Speculation Is Not Acquiescence:
Suescum‑Mora v. Bondi and the Distinct State‑Action Standard for CAT Protection

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Suescum‑Mora v. Bondi, No. 23‑7885 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2025), denying a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision that upheld the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection to an Ecuadorian mother and her two minor children.

Although the disposition is a non‑precedential “summary order” under the Second Circuit’s rules, it is doctrinally important in two main respects:

• It underscores the strict consequences of abandoning dispositive issues on petition for review through inadequate briefing, and
• It expressly endorses a key principle articulated by the BIA in Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61 (B.I.A. 2025): the CAT “acquiescence” standard is distinct from the “unable or unwilling to protect” standard used in asylum and withholding of removal, and mere speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to show acquiescence.

The case also illustrates recurring themes in protection jurisprudence: the burden of proof and corroboration in asylum claims, the limits of particular social group theory (especially where persecution appears criminally motivated), the requirement that governments be “unable or unwilling” to control persecutors, and the two‑step inquiry in CAT cases (likelihood of torture and state action). Finally, the panel takes the unusual step of referring petitioners’ counsel to the court’s Grievance Panel for serious briefing deficiencies.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Basic Facts

Petitioner Dayana Paulette Suescum‑Mora and her two minor children, all citizens of Ecuador, sought protection in the United States. The minors are identified only by initials in accordance with privacy rules for minors (Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5)), a routine but important reminder of confidentiality protections in immigration litigation involving children.

According to her account, Suescum‑Mora witnessed an armed robbery in Ecuador. After she reported the incident to the police, the robber allegedly threatened her. She then fled Ecuador with her children in 2021, shortly after filing her initial police report. Her core theory was that she was targeted because she was a “female witness to armed robbery”, a status she advanced as a “particular social group” (PSG) under U.S. asylum law.

B. Agency Proceedings

An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief in a decision dated February 8, 2023. The IJ’s key findings (later adopted by the BIA) included:

• Her testimony was not sufficiently persuasive and was uncorroborated in material respects, so she did not meet her burden of proof;
• The proposed PSG of “female witnesses to armed robbery” was not cognizable under governing law;
• Even assuming a cognizable PSG, the evidence did not show that a protected ground was “one central reason” for the threats; the robber was motivated by a desire to avoid arrest and punishment;
• The Ecuadorian government was not “unwilling or unable” to protect her—indeed, the police took several concrete steps to apprehend the robber, including offering a reward;
• The country conditions and other evidence did not independently demonstrate a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence as required for CAT protection.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on October 30, 2023. The petitioners then sought review in the Second Circuit.

C. Issues on Petition for Review

On review, the central issues—at least as framed by the court—were:

• Whether petitioners had preserved challenges to the IJ’s core burden‑of‑proof and CAT findings, or had instead abandoned them by failing to brief them adequately;
• Whether, on the merits, the IJ and BIA erred in rejecting:
  • the proposed PSG of “female witnesses to armed robbery,”
  • the alleged nexus between threats and a protected ground,
  • the claim that Ecuadorian authorities were “unwilling or unable” to control the robber, and
  • the claim that the Ecuadorian government would acquiesce in torture under CAT;
• Whether the petitioner’s argument that CAT state action can be proven by an “unable or unwilling to assist” theory is compatible with the regulatory “acquiescence” standard.

The court denied the petition in full, largely on abandonment grounds, but also by endorsing the agency’s alternative merits rulings.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Second Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three broad steps:

