State-Only Standing to Prosecute Dependency and Neglect Petitions in Colorado: Overruling People in Interest of R.E. and Limiting Counsel‑for‑Youth Authority

Introduction

In In re The People in the Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, 569 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2025), the Colorado Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Márquez, reaffirmed and sharpened a foundational boundary in dependency and neglect proceedings: only the State, acting in its parens patriae capacity, has standing to prosecute such cases. The Court held that a child—whether represented by a guardian ad litem (GAL) or by the newly authorized counsel for youth (CFY)—may not prosecute a dependency and neglect petition when the State has decided to dismiss it. In doing so, the Court overruled People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1986), to the extent R.E. had allowed a GAL to continue a case after the State sought dismissal.

The case arose after Denver Human Services filed a dependency and neglect petition alleging abuse and unsafe conditions involving thirteen-year-old R.M.P. and his sibling. After investigation, the Department moved to dismiss as to the father, concluding the allegations were unfounded and the continued court involvement was harmful. R.M.P., through his CFY (a representation model enacted in 2022 for youths 12 and older), objected and asked to proceed to adjudication. Relying on R.E., the juvenile court convened a “credible evidence” hearing, found the petition could proceed, and set the matter for adjudication. The father—supported by the Department—then sought C.A.R. 21 relief. The Supreme Court granted review given the urgency, the novelty of CFY representation, and the issue’s statewide import.

The sharp dispute centered on: (1) whether any non-state actor (a GAL or CFY) can prosecute a dependency and neglect petition when the State seeks dismissal; (2) whether longstanding precedent recognizing the State’s exclusive role was properly limited by R.E.; and (3) whether the juvenile court has any discretion to deny the Department’s motion to dismiss after the State files a petition.

Summary of the Opinion

The majority holds that under the Colorado Children’s Code and the State’s parens patriae authority, the State alone has standing to prosecute dependency and neglect proceedings. No statute authorizes a child, GAL, CFY, or any other non-state party to initiate or continue prosecution of a dependency and neglect petition once the State has determined dismissal is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court:

Overrules People in Interest of R.E. to the extent it permitted a GAL to prosecute a petition over the State’s objection.
Concludes that the juvenile court erred in permitting the case to proceed based on a hearing akin to a criminal probable cause inquiry and in allowing the CFY to carry the petition forward.
Makes the rule to show cause absolute and remands with instructions to dismiss the petition.

The Court exercised original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 due to the time-sensitive posture (ongoing custody and placement concerns, including a separate delinquency case) and because the CFY issue is one of first impression and likely to recur. The Court treated the question as one of standing—jurisdictional and reviewable de novo at any stage.

Justice Gabriel dissented. He reframed the issue as whether the Department may unilaterally dismiss a dependency and neglect petition without judicial oversight, emphasized the Children’s Code’s robust grant of court supervision and the statutory right of children to be parties and be heard, defended R.E.’s long-settled approach, and argued the majority’s rule is in tension with the Legislature’s rationale for creating CFY representation.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

McCall v. District Court, 651 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1982) — Foundational authority that “[t]he State is the exclusive party entitled to bring an action in dependency and neglect.” McCall anchors the State’s unique role in parens patriae. The majority treats McCall as the controlling principle that R.E. erroneously narrowed.
C.W.B., Jr. v. A.S., 2018 CO 8, 410 P.3d 438 — Reiterates and applies McCall, framing standing as jurisdictional and reinforcing that the Children’s Code contemplates State initiation and prosecution of D&N cases.
L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995); A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, 296 P.3d 1026; People in Interest of L.M., 2018 CO 34, 416 P.3d 875 — Consistent statements that only the State may file and prosecute dependency and neglect petitions.
Parens patriae doctrine — Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982); In re House, 23 Colo. 87, 46 P. 117 (1896). The State acts as “sovereign guardian” to protect children unable to protect themselves.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) — Recognizes the constitutional presumption of fit parental decision-making and limits on State intrusion absent necessity. The majority situates D&N proceedings within this intrusion framework.
Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953) — Describes the core D&N question: whether it is the State’s duty to take custody and make the child a ward of the State.
People in Interest of R.E., 729 P.2d 1032 (Colo. App. 1986) — Allowed a GAL to oppose dismissal and obtain a merits adjudication after the State sought to dismiss. The majority overrules R.E. as inconsistent with McCall and the Children’s Code.
Criminal procedure analogies and limits — People v. Storlie, 2014 CO 47 (trial court’s limited discretion to deny prosecutor’s dismissal under Crim. P. 48); § 16-5-209, C.R.S. (court’s power to compel prosecution if dismissal is arbitrary/capricious). The majority notes no dependency analog exists and, even if it did, the Department’s motion here was not arbitrary or capricious.
Procedural standards for original jurisdiction — People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10 (first impression, significant public importance); People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13 (likelihood of recurrence).
Key statutes and rules — §§ 19-3-312(1), -501, -502, -505, C.R.S. (2024) (Children’s Code initiation and adjudication framework); § 19-3-203 (GAL and CFY roles); § 19-3-502(4.5) (child as party); § 19-1-102(1) (Code purposes); C.R.C.P. 17(a) (actions in the name of the People only when statute authorizes); C.R.J.P. 1 (interplay with civil rules); § 24-4.1-302.5(1) (crime victims’ rights—used by analogy to show no victim veto of dismissals).

