State v. Chavez: Reaffirming that Pre‑arming, a Prolonged Multi‑Stab Attack, and Post‑Crime Evasion Support Deliberate Intent; Self‑Defense Instruction Requires Subjective Fear of Death or Great Bodily Harm

Introduction

In this nonprecedential decision, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed Daniel Robert Chavez’s convictions for first-degree willful and deliberate murder and tampering with evidence. The case arises from a fatal stabbing outside a convenience store in El Prado, New Mexico, captured largely on surveillance video. The opinion addresses four principal issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove deliberate intent for first-degree murder; (2) whether the district court committed fundamental error by failing to instruct on self-defense or defense of another; (3) whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose an officer’s notes; and (4) whether prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error requiring reversal.

Justice Briana H. Zamora authored the decision, with the Court affirming across the board. While unpublished and subject to Rule 12‑405 NMRA’s citation restrictions, the opinion offers practical guidance on: how juries may infer deliberate intent from a defendant’s conduct before, during, and after a killing; the threshold for self-defense/defense-of-another instructions; the defendant’s burden to establish favorability and materiality under Brady; and the high bar for reversing on unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, together with notable ethical admonitions to both defense counsel and the prosecutor.

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency of the evidence (first-degree willful and deliberate murder): The Court held that substantial evidence supported deliberate intent. Chavez armed himself with a knife inside the store, pushed past his girlfriend to get to the victim, pursued the victim, and stabbed him 28 times in a prolonged struggle. Afterward he taunted the victim, disposed of the knife, fled, and attempted to mislead police—conduct from which a jury could infer deliberation.
Self-defense/defense of another instructions: Reviewing for fundamental error (no request was made below), the Court held there was insufficient evidence of the threshold subjective element—fear of immediate death or great bodily harm—to warrant either instruction. Size disparity, taunting, and confrontational looks did not satisfy the subjective fear requirement, particularly where Chavez armed himself and pursued an unarmed victim.
Brady claim (lost officer notes): The State conceded suppression, but the Court held the defendant failed to show the undisclosed notes were favorable or material. The discrepancy about who reported not seeing the victim with a BB gun (Chavez vs. his girlfriend) did not assist a self-defense theory and did not undermine confidence in the verdict.
Prosecutorial misconduct (fundamental error review): The Court found no fundamental error. Leading questions were met with successful objections and curative instructions. Most colorful language in opening statement was tethered to the evidence; two phrases (“macho man” and slaughtering “like a pig”) were unprofessional and admonished but isolated, not prejudicial. The defense stipulated to admission of numerous graphic photos—invited any alleged error—foreclosing relief.

Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Inferring Deliberate Intent from Pre‑arming, Prolonged Attack, and Post‑Crime Conduct

The Court measured sufficiency against the jury instructions (the “law of the case”). See State v. Arrendondo, 2012‑NMSC‑013, ¶ 18. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, resolving conflicts for the State, and indulging reasonable inferences, the Court concluded substantial evidence supported the verdict. See State v. Duran, 2006‑NMSC‑035, ¶ 5; State v. Rojo, 1999‑NMSC‑001, ¶ 19; State v. Sutphin, 1988‑NMSC‑031, ¶ 21.

New Mexico’s uniform instruction defines deliberate intent as a decision “arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against” the killing—recognizing that such a calculated judgment “may be arrived at in a short period of time,” and excluding “a mere unconsidered and rash impulse.” UJI 14‑201.

The Court emphasized three phases:

Before: Chavez brandished a knife with the blade pointed downward, attempted several times to move toward the front of the store, and physically pushed past his girlfriend’s attempts to prevent an encounter. A jury may infer deliberation when a defendant wields an object “for no other discernible purpose than to use it as a weapon.” State v. Flores, 2010‑NMSC‑002, ¶ 22 (overruled on other grounds by State v. Martinez, 2021‑NMSC‑002, ¶ 87). Cf. State v. Largo, 2012‑NMSC‑015, ¶ 33 (deliberation inferred prior to a fatal shooting where the victim resisted).
During: Surveillance and blood spatter evidence established a prolonged physical struggle culminating in 28 stab wounds. Multiple wounds during an extended altercation support an inference of deliberation. See Duran, 2006‑NMSC‑035, ¶ 8.
After: Chavez taunted the victim, disposed of the knife, left the scene, sought treatment, and falsely denied involvement to police—conduct that supports deliberation and consciousness of guilt. See State v. Guerra, 2012‑NMSC‑027, ¶ 29 (lack of remorse); Flores, 2010‑NMSC‑002, ¶ 22 (disposing of evidence, fleeing, and deception); State v. Smith, 2016‑NMSC‑007, ¶ 20 (flight and deception).

