Soil Friends: Appellate Abandonment of “Clearly Established” Arguments Affirms Qualified Immunity and Allows Reliance on Plaintiffs’ Disavowal of Monell Liability

1. Introduction

Soil Friends arises from a protracted conflict between farm owners (Benjamin and Sarah Martin and their entity, Soil Friends, LLC) and local authorities in Comstock Township, Michigan over zoning approvals, building-code compliance, and the permissible scope of agritourism and alcohol-related on-site activities in a newly built “red barn.” After the Township cited the plaintiffs, posted condemnation signage, and required multiple layers of approvals (special-exception use, site plan, building and fire approvals), the plaintiffs escalated their dispute publicly—particularly on Facebook—while also pursuing administrative and court avenues.

In federal court, plaintiffs asserted federal constitutional claims (First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments) and related state claims, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. The district court dismissed the case on immunity grounds—granting absolute immunity to two defendants and qualified immunity to the remaining individual officials—and disposed of claims against the Township and KABA based on plaintiffs’ own representations. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in its entirety, holding:

• Municipal defendants (Township and KABA): Plaintiffs could not revive a Monell theory on appeal after expressly disavowing it in the district court; the district court did not err by relying on plaintiffs’ representations to dispose of the municipal claims.
• Qualified immunity: Plaintiffs abandoned their challenge to the district court’s “clearly established” analysis by failing to address it in their opening appellate brief; belated reliance on case law in a reply brief was waived.
• Dismissal with prejudice: The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing federal claims with prejudice where plaintiffs never formally moved to amend nor proposed a concrete amendment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

A. Municipal liability and party representations

• Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)
  Rule invoked: Municipal liability under § 1983 requires that the constitutional injury be caused by an official municipal “policy, practice, or custom,” and municipalities are not liable under a respondeat superior theory.
  Role here: Plaintiffs used Monell to argue the opposite of what they argued on appeal: in the district court, they emphasized that their allegations did not “imply a policy, practice, or custom,” to show they were pursuing individuals (not the municipality). That strategic disavowal boxed them in on appeal.
• Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
  Rule invoked: Official-capacity suits are effectively suits against the governmental entity; they can be duplicative of direct municipal claims.
  Role here: Defendants argued that the individuals were being sued in official capacities (thus duplicating municipal claims). Plaintiffs countered by emphasizing the absence of a Monell claim—helping drive the district court’s conclusion that no municipal claim was being pursued at all.
• Castellon-Vogel v. Int'l Paper Co., 829 F. App'x 100, 102 (6th Cir. 2020)
  Rule invoked: Appellants must confront the district court’s reasoning; failure to do so results in abandonment on appeal. The opinion also underscores that litigants cannot fault a court for accepting their own prior representations.
  Role here: The Sixth Circuit used Castellon-Vogel as a direct response to plaintiffs’ attempt to reverse course: having told the district court they were not bringing Monell claims, they could not meaningfully argue error in the court’s reliance on that stance.

B. Qualified immunity—procedure and the “clearly established” requirement

• Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015)
  Rule invoked: Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, not merely from liability; plaintiffs must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the right was clearly established.
  Role here: The court set the framework and reinforced that the “clearly established” prong is a distinct, essential hurdle.
• Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009)
  Rule invoked: Immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage to avoid discovery burdens for insubstantial claims.
  Role here: The court’s approach aligns with early dismissal where plaintiffs fail to identify clearly established law at the pleading stage.
• Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2021)
  Rule invoked: Once qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden to overcome it.
  Role here: This burden allocation mattered because plaintiffs did not carry the “clearly established” burden—below or on appeal.
• Fitzpatrick v. Hanney, 138 F.4th 991, 995 (6th Cir. 2025)
  Rule invoked: A right is clearly established only if controlling authority dictates it and it clearly prohibits the conduct in the particular circumstances; precedent must be so clear that every reasonable official would understand it to establish the specific rule plaintiffs seek.
  Role here: The court emphasized factual specificity. This reinforced the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ sole cited comparator—Fritz—was too factually dissimilar.
• Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F. 3d 718 (6th Cir. 2010)
  Role here: Plaintiffs’ only identified authority (below) for First Amendment retaliation was deemed too dissimilar to place the “constitutional question beyond debate.” On appeal, plaintiffs did not even cite Fritz in their opening brief, reinforcing abandonment.
• Scott v. First Southern Nat'l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019) (cited via Castellon-Vogel)
  Rule invoked: Failure to engage the district court’s reasoning abandons an issue on appeal.
  Role here: The court treated plaintiffs’ omission as dispositive: they argued plausibility of violations but not clearly established law.
• Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010)
  Rule invoked: Arguments first raised in a reply brief are waived.
  Role here: Plaintiffs’ attempt to introduce “clearly established” authorities late (in reply) was rejected to avoid prejudice to defendants, who had no chance to respond.

