Specificity in Pleading Religious Objections to COVID‑19 Vaccines: The Seventh Circuit’s Nonprecedential Guidance in Troogstad v. City of Chicago

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Scott Troogstad v. City of Chicago (No. 25‑1575, decided December 9, 2025) is another chapter in the wave of litigation arising from COVID‑19 vaccination mandates. Although formally labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” the order offers concrete and practical guidance on how plaintiffs must plead religion-based objections to vaccination policies, and it solidifies the circuit’s broader approach to constitutional challenges to such policies.

The case involves more than 130 City of Chicago employees—primarily from the Fire, Water, and Transportation Departments—who challenged the City’s COVID‑19 vaccination policy. They alleged that the denial or non‑approval of their religious exemption requests violated:

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment;
The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA), 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq.; and
The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee (via rights to bodily autonomy and privacy).

Procedurally, this was a successive appeal. An earlier appeal in the consolidated case Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022), had already upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction against similar COVID‑19 testing and vaccination policies. After multiple rounds of amended complaints in the district court, most claims were dismissed with prejudice. Only the free exercise and IRFRA claims were allowed one further chance. Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, which again failed, and the district court refused to permit a fourth.

The key issues before the court were:

Whether the plaintiffs plausibly stated a Free Exercise claim by alleging that “the gene‑altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates [their] beliefs as a Christian.”
Whether they stated a claim under IRFRA, which mirrors the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
Whether the City’s vaccine policy violated their substantive due process rights.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to file a fourth amended complaint.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in full, underscoring that even modest pleading standards for religious-exemption claims require at least some factual description of the religious beliefs and how they conflict with vaccination—not merely a bare, conclusory assertion of religious objection.

II. Summary of the Order

The Seventh Circuit held:

Free Exercise: The complaint did not plausibly allege a Free Exercise violation. Simply stating that “the gene‑altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates [plaintiff’s] beliefs as a Christian” is too conclusory. Plaintiffs failed to provide factual allegations connecting specific Christian beliefs to their objection to the vaccine, as required under Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc. and Bube v. Aspirus Hosp., Inc.
IRFRA: For the same reason, the IRFRA claim failed. IRFRA, like RFRA, requires the plaintiff to identify the religious belief that is burdened; conclusory statements do not satisfy federal pleading standards.
Substantive Due Process: The court reiterated its earlier holding in Lukaszczyk and its prior decision in Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University that there is no fundamental constitutional right to refuse vaccination. Thus, the City’s policy is reviewed under rational basis, and plaintiffs had already failed to show it was irrational. They offered nothing new to disturb that conclusion.
Leave to Amend: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to fix the defects, were expressly told what was missing, and even possessed the necessary information (as shown in their motion to reconsider, which attached their full religious exemption request), yet never incorporated it into the operative complaint. In these circumstances, further amendment was properly denied.

As a result, the constitutional and IRFRA claims were finally dismissed with prejudice, while the plaintiffs continue to pursue separate Title VII religious accommodation claims in another case.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Background and Procedural History

After the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the City of Chicago enacted a policy requiring certain employees to be vaccinated, with stated provisions for religious exemptions. Plaintiff Scott Troogstad, a City Fire Department employee who had previously tested positive for COVID‑19, and more than 130 other City employees (collectively, the “Troogstad plaintiffs”) filed suit in October 2021 to challenge this policy.

Initially, their case was combined with others and addressed at the preliminary injunction stage in Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022). There, the Seventh Circuit:

Rejected the argument that vaccine mandates infringe a fundamental right; and
Applied rational-basis review to the substantive due process challenge, concluding that the policies were constitutionally permissible.

After remand, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, asserting a variety of constitutional and state-law theories against the City and the Illinois Governor. In January 2024, the district court:

Dismissed with prejudice most claims, including the substantive due process claim; but
Dismissed without prejudice the Free Exercise and IRFRA claims, inviting a more specific re‑pleading.

In March 2024, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, focusing on the Free Exercise and IRFRA claims. The complaint alleged, among other things, that:

“Troogstad’s request for an accommodation stated that he was a Christian and that he opposed the vaccination on the basis of his religion. He further elaborated that the gene‑altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates his beliefs as a Christian.”

The City again moved to dismiss. On September 9, 2024, the district court granted the motion with prejudice. The next day, the court issued an amended decision referencing two then‑recent Seventh Circuit vaccination cases: Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc. and Bube v. Aspirus Hosp., Inc.

