State v. Gores (2025 ND 194): Forcible Resistance, the Duty to Inform, and “Willful” Domestic Violence in North Dakota Law

I. Introduction

In State v. Gores, 2025 ND 194, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed two closely watched issues in criminal practice:

1. When an officer making a warrantless arrest must inform a suspect of the cause of the arrest, and how that requirement interacts with the offense of preventing arrest; and
2. What it means to “willfully” cause bodily injury in the context of a domestic violence prosecution, particularly where the defendant claims self-defense and asserts a benign purpose for his conduct.

The defendant, Patrick Brian Gores, was convicted in a bench trial of:

• Preventing arrest, a class A misdemeanor, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑08‑02(1); and
• Domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑17‑01.2(2)(a).

On appeal, Gores argued his convictions were unsupported by sufficient evidence. As to preventing arrest, he contended the officers were not acting lawfully because they never told him he was under arrest or why, as required by N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑17. As to domestic violence, he argued he did not willfully cause injury to his sister and was acting in self-defense.

The majority, in an opinion by Justice Crothers joined by Chief Justice Jensen and Justices McEvers and Tufte, affirmed both convictions. Justice Bahr dissented in part, concluding the evidence was insufficient to support the preventing-arrest conviction because the officers failed to comply with § 29‑06‑17 and had ample opportunity to do so.

This decision refines several important points of North Dakota criminal law:

• It underscores that “effecting an arrest” is a process, and that resistance early in that process can trigger criminal liability for preventing arrest and the statutory exception excusing an officer’s duty to inform.
• It confirms that “willfully” in the domestic violence statute includes reckless conduct, making the defendant’s claimed non-injurious motive largely irrelevant to sufficiency analysis.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding

The Supreme Court of North Dakota held:

1. Preventing arrest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence that:
   • The officers were lawfully “effecting an arrest” of Gores;
   • Gores, intending to prevent that arrest, forcibly resisted; and
   • The officers were excused from the statutory duty to inform him of the cause of the arrest under N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑17(3) because he resisted before they had an “opportunity” to do so.
2. Domestic violence. There was sufficient evidence that:
   • Gores willfully caused bodily injury to his sister, a “family or household member”; and
   • He was not acting in lawful self-defense.

B. Dissent

Justice Bahr dissented as to the preventing-arrest conviction. Relying heavily on the officers’ body camera footage and their testimony, he concluded:

• The officers had reasonable opportunities to inform Gores of the cause of his arrest before initiating physical restraint;
• They never did so, even after he was handcuffed; and
• Because the officers failed to comply with N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑17, they were not “acting lawfully,” giving Gores a statutory defense to the preventing-arrest charge under N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑08‑02(2).

Justice Bahr would have reversed the preventing-arrest conviction but joined the majority in affirming the domestic-violence conviction.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Domestic Violence Incident

Gores’s sister (“Jane Doe”) was visiting their mother at a residence in Minot where Gores also lived. On June 7, 2024, she heard an argument between Gores and their mother. She went downstairs “to try to stop it.”

According to Jane Doe:

• As she came down, Gores “put his hand up and his fingers on [her] face,” and “pushed [her] backwards.”
• She fell against the stairs; her shoulder hit the railing, causing “a big bruise,” and she also scraped her arm.
• On cross-examination she testified:
  • She did not touch, push, or slap Gores before he pushed her;
  • The hallway was “very tight,” and she was at the edge of the stairs; and
  • She was effectively blocking his path, though he could have exited through the garage.

On redirect, she testified she was “pushed immediately” after descending the stairs.

Gores testified differently:

• He claimed his sister “full on body checked” him, forcing him back three feet into the laundry room.
• He stated he then “pushed her with three fingers and a thumb” merely to “prevent this from happening again,” characterizing it as minimal contact to create space to exit because she was blocking his only way out.

B. Police Response and Arrest

Officers Shaide and Sullivan responded. The interaction was recorded on both officers’ body cameras, and those videos were admitted at trial.

Key points, particularly from Officer Shaide’s camera (Exhibit 7):

• Upon entering the home, Shaide announced “Police department.”
• He had a several-minute noncustodial conversation with Gores, who was seated in a chair, about what had happened.
• While Sullivan spoke with the sister and took photos, the officers conferred and decided they had probable cause to arrest Gores for domestic violence.