1. Abandonment of Dispositive Issues. The court holds that Suescum‑Mora’s brief does not address two dispositive agency findings:
   • that her uncorroborated and insufficiently persuasive testimony failed to meet her burden of proof for asylum/withholding, and
   • that the country‑conditions evidence did not independently establish a likelihood of torture for CAT purposes.
   Under Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023), claims not adequately argued are deemed abandoned; because all protection claims rested on the same factual predicate, this abandonment disposes of the petition.
2. Alternative Merits Analysis for Asylum and Withholding. Even “in any event,” the panel agrees with the Government that the IJ’s alternative determinations were correct:
   • The proposed PSG of “female witnesses to armed robbery” is not cognizable in light of existing case law on witness/cooperator groups;
   • Precedent concerning people who publicly cooperate with law enforcement does not aid Suescum‑Mora because she did not cooperate publicly and did not show others knew of her cooperation;
   • Even assuming a valid PSG, Suescum‑Mora failed to show the required nexus; the robber’s motive was to avoid arrest and punishment, an “ordinary criminal” motive, not persecution “on account of” her membership in a protected group;
   • Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Ecuadorian authorities were not unwilling or unable to control the robber, given their concrete efforts and the lack of evidence about what happened after she left the country.
3. Merits and Abandonment in the CAT Claim; Distinct Acquiescence Standard.
   • The CAT claim fails first because petitioner’s briefing ignored the dispositive element of a CAT claim: she did not contest the finding that she failed to show a likelihood of torture at all. That issue is therefore abandoned.
   • Her argument focused instead on the state‑action component of CAT (government acquiescence). On the merits, the panel finds that:
     • She misstates the law by attempting to import the asylum/withholding “unwilling or unable to assist” standard into CAT;
     • Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), torture must involve intentional infliction of severe pain “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of” a public official acting in an official capacity;
     • Under § 1208.18(a)(7), “acquiescence” requires official awareness of the impending torture and a subsequent breach of legal duty to intervene;
     • Matter of M‑S‑I‑ confirms that the CAT acquiescence standard is distinct from the unable‑or‑unwilling standard, and that the “potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.”
   • Accordingly, both the likelihood‑of‑torture element (abandoned) and the state‑action element (meritless) doom the CAT claim.

In a final, notable step, the court orders that a copy of its summary order be forwarded to the Second Circuit’s Grievance Panel, citing defects in petitioners’ briefing by counsel Michael Borja: failure to address dispositive issues, lack of record citations required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), and misstatements of the record and controlling legal standards.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Deference to the Agency

The court recites well‑established standards:

• It reviews the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
• Factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard; they are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
• Questions of law and the application of law to fact are reviewed de novo. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

These standards frame the rest of the analysis: petitioners must overcome a deferential factual standard while properly preserving legal challenges in their briefing. They fail at both.

B. Abandonment and Appellate Preservation

A central holding is that key arguments are forfeited by inadequate briefing. Citing Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023), the court reiterates:

“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.”

Specifically, Suescum‑Mora’s brief does not address:

• the IJ/BIA finding that her testimony was not sufficiently persuasive and lacked corroboration, and
• the finding that country conditions did not independently show a likelihood of torture for CAT purposes.

Because all her protection claims (asylum, withholding, CAT) rested on the same factual basis, the failure to challenge these factual/ evidentiary rulings is dispositive. The court buttresses this by citing:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), which allows testimony alone to meet the burden only if it is “credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts,” and
• Pinel‑Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529 (2d Cir. 2022), which explains that in some cases even credible testimony is insufficient without corroboration.

For CAT specifically, the court notes that the independent question whether country conditions demonstrate a probability of torture with state involvement was left unchallenged on appeal.

From an appellate‑practice perspective, this is a forceful reminder that:

• Petitioners must identify and challenge each independent ground on which the agency’s decision rests.
• Generalized grievances or reframings that ignore the IJ’s actual reasons will not suffice.
• The court will not “rescue” poorly presented claims simply because the underlying immigration stakes are high.

C. Asylum and Withholding: Burden, PSG, Nexus, and State Protection

1. Burden of Proof and Corroboration

Asylum applicants bear the burden to prove they are “refugees” under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). The statute explicitly links the sufficiency of testimony to its credibility, persuasiveness, and specificity, and it authorizes adjudicators to require corroboration where reasonably available. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

The decision builds on Pinel‑Gomez:

“In some cases, an applicant must provide corroborating evidence because the applicant’s testimony, although credible, is not sufficient on its own.” 52 F.4th at 529.

While this order does not re‑litigate the IJ’s credibility assessment in detail, it reinforces the principle that:

• Testimony can be truthful yet still not persuasive or detailed enough to meet the burden, especially when not supported by any independent evidence.
• Where an IJ has identified a lack of corroboration as a basis for denying relief, petitioners must confront that reasoning directly on appeal or risk abandonment.