Plaintiffs moved under Rule 59(e) to vacate or reconsider the dismissal and once more sought leave to amend. In support, they attached the full text of their religious exemption request, which contained more detail than the bare allegation quoted above. The court:

Allowed amendment in a separate Title VII case arising from the same facts (alleging failure to accommodate religious objections under federal employment discrimination law); but
Denied leave to amend again in this constitutional/IRFRA case.

On appeal, plaintiffs challenged:

The dismissal of their Free Exercise claim;
The dismissal of their IRFRA claim;
The dismissal of their substantive due process claim (originally dismissed in January 2024); and
The denial of leave to file a fourth amended complaint.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed on all points.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022)

Kennedy reshaped modern Free Exercise jurisprudence, emphasizing that a plaintiff must show:

A government entity burdened a sincere religious practice; and
Did so pursuant to a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable.

The Troogstad panel cites Kennedy for the basic framework: a plausible Free Exercise claim requires more than simply asserting that something is “religious”—plaintiffs must allege a religious practice and a burden imposed by governmental action. Although the opinion resolves the case at the pleading stage, before engaging fully with neutrality and general applicability, Kennedy sets the doctrinal backdrop.

2. Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005 (7th Cir. 2024)

In Passarella, a healthcare worker challenged her employer’s vaccination requirement, claiming a religious exemption based on her Christian beliefs.

The Seventh Circuit held that her Free Exercise claim was adequately pleaded because she:

Described her Christian belief in the sanctity of the human body; and
Linked that belief to her concern that the vaccine could harm her body, which she considered sacred.

Thus, unlike in Troogstad, the plaintiff in Passarella set out specific religious tenets and explained how they conflicted with vaccination.

3. Bube v. Aspirus Hospital, Inc., 108 F.4th 1017 (7th Cir. 2024)

Bube involved similar claims by healthcare workers objecting to a vaccine mandate. The plaintiffs alleged that:

God created their bodies; and
Being vaccinated would violate their religious duty not to interfere with that divine creation.

The court stated that it had “no trouble” concluding that these objections were “based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.” Again, the key was the specific articulation of a religious principle (divine creation and stewardship of the body) and its connection to the vaccination requirement.

In Troogstad, the court contrasts those detailed pleadings with the bare assertion that “gene‑altering” vaccines violate Christian beliefs, where no underlying belief is actually described.

4. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

Twombly and Iqbal established the “plausibility” standard for federal pleadings:

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face.
Legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals” of elements of a cause of action are insufficient.

The Troogstad panel applies this framework to religious freedom claims. It emphasizes that:

“A complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations; mere conclusions generally will not suffice.”

And:

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”

This is the doctrinal foundation for requiring plaintiffs to plead specific religious beliefs and their conflict with the vaccine mandate.

5. Society of the Divine Word v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 129 F.4th 437 (7th Cir. 2025)

This RFRA case (cited by the panel by analogy to IRFRA) held that to state a claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must:

Identify the religious belief that is allegedly burdened; and
Provide enough detail for the court to evaluate whether the contested requirement substantially burdens that belief.

The Troogstad court quotes Society of the Divine Word for the proposition that:

“We must know what beliefs the claimant contends the regulation offends” in order to evaluate whether a requirement substantially burdens a religious belief.

This rule is transposed directly onto the IRFRA claim in Troogstad.

6. Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022)

Lukaszczyk is central background precedent. It involved overlapping plaintiffs, including the Troogstad group, and addressed COVID‑19 vaccination and testing mandates at the preliminary injunction stage.

Key points from Lukaszczyk that are reaffirmed in Troogstad:

There is no fundamental constitutional right to refuse vaccination.
Accordingly, COVID‑19 vaccine mandates are evaluated under rational-basis review, not strict scrutiny.
The plaintiffs had already failed to show the policies lacked a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.
The Seventh Circuit had admonished plaintiffs that they needed to show “how the religious exemption is applied in practice.”

That last point is especially important for the pleading issue: the district court dismissed the second amended complaint partly because it failed to heed this instruction, and the third amended complaint still did not cure the defect.

7. Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University, 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021)

Klaassen was one of the first appellate decisions upholding a COVID‑19 vaccine mandate. There, the Seventh Circuit held that:

University students have no fundamental right to refuse a vaccine as a condition of attendance.
The university’s policy was subject to rational-basis review and easily satisfied that standard.

Troogstad cites Klaassen alongside Lukaszczyk to reinforce the conclusion that vaccine mandates do not implicate fundamental rights and therefore are rarely vulnerable to substantive due process challenges.