The critical sequence occurs when the officers return to Gores after deciding to arrest him for domestic violence:

• Gores is seated, with hands on the armrests and a remote in his left hand.
• Officer Shaide says, “Hey, Patrick, do you want to hop up for me real quick?” Gores stands, says something like “Oh, jeez,” and puts his hands in his pockets.
• Shaide asks, “Can you just come over here for me?” Gores responds, “Nope. Nope. I’m not going to jail.”
• Shaide warns, “Don’t reach into your pockets.” Gores pulls his hands out and starts to sit back down, repeating “not going to jail.”
• The officers then grab his arms. According to Sullivan, Gores:
  • “Forcefully” sat down when told to stand;
  • Would not put his hands behind his back;
  • Kept trying to pull away; and
  • Trapped his arms under his chest on the floor, requiring the officers to use force to pull his arms out and handcuff him.
• As they are handcuffing him, one officer states (to dispatch), “Now you’re under arrest for preventing as well,” and later radios that Gores is under arrest for “domestic violence bodily injury and preventing arrest.”

Crucially, both officers testified they did not tell Gores he was under arrest, nor did they state to him the cause of the arrest. Gores also testified he was never told he was under arrest or detained. The dissent emphasizes that point.

C. Trial, Conviction, and Appeal

After a one-day bench trial, at which the State presented the victim and both officers and the defense presented Gores, the court denied Gores’s Rule 29 motions for acquittal and found him guilty on both counts.

He was sentenced to:

• 360 days’ imprisonment for preventing arrest, with all but 125 days suspended and 18 months of supervised probation; and
• A concurrent 30-day term for domestic violence.

Gores appealed, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Preventing Arrest – N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑08‑02

Gores was convicted under § 12.1‑08‑02(1), which provides that a person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if:

• With intent to prevent a public servant from:
  • Effecting an arrest of himself or another for a misdemeanor or infraction, or
  • Discharging any other official duty;
• He either:
  • Creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or others (excluding himself), or
  • Employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome his resistance.

Subsection (2) adds an important defense:

“It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the public servant was not acting lawfully, but it is no defense that the defendant mistakenly believed that the public servant was not acting lawfully.”

Thus, the lawfulness of the officer’s actions—including compliance with statutory arrest procedures—is potentially dispositive in a preventing-arrest prosecution.

B. Duty to Inform – N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑17

Section 29‑06‑17 governs the content of an officer’s announcement when making a warrantless arrest:

“When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the officer’s authority and the cause of the arrest, unless:

1. The person to be arrested then is engaged in the commission of an offense;
2. Such person is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or after an escape;
3. Such person flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform the person; or
4. The giving of such information will imperil the arrest.” (Emphasis added.)

The third exception—where the person “flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity”—is the linchpin of the majority’s conclusion that the officers were acting lawfully despite not informing Gores he was under arrest for domestic violence.

C. Definition of Arrest – N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑09 and State v. Linghor

Under N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑09:

“An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant or by the defendant’s submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.”

In State v. Linghor, 2004 ND 224, ¶ 14, 690 N.W.2d 201, the Court held:

• An arrest can occur before an officer formally says “you’re under arrest.”
• The proper test is objective: whether a reasonable person would conclude he was under arrest and not free to leave.

The majority in Gores builds on this by emphasizing that “making” or “effecting” an arrest is a process composed of multiple steps—steps that can be interrupted by resistance, potentially giving rise to a preventing-arrest charge before the moment of full restraint.

D. Domestic Violence – N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑17‑01.2(2)(a)

Section 12.1‑17‑01.2(2)(a) creates a B-misdemeanor offense of domestic violence when a person “willfully causes bodily injury to the actor’s family or household member.”

Key statutory definitions:

• “Family or household member” (N.D.C.C. § 14‑07.1‑01(4)) includes:
  • Spouses, former spouses, parents, children, persons related by blood or marriage, and persons who reside or resided together in the past.
• “Willfully” (N.D.C.C. § 12.1‑02‑02(1)(e) and § 14‑07.1‑01(7)) includes conduct done:
  • Intentionally,
  • Knowingly, or
  • Recklessly.