2. Particular Social Group: “Female Witnesses to Armed Robbery”

Suescum‑Mora claimed membership in a PSG defined as “female witnesses to armed robbery.” The IJ rejected this group as not cognizable. While the order does not spell out the IJ’s full PSG analysis, it alludes to governing doctrine and to a critical limitation:

• Some precedents have recognized PSGs comprised of persons who publicly cooperate with law enforcement (e.g., public witnesses or informants who testify against gangs or cartels).
• But those precedents were “inapplicable” here because Suescum‑Mora did not cooperate publicly; she merely filed a police report, and the record did not show that others were aware of her report.

Implicitly, the panel is emphasizing features that often make a witness/cooperator group cognizable:

• The cooperation is public and socially visible—e.g., testifying in court, widely known cooperation with authorities.
• There is evidence that society (or the persecutor) recognizes such cooperators as a distinct class.

By contrast, a person who files a police complaint that is not known outside official channels may not fit within the recognized “public cooperator” PSG line, because:

• The group may lack social distinction in the society at issue, and
• Persecutors may target them for wholly non‑group reasons (such as silencing a specific witness to their crime).

Thus, the proposed PSG of “female witnesses to armed robbery” fails at least in part because:

• It does not track existing, recognized groups of public cooperators, and
• Even if theoretically conceivable, Suescum‑Mora did not prove she was perceived as part of such a group.

3. Nexus: The “One Central Reason” Standard for Asylum and Withholding

To win asylum or withholding, an applicant must not only show persecution but also that a protected ground (here, membership in a PSG) was, in asylum terms, “at least one central reason” for that persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

In Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit held that this “one central reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal, not merely asylum. The panel cites Quituizaca to reject Suescum‑Mora’s argument that a different, more lenient nexus standard applies to withholding:

“[T]he ‘one central reason’ standard also applies to withholding of removal.” 52 F.4th at 109–14.

The court agrees with the IJ that the evidence does not show such a nexus. Instead:

• Suescum‑Mora’s own narrative suggests that the robber threatened her in order to avoid apprehension and punishment after she witnessed him commit a crime.
• She argues she was targeted for “defying criminals,” but the panel notes she does not explain how this characterization undercuts the agency’s conclusion that the robber’s motive was simply to avoid being reported and arrested.

Quoting Quituizaca, the court analogizes:

[The record does not] compel the conclusion that a protected ground was “one central reason” for gang abuse when circumstances suggested that the gang was motivated by ordinary criminal incentives. 52 F.4th at 114–16.

The underlying doctrinal point is significant:

• Where a persecutor acts primarily to eliminate witnesses, avoid prosecution, or further criminal objectives, courts often treat the motive as non‑protected, even if the victim has some characteristic that could be articulated as a PSG.
• A group definition that essentially repackages the criminal motive (e.g., “witnesses against criminals”) is especially vulnerable to being viewed as an attempt to transform ordinary criminal retaliation into refugee‑law persecution.

4. State Protection: “Unable or Unwilling to Control”

Asylum and withholding require not only a persecutor and a protected ground but also that the persecutor be a state actor or a private actor whom the state is “unable or unwilling to control.” See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015)).

Here, the IJ found, and the court agrees, that Ecuadorian authorities were neither unwilling nor unable to protect Suescum‑Mora:

• She testified that the police intended to arrest the robber and took “significant steps” to locate him, including offering a reward.
• She left Ecuador less than a week after filing her initial report, so the record lacks evidence about whether the police ultimately succeeded.

The court stresses that, where the applicant bears the burden, the absence of evidence about the efficacy of police efforts can itself constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding of adequate state protection. Citing Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008):

“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the agency’s challenged decision.”

Thus:

• Evidence of initial, active police intervention undercuts claims of governmental acquiescence in or indifference to persecution.
• Speculative claims about police “corruption” or “inaction” that are contradicted by the applicant’s own testimony and unsupported by record citations carry little weight.

D. CAT Protection: Two‑Step Inquiry and the Distinct Acquiescence Standard

1. Elements of a CAT Claim

Under CAT regulations, an applicant must show:

1. That she is “more likely than not” to be tortured (a >50% probability of torture); and
2. That the torture would be inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also § 1208.16(c)(2).