8. Other Circuits: Children’s Health Defense, Inc. v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 93 F.4th 66 (3d Cir. 2024), and Norris v. Stanley, 73 F.4th 431 (6th Cir. 2023)

The Seventh Circuit also notes alignment with:

Children’s Health Defense, Inc. v. Rutgers, where the Third Circuit held there is no constitutional right to refuse vaccination; and
Norris v. Stanley, where the Sixth Circuit upheld a university vaccine policy under rational-basis review.

These citations situate the Seventh Circuit’s position within a broader appellate consensus that COVID‑19 vaccination mandates, at least when neutrally and generally applied, survive substantive due process challenges.

9. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 15(a)(2), and 59(e)

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement” of the claim showing entitlement to relief, as interpreted by Twombly and Iqbal to demand plausible factual allegations.
Rule 15(a)(2) instructs courts to “freely give leave” to amend when justice so requires but allows denial where there is repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.
Rule 59(e) permits motions to alter or amend a judgment, often used to seek reconsideration based on manifest error or new evidence.

The court applies these rules to uphold the denial of yet another amendment after several failed attempts and to affirm the final dismissal of the case.

C. Legal Reasoning in Troogstad

1. Free Exercise Claim: The Need for a Concrete Link Between Belief and Objection

To state a plausible Free Exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege that:

He or she has a sincere religious belief or practice; and
The government has substantially burdened that religious practice through a policy that is not neutral and generally applicable.

The panel focuses on a preliminary, but indispensable, threshold: plaintiffs must plead what their religious beliefs are and how those beliefs conflict with the disputed requirement. Drawing on Passarella and Bube, the court characterizes this as “not a high standard,” but one that still requires some factual content.

In the third amended complaint, Troogstad alleged:

“[T]he gene‑altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates his beliefs as a Christian.”

The court treats this as a classic example of a conclusory allegation. It fails in two ways:

It asserts that a conflict exists (“violates his beliefs”) but never describes what the beliefs actually are; and
It characterizes the vaccines as “gene‑altering” but does not explain why, as a matter of doctrine or religious teaching, that characteristic contradicts Christian faith.

By contrast, in Passarella and Bube, plaintiffs did at least the following:

Identified a specific religious tenet (e.g., that the body is a sacred creation of God); and
Explained that receiving a vaccine would contravene that tenet (e.g., by harming or altering the divinely created body or reflecting a lack of trust in God’s protection).

The Troogstad complaint “misses that step.” Without any facts describing how the plaintiff’s Christian beliefs conflict with vaccination, the complaint does not cross the line from mere conclusion to plausible claim. Accordingly, under Twombly/Iqbal, the Free Exercise claim is deficient and subject to dismissal.

The court emphasizes that this defect is particularly inexcusable given the procedural history:

Plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to amend (at least three operative complaints).
The court had already indicated in Lukaszczyk that they needed to show how the religious exemption worked “in practice.”
Later filings (outside the complaint) showed they actually had more detailed religious explanations but failed to include them in the operative pleading.

These factors support dismissal with prejudice.

2. IRFRA Claim: Transposing RFRA’s Pleading Requirements

IRFRA provides that a “government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government demonstrates that the burden:

Furthers a compelling governmental interest; and
Is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 775 ILCS 35/15.

The statute is modeled on the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). As RFRA jurisprudence (here, Society of the Divine Word) makes clear, a plaintiff must:

Identify the religious belief or practice;
Allege that the government has substantially burdened that belief or practice; and

Only then does strict scrutiny (compelling interest/least restrictive means) come into play.

The Troogstad plaintiffs fail at step one. Just as in the Free Exercise analysis, the court finds that they:

Do not identify specific Christian beliefs allegedly violated by the vaccine requirement; and
Offer only conclusory assertions without factual support.

Quoting Society of the Divine Word, the court explains that it “must know what beliefs the claimant contends the regulation offends” to assess substantial burden. Because the complaint does not specify those beliefs, it does not state a plausible IRFRA claim.

The court therefore never reaches the second half of IRFRA’s test (compelling interest and least restrictive means). Instead, the claim is dismissed at the pleading threshold.

3. Substantive Due Process: Reaffirmation of No Fundamental Right to Refuse Vaccination

Plaintiffs also alleged that the City’s COVID‑19 policy violated their substantive due process rights by interfering with fundamental rights to bodily autonomy and privacy. That claim had already been dismissed with prejudice in January 2024, and plaintiffs sought to revive it on appeal.

