State v. Calderon: Unifying the Indecent Liberties Doctrine Through the “Distinct Interruption” Test

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in State v. Calderon (No. 238A23, filed 12 December 2025) is a significant clarification of how multiple counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) may be charged and sustained.

At its core, the case involves a 40-year-old defendant, Pedro Isaias Calderon, and a thirteen-year-old girl, “Jocelyn” (a pseudonym). A jury convicted Calderon of three counts of indecent liberties based on three separate kissing incidents:

A kiss on Jocelyn’s neck outside his van;
A kiss on her mouth inside the van; and
A second kiss on her mouth inside the van, occurring several minutes later.

The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, concluded that the evidence supported only two of these three counts. It reasoned, applying a Kansas four-factor test from State v. Sellers, that the two kisses inside the van were not sufficiently distinct to support separate indecent liberties charges. The dissent would have upheld all three convictions.

On review, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve multiple issues:

Whether the Court of Appeals properly used a threshold distinction between “touching” and “sexual acts” in indecent liberties cases;
Whether the Kansas Sellers four-factor test was the correct standard for determining multiplicity of indecent liberties offenses;
Whether Calderon’s conduct constituted one continuing offense or three separate indecent liberties;
Whether the jury instructions and the failure to arrest judgment on multiple convictions violated double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court’s answer reorients this area of law. It rejects the touching/sexual-act dichotomy that had developed in the Court of Appeals, adopts the “distinct interruption” framework from State v. Dew, 379 N.C. 64 (2021), for indecent liberties cases, and upholds all three convictions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Riggs, writing for the Court, announces three principal holdings:

Rejection of the touching vs. sexual-act threshold distinction. The Court holds that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) does not support a preliminary classification of conduct as either “touching” or “sexual act” with different analytical paths depending on that classification. The statute’s text does not use those terms, and prior case law (such as Etheridge and Hartness) emphasizes that the gravamen of the offense is the defendant’s purpose in committing an indecent act, not the specific physical nature of the act.
Adoption of the “distinct interruption” test from Dew for multiple indecent liberties counts. The Court holds that when a defendant is charged with multiple counts of indecent liberties arising from related conduct, courts must apply the “distinct interruption” test articulated in State v. Dew. Multiple charges are proper only when there is substantial evidence of a distinct interruption between acts, such as a lapse of time, intervening events, change in location, or another clear break that would allow a reasonable opportunity to reconsider.
Affirmance of three indecent liberties convictions in this case. Applying the Dew test, the Court finds that each kiss — the kiss on the neck outside the van, the first kiss on the mouth inside the van, and the second kiss on the mouth inside the van separated by six to seven minutes — was separated by a distinct interruption. Therefore, all three convictions stand, the motion to dismiss was properly denied, and there was no double jeopardy violation.

The Court reverses the Court of Appeals’ partial relief (which had directed arrest of judgment on one count and resentencing) and reinstates the trial court’s judgment on all three indecent liberties convictions.

III. Factual and Procedural Context

A. The Underlying Conduct

The factual record, viewed in the light most favorable to the State (as required for sufficiency review), describes a sequence of events on July 5, 2019:

Calderon, age 40, had met Jocelyn (13) at church and later at a pool party. He commented on her body to a housemate, asked about her status, friended her on Facebook, and messaged her frequently, including indicating a desire to touch her.
On July 5, Jocelyn’s grandmother and younger sister left in a taxi, leaving Jocelyn at home with siblings and an uncle. Calderon arrived outside her home in a van.
Jocelyn testified that Calderon grabbed her as she took out trash, kissed her neck outside the van, lifted her into the van, then engaged in more serious sexual behavior — including kissing her breasts, licking her vagina, and digitally penetrating her. The jury, however, acquitted on the charges related to those alleged sexual acts.
Two sisters living nearby observed Calderon and Jocelyn in the van from about ten to twelve feet away. They testified they saw the pair cuddling and kissing twice in the van, with six to seven minutes between kisses.
Calderon admitted to kissing Jocelyn on the neck outside the van and to kissing inside the van but denied more invasive sexual acts.

