Sixth Circuit: § 1983 Procedural Due Process Claims Accrue No Later Than the Last Denial of Process, and Michigan’s No‑Equitable‑Tolling Regime Applies

Sixth Circuit: § 1983 Procedural Due Process Claims Accrue No Later Than the Last Denial of Process, and Michigan’s No‑Equitable‑Tolling Regime Applies

Introduction

In Charles Bozzo v. Jennifer Nanasy, et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Thapar, Readler, and Hermandorfer; opinion by Judge Readler) affirmed the dismissal of a former Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) correctional officer’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. The plaintiff, Charles Bozzo, alleged that MDOC violated his constitutional rights—focusing on procedural due process—when it terminated him following harassment complaints by a coworker and later upheld the termination in arbitration.

The district court had dismissed the case on two grounds: first, the claims were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations; second, even if timely, the complaint failed to state a procedural due process claim. On appeal, Bozzo pressed only the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on both grounds: the claim was time-barred, and it failed on the merits.

The decision is important for two reasons:

  • It clarifies when a § 1983 procedural due process claim “accrues” in the employment-termination context: no later than the last alleged denial of process (here, the end of the arbitration hearing), not when the arbitrator issues a final decision.
  • It reinforces that Michigan’s three-year limitations period and its rejection of common-law equitable tolling govern § 1983 claims arising in Michigan, absent inconsistency with federal law—and that the usual administrative or grievance steps do not toll the limitations period for non-prisoners.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. It held:

  • Statute of limitations: Michigan’s three-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims. Even assuming (without deciding) the Sixth Circuit’s “discovery rule” applies, Bozzo’s procedural due process claim accrued no later than December 17, 2020—when the arbitration hearing concluded—because by then both the deprivation (termination) and the allegedly inadequate process had occurred. His first federal complaint, filed December 18, 2023, came one day too late; the later refiled complaint could not revive the expired claim. Michigan’s tolling rules did not save the suit.
  • No equitable tolling: Michigan does not recognize common-law equitable tolling for the three-year statute at issue, and applying Michigan’s tolling regime is consistent with § 1983 policy. Even under federal equitable tolling principles, Bozzo showed no “compelling equitable considerations,” and his multi-year delay reflected a lack of diligence.
  • No tolling for “exhaustion” of remedies: Non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state remedies and, therefore, cannot claim tolling on that basis. Only prisoners benefit from exhaustion-based tolling pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
  • Failure to state a procedural due process claim (alternative holding): MDOC afforded Bozzo constitutionally adequate pre-termination and post-termination procedures. The pre-termination conference satisfied Loudermill’s minimal “initial check” requirements, and the post-termination arbitration provided a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker with the opportunity to present and challenge evidence. Allegations that the arbitrator earned “significant income” from MDOC arbitrations, relied on “falsehoods,” or applied “evolving standards” were insufficient to plausibly plead bias or procedural inadequacy; they reflected dissatisfaction with the outcome rather than a defect in process.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Accrual of § 1983 claims:
    • Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007): Federal law governs accrual; a claim accrues when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action.”
    • Reed v. Goertz, 143 S. Ct. 955 (2023): A procedural due process claim “completes” when both a state deprivation and inadequate process have occurred. The panel uses Reed to frame the two-element structure for accrual in due process cases.
    • American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Amtrak, 839 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2016) and Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991): The “injury” in procedural due process is the infirm process itself; no “final decision” is required for accrual.
    • Printup v. Director, Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Services, 654 F. App’x 781 (6th Cir. 2016): Accrual may precede completion of administrative review; the claim accrues when the alleged process defects first cause harm, not when a reviewing officer affirms them.
    • Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874 (6th Cir. 2024): Reiterates the accrual concept as occurring when all elements are present; also notes tension between Supreme Court’s occurrence-based rule and Sixth Circuit’s discovery rule.
    • Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water, 777 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2015): Recites the Sixth Circuit’s discovery rule (accrual when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury), which the panel assumes applies because the parties argued under it.
    • United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020): Party-presentation principle; the court takes the case as framed by the parties and declines to resolve doctrinal tensions not raised by them.
  • Statute of limitations and tolling:
    • Eidson v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, 510 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2007): § 1983 borrows the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period (here, Michigan’s three-year period under MCL 600.5805(2)).
    • Rapp v. Putnam, 644 F. App’x 621 (6th Cir. 2016); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986): Apply Michigan’s three-year statute to § 1983 claims.
    • Cataldo v. U.S. Steel, 676 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2012) and Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007): A complaint is subject to 12(b)(6) dismissal when it affirmatively shows the claim is time-barred.
    • Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630 (6th Cir. 2025): Recognizes Michigan’s tolling rules in prior-suit contexts; here, the panel notes that Bozzo’s first suit would have tolled his claim only if filed before the limitations period expired—which it wasn’t.
    • Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980): State tolling rules apply to § 1983 unless inconsistent with federal policy.
    • Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738 N.W.2d 664 (Mich. 2007); Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 702 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. 2005); Secura Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 605 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. 2000): Michigan does not allow common-law equitable tolling to expand express statutory limitation periods.
    • Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum, 209 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2000); Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2017): Federal equitable tolling is “sparingly” applied and requires unavoidable circumstances; absent compelling equities, deadlines are not extended “by even a single day.”
    • Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) and Cada v. Baxter Healthcare, 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990): No “stop-clock” approach; lack of diligence defeats tolling, even where some equitable considerations might exist.
    • Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) and Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982): Non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies; only prisoners must exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
  • Procedural due process in employment termination:
    • Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) and Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997): Pre-termination “initial check” requires notice of charges, explanation of evidence, and an opportunity to respond; no full evidentiary hearing is required pre-termination.
    • Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491 (6th Cir. 1990): Informal pre-termination meeting can suffice if it affords the employee a chance to be heard.
    • Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2004): Post-termination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker satisfies due process; collective-bargaining arbitration may fulfill this requirement. Dissatisfaction with outcomes is not a process defect.
    • Rodgers v. 36th District Court, 529 F. App’x 642 (6th Cir. 2013) and Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 767 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985): Minimal post-termination process includes attendance, assistance of counsel, ability to present and challenge evidence.
    • Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005): Prior service by an arbitrator in disputes involving a party does not, without more, plausibly demonstrate partiality.
    • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Conclusory allegations do not suffice to plausibly plead bias or other elements; factual content is required.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Accrual and the Statute of Limitations