Majority’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

Exclusive State standing under parens patriae and the Children’s Code. The Court anchors its holding in the parens patriae doctrine and the statutory architecture of Article 3 of the Children’s Code. Reports of abuse or neglect prompt investigation; upon authorization, the “People of the State of Colorado, through the relevant county department” file the petition; and at adjudication, “the State must prove the allegations.” No provision authorizes non-state parties to initiate or prosecute these actions, including children, GALs, or CFYs. The Court reaffirms McCall and its progeny: the State is the “exclusive party” with a legal interest to litigate whether to intrude on the family and take a child into State custody.
No statutory or rule-based authority for non-state prosecution; CRCP 17(a) inapplicable. C.R.C.P. 17(a) permits suits in the People’s name by non-state actors only where statute so provides. The Children’s Code contains no such authorization in dependency and neglect matters, and the Juvenile Rules add none. Allowing a child, family, or foster parent to prosecute a petition would risk transforming parens patriae protection into a “weaponized family court system.”
R.E. overruled; criminal analogies do not save non-state prosecution. The Court rejects R.E.’s conclusion that a GAL can prevent dismissal and force a merits adjudication. The State’s initial filing does not confer standing on other parties to prosecute. Nor do criminal analogies help: although prosecutors’ dismissals require court consent under Crim. P. 48 and may be reviewable if arbitrary under § 16-5-209, the dependency and neglect context lacks comparable provisions. Even if such a standard applied, the Department’s reasons here—factual recantation or disproof, absence of safety concerns, and harm from continued involvement—were not arbitrary or capricious.

The majority characterizes the juvenile court’s approach—borrowing a criminal preliminary hearing model and excluding the Department’s offer of proof—as incompatible with the governing framework because it presupposed a right in the CFY to prosecute that the Code does not grant.

The Dissent’s Legal Reasoning (Justice Gabriel)

Justice Gabriel reframes the dispute: the core question is not whether a CFY may “prosecute,” but whether the Department holds unilateral, unreviewable power to dismiss a D&N petition it filed. In his view:

The Children’s Code embeds robust judicial oversight. Sections 19-3-501 and -505 charge courts with authorizing filings, holding adjudications at the earliest possible time, and conforming pleadings to the evidence. Section 19-3-502(4.5) makes the child a party with the right to “fully participate.” Allowing the Department to dismiss unilaterally diminishes court supervision and the child’s statutory voice.
R.E. is sound and consistent with McCall. R.E. did not confer standing on the GAL to file a petition; it held that once the State files, the court need not dismiss on the Department’s say-so if another party objects, and that the court should test the sufficiency of the evidence. McCall spoke to who may “bring” a case, not who may insist on a judicial resolution after filing.
CFY legislation supports a child’s meaningful participation. The 2022 CFY enactment reflects legislative findings that youths have liberty interests at stake, a right to counsel who will advocate their positions, and a deserved voice in life-altering proceedings. The majority’s rule curtails these aims by allowing dismissal over a youth’s objection without court inquiry.
Criminal analogies are inapt. Prosecutors operate within separation-of-powers constraints and still face some judicial oversight of dismissals; by contrast, the majority grants the Department greater unilateral power than prosecutors enjoy. Moreover, children in D&N are parties; crime victims are not.
Other jurisdictions’ approaches. Decisions from the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, and Maryland recognize trial court discretion to deny agency dismissals when contrary to a child’s best interests and permit adjudication when sufficient evidence exists notwithstanding agency withdrawal.

On this view, the juvenile court’s threshold “credible evidence” screening was a reasonable, Code-consistent case management device to decide whether an adjudication should proceed.