B. Charges, Trial, and Verdict

Calderon was ultimately charged with:

Five counts of indecent liberties with a child (N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2));
Two counts of statutory sex offense with a child under 15; and
One count of second-degree kidnapping.

At the charge conference, the State specifically tied three indecent liberties counts to three kissing acts:

Kiss on the neck outside the van;
First kiss on the mouth inside the van; and
Second kiss on the mouth inside the van.

Calderon moved to dismiss, arguing insufficiency of the evidence and variance with the indictments, and later contended that multiple kisses during a single encounter could not support multiple indecent liberties counts, relying heavily on State v. Laney, 178 N.C. App. 337 (2006). The trial court denied the motion, overruled his objections to jury instructions on three kissing-based counts, and the jury:

Convicted him of three indecent liberties counts based solely on the three kissing incidents;
Acquitted him of two other indecent liberties counts (breast-touching and solicitation of oral sex), the statutory sex offenses, and kidnapping.

He was sentenced to three consecutive prison terms of 16–29 months each.

C. Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals majority concluded that:

The kisses were “non-sexual acts” (for purposes of its prior jurisprudence distinguishing touching from sexual acts);
Applying the Kansas Sellers four-factor test (time, location, intervening event, fresh impulse), there was sufficient distinction between the kiss outside the van and the kisses inside the van to support separate counts; but
The two kisses in the van were insufficiently distinct under Sellers and thus should constitute only one offense.

It remanded to arrest judgment on one indecent liberties conviction and for resentencing. The dissent agreed that existing Court of Appeals precedents had drawn a touching vs. sexual-act distinction and expressly requested clarification from the Supreme Court on whether that distinction was correct. But the dissent would have held the three kisses were distinct acts even under Sellers and would have affirmed all three convictions.

The State appealed based on the dissent, and both parties sought discretionary review on additional issues. The Supreme Court granted review and ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Statutory Framework: N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)

The indecent liberties statute criminalizes two types of conduct when the defendant is at least 16 and at least five years older than the child under 16:

(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or

(2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years.

Notably, the statute:

Does not use the terms “touching” or “sexual act”;
Focuses on “immoral, improper, or indecent liberties” and “lewd or lascivious acts” committed for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

This textual silence on touching and sexual acts is central to the Court’s rejection of the Court of Appeals’ threshold dichotomy.

B. Etheridge and Hartness: No Touching Required, Purpose is Gravamen

Two seminal Supreme Court cases shaped the interpretive backdrop:

State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34 (1987): The Court held that a defendant need not physically touch the child to commit indecent liberties. “It is not necessary that defendant touch his victim to commit an immoral, improper, or indecent liberty within the meaning of the statute.”
State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561 (1990): The Court reiterated that “a variety of acts may be considered indecent” even without actual touching, as long as done for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, and emphasized:
“Defendant’s purpose for committing such an act is the gravamen of this offense; the particular act performed is immaterial.”

Together, these cases stand for three core propositions:

No touching is required for indecent liberties;
The specific act (e.g., touching, kissing, exposure) is not the essence of the crime;
The defendant’s purpose — arousing or gratifying sexual desire — is what matters.

These propositions directly conflict with an analytical regime that makes the classification of conduct as “touching” vs. “sexual act” determinative of whether multiple charges may be brought.

C. Laney, James, and Williams: The Now-Rejected Dual Path

The Court of Appeals created the touching/sexual-act dichotomy through a line of cases:

State v. Laney, 178 N.C. App. 337 (2006): The defendant touched a child’s breasts and then touched under her waistband. The Court of Appeals concluded these were part of “one transaction” without a temporal gap and treated them as a single act of “touching,” supporting only one indecent liberties charge. It distinguished State v. Lawrence, 360 N.C. 368 (2006), where three separate encounters supported multiple charges.
State v. James, 182 N.C. App. 698 (2007): The court distinguished Laney in part because that case “emphasized the sole act alleged was touching, and ‘not two distinct sexual acts.’” This suggested that multiple “sexual acts” in a single encounter could support multiple indecent liberties counts, whereas multiple touchings could not.
State v. Williams, 201 N.C. App. 161 (2009): The Court summarized Laney and James as establishing “different analytical path[s]” for “sexual acts” and touchings in indecent liberties cases.