Michigan’s three-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 claims arising in Michigan. Accrual, however, is a federal question. A procedural due process claim “completes” when both elements occur: (i) a state deprivation of a protected interest; and (ii) inadequate process.

Applying that template:

  • Deprivation: Bozzo’s property interest (public employment) was terminated on July 31, 2019.
  • Process: The latest alleged process denial occurred at the conclusion of his post-termination arbitration hearing on December 17, 2020. By then, any alleged procedural infirmities (from pre-termination conference through post-termination arbitration) had already occurred.

The court therefore treated December 17, 2020 as the latest possible accrual date, rendering the three-year deadline December 17, 2023. Bozzo’s first complaint (December 18, 2023) was one day late; his second complaint (June 14, 2024) was necessarily untimely as well. Because the complaint itself showed untimeliness, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper.

2) The “Discovery Rule” Assumption Did Not Change the Accrual Date

Although Supreme Court precedent favors an occurrence-based accrual rule, and the Sixth Circuit has recognized tension with its own discovery rule line, the panel proceeded on the parties’ shared assumption that the discovery rule applied. Even so, the discovery rule did not help Bozzo: in a procedural due process claim, “injury” means the infirm process itself, not the outcome of a later decision. Bozzo knew (or had reason to know) of the alleged procedural deficiencies as they occurred—such as the supposed “surprise” witness at the arbitration hearing—well before the arbitrator issued the March 1, 2021 award. Waiting for an unfavorable decision is “dissatisfaction with the result,” not discovery of a new injury.

3) No Equitable Tolling Under Michigan Law—and None Under Federal Standards Either

For § 1983, courts apply state tolling rules unless they are inconsistent with federal law. Michigan’s Supreme Court has squarely rejected common-law equitable tolling for explicit statutory limitation periods like MCL 600.5805(2). That policy is not inconsistent with § 1983. And even under federal equitable tolling, courts act “sparingly” and require compelling equities and diligence—neither present here. Bozzo also waited nearly three years after the arbitrator’s award to sue, a lack of diligence that independently precludes tolling.

4) No Tolling for “Exhaustion” of Remedies for Non-Prisoners

Non-prisoner § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state administrative or grievance remedies; thus, pursuit of those avenues does not toll the statute. Only prisoners, who must exhaust under the PLRA, receive tolling tied to exhaustion.

5) Alternative Merits Holding: Adequate Process Was Provided

Even if timely, Bozzo’s complaint failed to state a procedural due process claim.

  • Pre-termination: Loudermill requires only an “initial check” against mistaken decisions: notice of the charges, explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond. MDOC served written charges detailing the alleged misconduct and rules implicated and conducted a pre-termination disciplinary conference attended by Bozzo and his union representative. That “brief discussion” sufficed; a full evidentiary hearing is not required pre-termination.
  • Post-termination: Due process requires an opportunity for a post-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, with the ability to present and challenge evidence. Bozzo received a three-day arbitration hearing under his collective bargaining agreement, attended with representation. He did not allege facts showing that he was barred from calling witnesses, presenting evidence, or challenging the employer’s case. Arbitration routinely satisfies post-termination due process in this Circuit.
  • Neutrality/Bias: Allegations that the arbitrator earned “significant income” from MDOC arbitrations, relied on “falsehoods,” or applied “evolving standards” are conclusory and do not plausibly plead bias or structural unfairness. Prior service in arbitrations with a party does not, by itself, show partiality. These allegations go to disagreement with the arbitrator’s fact-finding or legal analysis—i.e., substance, not process.