The Seventh Circuit rejects that effort, relying heavily on:

Lukaszczyk, where it had already “analyzed and rejected the contention that a vaccination policy infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, which would implicate strict scrutiny”; and
Klaassen, plus decisions from the Third and Sixth Circuits, confirming there is no constitutional right to refuse vaccination as such.

Because no fundamental right is at stake, the policy is evaluated under rational-basis review. Under that deferential standard, the government’s action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest—in this context, protecting public health and workplace safety during a pandemic.

In Lukaszczyk, the court had already held:

“[T]he Troogstad plaintiffs have not met their burden under the rational basis standard to show that the challenged policies violate their substantive due process rights.”

The plaintiffs’ arguments in this appeal “repeat contentions [the court] already denied” and do not present new legal or factual developments that would justify revisiting that conclusion. Accordingly, the substantive due process claim remains dismissed.

4. Denial of Leave to Amend: Repeated Failure and Futility

Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts should freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” However, they may deny leave if:

The party has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies;
There is undue delay or prejudice; or
Amendment would be futile.

In Troogstad, the plaintiffs:

Had already amended their complaint several times;
Were explicitly told by the Seventh Circuit (in Lukaszczyk) to allege how the religious exemption process worked in practice; and
Yet, even by the third amended complaint, still failed to allege how their Christian beliefs conflicted with the vaccine requirement.

Crucially, the court notes that in a September 2024 motion to reconsider, plaintiffs did present the full text of Troogstad’s original religious exemption request—demonstrating that they had the specific religious explanations all along. But for reasons unexplained, they did not incorporate those details into the operative complaints.

Given this history, the Seventh Circuit holds that the district court acted within its discretion in denying yet another amendment. The court also distinguishes the separate Title VII case:

The Title VII case was in a different procedural posture (only one complaint had been filed and dismissed, making leave to amend more appropriate there).
Title VII claims involve different legal standards (employment discrimination/failure to accommodate) from constitutional and IRFRA claims.
That separate case cannot be used as a vehicle to retroactively amend the pleadings in this one.

In other words, the fact that plaintiffs are being allowed to pursue Title VII claims elsewhere does not entitle them to unlimited amendments here.

D. Impact and Significance

1. Practical Pleading Lessons for Religious Exemption Cases

Although nonprecedential, Troogstad, read together with Passarella and Bube, sends a clear message to litigants in the Seventh Circuit:

It is not enough to say “I am a Christian” (or member of any faith) and therefore object to vaccination.
Plaintiffs must describe, in at least modest detail, what specific religious beliefs they hold and how those beliefs make vaccination religiously objectionable.
Conclusions without facts—e.g., “the gene‑altering aspect of mRNA vaccinations violates my beliefs”—are insufficient under Rule 8, Twombly, and Iqbal.

The decision also illustrates a key strategic point: if a plaintiff has written a detailed religious exemption request to an employer or governmental entity, that text should be incorporated verbatim or summarized with specificity in the complaint. Merely referring to it or relying on the court to infer its contents will not suffice at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage.

2. Reinforcing the Limited Role of Substantive Due Process in Vaccination Disputes

Troogstad further entrenches the Seventh Circuit’s view—consistent with other circuits—that:

There is no freestanding substantive due process right to refuse vaccination.
Public employers and educational institutions may condition employment or enrollment on vaccination, subject to ordinary rational-basis constraints and applicable statutory accommodations (e.g., Title VII, ADA, IRFRA, RFRA).

Substantive due process challenges to COVID‑19 vaccine mandates are therefore, as a practical matter, foreclosed in the Seventh Circuit absent highly unusual facts.

3. Clarifying the Threshold Role of IRFRA/RFRA Pleading

By analogizing IRFRA to RFRA and applying Society of the Divine Word, the court underlines:

IRFRA is a powerful statute only after a plaintiff clears the initial hurdle of plausibly alleging a specific religious belief and a substantial burden on that belief.
Court will not reach compelling interest and least restrictive means unless that threshold is met.

This prevents plaintiffs from converting generalized distrust of or opposition to public health measures into statutory religious freedom claims without a clearly articulated religious dimension.

4. Boundary Between Constitutional Claims and Title VII

The decision also implicitly marks the boundary between:

Constitutional and IRFRA claims (often focused on the facial validity of a policy or its general application), and
Title VII claims (focused on whether an employer reasonably accommodated an employee’s religious beliefs).