Under this framework:

If the conduct was categorized as mere “touching,” multiple contacts in a single encounter generally yielded only a single charge.
If the conduct involved multiple “sexual acts,” multiple counts could be sustained even within a single encounter.

The Court of Appeals in Calderon treated this as a binding threshold inquiry and classified the kisses as “non-sexual acts,” triggering its more restrictive approach toward multiple counts.

D. Dew and Rambert: Defining the “Unit of Prosecution” Through Distinct Interruptions

1. State v. Rambert

In State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173 (1995), the Supreme Court upheld three separate convictions for discharging a firearm into occupied property when the defendant fired three shots at a vehicle. The Court reasoned:

“[E]ach shot ... required that defendant employ his thought processes each time he fired the weapon. Each act was distinct in time, and each bullet hit the vehicle in a different place.”

From Rambert, the principle emerged that, at least for the firearm discharge statute, each separate shot could properly form the basis for a separate count.

2. State v. Dew

In State v. Dew, 379 N.C. 64 (2021), the Court considered how many assault charges could arise from a prolonged beating:

Inside a trailer, the defendant subjected his girlfriend to a “continuous, nonstop beating” for about two hours;
Afterwards, there was a break in which she cleaned up and packed bags, and the parties moved to a car;
The defendant then resumed beating her in the car while driving home.

The defendant was convicted of multiple assault counts, and he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for more than one. The Supreme Court held:

There was insufficient evidence to support two separate assault counts for the continuous beating inside the trailer — that conduct was one ongoing, uninterrupted attack;
There was, however, sufficient evidence to treat the assault in the trailer and the assault in the car as distinct because of the intervening break: cleaning the bed, packing, moving to the car, and the lapse of time in which a reasonable person could calm down.

Critically, the Court announced the “distinct interruption” test:

“[T]he State may charge a defendant with multiple counts of assault only when there is substantial evidence that a distinct interruption occurred between assaults.”

It offered a non-exhaustive list of what can constitute a distinct interruption:

An intervening event;
A lapse of time in which a reasonable person could calm down;
An interruption in the momentum of the attack;
A change in location; or
Some other clear break delineating the end of one assault and the beginning of another.

Conversely, it held that multiple injuries or varied methods of attack, without more, do not themselves create multiple assault offenses.

In Dew, the Court also expressly declined to extend Rambert’s “each shot is a separate charge” rationale to assault, given the different nature of the conduct.

E. Sellers (Kansas) and the Court of Appeals’ Four-Factor Test

The Court of Appeals in Calderon imported a four-factor multiplicity test from the Kansas Supreme Court’s State v. Sellers, 253 P.3d 20 (Kan. 2011). Under Sellers, courts consider:

Whether the acts occur at or near the same time;
Whether they occur in the same location;
Whether a causal relationship or intervening event separates them; and
Whether there is a “fresh impulse” motivating the subsequent conduct.

Believing this to be consistent with Rambert and applying it specifically to “non-sexual acts” of indecent liberties, the Court of Appeals concluded that the two kisses in the van lacked sufficient separation to yield two offenses.

The Supreme Court in Calderon finds this importation unnecessary and incorrect, given the existence of the established Dew framework and the absence of any statutory basis for treating “non-sexual acts” differently.

F. Standards of Review and Other Authorities

The Court reiterates familiar principles:

De novo review for:
- Denials of motions to dismiss for insufficient evidence (Tucker, Crockett);
- Questions of law in jury instructions (Osorio, Copley, Greenfield);
- Alleged double jeopardy violations (Courtney).
The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the State’s favor (Barnes).
Statutory interpretation is governed by legislative intent, primarily gleaned from the statutory text (Fearrington; Piedmont Canteen Serv.; N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd.).

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Rejecting the Touching/Sexual-Act Dichotomy

The Court’s first major move is to dismantle the Court of Appeals’ threshold requirement to classify conduct as either “touching” or “sexual act” before analyzing multiplicity.