Thus, the State does not need to prove an intent to injure; proof that the defendant acted recklessly, in a way that disregards a substantial risk of injury, is sufficient.

E. Justification – Self-Defense and Proportionality

Self-defense is governed by N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1‑05‑03 and 12.1‑05‑07:

• Under § 12.1‑05‑03, a person is justified in using force to defend himself against imminent unlawful bodily injury.
• Under § 12.1‑05‑07(1), a person is not justified in using more force than is “necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.”

If the trier of fact rejects the claim of self-defense—because the complainant’s account is credited or the defendant’s force is deemed excessive—the justification fails, and the underlying assaultive conduct can support a domestic-violence conviction.

F. Appellate Standard – Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Court recites and applies its familiar sufficiency standard, citing State v. Nelson, 2023 ND 217, and State v. Grensteiner, 2024 ND 218:

When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the Court:

• Reviews the record for competent evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, permits a reasonable inference of guilt and fairly warrants a conviction;
• Places the burden on the defendant to show the evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt;
• Does not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses; and
• Recognizes that a fact finder may convict despite evidence which, if believed, could support acquittal.

The Court notes, citing State v. Smith, 2024 ND 127, ¶ 4, that in a bench trial a defendant need not move for judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 to preserve a sufficiency challenge. Here, as in Smith, the Court again declines to decide whether a Rule 29 motion in a bench trial might narrow the scope of appellate review.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Sufficiency-of-Evidence Cases

• State v. Nelson, 2023 ND 217. Cited to emphasize that the sufficiency standard is the same in bench and jury trials.
• State v. Grensteiner, 2024 ND 218. Quoted for the core sufficiency rule: review in the light most favorable to the verdict; no reweighing of evidence or credibility assessments on appeal.
• State v. Smith, 2024 ND 127. Cited for two related points:
  • A Rule 29 motion is unnecessary in bench trials to preserve sufficiency arguments; and
  • The Court again avoids deciding whether the filing of such a motion in a bench trial narrows the issues reviewable on appeal.

These authorities reinforce that the appellate court’s role is limited and highly deferential, especially regarding factual disputes and credibility.

B. Arrest and Custody Cases

• State v. Linghor, 2004 ND 224.
  • Establishes that an arrest can occur before formal words of arrest are spoken.
  • Provides the objective test: whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would believe he was under arrest and not free to leave.
  • The Gores majority uses this to support viewing “effecting an arrest” as a process that can begin before actual restraint.
• State v. Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179.
  • Cited in the dissent for the proposition that placing a person in handcuffs can conclusively indicate that an arrest has occurred.

C. Duty to Inform – Older North Dakota Cases

• State v. Gagnon, 207 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1973).
  • Held an arrest was unlawful where the officer, arresting without a warrant, did not inform the defendant of the cause of arrest as required by § 29‑06‑17, merely stating they were “investigating his activities.”
  • Justice Bahr uses Gagnon to argue that failure to inform of the cause, when no exception applies, renders an arrest unlawful under the same statute at issue in Gores.
• State v. Arntz, 286 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1979).
  • Held that an officer’s being in uniform satisfies the requirement of stating his authority under § 29‑06‑17.
  • In Gores, all agree Gores knew the officers’ authority; the dispute centers only on the second requirement—stating the cause of arrest.

D. Video Evidence and Appellate Review

• State v. Boger, 2021 ND 152.
  • Cited in the dissent to support the proposition that when video evidence indisputably contradicts a trial court’s findings, an appellate court may rely on the video and reverse without it being considered impermissible “reweighing” of the evidence.
• Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693 (Ind. 2017).
  • Cited in Boger and by the dissent for the same principle regarding video evidence.

E. Statutory Interpretation – Recent North Dakota Case

• State v. Lee, 2025 ND 148.
  • Cited by the dissent to reinforce the interpretive rule that statutory words are given their ordinary meaning (N.D.C.C. § 1‑02‑02).
  • Justice Bahr uses this to define “opportunity” in § 29‑06‑17(3) according to its common dictionary meaning: “a set of circumstances that makes it possible to do something.”

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Preventing Arrest and the Lawfulness of the Arrest

1. Framing the Issue

Gores’s central argument on this count was that the officers acted unlawfully because they:

• Failed to inform him that he was under arrest; and
• Failed to inform him of the cause of the arrest (domestic violence), as required by N.D.C.C. § 29‑06‑17.