The Second Circuit in Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022), described CAT analysis as a two‑step inquiry:

(1) Is it more likely than not that the applicant will be tortured? and (2) if so, will that torture be inflicted with sufficient state involvement (e.g., consent or acquiescence)? See 53 F.4th at 758–59.

The concept of “acquiescence” is further elaborated in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7):

“Acquiescence” requires that a public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.

2. Failure to Show Likely Torture (Abandoned Issue)

The IJ and BIA concluded that:

• Suescum‑Mora’s unpersuasive and uncorroborated testimony did not satisfy her burden to show that she would more likely than not face torture, and
• The country‑conditions evidence and testimony about the police (even assuming credibility) did not demonstrate a probability of torture with state involvement.

On appeal, however, Suescum‑Mora focused only on the state‑action question (arguing about the appropriate “standard” for government involvement) and did not address the dispositive finding that she had not shown a likelihood of harm rising to the level of torture. The court therefore deems the first step of the CAT inquiry abandoned, citing Debique and Garcia‑Aranda.

Doctrinally, this matters because:

• Even if the state‑action standard were misapplied, a CAT claim still fails absent a proper showing that torture itself is probable.
• Counsel must address both prongs on appeal; litigating only the “standard” for state action cannot salvage a claim where the factual predicate (likelihood of torture) goes undefended.

3. State Action Under CAT: Rejecting the “Unable or Unwilling” Analogy

On the state‑action prong, Suescum‑Mora argued that the CAT inquiry should track the asylum/withholding test: whether the government is “unable or unwilling to assist” or protect her. The court firmly rejects this:

• It points to the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), which defines torture as an act intentionally inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of” a public official acting in an official capacity.
• It notes § 1208.18(a)(7)’s requirement of prior awareness and a breach of legal duty to intervene.
• It emphasizes that a CAT claim cannot be reduced to a showing that authorities are merely ineffective or indifferent in a general sense; the standard is more specific and demanding.

The court’s reasoning is informed by two authorities:

1. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020). In Scarlett, the court remanded to the BIA to decide “how the ‘unable’ prong” of the asylum/withholding standard “might translate to identifying government acquiescence in torture.” 957 F.3d at 336. Here, the Second Circuit notes that question has now been addressed by the BIA in Matter of M‑S‑I‑.
2. Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61 (B.I.A. 2025). The BIA held:

   “[T]he acquiescence standard for CAT protection differs from the unable‑or‑unwilling standard for asylum and withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.”

By quoting M‑S‑I‑ with approval, the Second Circuit:

• Clarifies that CAT acquiescence is not satisfied by the same “unable or unwilling to protect” showing used in asylum/withholding;
• Confirms that generalized speculation that police “cannot or will not help” in the face of private violence does not amount to proof that government officials would know of impending torture and deliberately fail to stop it;
• Aligns its understanding of CAT state action with the BIA’s more demanding standard.

The result: Suescum‑Mora’s argument that CAT should mirror asylum/withholding on state action is “unsupported” and “meritless” under the regulations and M‑S‑I‑.

4. The “Speculation Is Not Enough” Principle

The key doctrinal takeaway from M‑S‑I‑, as endorsed in this order, is succinct:

The “potential for private actor violence” plus mere speculation that police “cannot or will not help” is insufficient to prove government acquiescence for CAT purposes.

In practical terms:

• CAT claims require concrete, individualized evidence that public officials know or will likely know about the torture and will nonetheless breach their obligation to intervene.
• Evidence that a country has crime, corruption, or imperfect policing is not enough by itself, especially where authorities have taken proactive steps in the applicant’s own case.
• Attorneys must avoid conflating:
  • the relatively broader “unable or unwilling” standard (asylum/withholding), with
  • the narrower, more demanding concept of consent or acquiescence under CAT.

E. Professional Responsibility and Briefing Standards

1. Referral to the Grievance Panel

A striking feature of the order is its closing paragraph:

“Given the defects in briefing by petitioners’ counsel, Michael Borja, a copy of this order will be forwarded to the Grievance Panel. As outlined above, the brief fails to address dispositive issues, lacks record citations as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), and misstates the record and relevant legal standards.”

