evidence that is both legally admissible and relevant, and that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is not a demanding standard, but it requires more than speculation or ambiguous paperwork.
• Contemporaneous-objection rule (K.S.A. 60-404): A party must object at the time evidence is admitted to later argue on appeal that the admission was erroneous. It does not apply when the issue is whether admitted evidence is sufficient to support a finding.
• Preservation: The general rule that issues must be raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal. Humphrey clarifies an exception: a defendant can challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the State’s proof of restitution because the State bears the burden.
• Invited error: A party cannot induce a legal error at trial and then complain about it on appeal. Mere silence or acquiescence is not the same as inviting error; Smith and Humphrey reaffirm that sufficiency challenges survive.
• Proximate cause (for restitution): The loss must be caused-in-fact by the crime and legally attributable to it. This limits restitution to losses sufficiently connected to the offense.
• Unworkability of restitution: A defendant’s claim that a restitution plan is not feasible or realistic (e.g., given the defendant’s financial circumstances). Defendants bear the burden on unworkability, and ordinary preservation rules apply.
• “One bite at the apple”: The State generally gets a single meaningful chance to prove restitution. If it fails without excuse, an appellate court may vacate without remand. If no hearing occurred, remand may be appropriate to afford that opportunity.

Practical Takeaways

• For prosecutors:
  • Prepare itemized documentation and, where necessary, testimony explaining each category of loss and its causal link to the offense.
  • Match the restitution request to the evidence—or tailor the requested order (e.g., “economic damages caused by the crime”) to the categories you can prove.
• For defense counsel:
  • Object at sentencing on unworkability and evidentiary clarity—but if not, you may still argue on appeal that the State’s proof is insufficient.
  • Scrutinize claim summaries for ambiguous or unexplained categories not supported by detailed documentation tied to the court’s stated basis for restitution.
• For trial judges:
  • State the scope of any award (e.g., “medical bills,” “economic losses”) and make findings tying specific amounts to evidence and causation.
  • Where documentation is unclear, require clarification before entering an award.

Conclusion

State v. Humphrey crystallizes Kansas law in two consequential ways. First, it confirms that K.S.A. 60-404’s contemporaneous-objection rule does not bar appellate review when a defendant claims that properly admitted evidence is insufficient to support a restitution award. Second, it holds that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the State’s restitution proof on appeal without objecting at sentencing because the State bears the burden. On the merits, the Court enforced the evidentiary requirement that the amount awarded be supported by substantial competent evidence. Because the State’s proof identified only a portion of the award as “MEDICAL” and left the rest in unexplained categories while the district court expressly awarded “medical bills,” the evidence did not suffice.

The decision will prompt more careful proof of restitution and more precise judicial findings. It also preserves a fair remedial balance: while the State gets only one meaningful opportunity to prove restitution, a remand is appropriate where the original proceeding never afforded that opportunity. In the broader legal context, Humphrey aligns restitution practice with established sufficiency-of-the-evidence principles, respects burdens of proof, and reinforces that restitution—like any other component of a criminal judgment—must rest on demonstrable, reliable evidence.