If the arrest was unlawful, he argued, he could not be guilty of preventing arrest because § 12.1‑08‑02(2) makes the lawfulness of the officer’s actions a defense.

2. When Were the Officers “Effecting an Arrest”?

The majority emphasizes the textual link between:

• The preventing-arrest statute, which prohibits interference with an officer “effecting an arrest”; and
• The arrest-procedure statute, which speaks to what an officer must do “when making an arrest without a warrant.”

Justice Crothers writes:

“The process of ‘making an arrest’ or ‘effecting an arrest’ contains many steps, which, if uninterrupted, result in an arrest or ‘the actual restraint of the person.’ … ‘Preventing arrest’ is the charged crime for preventing an officer from ‘effecting an arrest’ at any point during the arrest process.” (¶ 16)

By conceptualizing arrest as a process with multiple steps, the majority justifies applying the preventing-arrest statute at an early stage—when officers begin to move from investigation to custodial control, even before actual restraint.

3. Application of the § 29‑06‑17(3) Exception

The critical statutory provision is § 29‑06‑17(3), which excuses the officer’s duty to inform where the person “flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform the person.”

The majority’s key findings, relying on the testimony and bodycam footage, are:

• The officers had decided to arrest Gores and began “effecting” that arrest by:
  • Telling him to stand up; and
  • Asking him to move toward them.
• Gores:
  • Stood, then immediately placed his hands in his pockets while “digging around”;
  • Refused to come forward, saying “nope” and “not going to jail” multiple times; and
  • Sat back down even as the officers tried to gain control of his arms.
• He then physically resisted the officers’ efforts to handcuff him by pulling away, refusing to place his hands behind his back, and pinning his arms beneath him on the floor.

On that basis, the majority concludes:

“Here, Gores began preventing the process of the arrest before the officer had the opportunity to inform Gores of the cause of his arrest.” (¶ 16)

And more specifically:

“Gores ‘forcibly resist[ed] before the officer ha[d] opportunity’ to inform Gores of ‘the cause of the arrest.’ This evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient evidence to convict Gores of preventing arrest.” (¶ 17)

The majority treats Gores’s combination of verbal refusal (“not going to jail”), noncompliance (refusing to approach), and physical conduct (sitting back, pulling away, hiding arms) as “forcible resistance” that cuts off the officers’ opportunity to comply with § 29‑06‑17’s notice requirement.

4. Lawfulness of the Officers’ Conduct

Because the majority finds that § 29‑06‑17(3) applies, it holds the officers were not required to inform Gores of the cause of the arrest. Therefore, their failure to do so did not render the arrest unlawful. As a result:

• The defense under § 12.1‑08‑02(2) (officer not acting lawfully) does not apply; and
• The remaining elements of preventing arrest—intent to prevent arrest and use of means requiring substantial force—were sufficiently supported by the evidence.

In short, the majority reads the exception broadly enough to cover the entire escalation sequence from the moment officers began to implement the arrest, effectively eliminating the requirement to give notice once resistance starts at that early stage.

B. Domestic Violence: Willfulness, Recklessness, and Self-Defense

1. Elements and Disputed Issues

To convict Gores of domestic violence under § 12.1‑17‑01.2(2)(a), the State had to prove:

• He “willfully” caused bodily injury;
• To a “family or household member” (his sister plainly qualifies); and
• He was not justified in using the force (i.e., no valid self-defense claim).

Gores conceded contact but claimed:

• His sister first “body checked” him; he merely responded with minimal force to protect himself and exit the confined area; and
• He did not intend to cause injury; his only purpose was to get past her.

2. The Meaning of “Willfully” and the Irrelevance of Benign Motive

The Court’s most analytically significant statement on this count is:

“Gores’s intent to exit the situation is irrelevant. ‘Willful’ conduct includes reckless conduct. … In the least, Gores engaged in reckless conduct that resulted in bodily injury to his sister.” (¶ 24)

This reinforces an important doctrinal point:

• “Willfully” does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended the injury or harbored animosity; it is satisfied if he:
  • Intentionally applied force in a way that created an obvious risk of bodily injury; and
  • Did so in conscious, unjustifiable disregard of that risk (recklessness).
• Therefore, even if Gores’s subjective goal was simply to leave, the fact that he knowingly pushed her in a tight stairway area, causing bruising and abrasions, suffices to prove willful causation of bodily injury.

