State v. Haynes: A Defendant’s Direct-Motion Right to Obtain Warrant Affidavits—But Not Warrants—Under K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and 22-2502(d)

Introduction

In State v. Haynes (Kan. July 3, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court clarified the contours of a defendant’s statutory access to materials underlying criminal warrants. Dennis O. Haynes III, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder, filed a postconviction request seeking his arrest warrant, the supporting affidavit, any search warrants, and the supporting materials for those warrants. The Sedgwick County District Court granted partial relief (for the arrest warrant and affidavit) and denied access to any search-warrant materials. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that Kansas statutes grant defendants a personal right to access affidavits or sworn testimony supporting both arrest and search warrants—but not to the warrants themselves—and that a defendant may properly initiate the request by filing a motion directly with the district court.

This opinion is significant for two reasons: it sharpens the distinction between the warrant instrument and its probable-cause support, and it confirms a streamlined procedure for defendants—including those postconviction—to invoke the statutory right by direct motion, without first routing the request through the clerk’s office. The case was submitted without oral argument on April 2, 2025, and decided on July 3, 2025. The opinion was authored by Justice Wall; Justice Wilson did not participate.

Summary of the Opinion

Statutory right defined: K.S.A. 22-2302(b) (arrest warrants) and K.S.A. 22-2502(d) (search warrants) confer on a defendant a personal right of access to “affidavits or sworn testimony in support of the probable cause requirement.” These provisions do not govern access to the warrant documents themselves.
Procedure to invoke right: A defendant may initiate the request by filing a motion directly with the district court. The statutory text does not require the defendant to begin with a request to the clerk.
Timing and justification: The right exists both pre- and postconviction and may be invoked “regardless of the reason for the request.” No showing of need is required.
Fees and production: Production may be compelled upon the defendant’s payment of any necessary fee calculated by the clerk. A defendant need not pre-identify the exact materials or compute the cost to successfully invoke the right.
Application to Haynes: The district court correctly ordered access to the arrest-warrant affidavit; it erred by denying access to search-warrant affidavits. On remand, the district court must ensure production of any search-warrant affidavits upon Haynes’ payment of the applicable fee.
Warrants themselves: The statutes at issue do not extend to the warrant instruments. As a matter of court records, executed warrants are generally public unless sealed by court order (Supreme Court Rule 22(d)(10), comments 1 and 2).
Appellate posture and jurisdiction: This postconviction request is a cognizable “new matter” filed within the criminal case, and the Kansas Supreme Court had jurisdiction because Haynes received a life sentence for an off-grid crime (K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4)).
Harmless error rejected: Denial of the statutory access right is itself prejudicial; the State’s assertions about plea waivers or anticipated hurdles to K.S.A. 60-1507 relief do not render the error harmless.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Thomas, 273 Kan. 750, 46 P.3d 543 (2002), is the foundational case. Thomas interpreted K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and K.S.A. 22-2502(d) to create a personal right for defendants to obtain probable-cause affidavits or sworn testimony in support of warrants, both before and after conviction, and “regardless of the reason for the request.” Thomas also held that production may be compelled upon payment of the necessary fee to the clerk. Haynes builds on Thomas in two ways: it reaffirms the scope of the statutory right and clarifies procedure by holding that defendants may initiate the request through a direct motion to the district court (Thomas involved an initial request to the clerk, but Haynes holds that is not mandatory).

State v. Redding, 310 Kan. 15, 444 P.3d 989 (2019), guides the court’s liberal reading of pro se motions. Using Redding, the Supreme Court construed Haynes’ filings broadly to encompass requests for (1) the arrest warrant; (2) the arrest-warrant affidavit(s); (3) any search warrants; and (4) any search-warrant affidavit(s)—ensuring the pro se litigant’s intent was not lost in technicalities.

On appellate jurisdiction, the court drew from State v. Tafoya, 304 Kan. 663, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) (final judgment is typically the sentence), and State v. LaPointe, 305 Kan. 938, 390 P.3d 7 (2017) (a statute may grant postconviction rights that create a “new matter” within the criminal case), along with State v. Richardson, 316 Kan. 752, 521 P.3d 1111 (2022), State v. Butler, 315 Kan. 18, 503 P.3d 239 (2022), and State v. Angelo, 316 Kan. 438, 518 P.3d 27 (2022), each recognizing appellate review of postconviction discovery or DNA-testing orders. Collectively, these authorities support jurisdiction over orders deciding statutory postconviction access.