Synthesizing this evidence through the UJI’s lens, the Court concluded a rational jury could find deliberate intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. No Fundamental Error in Omitting Self‑Defense or Defense‑of‑Another Instructions

Because the defense did not request either instruction, review proceeded under the exacting fundamental error standard, which applies only in exceptional circumstances where guilt is so doubtful that allowing the conviction to stand would “shock the judicial conscience.” See State v. Silva, 2008‑NMSC‑051, ¶ 11; State v. Cunningham, 2000‑NMSC‑009, ¶ 13.

To warrant a self-defense instruction, there must be evidence sufficient for reasonable minds to differ on each element: (1) the defendant was put in fear by an apparent danger of immediate death or great bodily harm; (2) the killing resulted from that fear; and (3) the defendant acted as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. See State v. Lopez, 2000‑NMSC‑003, ¶ 23; State v. Coffin, 1999‑NMSC‑038, ¶ 15 (elements one and two are subjective; element three is objective). Defense of another is analyzed similarly. See State v. Sandoval, 2011‑NMSC‑022, ¶ 16.

The Court found the first (subjective) element dispositive. The record did not support a subjective belief of immediate death or great bodily harm to Chavez or his girlfriend. The defendant pointed to the victim’s size advantage, taunting, and confrontational looks. But size disparity alone is insufficient. See State v. Duarte, 1996‑NMCA‑038, ¶ 10. Nor did the remaining factors suggest a perceived threat beyond a simple battery, which does not justify deadly force. See State v. Lucero, 2010‑NMSC‑011, ¶ 15 (fear of a punch to the face is not deadly-force-justifying).

The video showed Chavez armed himself while the unarmed victim was at the register, then pursued the victim outside; the victim’s punch came only after Chavez approached with a knife. On this record, the Court held there was insufficient evidence to trigger self-defense or defense-of-another instructions. Consequently, their omission was not error, let alone fundamental error.

C. No Brady Violation: Failure to Show Favorability or Materiality

The Court reviewed the denial of the motion to dismiss for a purported Brady violation for abuse of discretion. See State v. Turrietta, 2013‑NMSC‑036, ¶ 35; Case v. Hatch, 2008‑NMSC‑024, ¶ 47. Under Brady v. Maryland, the defendant must show: (1) suppression; (2) favorability; and (3) materiality. Hatch, 2008‑NMSC‑024, ¶ 44.

The State conceded suppression because the officer’s notes were lost. But Chavez failed to show favorability or materiality. His theory hinged on a discrepancy regarding who told police they did not see the victim with a BB gun (Chavez vs. his girlfriend, Katrina). The Court reasoned that either way, the statement undermined—not aided—self-defense, because it suggested the victim had no weapon, weakening any perceived threat of death or great bodily harm. See State v. Worley, 2020‑NMSC‑021, ¶ 23 (favorability includes any evidence that “may make the difference between conviction and acquittal,” whether impeachment or exculpatory).

On materiality, the Court assessed the suppressed evidence “in relation to the record as a whole,” asking whether it could reasonably “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Worley, 2020‑NMSC‑021, ¶ 28 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999)). Given the strong evidence of deliberation and the mismatch between the notes issue and the defense theory, the Court found no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The Court further rejected speculation about other potential content of the missing notes. See Hatch, 2008‑NMSC‑024, ¶ 55 (“For Brady purposes, exculpatory evidence cannot be purely speculative.”).

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct: No Fundamental Error on This Record

Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for fundamental error, requiring a showing that the conduct was “so egregious and had such a pervasive and prejudicial effect” that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Carrillo, 2017‑NMSC‑023, ¶ 50; State v. Sosa, 2009‑NMSC‑056, ¶ 35. The Court weighs:

whether the conduct invaded a distinct constitutional protection,
whether it was isolated or pervasive, and
whether it was invited by the defense.