This is a serious admonition. The court identifies three core deficiencies:

• Failure to address dispositive issues—not contesting the IJ’s central findings on burden of proof and CAT likelihood of torture;
• Lack of record citations—contrary to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), which requires that factual assertions be tied to specific parts of the record;
• Misstatements of the record and relevant legal standards—an ethical and professional issue, not merely a stylistic one.

Such a referral signals that the court views these deficiencies as systemically problematic, not mere oversights. For the immigration bar, it underscores:

• The heightened duty of competence and candor in appellate representation, especially in high‑stakes removal cases;
• The real risk of professional discipline where counsel repeatedly fails to meet basic standards of advocacy and accuracy.

2. Consequences for Litigants

For petitioners, defective briefing can be outcome‑determinative:

• Even meritorious factual or legal issues can be lost if not properly preserved and argued.
• Abandonment doctrine prevents courts from reaching unbriefed issues, both to ensure fairness to the opposing party and to manage limited judicial resources.

This order is therefore an implicit warning:

• Immigration litigants must ensure that their counsel understands and applies appellate rules;
• Counsel must systematically address each independent ground on which the agency decision rests and support each factual claim with record citations.

F. Role of Precedents Cited

The order relies on a constellation of earlier decisions, each reinforcing a component of the analysis:

• Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005): explains that the court reviews the IJ decision as modified by the BIA’s reasoning.
• Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018): clarifies the standard of review for factual findings (substantial evidence) and legal questions (de novo).
• Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023): anchors the abandonment doctrine: failure to adequately brief a claim or issue constitutes abandonment.
• Pinel‑Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523 (2d Cir. 2022): confirms that corroboration may be required even where testimony is deemed credible, reinforcing the burden of proof framework under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
• Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010): explains that failure to meet the chance‑of‑persecution standard for asylum necessarily defeats both withholding (higher likelihood) and CAT (higher “more likely than not to be tortured” standard) when all claims rest on the same facts.
• Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2020): applies the “unable or unwilling to control” test and flags the open question (now addressed by M‑S‑I‑) of how the “unable” prong might translate to CAT acquiescence.
• Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2015): articulates the rule that persecution must be by the government or actors the government is unable or unwilling to control.
• Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022): (1) extends the “one central reason” nexus standard to withholding claims, and (2) emphasizes that ordinary criminal motives (e.g., extortion, retaliation against witnesses) generally do not satisfy the persecutor‑on‑account‑of‑protected‑ground requirement absent clear evidence to the contrary.
• Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008): clarifies that when the applicant bears the burden, lack of affirmative evidence can itself be substantial evidence supporting the agency’s decision.
• Garcia‑Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752 (2d Cir. 2022): sets out the two‑step CAT inquiry (likelihood of torture and state action) and underlines that both elements are required.
• Matter of M‑S‑I‑, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61 (B.I.A. 2025): as quoted, clarifies that the CAT acquiescence standard is distinct from the asylum/withholding “unable or unwilling” standard and that private violence plus speculative ineffectiveness of police does not amount to acquiescence.

Suescum‑Mora synthesizes these precedents to reinforce a unified message: evidentiary rigor, doctrinal precision, and proper appellate preservation are indispensable in protection cases.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several technical terms recur in the decision; in plainer language:

• Particular Social Group (PSG): A category of people sharing a characteristic that:
  • They cannot or should not have to change (e.g., kinship ties, some gender‑based groups), and
  • Is recognized in their society as a distinct group (social distinction), and
  • Is defined clearly enough (particularity) that the group has discernible boundaries.
  A group like “people who privately reported a crime to the police” is often difficult to prove as socially distinct or as a target of persecution, especially when others do not know of the report.
• Nexus (“on account of” / “one central reason”): The requirement that the persecutor’s reason for harming the applicant be linked to a protected characteristic (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, PSG). Ordinary criminal motives—stealing money, eliminating witnesses solely to avoid arrest—do not satisfy this unless the evidence shows that the protected ground was one of the central reasons for the harm.
• “Unable or unwilling to control” (asylum/withholding): When persecution is inflicted by private actors (criminals, gangs), the applicant must show the government cannot or will not reasonably protect them. Evidence of police inaction, corruption, or token efforts may show inability or unwillingness; substantial, genuine efforts by authorities usually undercut such claims.
• Acquiescence (CAT): A higher bar than “unable or unwilling.” The applicant must show that officials:
  • Will be aware of the torture in advance (or at least as it is occurring), and
  • Will breach their legal duty to try to stop it (for example, by turning a blind eye or actively colluding).
  General crime problems or speculation that police might be ineffective do not, alone, establish acquiescence.
• “More likely than not” (CAT standard): A probability greater than 50%. The applicant must show it is probable, not merely possible or plausible, that she would be subjected to torture if removed.
• Substantial evidence: A deferential standard of review. The court will not disturb the agency’s fact findings if they are supported by evidence that a reasonable person could accept, unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.
• Abandonment (or waiver) on appeal: If a party does not raise a legal issue or contest a factual finding in the appellate brief with specific arguments and record citations, the court treats that issue as forfeited and will not address it.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarifying the Asylum–CAT Divide on State Action

The most doctrinally salient aspect of Suescum‑Mora is its explicit embrace of Matter of M‑S‑I‑’s articulation that:

• The CAT acquiescence requirement is not the same as the asylum/withholding “unable or unwilling to protect” test; and
• Private actor violence plus speculation about police inaction is not enough to prove acquiescence.

Although this is a non‑precedential summary order, it is a clear indicator of how the Second Circuit views the relationship between asylum/withholding and CAT:

• Practitioners can no longer plausibly argue that showing governmental inability or unwillingness suffices for CAT;
• They must develop evidence of specific, likely government acquiescence to the expected torture—typically via individualized evidence of official collusion, corruption, or patterns of non‑intervention in analogous cases.

B. Reinforcing the “Ordinary Crime” / Nexus Distinction

By analogizing to Quituizaca, the order reinforces:

• Persecution arising from ordinary crime control (gang retaliation, witness intimidation, extortion) is not automatically persecution on account of a protected ground;
• Applicants must separate criminal motives from protected‑ground motives and show that the latter are genuinely central to the persecutor’s actions.

Claims framed around “witnesses to crime” or “people who defy criminals” will continue to face high hurdles in establishing both a cognizable PSG and the required nexus.

C. Heightened Emphasis on Corroboration and Appellate Preservation

The decision places a spotlight on two practical necessities:

• Corroboration where possible. Applicants should provide police reports, medical records, affidavits from witnesses, or other documentation whenever reasonably available. Where corroboration is missing, counsel must explain why and directly engage with the IJ’s reasoning on appeal.
• Comprehensive, record‑based briefing. Appellate counsel must:
  • Address each independent ground supporting the agency decision;
  • Support factual assertions with record citations as required by Rule 28(a);
  • Accurately describe both the record and controlling legal standards.

The referral to the Grievance Panel serves as a cautionary example of what can happen when these standards are not met.

VII. Conclusion

Suescum‑Mora v. Bondi is formally a non‑precedential summary order, yet it is doctrinally instructive. It:

• Demonstrates the harsh consequences of abandoning dispositive issues through inadequate briefing;
• Applies and reinforces the requirement that asylum and withholding applicants show a cognizable PSG, a strong nexus to that group, and government inability or unwillingness to control private persecutors;
• Clarifies, through express reliance on Matter of M‑S‑I‑, that CAT’s acquiescence requirement is distinct from the asylum/withholding “unable or unwilling” standard, and that speculation about police inaction is not enough to show acquiescence;
• Reiterates that CAT protection requires a rigorous showing that torture is more likely than not, and that both likelihood and state action must be proven and preserved on appeal;
• Signals the Second Circuit’s serious view of professional obligations by forwarding counsel’s deficient brief to its Grievance Panel.

For practitioners and scholars, the case crystallizes a central message: evidentiary sufficiency, careful doctrinal framing, and meticulous appellate practice are essential in modern protection litigation. The line between ordinary criminal risk and refugee‑law “persecution,” and between general state weakness and CAT “acquiescence,” is sharply drawn—and Suescum‑Mora illustrates how failing to navigate these distinctions, both factually and procedurally, can be fatal to a petition for review.