State v. Liles, 313 Kan. 772, 490 P.3d 1206 (2021), supplied the burden-of-record principle: an appellant must designate a record showing error. Applying Liles, the court rejected Haynes’ claim that he did not receive the arrest-warrant affidavit where the record indicated otherwise.

Supreme Court Rule 22(d)(10), comments 1 and 2 (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 78), informs the separate, general-access rule for warrant instruments themselves: executed warrants are usually publicly available unless sealed. The court invoked this rule to explain why the statutes at issue, which address affidavits or sworn testimony, do not need to—and do not—speak to access to the warrant documents.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis rests on a straightforward textual reading of the statutes and a clean separation of two ideas: (1) the right to invoke access to probable-cause materials and (2) the mechanics of fulfilling that right through production upon payment.

Statutory text controls scope: K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and 22-2502(d) expressly address “affidavits or sworn testimony in support of the probable cause requirement.” They do not mention the warrant instrument. Therefore, the right is to the probable-cause support materials, not to the warrant itself.
Public access to warrants is governed elsewhere: Because executed warrants are generally public unless sealed (Rule 22), the legislature did not need to confer a special defendant-only right to the warrant document in these provisions. Hence, the statutes’ silence on warrants is deliberate and meaningful.
When and why the right may be invoked: Relying on Thomas, the court reaffirmed that defendants may request the materials before or after conviction and “regardless of the reason.” The right is personal and unconditional as to purpose.
How the right is invoked: The court rejected the State’s argument that a defendant must first ask the clerk. The statutory phrase “shall be made available … when requested” does not specify the recipient of the request. A motion filed directly with the district court is a proper way to initiate the request. This clarification is especially pragmatic for incarcerated or pro se defendants.
Payment and production: Thomas draws a bright line—defendants may compel production, but only after paying any necessary fees. In Haynes, the district court erred by denying access to search-warrant affidavits outright; the proper sequence is to recognize the right, have the clerk calculate costs, and produce upon payment.
No harmless-error “backdoor”: The State’s reliance on plea waivers or potential 60-1507 barriers misunderstood the nature of the statutory right. Denying access itself prejudices the defendant’s statutory entitlement; the court declined to treat such error as harmless on predictions about the success of future litigation.
Record sufficiency for arrest-affidavit issue: Because the record contained the arrest-warrant affidavit, and the district court had ruled in Haynes’ favor on that item, Haynes could not show error under Liles.

The opinion also notes that the disclosure framework varies depending on whether a warrant issued before or after July 1, 2014 (the arrest warrant here was pre-2014). That historical point reinforces that the legislature has repeatedly tailored access rules over time. Yet the core feature the court underscores—defendant access to probable-cause affidavits or sworn testimony—remains the lodestar in both warrant contexts (arrest and search).

Impact and Practical Consequences

Haynes meaningfully refines practice in Kansas by confirming both the scope and the procedure for obtaining warrant-support materials.

