Stand-Your-Ground’s Initial-Aggressor Limit Clarified; Voir Dire on Lesser Burdens May Be Curtailed: Collins v. State, 2025 Ark. 137

Introduction

In Dylan Collins v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 137, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a capital-murder conviction arising from a roadside shooting following a high-speed encounter on the interstate. The appeal presented two issues:

Whether the State presented substantial evidence to negate Collins’s justification (self-defense) claim beyond a reasonable doubt; and
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by restricting voir dire that sought to contrast the criminal burden of proof (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) with lesser, civil burdens.

Writing for a unanimous court, Associate Justice Cody Hiland held that the State introduced ample evidence from which the jury could find—beyond a reasonable doubt—that Collins was not justified in using deadly force and that the trial court acted within its wide discretion in limiting voir dire to avoid juror confusion about legal standards that would not be contained in the jury instructions.

Doctrinally, the decision is most notable for two clarifications:

Arkansas’s 2021 “stand-your-ground” amendments to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607 do not protect an initial aggressor; where the defendant provokes or initiates the confrontation, the no-retreat safe harbor does not apply.
Trial courts may confine voir dire to the applicable “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and bar comparisons to “preponderance” or “clear and convincing” burdens that will not be the subject of jury instructions.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the conviction and sentence (life imprisonment plus a 10-year firearm enhancement), holding:

Sufficiency/Justification: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the State presented substantial evidence negating self-defense. Eyewitness testimony showed Collins was the initial aggressor—exiting his vehicle with pistol raised and firing rapidly without any interaction. Collins admitted he never saw a gun. A pistol was later found in the victim’s closed center console, and multiple witnesses saw no weapon in the victim’s hands. Under § 5-2-607, the no-retreat rule does not shield an initial aggressor; therefore, even if Collins perceived danger, he was not justified in using deadly force without retreating or otherwise withdrawing.
Voir Dire: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by precluding defense counsel from contrasting “beyond a reasonable doubt” with civil burdens (preponderance, clear and convincing). The judge permitted discussion of the correct standard as contained in the instructions but prohibited potentially confusing, non-instructional comparisons.
Rule 4-3(a) Review: The court’s mandatory review of adverse rulings revealed no prejudicial error.

Factual Background

On January 14, 2023, motorist Arva Wilkerson called 911 to report a gray Honda with a Tennessee plate speeding near Maumelle; during the call, he said, “he is on to me.” Collins, the Honda’s driver, pulled to the roadside and stopped; Wilkerson stopped behind him. Without any communication, Collins exited with his pistol raised, advanced, and fired thirteen rounds into Wilkerson’s truck. Collins drove home to Marion and destroyed the firearm. Several bystanders stopped to help; Wilkerson, shot four times, died the next day.

Investigators identified Collins through the plate number. In a recorded interview, Collins initially denied involvement but later claimed self-defense, asserting Wilkerson “went for his gun.” Under questioning, Collins conceded he never saw a weapon. Multiple eyewitnesses testified there was no time for any interaction before Collins began firing and that no gun was visible in Wilkerson’s hands; police later found a pistol in the truck’s closed center console.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Brown v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 198, 595 S.W.3d 456 — Establishes that when justification is at issue, sufficiency review asks whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that the State negated the defense. The court relied on Brown to frame the sufficiency inquiry through a justification lens.
Gentry v. State, 2021 Ark. 26 — Provides the “substantial evidence” definition (“sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds”) and reiterates that justification is a question of fact for the jury, which weighs credibility and may accept the State’s account over the defendant’s. The court leaned on Gentry to emphasize deference to the jury’s credibility determinations and to describe the standard of review.
Smith v. State, 2025 Ark. 83 — Confirms that once justification is raised and supported by evidence, it becomes an element the State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. Collins invoked Smith to insist on the State’s burden; the court agreed with the legal standard but found the burden satisfied on this record.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607 (Supp. 2021) — The “stand-your-ground” statute. Subsection (a)(2) authorizes deadly force if the actor “reasonably believes” the other is using or about to use unlawful deadly force. Subsection (b) eliminates the duty to retreat if, among other things, the actor is lawfully present, reasonably believes imminent deadly threat, and “is not the initial aggressor and has not provoked” the other person. The court’s application underscores that the no-retreat provision is conditioned on the actor not being the initial aggressor.
Ark. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (2019) — Sets the minimum voir dire the court must conduct; additional questioning is permitted only “as the judge deems reasonable and proper.” This anchored the trial court’s authority to cabin voir dire.
Thessing v. State, 365 Ark. 384, 230 S.W.3d 526 (2006) — Reiterates the wide discretion accorded trial courts in managing voir dire; reversal requires a “clear abuse of discretion.”
Nelson v. State, 2024 Ark. 24, 683 S.W.3d 177 — Recent authority reinforcing that beyond Rule 32.2(a)’s required topics, additional questions on voir dire are subject to the trial judge’s reasonableness determination.
Bader v. State, 344 Ark. 241, 40 S.W.3d 738 (2001) — Approves trial-court restrictions on voir dire that risk juror confusion, a principle applied here to limit comparisons to non-instructional burdens.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency and the Justification Defense