Impact and Practical Implications

  • Accrual clarity in employment due process claims: Plaintiffs cannot defer accrual until the issuance of a final arbitration or administrative ruling. The limitations clock starts no later than the last alleged denial of process (here, the end of the hearing). Counsel should identify the latest alleged process defect and calculate limitation periods from that date—often long before a final award or decision issues.
  • Protective filings while grievances/arbitrations proceed: Because administrative and grievance proceedings do not toll limitations for non-prisoners, plaintiffs should consider filing protective § 1983 suits within the three-year window and then seeking a stay if parallel proceedings are ongoing.
  • No equitable tolling safety net in Michigan: Michigan’s no‑equitable‑tolling rule for the three-year period (MCL 600.5805(2)) leaves little room for equitable rescue. Diligent calendaring is essential; even a one-day delay can be fatal.
  • Arbitrator bias pleading standard: To state a due process claim premised on lack of neutrality, plaintiffs must allege concrete facts showing actual partiality or structural bias. Bare allegations of repeat-player status or income from arbitrations, without more, are insufficient.
  • Loudermill’s low pre-termination bar remains intact: Employers need only provide notice, explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond before termination. Formalities are not required.
  • Unionized public employees: Arbitration procedures under collective bargaining agreements, if facially neutral and permitting presentation and challenge of evidence, will typically satisfy post-termination due process.
  • Doctrinal tension preserved: The panel flags—without resolving—the tension between Supreme Court occurrence-based accrual and the Sixth Circuit’s discovery rule. Practitioners should not rely on the discovery rule to extend accrual when the “injury” is the allegedly infirm process itself and is known when it occurs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Accrual: The moment when a claim becomes complete and the clock starts running. For procedural due process, accrual requires both a deprivation (e.g., termination) and the denial of adequate procedures.
  • Statute of limitations: The legal deadline for filing a lawsuit. Michigan’s § 1983 deadline is three years, borrowed from the state’s personal-injury limitations period (MCL 600.5805(2)).
  • Discovery rule: A doctrine (assumed by the court here) that accrual begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury. For due process claims, the “injury” is the defective process, not the adverse decision that might follow it.
  • Equitable tolling: A court’s power to pause the limitations period for fairness reasons. Michigan generally disallows common-law equitable tolling for the three-year period at issue; federal tolling is applied sparingly and requires diligence and unavoidable obstacles.
  • Loudermill hearing: A minimal pre-termination opportunity to be heard: notice of charges, explanation of evidence, and a chance to respond—no trial-level hearing required at this stage.
  • Post-deprivation hearing: A more robust opportunity after termination before a neutral decisionmaker to present and challenge evidence. Arbitration commonly satisfies this requirement when it affords basic adversarial rights.
  • Neutral decisionmaker: A decisionmaker without bias or stake in the outcome. Repeat arbitration work for a party, standing alone, does not establish bias; specific facts showing actual partiality are necessary.
  • “Dissatisfaction with the result” vs. “process defect”: Due process protects fair procedures, not correct outcomes. Complaints about evidentiary or legal errors, absent structural unfairness, generally do not state procedural due process claims.

Conclusion

Bozzo v. Nanasy reinforces two practical and doctrinal points in Sixth Circuit § 1983 litigation. First, procedural due process claims accrue no later than the last alleged denial of process and do not await the issuance of a final arbitration or administrative decision. Second, Michigan’s three-year statute and its disfavor of common-law equitable tolling govern § 1983 claims arising in Michigan, leaving plaintiffs little margin for delay. On the merits, the opinion underscores that Loudermill’s pre-termination requirements are modest and that standard post-termination arbitration procedures typically suffice, absent well-pleaded facts showing bias or structural unfairness.

The case thus offers clear guidance: identify and calendar the last alleged procedural defect; file within three years of that date; do not assume that grievance or arbitration processes will toll the limitations period; and, to plead a due process violation, focus on specific procedural inadequacies or bias, not disagreement with the outcome. While the panel preserves the ongoing dialogue over accrual methodology (occurrence versus discovery), this decision provides a workable and plaintiff-specific accrual marker in employment due process cases—the last alleged denial of process—along with a firm reminder that Michigan’s tolling regime controls.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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