This approach significantly narrows the space for defendants to rely on benign motives as a shield where their chosen means of accomplishing that motive are physically risky.

3. Self-Defense and Factual Deference

The Court’s resolution of the self-defense claim is grounded in the sufficiency standard and deference to the trial court’s credibility findings:

• Jane Doe testified she did not push or assault Gores before he pushed her; she simply came down the stairs and was almost immediately pushed.
• Gores claimed she first “body checked” him.

The district court credited Jane Doe’s account and implicitly rejected Gores’s version and his self-defense narrative. On appeal, the Court notes:

“Gores asks us to reweigh the evidence. ‘When considering insufficiency of the evidence, we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.’ … Sufficient evidence supports the finding Gores willfully caused bodily injury, and he was not acting in self-defense.” (¶ 25)

Given:

• Evidence of actual injury (bruises, scraped arm);
• Jane Doe’s testimony about being pushed without provocation; and
• The statutory inclusion of “recklessness” within “willfully,”

the Court holds that a reasonable fact finder could find the elements of domestic violence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

VII. The Dissent: A Stricter View of the Duty to Inform

A. The Statutory Requirement and Its Narrow Exception

Justice Bahr’s dissent pivots on a fundamentally different reading of § 29‑06‑17 and the body-camera evidence.

He emphasizes:

• The statute’s plain mandate that an officer making a warrantless arrest “shall inform the person to be arrested of the officer’s authority and the cause of the arrest,” subject to limited exceptions.
• Among those exceptions, the only one plausibly applicable here is subsection (3): where the person “flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity” to inform him.

He then defines “opportunity” by its ordinary meaning, citing both § 1‑02‑02 and State v. Lee:

“The word ‘opportunity’ is generally understood to mean ‘a set of circumstances that makes it possible to do something.’ … Thus, the issue is whether the officers had a reasonable opportunity to inform Gores of the cause of his arrest before he resisted.” (¶ 41)

B. The Role of Bodycam Evidence

The dissent carefully describes the video timeline, stressing:

• The officers’ detailed and unhurried conversation with Gores before deciding to arrest him;
• Their subsequent decision, during a gap in the recording, that they had probable cause for domestic-violence arrest;
• That they approached Gores, who was seated calmly, and:
  • Asked him to stand, which he did;
  • Asked him to move toward them, which he refused, saying he would not go to jail; and
  • Watched him attempt to sit back down.
• At no point did they inform him he was under arrest or state the cause; even after handcuffing him, references to domestic violence were spoken into the radio, not to Gores.

Relying on Boger and Love, Justice Bahr asserts that where the video evidence and testimony are undisputed, the appellate court may reject the trial court’s application of the statute without “reweighing” evidence.

C. Why the Exception Does Not Apply

For Justice Bahr, the undisputed facts show that:

• The officers had multiple “sets of circumstances that made it possible” to inform Gores of his arrest and its cause:
  • As they approached him in the chair after deciding to arrest him;
  • After he stood up in response to their request; and
  • Even as he was about to sit back down.
• Gores did not flee, and his initial conduct did not amount to “forcible resistance” before the officers had those opportunities:
  • He did not attempt to strike, push, or flee from the officers;
  • He simply refused to move closer and tried to remain seated;
  • His stronger physical resistance began only once the officers grabbed him.

Thus, he concludes the § 29‑06‑17(3) exception cannot excuse the officers’ failure to inform Gores of the cause of his arrest:

“The undisputed evidence shows it was reasonably possible under the circumstances for the officers to inform Gores he was under arrest for domestic violence. Troubling, even after they took Gores down and handcuffed him, the officers still did not tell Gores he was under arrest for domestic violence.” (¶ 42)

D. Unlawfulness of the Arrest and the Statutory Defense

Building on Gagnon, Justice Bahr reasons:

• An arrest without a warrant is unlawful where § 29‑06‑17 requires an announcement of cause and the officer fails to give it.
• Here, because the officers never told Gores the cause of his arrest (domestic violence), and no exception applies, the arrest was unlawful.
• Under § 12.1‑08‑02(2), “It is a defense … that the public servant was not acting lawfully.”