The court began with familiar sufficiency principles: it reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, asks whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and defers to the jury on credibility and weight of testimony (Gentry). Once justification is raised with supporting evidence, the State must negate it beyond a reasonable doubt (Smith).

The jury was instructed on § 5-2-607, including:

Deadly force is justified if the defendant reasonably believes the victim is using or about to use unlawful deadly force.
Deadly force is not justified if the defendant knew the danger could be avoided by retreating; however, there is no duty to retreat if the defendant was lawfully present, reasonably believed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury existed, and was not the initial aggressor and did not provoke the confrontation.

Applying these principles, the court emphasized two evidentiary pillars:

Initial aggressor finding: Multiple eyewitnesses testified that Collins immediately exited his vehicle, raised a firearm, advanced, and fired repeatedly without any verbal exchange. Those facts permitted the jury to find that Collins initiated and provoked the confrontation.
Lack of objectively reasonable belief in imminent deadly force: Collins admitted he never saw a weapon and merely assumed one. Several witnesses saw no gun in Wilkerson’s hands; the only firearm was later found in the closed center console. These facts allowed the jury to find an absence of reasonable belief in imminent deadly force from Wilkerson.

Critically, the court linked the initial aggressor finding to the stand-your-ground framework. Because § 5-2-607(b)’s no-retreat rule applies only if the actor is not the initial aggressor, a defendant who initiates the confrontation cannot claim the no-retreat protection. The opinion therefore concludes that even if the jury thought Collins perceived a threat, his initial-aggressor status meant he could not justifiably deploy deadly force without retreating or otherwise withdrawing. On these facts, the State’s proof negated justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

2) Voir Dire and Burden-of-Proof Comparisons

Defense counsel sought to emphasize that “beyond a reasonable doubt” is the “highest” burden by contrasting it with “preponderance” and “clear and convincing” standards, using a demonstrative aid. The State objected, noting the jury would not be instructed on those standards. The trial court permitted discussion of “beyond a reasonable doubt” as defined in the instructions but forbade comparison to other, non-instructional burdens.

Affirming, the Supreme Court recited the governing framework: trial courts have wide discretion over voir dire (Thessing), and may restrict questioning that risks confusing jurors (Bader). Rule 32.2(a) identifies the court’s mandatory subjects for voir dire; beyond those, additional questioning is allowed only to the extent the judge deems it “reasonable and proper” (Nelson). Because the jury would not be instructed on preponderance or clear and convincing evidence, the trial court reasonably curtailed lines of questioning likely to sow confusion. No abuse of discretion occurred.

Impact and Significance

A. Substantive Criminal Law (Justification/Self-Defense)

Clarified limit on Arkansas’s stand-your-ground law: § 5-2-607(b)’s no-retreat safe harbor does not apply to an initial aggressor or provocateur. The court’s application underscores that “stand your ground” is a conditional protection, not a blanket shield.
Initial aggressor designation has dispositive consequences: A finding that the defendant initiated the confrontation can defeat the no-retreat protection and, as here, support the State’s negation of justification even where the defendant asserts a subjective fear.
Objective reasonableness matters: A mere assumption that the other person has a weapon—particularly without seeing one—will rarely suffice to establish a reasonable belief of imminent deadly force. The court’s emphasis on eyewitness testimony and the locked location of the victim’s firearm is instructive.