1. Textual Silence and Legislative Intent

The Court highlights that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a):

Nowhere uses the words “touching” or “sexual act”;
Criminalizes “immoral, improper, or indecent liberties” and “lewd or lascivious” acts, with the unifying element being the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

Given this, creating a threshold classificatory scheme between touching and sexual acts is “atextual.” Guided by the principle that “the actual words of the legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent,” the Court holds that the statute does not authorize — and, by implication, disapproves — such a distinction.

2. Consistency with Etheridge and Hartness

Relying on Etheridge and Hartness, the Court reinforces that:

No touching is required to commit indecent liberties;
The “particular act performed is immaterial” so long as it is done for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

If an indecent liberties conviction can be sustained without physical touching, it would be anomalous to make the presence or absence of a “touching” (versus a “sexual act”) determinative of whether multiple counts are permissible.

Accordingly, the Court expressly rejects the Court of Appeals’ assumption that it must first classify the conduct as touching vs. sexual act to decide whether multiple indecent liberties counts can arise from related conduct.

B. Choosing Dew Over Sellers and Rambert in the Indecent Liberties Context

1. Dew as the Governing “Unit of Prosecution” Framework

The Court next addresses how to determine when related conduct constitutes one indecent liberties offense or multiple offenses. It holds that the proper test is the Dew “distinct interruption” test, originally applied in the assault context.

The Court reasons:

Indecent liberties, like assault, often involve a series of physical or quasi-physical acts during a single encounter or over a short period;
Just as with assault, multiple acts may constitute a single continuous offense or multiple offenses, depending on whether there are distinct interruptions that give the defendant an opportunity to reconsider and desist;
The Dew factors are flexible and fact-sensitive, focusing on:
- Intervening events;
- Lapses of time sufficient for a reasonable person to “calm down” and reevaluate;
- Interruptions in momentum;
- Changes in location; or
- Other clear breaks between episodes.

Thus, the Court extends Dew’s rationale, by analogy, from assault to indecent liberties. It does so expressly while declining, as it did in Dew, to extend Rambert’s per-shot analysis from firearm-discharge to other types of offenses.

2. Why Rambert is Not the Right Analogy

The Court distinguishes Rambert again:

In discharging a firearm, “each distinctly fired shot is a separate discharge,” inherently suggesting discrete choices and acts;
In assault and indecent liberties, by contrast, the conduct often flows as an ongoing interaction with a victim, where discrete blows or touches are not automatically separate offenses.

Therefore, it would be inappropriate to say that every inappropriate touch or kiss is automatically a separate indecent liberties crime, just as every punch in a fight is not automatically a separate assault. The “distinct interruption” concept is thus the proper lens.

3. Rejection of Sellers and the Four-Factor Test

The Court declines to adopt Sellers or to treat it as a controlling or necessary framework:

North Carolina already has a governing test in its own jurisprudence — Dew — tailored to the “unit of prosecution” problem for continuing offenses;
The Court of Appeals’ decision to craft a Sellers-based test specifically for “non-sexual acts” of indecent liberties both imports out-of-state doctrine unnecessarily and doubles down on the now-rejected touching vs. sexual-act distinction.

Accordingly, the Court holds that lower courts should apply the Dew distinct interruption analysis in indecent liberties cases and should not rely on the touching/sexual-act dichotomy or the Sellers four-factor test.

C. Application to Calderon’s Conduct

Turning to the facts, the Court examines whether, in the light most favorable to the State, the three kisses were separated by distinct interruptions sufficient to support three separate indecent liberties counts.

1. Kiss on the Neck Outside the Van vs. Kisses Inside the Van

The first distinction is straightforward:

The initial kiss on Jocelyn’s neck occurred outside the van;
Subsequent kisses on her mouth occurred inside the van, after Calderon moved her into the vehicle and repositioned himself.

This change in location, combined with the shift in setting and posture, constitutes a clear break in the interaction. It aligns with Dew’s example of a distinct interruption: a change in location that naturally separates episodes of criminal conduct.

Thus, at minimum, there is adequate evidence to support one indecent liberties count for the outside kiss and at least one for the conduct inside the van.

2. First and Second Kisses Inside the Van

The closer question — and the one on which the Court of Appeals majority had ruled against the State — is whether the two kisses in the van are one continuing act or two distinct offenses.

