State–Federal Drug Definition Mismatch Bars ACCA Enhancement: United States v. Cherry

Introduction

United States v. Aunyis Cherry, No. 22-13968 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2025), addresses whether prior state convictions for sale or delivery of cocaine qualify as “serious drug offenses” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Cherry, a Florida resident and convicted felon, was found in November 2020 to possess a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court applied the ACCA’s enhanced range—mandating a 15-year minimum and up to life—on the basis of three prior Florida cocaine convictions. Cherry appealed solely to challenge the ACCA enhancement, contending that at the time of his state offenses (April–May 2017), Florida’s statutory definition of “cocaine” was broader than the federal definition, and thus could not serve as ACCA predicates.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit granted Cherry’s unopposed motion for summary reversal. Applying the categorical approach and plain‐error review, the court concluded that Florida law included “ioflupane”—a cocaine derivative used in medical imaging—within its definition of “cocaine” until July 2017, whereas federal law had excluded ioflupane since 2015. Because the Florida statute was broader at the time Cherry committed his state offenses, those convictions did not match the ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition and could not trigger the enhancement. The panel vacated Cherry’s 275-month sentence and remanded for resentencing under the standard statutory maximum of 10 years.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024) – Held that a state drug statute qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if its definition of the controlled substance matches federal law at the time of the state offense. Brown squarely established that Florida’s broader cocaine definition, including ioflupane until July 2017, failed the match test.
United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016) – Confirmed that serious drug offenses under ACCA require identical statutory definitions, applying the categorical approach to compare state and federal statutes.
United States v. Conage, 976 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020) – Reiterated that only the statutory text, not the underlying conduct, governs whether a state conviction qualifies under ACCA.
Johnson v. United States, 694 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2012) – Affirmed plain‐error review for issues raised first on appeal.
United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2014) – Explained that an intervening Supreme Court decision can render an error “plain” for purposes of appellate relief.
Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969) – Provides the standard for summary disposition: when a party’s legal position is “clearly right” and no substantial question remains.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision turned on two interrelated doctrines: the ACCA’s categorical approach and plain‐error review. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a felon in possession faces enhanced punishment if he has three prior convictions for “serious drug offenses” committed on different occasions. The Supreme Court has required courts to compare the text of the state statute under which the defendant was convicted to the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense.” If the state statute sweeps more broadly—criminalizing conduct or substances that federal law does not—then the conviction cannot qualify.

In Brown v. United States (2024), the Supreme Court held that Florida’s cocaine statute included “ioflupane” until mid-2017, whereas the federal definition of “cocaine” had excluded that derivative by regulation in 2015. Cherry’s state convictions arose in April and May 2017—after federal exclusion but before Florida’s repeal. Consequently, Florida’s definition did not “match,” and therefore could not count under ACCA.

Cherry did not raise this precise argument below, so the Court applied plain‐error review: an error is plain if it is clear under controlling Supreme Court precedent and affects the defendant’s substantial rights. The panel found that Brown was squarely on point, that Cherry’s sentence exceeded the statutory maximum absent the ACCA enhancement (10 years versus 275 months), and that this disparity undermined the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.

Impact

This ruling reinforces the rigor of the categorical approach in ACCA litigation. State courts and defense attorneys must closely track whether state drug statutes mirror federal schedules and definitions at the time of the offense. After Brown and Cherry, any deviation—even the inclusion of a pharmacological derivative like ioflupane—will preclude ACCA treatment.

Practically, defendants with Florida drug convictions between 2015 and July 2017 may now challenge ACCA enhancements. More broadly, the decision underscores the importance of temporal alignment: legislative amendments at the state or federal level can create or eliminate predicate offenses, and those changes matter retrospectively for sentencing enhancements. Future circuit opinions are likely to test the limits of “matching” when statutes use generic terms (“opioids,” “stimulants”) that may have divergent definitions in each jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: A method that compares only statutory texts—state versus federal definitions—rather than the facts of an individual’s crime to determine ACCA eligibility.
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): A federal statute enhancing sentences for felons in possession of firearms if they have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.
Plain‐Error Review: The deferential appellate standard applied when an issue is raised for the first time on appeal. The error must be obvious under established law and have affected the outcome.
Ioflupane: A radioactive derivative of cocaine used in medical imaging. Its classification determines whether a statute is broader than federal law for ACCA purposes.

Conclusion

United States v. Cherry crystallizes the principle that state drug statutes must align exactly with federal definitions at the time of the offense to serve as ACCA predicates. By vacating and remanding for resentencing, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the categorical approach’s strict textual focus and clarified that even minor discrepancies—such as a single derivative compound—can bar enhancements. This decision not only secures relief for Cherry and similarly situated defendants but also signals to legislatures and practitioners that precision in statutory drafting and temporal sensitivity are paramount in the landscape of federal sentencing law.