B. Trial Practice (Voir Dire)

Boundaries on burden-of-proof analogies: Trial judges may limit voir dire to the correct criminal standard and restrict comparisons to civil burdens that are not in the jury instructions. Counsel should prepare to explain “beyond a reasonable doubt” using the model instructions and permissible clarifications rather than analogies to other standards.
Wide discretion affirmed: The decision reinforces that appellate courts will defer to trial judges’ reasonable efforts to prevent juror confusion, particularly regarding legal standards.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Justification (Self-Defense): A legal excuse for using force. Deadly force is justified only if a person reasonably believes another is using or about to use unlawful deadly force. “Reasonably believes” blends what the defendant actually believed with what an ordinary, prudent person would have believed in the same circumstances.
Stand-Your-Ground (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(b)): In Arkansas, a person generally has no duty to retreat before using deadly force if three conditions are met: (1) the person is lawfully present, (2) reasonably believes an imminent risk of death or serious injury exists, and (3) the person is not the initial aggressor and did not provoke the encounter. Failing any condition removes the no-retreat protection.
Initial Aggressor: The person who initiates or provokes the confrontation. An initial aggressor cannot rely on stand-your-ground and typically must withdraw or retreat and communicate that withdrawal to regain the right to use self-defense.
Substantial Evidence (Appellate Review): Evidence of sufficient force and character that reasonable minds could reach the verdict without resorting to speculation.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The highest burden of proof in law. It does not mean absolute certainty but requires firmly convinced confidence in the verdict based on the evidence.
Voir Dire: The process of questioning prospective jurors to ensure they can be fair and impartial. Judges have wide latitude to control the scope of questioning.
Abuse of Discretion: A high appellate bar: a ruling is reversed only if the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without a reasonable basis.
Firearm Enhancement: An additional sentence imposed when a firearm is used in the commission of certain crimes. Here, Collins received an extra 10 years beyond life imprisonment.

Practical Takeaways

For defense counsel: If asserting self-defense, develop objective evidence of an imminent deadly threat. A defendant’s assumption or fear—without corroboration—will seldom suffice, especially where the defendant’s conduct manifests initiation of the encounter. Be cautious with voir dire: prepare to explain “reasonable doubt” within the contours of the model instruction; expect courts to bar contrasts with civil burdens.
For prosecutors: Establish initial aggressor status with precise, timely eyewitness testimony (sequence, gestures, weapons displayed) and physical evidence. Highlight absence of a visible weapon in the victim’s hands and post-incident conduct (e.g., fleeing, destruction of evidence) that jurors may view as consciousness of guilt.
For trial judges: This decision affirms discretion to limit voir dire to avoid confusion and to keep questioning tethered to the jury instructions. It also validates model instructions that explain both the no-retreat rule and its initial-aggressor limitation.

Conclusion

Collins v. State reinforces two important propositions in Arkansas criminal practice. First, under § 5-2-607’s stand-your-ground regime, the no-retreat protection does not extend to an initial aggressor; a defendant who provokes or initiates a confrontation cannot rely on stand-your-ground to justify deadly force and, absent withdrawal, may be required to retreat if safe to do so. The court’s sufficiency analysis underscores that objective facts—such as the absence of a visible weapon, immediate initiation of gunfire, and witness accounts—can defeat a self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second, the opinion confirms broad judicial authority to manage voir dire. Trial courts may restrict comparisons between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and lesser burdens that will not appear in the jury instructions, especially where such comparisons risk confusing prospective jurors.

In sum, 2025 Ark. 137 clarifies the contours of Arkansas’s post-2021 stand-your-ground law by centering the initial aggressor limitation, and it provides practical guidance on the permissible scope of voir dire concerning burdens of proof. Together, these holdings will shape both the litigation of justification defenses and the conduct of jury selection in Arkansas criminal trials.

Case details: Dylan Collins v. State of Arkansas, No. CR-25-20 (Ark. Sept. 25, 2025) (Hiland, J., affirming). Appeal from Faulkner County Circuit Court, Hon. Troy B. Braswell, Jr., presiding.