Therefore:

“The officers were not acting lawfully when they grabbed Gores, took him to the ground, and handcuffed him without telling him the cause of the arrest. … The undisputed evidence does not allow a fact finder to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove Gores’ guilt of preventing arrest and fairly warranting a conviction.” (¶¶ 47–48)

He would reverse the preventing-arrest conviction on this basis.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Sufficiency of the Evidence” on Appeal

When a defendant claims “insufficient evidence” on appeal, the appellate court does not ask whether it would have reached the same verdict. Instead, it asks:

1. Is there some competent evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
2. When that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict?

The court does not:

• Reweigh conflicting testimony; or
• Second-guess the trial judge’s or jury’s decisions about who was more believable.

This is crucial in Gores, especially on the domestic-violence count, where the Court defers to the trial judge’s decision to believe the sister rather than Gores.

B. “Willfully” and “Recklessly”

In everyday language, “willful” often suggests “on purpose” or “deliberate,” but North Dakota’s criminal code defines it more broadly. “Willfully” includes:

• Intentionally – The person’s conscious objective is to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
• Knowingly – The person is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that certain circumstances exist.
• Recklessly – The person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause the relevant harm, and that disregard is a gross deviation from acceptable standards.

In Gores, this matters because:

• Gores argued he only intended to exit a situation, not to harm his sister.
• The Court responds that even if his goal was escape, he still acted at least recklessly by pushing her in a confined stairway, thereby “willfully” causing her injury under the statute.

C. Self-Defense and Proportionality

Self-defense justifies the use of force only when certain conditions are met:

• There must be a danger of imminent unlawful bodily injury.
• The force used must be “necessary and appropriate” – no more than reasonably needed under the circumstances.

If a person uses force preemptively (without real imminent danger) or uses significantly more force than necessary, self-defense fails. In Gores, once the trial court credited the sister’s testimony that she did not attack him first, there was no factual basis for self-defense.

D. Lawfulness of Officer Conduct in Preventing-Arrest Cases

Section 12.1‑08‑02(2) creates an unusual and important defense: the defendant can be acquitted if the officer was not “acting lawfully.”

“Acting lawfully” here includes complying with:

• The constitution; and
• Relevant statutory procedures governing arrests, including § 29‑06‑17’s duty to inform.

Thus, in a preventing-arrest case, the defense can argue:

• The officer lacked legal authority (no probable cause or no jurisdiction); or
• The officer failed to comply with mandatory procedures (such as informing the suspect of the cause of arrest when required).

The majority in Gores finds the officers “acting lawfully” because a statutory exception to the duty to inform applied; the dissent concludes the opposite.

E. Effecting an Arrest vs. Being Under Arrest

Two slightly different ideas appear in the opinion:

• “Effecting” or “making” an arrest – The entire process by which officers move from investigation to custodial control, including:
  • Deciding they have probable cause;
  • Approaching the suspect;
  • Issuing commands like “stand up” or “turn around”; and
  • Physically restraining and handcuffing.
• “Being under arrest” – The moment when:
  • The suspect is actually restrained or submits to custody; or
  • A reasonable person in that situation would believe he is not free to leave.

The preventing-arrest statute applies when a person interferes with the process of effecting an arrest, even before the arrest is completed. That is why Gores’s refusal to comply with initial commands and ensuing physical resistance could constitute preventing arrest even before he was fully handcuffed.

IX. Impact and Implications

A. For Law Enforcement

State v. Gores has mixed lessons for officers:

• Expanded practical leeway. The majority’s application of § 29‑06‑17(3) suggests that officers will often be excused from stating the cause of arrest once a suspect begins to resist or refuses to comply with basic commands in the arrest process.
• Risk of noncompliance claims. The dissent, however, underscores that failure to announce the cause of arrest can render the arrest “unlawful” for purposes of a preventing-arrest prosecution if no exception truly applies. Officers should:
  • Give clear, audible advisements (“You’re under arrest for [offense]”) whenever practicable;
  • Ensure such advisements are captured on bodycam; and
  • Be prepared to justify why it was not possible under the circumstances if no advisement was given.

