Sixth Circuit Clarifies Title VII Pleading: Time‑Barred Incidents Can Bolster Plausibility and Plaintiffs Need Not Name Comparators; Medical Leave Does Not Break Retaliation Causation

Case: Ashraf Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 24-1763 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2025) (unpublished)
Panel: Judges Stranch, Bush (author), and Nalbandian
Disposition: Reversed and remanded

Introduction

This unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion revives a former Ford engineer’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims that had been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The court uses the occasion to restate and sharpen several important pleading-stage principles in employment discrimination litigation.

First, the court reinforces that plaintiffs are not required to plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss; plausibility under Twombly/Iqbal remains the lodestar. Second, the court clarifies that although time-barred discrete acts cannot independently support liability, they may be used as “background evidence” to render a timely termination plausibly discriminatory or retaliatory. Third, the court holds that plaintiffs need not identify comparators by name to plead disparate treatment, so long as the complaint alleges concrete facts about how similarly situated colleagues were treated more favorably. Finally, the court explains that an employee’s medical leave taken between protected activity and termination does not necessarily break the causal chain; a sequence of post-complaint events and an immediate termination upon return can plausibly allege retaliation.

The decision offers practical guidance both to plaintiffs drafting Title VII complaints and to employers assessing the risks of early motions to dismiss.

Case Background and Key Issues

Parties and facts: Plaintiff–appellant Ashraf Mustafa, a Middle Eastern Muslim manufacturing engineer, worked at Ford from 2014 until his termination in July 2021. After a 2019 transfer to Ford’s Kansas City launch team (for the 2022 F‑150), Mustafa alleges he received disparate treatment from supervisors Gordon Richei and Victoria Wilson and manager Daniel Schluentz: negative performance reviews despite meeting deliverables, reprimand for wearing shorts when non-Muslim white colleagues were not disciplined, a heavier workload after a colleague left, promised help later withdrawn, and a false accusation of timecard fraud later disproved. He filed a formal human-resources complaint alleging harassment and discrimination in October 2020. He took medical leave in January 2021 following an on-the-job injury and was terminated three days after returning in July 2021 for purported poor performance.

Procedural posture: Mustafa filed an EEOC charge 299 days after termination, received a right-to-sue letter, and sued under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation. The district court twice dismissed for failure to state a claim, the second time with prejudice. Mustafa appealed.

Issues on appeal:

Whether Mustafa plausibly alleged discriminatory termination under Title VII.
Whether Mustafa plausibly alleged retaliatory termination, including whether the temporal sequence and intervening medical leave undermined causation at the pleading stage.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that both the discrimination and retaliation claims were plausibly pleaded and should not have been dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The court emphasized that:

Only the termination falls within the 300-day EEOC window and thus can independently support liability; earlier events are time-barred as discrete acts but may be considered as “background evidence” supporting the inference that the termination was discriminatory or retaliatory.
Mustafa alleged multiple “specific events” of disparate treatment, satisfactory performance despite negative reviews, and that the same supervisor (Richei) was repeatedly involved, plausibly linking earlier incidents to the termination decision. Those allegations suffice under Rule 8 without naming comparators.
For retaliation, a plausible causal chain exists: an HR complaint, a swift and unsubstantiated timecard accusation, a negative performance review acknowledging completed deliverables, followed by medical leave and an immediate termination upon return. Medical leave does not, at the pleading stage, sever causation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002): Plaintiffs need not plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. The Sixth Circuit leans on Swierkiewicz repeatedly to reject the district court’s insistence on prima facie-level specificity at the pleading stage. This frames the entire opinion: plausibility under Rule 8, not prima facie proof, governs a motion to dismiss.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The benchmark for “plausibility” (not possibility). The court deploys these standards to distinguish between “naked assertions” and the concrete, event-based allegations found sufficient here.
Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012): A key Sixth Circuit pleading case. Like Keys, Mustafa’s complaint identifies supervisors, specific episodes of disparate treatment, and adverse actions despite satisfactory performance—“easily” enough for plausibility.
Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932 (6th Cir. 2024): Confirms that alleging specific events where a plaintiff was treated differently can plausibly show discrimination at the pleading stage; the opinion cites Savel to reinforce that comparator names are not required if the complaint describes differential treatment.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002): Distinguishes timely and time-barred discrete acts. The court uses Morgan to limit liability to the termination but simultaneously to admit time-barred events as “background evidence” supporting plausibility and pretext.
Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008): Temporal proximity plus other post-complaint adverse events can support retaliation. The court applies Mickey to recognize an “escalating retaliation” narrative between an HR complaint and termination.
Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833 (6th Cir. 2024): Reinforces that some plausible allegation of causation is required, but the burden is modest at the pleading stage.
Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009): Causation burden at prima facie stage is “minimal.” The court alludes to this to resist imposing a heightened causation standard on Mustafa’s complaint.
Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F. App’x 446 (6th Cir. 2018), and House v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 630 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2015): Plaintiffs must allege facts about “other employees or their differing treatment,” but need not list names. The court uses these to explain what crosses the line from speculation to plausibility.
16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2013): Dismissal is appropriate when complaints offer only “naked assertions” and speculation. The court distinguishes Flagstar because Mustafa alleges concrete differential treatment and a factual narrative, not bare conclusions.
Han v. University of Dayton, 541 F. App’x 622 (6th Cir. 2013): Insufficient where plaintiff alleged only replacement by a white male without specifics on comparator treatment. The court contrasts Mustafa’s more robust factual allegations.
Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399 (6th Cir. 2008), Gibson v. Shelly Co., 314 F. App’x 760 (6th Cir. 2008), and Kellogg v. Ball State Univ., 984 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2021): Support using time-barred acts as background to infer pretext or discriminatory motive for a timely adverse action.
Masaebi v. Arby’s Corp., 852 F. App’x 903 (6th Cir. 2021): Pleading-stage resolution of discrimination claims is disfavored because key evidence rests with the employer; this supports letting discovery proceed.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020): Causation discussion cited to underscore that a protected trait being “at least a motivating factor” suffices for Title VII’s mixed-motive path, and that but-for causation does not require sole cause—helpful at the plausibility stage.
Statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (discrimination), § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation), § 2000e-5(e)(1) (EEOC charge deadlines). The court also notes the 300-day extended filing period in deferral states like Michigan, consistent with Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019).

Legal Reasoning

1) Discrimination

Pleading standard and the role of time-barred acts: The court cabins the merits to the termination (the only timely discrete act), but explicitly treats earlier negative reviews, differential discipline (shorts), withdrawn support, and a disproven timecard accusation as “background evidence” that plausibly contextualizes the termination as discriminatory. This is a careful application of Morgan: background facts may support a reasonable inference of pretext and discriminatory motive for a timely adverse action.

Specificity without prima facie proof: The court stresses that Mustafa was not required to present a full prima facie case or commit to a direct/circumstantial theory. Instead, he had to allege facts allowing a reasonable inference of discriminatory termination. He did so by alleging:

Multiple, concrete episodes of less favorable treatment than non-Middle Eastern, non-Muslim colleagues (e.g., discipline for attire others wore without consequence; denial of promised assistance; heavier redistributed workloads).
Adverse reviews despite acknowledged completion of deliverables, consistent with pretextual performance criticisms.
Replacement by someone outside his protected classes.
Continuity of decisionmaking actors—especially Richei—across pre-termination incidents and the termination, which ties the alleged discriminatory animus to the final adverse action.

Comparators at the pleading stage: The court rebuffs the argument that plaintiffs must name comparators. It suffices to describe how similarly situated colleagues were treated more favorably (e.g., receiving assisting engineers, better credit for work, raises, and lax enforcement of dress rules). This is a meaningful clarification for pleadings: detail the nature of the differential treatment and the comparability of roles or expectations; names can come later in discovery.

2) Retaliation

Causation through sequence and context: The district court viewed the nine-month span between the HR complaint and the termination as fatal to causation. The Sixth Circuit disagrees, crediting a more nuanced timeline:

October 2020: HR complaint alleging discrimination.
Two weeks later: Accusation of timecard falsification (later unsubstantiated).
December 2020: Negative review acknowledging completed deliverables.
January–July 2021: Medical leave following an injury suffered around the time of the complaint.
Three days after returning: Termination for alleged performance issues.

In light of post-complaint adverse actions and an immediate termination upon return from leave, the court held that the complaint plausibly alleges an escalating retaliatory campaign, consistent with Mickey. Importantly, the medical leave does not break the causal chain at the pleading stage.