Here, the Court relies heavily on the testimony of the neighbors (viewed in the State’s favor):

They observed the couple “laying in the car, kind of cuddled up,” laughing and talking;
They specifically recalled seeing two kisses that were “not back to back,” with about six to seven minutes between kisses;
During the interval, the couple continued to cuddle and converse.

Under the Dew framework, the Court views this six-to-seven-minute pause, during which no kissing occurred, as a distinct interruption:

There was a lapse of time in which a reasonable person could “calm down” or at least reconsider whether to continue the unlawful conduct;
The momentum of the particular act of kissing was interrupted, replaced by talking, laughing, and cuddling before the defendant consciously chose to initiate another kiss.

The Court explicitly distinguishes this from:

The “continuous, non-stop beating” in the trailer in Dew, which was a single assault absent a break; and
The virtually instantaneous sequence of touches in Laney (“no gap in time”), which formed “one transaction.”

By contrast, the six-to-seven-minute break between kisses is deemed sufficient to present a jury question — and to support a conviction — that Calderon committed two separate indecent liberties inside the van.

Importantly, the Court declines to announce any bright-line rule for how long a pause must be to constitute a distinct interruption. Instead, it emphasizes the fact-specific nature of the inquiry and holds only that, “on these facts,” six to seven minutes was long enough.

D. Double Jeopardy and Jury Instructions

Because the Court finds that three distinct indecent liberties offenses occurred, it resolves the defendant’s double jeopardy arguments and jury instruction challenges against him.

No double jeopardy violation: The Double Jeopardy Clauses protect against multiple punishments for the same offense. Here, however, the Court holds that Calderon committed three separate offenses, each supported by discrete evidence of a distinct interruption. Multiple punishments are therefore permissible.
No error in jury instructions on three counts: Since the evidence was sufficient to support three distinct indecent liberties charges, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on three separate counts and to allow the jury to return three guilty verdicts.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss, in instructing on three counts, or in declining to arrest judgment on any of the three indecent liberties convictions.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact on Indecent Liberties Jurisprudence

The decision in Calderon has at least three significant doctrinal consequences:

Unification of analysis for all indecent liberties conduct.
By rejecting the touching/sexual-act dichotomy, the Court ensures that the same legal framework applies to all forms of indecent liberties conduct — whether physical or non-physical — so long as they are undertaken for sexual-arousal purposes.
Incorporation of Dew’s “distinct interruption” test into indecent liberties law.
Trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel must now analyze multiplicity in indecent liberties cases through the Dew lens: Was there a distinct interruption between acts? Were there intervening events, changes in location, or lapses in time adequate to allow reconsideration?
Partial displacement of prior Court of Appeals precedents.
While the Supreme Court does not systematically overrule each case by name, its reasoning effectively repudiates the analytical core of Laney, James, and Williams to the extent they:
- Impose a threshold touching vs. sexual-act classification; or
- Limit multiple counts in “touching” cases while allowing them more freely in “sexual act” cases.

B. Practical Consequences for Prosecution and Defense

1. For Prosecutors

Prosecutors now have clearer authority — and, practically, more latitude — to:

Charge multiple indecent liberties counts arising out of a single encounter, provided they can point to distinct interruptions between acts (e.g., passage of time, different locations, intervening conversations or activities);
Structure indictments and jury instructions around discrete episodes of indecent conduct rather than collapsing all conduct into a single charge based on its classification as “touching” or “sexual act.”

However, the decision also underscores the need to build a record demonstrating interruptions — through careful witness examination about timing, sequence, and breaks in the conduct.

2. For Defense Counsel

Defense strategies will likely adjust in several ways:

Challenging the sufficiency of evidence of any alleged distinct interruption — arguing that conduct was continuous, uninterrupted, and thus should support only a single indecent liberties count;
Highlighting inconsistencies or ambiguities in witness testimony on timing and sequence to contest whether the State has met its burden to show multiple offenses;
Raising unit-of-prosecution and double jeopardy arguments framed explicitly in terms of Dew and Calderon, rather than the earlier touching/sexual-act cases.