In close cases, defense counsel may rely on Justice Bahr’s dissent to argue that opportunities existed and were not used, seeking acquittals on preventing-arrest charges where officers omitted explicit notices.

B. For Defense Counsel

Defense practitioners should note several points:

• Lawfulness defense remains viable. Section 12.1‑08‑02(2) continues to provide a meaningful defense. Gores does not eliminate it but demonstrates that courts may accept evidence of early resistance as satisfying § 29‑06‑17(3).
• Bodycam review is essential. The dissent shows how detailed scrutiny of video can support the argument that officers had “opportunity” to inform but did not. Future litigants can build on this reasoning, particularly in cases with calm initial interactions.
• Domestic violence “willfulness” is broad. Given the Court’s emphasis that “willful” includes reckless conduct, defense arguments focused solely on the defendant’s claimed benign motive (e.g., “I only meant to get away”) will likely fail unless they also show the conduct was not reckless or did not cause injury.

C. For Trial Courts

Trial judges should be prepared to:

• Make explicit findings on whether and when officers communicated their authority and the cause of arrest;
• Assess whether an exception under § 29‑06‑17 applies, especially where bodycam footage allows precise timeline reconstruction; and
• Carefully distinguish between:
  • Mere non-cooperation (e.g., verbal refusal, hesitation); and
  • “Forcible resistance” sufficient to invoke § 29‑06‑17(3) and support a preventing-arrest conviction.

On domestic violence, courts can expect continued appellate deference on credibility and fact-finding where they clearly explain why one witness’s version is accepted over another’s.

D. For Domestic Violence Enforcement

Gores reinforces that:

• Even seemingly “minimal” force (a shove with fingers) can constitute domestic violence if it causes injury, particularly in confined spaces such as stairs or hallways.
• The State need not prove malicious intent; proof of reckless application of force causing bodily injury is enough.
• Self-defense claims will often turn on credibility and proportionality, giving trial courts significant discretion.

This may encourage more robust enforcement in family settings where one party claims to have used only “minor” force for nonviolent reasons.

E. Doctrinal Development and Future Litigation

Doctrinally, Gores advances two important propositions:

1. “Effecting an arrest” is a multi-step process. Interference at any point in that process can qualify as preventing arrest and can also affect whether the § 29‑06‑17 duty to inform is excused.
2. “Willfully” in domestic violence cases explicitly embraces reckless conduct. Defendants cannot negate willfulness merely by positing an alternative, benign reason for their actions if those actions were physically risky and caused injury.

The sharp division between the majority and Justice Bahr on the application of § 29‑06‑17(3) signals that future cases may need to more precisely define:

• What counts as “forcible resistance” for purposes of excusing the duty to inform; and
• How much “opportunity” an officer must have before the exception kicks in.

X. Conclusion

State v. Gores is a significant decision at the intersection of arrest procedure, resistance offenses, and domestic violence law in North Dakota.

On the preventing-arrest count, the majority adopts a process-oriented view of “effecting an arrest” and upholds a conviction where resistance began early in that process, excusing officers from the statutory duty to announce the cause of arrest under § 29‑06‑17(3). The dissent counters with a more stringent reading of the statute, emphasizing bodycam evidence and the statutory defense that applies when officers do not act lawfully.

On the domestic-violence count, the Court solidifies the principle that “willful” conduct encompasses recklessness and that a defendant’s asserted non-injurious motive does not defeat liability when the chosen conduct is reckless and results in bodily injury. The Court also reinforces its longstanding practice of deferring to trial courts on factual disputes and credibility in sufficiency-of-evidence challenges.

For practitioners, Gores is a reminder that:

• Video evidence can be pivotal, but how it is interpreted may split courts;
• Arrest-procedure statutes can play a direct role in resisting-arrest prosecutions; and
• Domestic-violence prosecutions have a relatively low threshold of proof on the “willfulness” element once injury is shown and self-defense is factually rejected.

In the broader doctrinal landscape, Gores underscores the Court’s willingness to view arrest as a dynamic process for both criminal-liability and procedural-compliance purposes, while also revealing a substantial intra-court debate about the scope and rigor of statutory protections afforded to arrest subjects in preventing-arrest prosecutions.