Doctrinal Effect and Scope

State-only prosecution reaffirmed and clarified. The decision cements that standing to prosecute D&N petitions is exclusive to the State. No non-state party—child, GAL, CFY, foster parent, or relative—may prosecute a petition when the State seeks dismissal.
R.E. overruled. To the extent R.E. allowed a GAL to compel a merits adjudication over the State’s objection, it is no longer good law.
Trial court discretion curtailed in dismissals. Absent a statutory analog to Crim. P. 48 or § 16-5-209 in the dependency sphere, juvenile courts lack authority to deny State motions to dismiss on the ground that another party wishes to proceed. The majority does not identify any independent judicial-review standard for agency dismissals in D&N cases.
CFY role limited to participation, not prosecution. The CFY remains counsel of record for the youth as a party with rights to be heard, but cannot force the State to litigate nor take over prosecution of the State’s petition.

Impact

The decision recalibrates Colorado dependency and neglect practice in several respects:

Juvenile court procedure on dismissals. Courts should not conduct R.E.-style “credible evidence” hearings to decide whether a child or GAL/CFY may carry a petition forward. If the Department elects to dismiss, the court must dismiss; there is no statutory authority to compel continued prosecution or to substitute another party.
CFY and GAL advocacy. Counsel for youth and GALs retain rights to participate and be heard on matters such as safety planning, visitation, and services while a case is pending. But they cannot prevent dismissal of the State’s petition by attempting to assume prosecutorial functions. Their advocacy may instead focus on persuading the Department before a dismissal decision or pursuing appropriate remedies outside D&N (where available).
Agency discretion and accountability. County departments’ dismissal decisions are effectively dispositive in D&N cases. Absent legislative change, judicial review for “arbitrary and capricious” is not available in this context. Oversight, if any, is political/administrative rather than judicial.
Children’s party status narrowed in effect. Although children remain statutory “parties” with the right to participate, this decision limits their ability—through GALs or CFYs—to ensure a merits adjudication occurs if the Department withdraws.
Legislative signal and potential reform. The dissent underscores a policy tension between this holding and the 2022 CFY enactment. The General Assembly could respond by creating a narrow statutory mechanism for court review of agency dismissals—akin to Crim. P. 48/§ 16-5-209—or by expressly authorizing a defined role for GALs/CFYs to seek a merits adjudication in limited circumstances.
Comparative law divergence. Colorado now aligns with a stricter State-only prosecution model than jurisdictions that allow courts to deny agency dismissals in the child’s best interests. Counsel practicing multistate should be alert to Denver’s narrower scheme.
Case management and timing. The Court’s reliance on C.A.R. 21 highlights that prolonged litigation while a youth remains out of the home can be harmful. The ruling encourages swift termination of D&N cases where the Department determines dismissal is warranted.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dependency and neglect (D&N): A civil proceeding to determine whether a child lacks proper care through no fault of the child and whether State intervention (including removal from the home) is necessary for safety and welfare. The State must prove allegations by a preponderance of the evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.
Parens patriae: Literally “parent of the country.” The doctrine under which the State has both the right and duty to protect citizens—especially children—who cannot protect themselves. In D&N, this justifies State initiation and control over petitions.
Standing: The legal authority to bring and pursue a case. In D&N matters, standing to prosecute is exclusive to the State; this is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised at any time.
Guardian ad litem (GAL) vs. Counsel for Youth (CFY): A GAL represents the child’s best interests; a CFY provides traditional client-directed legal representation to youths aged 12 and older. Neither is authorized to prosecute a D&N petition if the State seeks dismissal.
Original jurisdiction (C.A.R. 21): An extraordinary review mechanism allowing the Supreme Court to resolve urgent, important legal issues that are not adequately remediable by appeal.
C.R.C.P. 17(a): Allows suits in the name of the People by non-state actors only when a statute expressly authorizes it; the Children’s Code provides no such authorization in D&N.
“Arbitrary and capricious” (criminal analog): In criminal cases, courts may deny dismissals that are arbitrary/capricious and without reasonable excuse (§ 16-5-209). No analogous statutory check exists in Colorado D&N proceedings.

Conclusion

In re People in the Interest of R.M.P. crystallizes a bright-line rule in Colorado child-welfare litigation: only the State may prosecute dependency and neglect petitions. By overruling R.E., the Court eliminates the decades-old practice under which a GAL could compel a merits adjudication over the State’s dismissal. The opinion rests on the parens patriae foundation of the Children’s Code, the absence of any statutory authorization for non-state prosecution, and the conceptual alignment of D&N with State-controlled decisions to intrude upon the family.

The dissent spotlights unresolved policy tensions: the Code’s emphasis on court oversight, the child’s statutory status as a party, and the Legislature’s recent insistence on robust youth-directed legal representation. Those concerns may invite a legislative response if broader oversight of agency dismissals or a tailored role for GALs/CFYs in pursuing adjudication is desired. For now, R.M.P. establishes a clear procedural directive: when the Department elects to dismiss a D&N petition, no non-state party may prosecute the case, and the juvenile court must dismiss.