C. Broader Criminal Law Significance

Beyond indecent liberties, Calderon continues a broader trend in North Carolina jurisprudence:

Fact-specific “unit of prosecution” analysis for continuing offenses. The Court is increasingly explicit that many crimes — assault, indecent liberties — often occur as a course of conduct, and that the line between one offense and many is drawn by fact-intensive considerations, especially the presence or absence of distinct interruptions.
Restraint in expanding Rambert beyond its specific statutory context. The Court again signals that Rambert’s shot-by-shot approach is limited to the firearm discharge statute and not a general template for other offenses.
Textualism in statutory interpretation. The Court emphasizes fidelity to statutory language and is wary of judicially created categorical distinctions (like touching vs. sexual act) not grounded in the text or evident legislative intent.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Multiplicity and Double Jeopardy

Two related but distinct concepts are at play:

Multiplicity asks: Has the State improperly split what is essentially a single criminal offense into multiple counts? If so, some counts may be dismissed or judgments arrested.
Double jeopardy — under both federal and state constitutions — prohibits:
- Being tried twice for the same offense after acquittal or conviction; and
- Receiving multiple punishments for the same offense unless the legislature clearly authorizes it.

When a defendant argues there is only one offense but the State charges several counts, they are effectively raising a unit-of-prosecution (multiplicity) argument with double jeopardy implications. If the conduct is legally one offense, multiple punishments violate double jeopardy. If the conduct is legally multiple offenses, multiple punishments are permissible.

In Calderon, the Supreme Court resolves this by holding there are three distinct indecent liberties offenses; therefore, neither multiplicity nor double jeopardy bars three convictions and three consecutive sentences.

B. “Distinct Interruption” vs. “Continuing Offense”

A continuing offense is a course of criminal conduct that the law treats as a single crime, even if it involves multiple acts (e.g., a continuous assault or a continuous act of sexual touching without any break).

The distinct interruption test asks: Did something happen that reasonably separates one phase of conduct from another? Such as:

A pause or lapse in time;
Movement to a new place;
Stopping the assault or indecent act to do something different (clean up, drive, talk, etc.);
A break long enough that a reasonable person could reflect and choose not to continue.

If there is no distinct interruption, the conduct is one continuing offense (e.g., the two-hour nonstop beating in Dew inside the trailer). If there is an interruption, each episode may properly be charged as a separate crime (e.g., the beating in the trailer vs. the beating in the car in Dew; the three separated kisses in Calderon).

C. De Novo Review

When an appellate court reviews a matter de novo, it decides the issue afresh, without deferring to the trial court’s conclusions. In Calderon, the Supreme Court reviews de novo:

Whether the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury on each indecent liberties count;
Whether the jury instructions correctly state the law; and
Whether multiple convictions violate double jeopardy.

However, even under de novo review, the Court must respect the rule that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State on sufficiency questions.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Calderon is a pivotal decision in North Carolina’s indecent liberties jurisprudence. Its enduring contributions can be summarized as follows:

It eliminates the judicially crafted distinction between “touching” and “sexual acts” as a threshold determinant for multiple indecent liberties charges, re-centering the analysis on statutory text and the defendant’s sexual purpose.
It imports the “distinct interruption” test from assault law (Dew) into indecent liberties cases, thereby harmonizing how courts assess whether related misconduct constitutes a single offense or multiple crimes.
It clarifies that, on appropriate facts — here, three kisses separated by changes in location and a six-to-seven-minute pause — a defendant may be properly convicted of multiple indecent liberties offenses in a single encounter without violating double jeopardy.
It signals a broader trend toward fact-sensitive, text-based analysis of the unit of prosecution in continuing-offense contexts and away from rigid, atextual categorizations.

For practitioners, Calderon provides both a warning and a roadmap. Multiple episodes of indecent conduct, even in one meeting, may now readily support multiple charges if the State can show distinct interruptions. At the same time, defendants retain a meaningful avenue to challenge overcharging by carefully scrutinizing the record for evidence — or lack thereof — of any genuine break in the criminal conduct.

In the broader legal landscape, Calderon stands as a leading authority on how North Carolina defines the scope and number of indecent liberties offenses arising from a sequence of acts, and it will likely guide future litigation involving both sexual and non-sexual continuing offenses.