C. Dismissal with prejudice and failure to amend

• Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., 144 F.4th 880, 899 (6th Cir. 2025)
  Rule invoked: If a party never formally moves to amend and does not propose an amendment, dismissal with prejudice is not an abuse of discretion.
  Role here: This was the governing standard; plaintiffs did not move to amend.
• Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2019)
  Rule invoked: A cursory request to amend, embedded in briefing, is insufficient; courts may dismiss with prejudice absent a proper motion and proposed amendment.
  Role here: Plaintiffs’ “cursory request at the end” of their response was treated as inadequate, validating dismissal with prejudice.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s core is procedural discipline applied to civil-rights litigation:

• Litigation positions bind in practical effect: The court did not frame this as formal judicial estoppel, but the result is similar: when plaintiffs told the district court they were not pursuing Monell liability (and indeed could not, because no policy/custom was implicated), they could not later claim error in dismissing municipal defendants on that basis. Appellate review focuses on alleged judicial error; it is not a vehicle for retooling theories disclaimed below.
• Qualified immunity turns on the “clearly established” prong—and appellants must brief it: The district court’s decision rested on prong two (no clearly established law). The Sixth Circuit treated plaintiffs’ failure to contest that prong in their opening brief as abandonment, making it unnecessary to re-litigate the underlying constitutional merits. The court also enforced waiver doctrine to bar new “clearly established” authorities raised only in reply.
• Dismissal with prejudice is permissible absent a proper motion to amend: Rather than granting a do-over by default, the court required procedural steps: a formal motion and a proposed amendment explaining how deficiencies would be cured. Plaintiffs’ failure to do so meant the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal fell well within its discretion.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, Soil Friends is likely to be influential in three recurring litigation contexts:

• Appellate briefing in qualified-immunity cases: The decision is a cautionary template: when the district court dismisses on “clearly established” grounds, an appellant must identify and analyze controlling, factually similar precedent in the opening brief—or risk outright abandonment.
• Pleading and preserving municipal liability: Plaintiffs who strategically disclaim Monell to avoid “official-capacity/duplicative claim” complications may forfeit municipal recovery paths. The opinion underscores that appellate courts will not rescue a municipal theory abandoned (or affirmatively disclaimed) below.
• Amendment practice post-dismissal: The case reinforces that a perfunctory “leave to amend” request is not enough—especially where immunity doctrines are designed to terminate litigation early. Plaintiffs must timely present a concrete amended theory to avoid dismissal with prejudice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from being sued for damages unless the plaintiff can show (a) a constitutional violation and (b) that the unlawfulness was already clear under existing precedent in similar circumstances.
• “Clearly established” law: Not a general statement like “retaliation is unlawful,” but a case (usually binding) with sufficiently similar facts that would have put every reasonable official on notice that the specific conduct at issue was unconstitutional.
• Monell claim: A § 1983 claim against a city/township (or similar entity) requiring proof that an official policy, longstanding custom, or decision by a final policymaker caused the constitutional injury—mere employee wrongdoing is not enough.
• Individual-capacity vs. official-capacity suits: Individual-capacity targets the official personally (damages paid by the person, typically indemnified); official-capacity is treated as a suit against the government entity itself (triggering Monell-type requirements).
• Dismissal “with prejudice”: The federal claims are ended permanently in that court; the plaintiff cannot refile the same federal claims based on the same facts, absent a successful appeal or other exceptional circumstances.
• Waiver/abandonment on appeal: Appellate courts generally decide only issues properly raised and developed in the opening brief; arguments raised late (e.g., in a reply brief) are typically not considered.

5. Conclusion

Soil Friends does not announce a new substantive constitutional rule about zoning disputes or land-use retaliation; instead, it crystallizes a set of procedural, litigation-shaping principles in civil-rights cases: (1) district courts may rely on litigants’ express disavowals to resolve claims against municipal defendants; (2) appellants must directly challenge the “clearly established” prong when qualified immunity is the basis for dismissal, or the issue is abandoned; and (3) dismissal with prejudice is a proper endpoint when plaintiffs neither move to amend nor propose a curative amendment. For future litigants, the case functions as a roadmap of what must be preserved, briefed, and formally requested—especially when immunity doctrines are in play.