The Seventh Circuit notes that while the constitutional and IRFRA avenues are closed here, plaintiffs may still pursue their Title VII claims in a separate case. Practically, this means:

Employees challenging vaccine mandates are more likely to succeed, if at all, under employment-discrimination frameworks (Title VII) than under broad constitutional theories.
But even in Title VII cases, clear articulation of the religious beliefs and the requested accommodation will be critical.

5. Nonprecedential But Persuasive: Role Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Although the order is expressly labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL” and “to be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1,” it still:

Signals how the Seventh Circuit will apply Passarella, Bube, and Society of the Divine Word to future religious exemption cases;
Provides persuasive authority on the application of Twombly/Iqbal to Free Exercise and IRFRA claims; and
Reinforces an emerging pattern in the circuit’s COVID‑19 jurisprudence.

Lawyers litigating in the Seventh Circuit should treat Troogstad as instructive, even if not formally binding precedent.

IV. Key Legal Concepts Explained

1. “Neutral and Generally Applicable” (Free Exercise)

A law or policy is neutral if it does not target religion for adverse treatment and is generally applicable if it applies in the same way to religious and nonreligious conduct. Under Employment Division v. Smith and later clarified by Kennedy, a neutral and generally applicable law usually does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it incidentally burdens religious practices, unless it is administered in a discriminatory manner.

In Troogstad, the court never reached this analytical step because the complaint failed at the initial pleading threshold (no adequately pleaded religious belief/conflict).

2. Substantial Burden (IRFRA/RFRA)

A governmental action substantially burdens religious exercise when it:

Places significant pressure on a person to abandon, modify, or violate a religious belief or practice; or
Penalizes religious exercise through denial of benefits or imposition of sanctions.

To assess whether a burden is “substantial,” courts must first know what the religious belief is. That is why Society of the Divine Word and Troogstad insist on a clear articulation of the belief at the pleading stage.

3. Strict Scrutiny vs. Rational Basis

Strict Scrutiny: The government must show that its action serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. This is the most demanding standard and is typically triggered when a fundamental right is burdened or when a statute like RFRA/IRFRA applies.
Rational Basis: The government need only show that the policy is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Most economic and social regulations are reviewed under this standard, which is highly deferential.

In Troogstad, the court:

Applied rational-basis review to the substantive due process claim (no fundamental right to refuse vaccination); and
Never reached strict scrutiny under IRFRA because the complaint failed to allege a specific, burdened religious belief.

4. “With Prejudice” vs. “Without Prejudice”

A dismissal with prejudice is final as to that claim; the plaintiff cannot refile or replead it in the same case.
A dismissal without prejudice leaves the door open for the plaintiff to file an amended complaint correcting the defects.

In this litigation:

Initially, the Free Exercise and IRFRA claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing amendment.
After the third amended complaint again failed, those claims were dismissed with prejudice.
The substantive due process claim was dismissed with prejudice earlier and remained closed.

5. Leave to Amend Under Rule 15

Courts generally allow at least one amendment, especially early in a case. However, they may deny further amendments where:

The plaintiff has repeatedly failed to fix the same defect;
There is undue delay or bad faith; or
The proposed amendment would be futile (i.e., could not cure the legal insufficiency).

In Troogstad, repeated failures plus the failure to incorporate available factual material (the full religious exemption request) justified denying a fourth amendment.

V. Conclusion

Troogstad v. City of Chicago is formally a nonprecedential order, but it fits squarely within, and further clarifies, the Seventh Circuit’s COVID‑19 and religious liberty jurisprudence. Its main contributions are:

It crystallizes a pleading rule for vaccine-based Free Exercise and IRFRA claims: plaintiffs must articulate specific religious beliefs and explain how those beliefs conflict with vaccination. Bare statements that vaccination “violates my beliefs as a Christian” are not enough.
It reaffirms that there is no fundamental constitutional right to refuse vaccination; substantive due process challenges to vaccine mandates are thus reviewed under deferential rational-basis review and are unlikely to succeed.
It underscores that courts may deny further leave to amend when plaintiffs repeatedly ignore guidance and fail to incorporate available, relevant factual material into their complaints.
It draws a practical line between constitutional/statutory religious liberty claims and Title VII employment accommodation claims, indicating that the latter may be the more viable path for employees with genuine, well‑articulated religious objections.

For lawyers and litigants, the core lesson is straightforward but important: in religious exemption litigation—particularly regarding vaccination mandates—success begins at the pleading stage. Courts will require more than labels or general references to faith. Plaintiffs must put their religious beliefs, and the alleged conflict with the challenged policy, squarely and specifically into the complaint.