Knowledge can be inferred: The court rejects a heightened requirement that the complaint plead detailed facts showing the supervisor’s actual knowledge of the HR complaint. A reasonable inference arises that an HR complaint gives the employer (including relevant supervisors) knowledge. Whether (and to whom) HR communicated the complaint is a discovery issue, not a pleading deficiency.

Impact

Although “not recommended for publication” and therefore nonprecedential in the Sixth Circuit, this opinion is likely to influence district court practice and counsel’s litigation strategies in several ways:

Pleading playbook for plaintiffs: The decision maps a viable route to survive Rule 12(b)(6) by:
- Anchoring claims to a timely discrete act (here, termination) while marshalling out-of-time incidents as background that plausibly show pretext and discriminatory motive.
- Describing, but not necessarily naming, comparators by explaining how similarly situated colleagues were treated more favorably and why roles are comparable.
- Alleging a cohesive timeline that connects protected activity to adverse actions, including intervening retaliatory steps and immediate termination upon return from leave.
Constrained utility of early motions to dismiss for employers: Efforts to front-load McDonnell Douglas evidentiary burdens into Rule 12 are likely to meet resistance. Where complaints include concrete differential-treatment facts and a plausible sequence, courts may prefer to let discovery proceed.
Time-barred acts as context: Expect more plaintiffs to plead older events as narrative context to show pretext, pattern, or animus, even when those events cannot support standalone claims. Employers should be ready to address the “one decisionmaker across time” narrative.
Retaliation causation after leave: Medical or other leave will not necessarily wash out causation at the pleading stage. If adverse actions begin shortly after protected activity and a termination follows immediately upon return, courts may infer a continuous retaliatory chain.
HR knowledge inferences: Courts may allow reasonable inferences that supervisors knew about HR complaints, deferring granular knowledge questions to discovery. Employers should ensure clear, documented, need-to-know communication pathways regarding complaints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) and plausibility: At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepts factual allegations as true and asks only whether those facts, if true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. It’s a low bar: the plaintiff need not prove the case, only present a believable narrative grounded in specific facts.
McDonnell Douglas vs. pleading: The prima facie case and burden-shifting framework govern proof at summary judgment and trial, not what must be alleged in a complaint. A complaint must provide fair notice and plausible facts, not evidence.
Discrete acts vs. continuing violations: Each discrete act (e.g., termination, discipline) must be timely charged with the EEOC. Older acts cannot independently support liability if they fall outside the 300-day filing window, but they can be used as background to show motive or pretext for a timely act like termination.
Comparators: Employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class who are similarly situated in relevant respects (job duties, standards, decisionmakers) and treated better. At pleading, plaintiffs can describe those differences without listing names; discovery fills in the details.
Pretext: A reason offered by the employer that is false or not the true reason for the adverse action. Allegations like “negative reviews despite meeting deliverables” can support an inference of pretext.
Temporal proximity and causation (retaliation): Close timing between protected activity (like an HR complaint) and adverse actions supports causation. A string of retaliatory acts between the complaint and termination, and immediate termination upon return from leave, can make causation plausible despite a calendar gap.
Exhaustion and deadlines: In deferral states (like Michigan), an EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Only acts within that window can independently support liability, but older acts can still be pled as context.
Unpublished opinions: Marked “not recommended for publication,” this decision is nonprecedential in the Sixth Circuit. It is persuasive authority and reflects how this panel applies established Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit pleading principles.

Conclusion

This decision is a strong reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s Swierkiewicz-through-Iqbal/Twombly pleading rubric in Title VII cases. The Sixth Circuit underscores that a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case, name comparators, or negate every benign explanation to get past Rule 12(b)(6). Instead, concrete episodes of differential treatment, continuity of decisionmakers, and a coherent timeline of events can plausibly allege discriminatory and retaliatory termination.

Two clarifications are particularly significant:

Time-barred incidents may be pled as background to support the inference that a timely termination was discriminatory or retaliatory—especially when the same actors are involved and when earlier accusations (like timecard fraud) were later disproven.
Medical leave does not sever retaliation causation at the pleading stage if the narrative includes immediate adverse actions after protected activity and an immediate termination upon return.

On remand, discovery will test whether the alleged comparator treatment is truly comparable, whether the performance rationale was pretextual, and what decisionmakers knew and when. For now, the Sixth Circuit reiterates that plausible, fact-backed narratives—not prima facie evidentiary showings—control at the threshold.