The Court contrasted this case with State v. Lensegrav, 2025‑NMSC‑016, where the same prosecutor engaged in severe and pervasive misconduct. Here, the Court addressed the three categories of complaint:

Leading questions with inflammatory phrasing: Each instance drew an immediate defense objection and a curative instruction. Such measures ordinarily cure any prejudice, and the defendant identified no exceptional circumstances overcoming that presumption. See Sosa, 2009‑NMSC‑056, ¶ 25.
Inflammatory language in opening: Most colorful descriptors were supported by the evidence and permissible as framing inferences in an opening “preview” of proof. See State v. Gilbert, 1982‑NMSC‑137, ¶ 14; State v. Graves, 1915‑NMSC‑076, ¶ 29. Two phrases—“macho man” and slaughter “like a pig”—were unprofessional and admonished. See Rule 16‑804(D) NMRA (conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice”). But they were isolated and brief, and given the strength of the evidence, there was no reasonable probability they significantly influenced the jury’s deliberations. See State v. Clark, 1989‑NMSC‑010, ¶ 53; State v. Torres, 2012‑NMSC‑016, ¶ 17 (prosecutors may strike “hard blows,” not “foul ones,” quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
Graphic photographs: The defense stipulated to the admission of the crime-scene and victim blood-spatter photographs, inviting any alleged error. The doctrine of invited error precludes relief on such claims, especially on fundamental error review. See State v. Campos, 1996‑NMSC‑043, ¶ 47 (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Groves, 2021‑NMSC‑003); State v. Ortega, 2014‑NMSC‑017, ¶ 34.

On the whole, the Court concluded the prosecutor’s conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

Precedents and Authorities: How They Shaped the Decision

Arrendondo; Duran; Sutphin; Rojo: Reinforce the sufficiency framework—measure against the given instructions, view evidence in the State’s favor, and require substantial evidence for each element.
UJI 14‑201; Flores; Largo; Duran; Guerra; Smith: Provide the deliberate intent architecture: juries may infer deliberation from pre‑arming and wielding a weapon, the nature and duration of the attack, multiple wounds, and post‑crime conduct including flight, disposal of evidence, deception, and lack of remorse.
Lopez; Coffin; Sandoval; Duarte; Lucero; LaFave treatise: Define the self-defense/defense-of-another thresholds—emphasizing the subjective perception of imminent death or great bodily harm, the insufficiency of size disparity and taunting alone, and the prohibition on using deadly force to repel a simple battery.
Turrietta; Hatch; Worley; Bagley; Strickler: Frame Brady doctrine—suppression, favorability, and materiality—rejecting speculation and requiring a record-based showing that nondisclosure undermines confidence in the verdict.
Sosa; Carrillo; Gilbert; Graves; Torres; Berger; Clark; Campos; Ortega; Seaton; Lensegrav: Set the guardrails for prosecutorial conduct, preserving objections, curative instructions, the scope of permissible rhetoric, and the limits of fundamental error relief. The Court distinguished Lensegrav as involving pervasive, inadmissible themes, unlike the discrete issues here.
Heeter; Rule 16‑303(A)(1); In re Dixon; Rule 16‑804(D): Ethics anchors. The Court admonished defense counsel for mischaracterizing the record and reminded prosecutors that pejorative rhetoric risks crossing ethical lines.

Legal Reasoning: Why the Court Reached These Results

Deliberate intent: The Court carefully aggregated pre‑offense intent signals (arming, advancing toward the victim, overcoming restraint), the manner of the killing (28 stab wounds in a chase and struggle), and post‑offense behavior (taunting, disposal of the knife, flight, and deception). Under UJI 14‑201, even a brief period of calculated decision-making suffices; the record supported far more.
Self-defense instructions: The failure to request the instruction shifted the inquiry to whether omission was fundamental error. Focusing on the first, subjective element, the Court found no evidence that Chavez perceived an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm. The video evidence and sequence of events undermined that claim. Absent that predicate, no instruction was required or warranted.
Brady: The defendant could not transform the loss of notes into a Brady violation without demonstrating favorability or materiality. The supposed discrepancy weakened, rather than strengthened, a deadly force justification. The Court refused to speculate about other hypothetical contents of the missing notes.
Prosecutorial misconduct: The Court applied the Sosa factors and the overarching requirement that the misconduct be a significant factor in the jury’s deliberations. Corrective measures cured the leading questions; most rhetoric was evidence-based; two unprofessional phrases were admonished but isolated; and any photographic prejudice was invited by stipulation. On this record, the Court could not say guilt was doubtful or that the integrity of the process was compromised.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the decision provides guidance with practical ripple effects:

Proving deliberation: Prosecutors can persuasively marshal pre‑arming, chase/pursuit, multiple wounds, and post‑crime conduct to establish deliberate intent. Surveillance footage and forensic blood evidence can be central.
Self-defense threshold: Trial courts need not instruct on self-defense or defense of another absent some evidence of the defendant’s subjective fear of imminent death or great bodily harm. Size disparity, taunts, and dirty looks are insufficient—especially where the defendant arms himself and initiates or escalates the encounter.
Brady practice: Defense must articulate why suppressed evidence is favorable and material in relation to the entire record; speculation will not suffice. Prosecutors should maintain robust note-retention and disclosure practices to avoid disputes.
Prosecutorial rhetoric and preservation: Colorful openings must remain tethered to admissible evidence and avoid demeaning tropes; isolated lapses may be admonished but not reversible. Defense counsel should contemporaneously object to preserve error; curative instructions often remedy isolated improprieties.
Invited error caution: Stipulating to graphic exhibits forecloses later claims of undue prejudice. Parties should weigh stipulations carefully.
Ethics and the record: Mischaracterizing the record risks ethical consequences. Accurate record citations and candor to the tribunal are indispensable on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Willful and deliberate murder (Section 30‑2‑1(A)(1)): First-degree murder requiring proof the defendant made a calculated decision to kill—arrived at after weighing reasons for and against—recognizing that such deliberation can be formed quickly.
Deliberate intent (UJI 14‑201): Not a rash impulse; can be inferred from actions before, during, and after the killing.
Self-defense/defense of another: Requires evidence that the defendant actually feared imminent death or great bodily harm, that the use of force resulted from that fear, and that the response was objectively reasonable. Deadly force is not justified to prevent a mere punch or other simple battery.
Fundamental error: A narrow safety valve for unpreserved issues. Reversal is reserved for exceptional cases where guilt is doubtful or the process’s integrity is compromised.
Brady violation: Constitutional error where the State suppresses favorable, material evidence. Favorable means helpful to guilt or punishment; material means a reasonable probability the result would have been different or confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Curative instruction: A judge’s directive telling jurors to disregard improper testimony or argument. Courts presume jurors follow such instructions.
Invited error: A party cannot complain on appeal about an error it induced, such as stipulating to the admission of evidence later challenged as prejudicial.
Rule 12‑405 NMRA (unpublished decisions): Limits citation and precedential effect of unpublished New Mexico appellate decisions.

Notes on Ethics and Litigation Conduct

Record integrity: The Court admonished defense counsel for mischaracterizing the record and reminded counsel of Rule 16‑303(A)(1) NMRA’s duty of candor to the tribunal; see also Heeter v. Heeter, 1992‑NMCA‑032, ¶ 15; In re Dixon, 2019‑NMSC‑006.
Prosecutorial rhetoric: The Court criticized two pejorative phrases as unprofessional and cautioned prosecutors under Rule 16‑804(D) NMRA to avoid conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, invoking the classic Berger admonition to strike “hard” but not “foul” blows.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed Chavez’s life-plus-nine-year sentence, holding that the State presented substantial evidence of deliberate intent drawn from the defendant’s pre‑arming, pursuit, and prolonged multi‑stab attack, as well as post‑crime conduct. The omission of self-defense or defense-of-another instructions was not error because the record lacked evidence of a subjective fear of imminent death or great bodily harm. The Brady claim failed for want of favorability and materiality. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not rise to fundamental error, particularly where objections were sustained and curative instructions given, the objectionable phrases were isolated and admonished, and the defense stipulated to the graphic exhibits now challenged.

While unpublished, the decision underscores enduring principles: deliberate intent may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct across the temporal arc of a homicide; the self-defense instruction is not a vehicle for mere speculation about fear; Brady requires concrete showings of favorability and materiality; and fundamental error is a high bar, steepened when defense counsel fails to preserve objections or invites the challenged course. It also serves as a pointed reminder of counsel’s ethical obligations—precision in record citation for defense attorneys and restrained, evidence‑based rhetoric for prosecutors.