Symmetry for arrest and search warrants: Practitioners should treat K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and 22-2502(d) as parallel grants of a defendant’s personal right to the probable-cause affidavits or sworn testimony for both arrest and search warrants. District courts may not deny search-warrant affidavits while granting arrest-warrant affidavits; both are covered.
Procedural gateway clarified: Defendants, including those postconviction, may initiate requests by direct motion to the district court. Courts should not require a preliminary clerk-only request as a condition of adjudicating entitlement.
Fees are part of production, not entitlement: Courts should recognize the right first, then route the matter to the clerk to calculate costs. Defendants do not bear the initial burden to identify all existing affidavits or compute fees; the clerk is “best positioned” to do so. Production follows payment.
Limits of the statutory right: The statutes do not address access to the warrant instruments. If a litigant seeks the warrant itself, access will be governed by general court-records principles (executed warrants are generally public unless sealed). Practitioners should be prepared to proceed on parallel tracks: statutory access for affidavits, court-records access for warrants.
Postconviction litigation strategy: Because requests may be made “regardless of the reason,” postconviction counsel can obtain affidavits without first demonstrating good cause or tethering the request to an active 60-1507 claim. This may aid in investigating potential claims, negotiating with the State, or evaluating collateral remedies.
Reduced procedural friction for pro se litigants: The direct-motion mechanism can simplify access for incarcerated, self-represented defendants who may lack clarity on clerk procedures.
Court administration: Clerks should anticipate more requests to calculate fees and to locate any affidavits or sworn testimony filed in connection with warrants. Courts may wish to establish a standardized workflow to promptly notify requesting defendants of costs and timelines.
Sealing orders and redactions: Although not directly at issue, the opinion signals a continued role for sealing under Rule 22 with respect to the warrant instrument. The statutes govern affidavits and sworn testimony; whether and how sealing plays into defendant access to affidavits was not litigated here, leaving room for future case-specific questions (e.g., redactions to protect confidential informants or ongoing investigations).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person or place to be searched is connected to the crime. Warrants require probable cause.
Affidavit: A written, sworn statement of facts made under oath to support the probable-cause showing for a warrant.
Sworn testimony: Oral statements made under oath to a magistrate or judge to support probable cause, sometimes recorded or transcribed in lieu of a written affidavit.
Warrant vs. affidavit: The warrant authorizes police action (arrest or search). The affidavit or sworn testimony is the evidentiary foundation showing probable cause. In Haynes, the statutory right covers the latter, not the former.
Postconviction: Legal proceedings that occur after a conviction and sentence, often including collateral attacks such as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions challenging the legality of the detention or the effectiveness of counsel.
“Regardless of the reason”: Defendants do not need to justify why they want the affidavits or tie the request to a specific pending motion. The statutory right is not conditioned on a showing of good cause.
Fee requirement: The right of access is distinct from the logistics of producing copies. The clerk calculates a reasonable fee for production and transmission; the defendant must pay it before documents are provided.
Off-grid crime/life sentence: In Kansas, some offenses (e.g., first-degree murder) are “off-grid” and carry life sentences outside the standard sentencing grid. Appeals involving off-grid crimes or life sentences go directly to the Kansas Supreme Court (K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4)).
Harmless error: A legal error that does not affect the outcome or substantial rights may be deemed “harmless.” Here, denying a statutory access right is inherently prejudicial; it cannot be declared harmless because downstream litigation might fail for other reasons.
Executed vs. sealed warrants: After execution, warrants are generally available as public records unless a court issues a sealing order (Supreme Court Rule 22(d)(10), comments). This general rule is distinct from the defendant-focused statutory access to affidavits.

What This Decision Does Not Do

It does not require free production. Defendants must pay the clerk’s calculated fee before obtaining copies.
It does not create a statutory right to the warrant document. Access to warrants (as distinct from affidavits) is governed by court-records rules and any sealing orders.
It does not adjudicate or forecast the merits of any 60-1507 motion or collateral attack; it solely enforces the access right.
It does not mandate a particular handling of sealed affidavits; that issue was not presented.

Practice Notes for Litigants and Courts

How to request: File a simple motion in the criminal case asking for “affidavits or sworn testimony in support of the probable-cause requirement” for specified arrest and/or search warrants (cite K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and/or 22-2502(d)). A pro se filing is acceptable; no reason need be given.
Clerk’s role: Upon recognition of the right, the court should direct the clerk to identify responsive materials, calculate copying/transmission fees, and notify the defendant of the amount due.
Parallel requests for warrants: If the defendant also wants the warrant instrument, make a separate records request under court rules (executed warrants are generally public unless sealed). Do not rely on the statutes in Haynes for the warrant itself.
Handling uncertainty about existence: Defendants need not prove that affidavits exist. The clerk should determine whether they exist; if none exist, the clerk or the court should so indicate on the record.
Appellate preservation: If access is denied, ensure the order, briefing, and any attachments are included in the record on appeal. The appellant bears the burden to provide a record showing error (Liles).

Conclusion

State v. Haynes crystallizes two important principles of Kansas criminal procedure. First, K.S.A. 22-2302(b) and 22-2502(d) grant defendants a personal right to obtain the affidavits or sworn testimony establishing probable cause for arrest and search warrants. That right exists before and after conviction, and it does not depend on a defendant’s justification for wanting the materials. Second, a defendant may initiate the request by filing a motion directly with the district court; there is no statutory requirement to start with the clerk. While the right does not extend to the warrant documents themselves, those instruments are generally accessible under court-record rules unless sealed.

By affirming the right to arrest-warrant affidavits, reversing the denial of search-warrant affidavits, and remanding for production upon payment of fees, the court provides a clear, workable roadmap for defendants, courts, and clerks. The decision will likely reduce procedural friction in postconviction practice, standardize judicial responses to these recurring requests, and ensure that statutory access rights are honored on their own terms, independent of the perceived merits of any future collateral proceedings.