Introduction

In Michael Edward Tindall v. Samuel D. Sweet, Trustee (In re Christopher D. Wyman), No. 24-1945 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit disposed of a sprawling, multi-proceeding appeal arising from a long-running Chapter 7 case. The appellant, attorney Michael Tindall—found by the bankruptcy court to have committed fraud on the court and later disbarred for unrelated reasons—sought to unwind a series of bankruptcy rulings related to avoidance litigation, trustee conduct, professional employment and fees, and district court recusal.

The panel (Judges White, Stranch, and Murphy, with Judge Murphy writing) affirmed in large part and dismissed in part, reinforcing several key principles:

• Appellate forfeiture is fatal when an appellant fails to challenge all independent grounds supporting a decision.
• Rule 60(b)(4) “void judgment” attacks are constrained by Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement, even when the alleged voidness is grounded in subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Bankruptcy trustees enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken pursuant to court order, and fiduciary-duty counterclaims against trustees administering an estate stem from bankruptcy such that bankruptcy courts may enter final judgments without offending Stern v. Marshall.
• Interim attorney-fee determinations are not final, and district courts lack jurisdiction over appeals from non-final fee orders under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
• Prior judicial acts—here, a chief judge’s administrative imposition of reciprocal discipline—do not establish bias warranting recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144.

Summary of the Opinion

The court addressed four clusters of issues, tied to three adversary proceedings (2012, 2019, and 2020) and fee litigation in the main case:

1. 2012 adversary proceeding: Tindall sought to vacate a stipulated final judgment years after settlement, arguing lack of due process and later subject-matter jurisdiction defects. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial under appellate forfeiture principles: the bankruptcy court had rejected the Rule 60(b)(4) motion on two independent grounds—no due-process violation and untimeliness—and Tindall appealed only the first. Because Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” applies even to voidness claims (including for alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), the unchallenged timeliness holding sustained the result.
2. 2019 and 2020 adversary proceedings: Tindall and Duggan counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty against the trustee, Sweet. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment on trustee “absolute immunity” (acts pursuant to court order) and permitted Sweet to amend his answer to add that defense. The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in allowing amendment and rejected Tindall’s argument that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional power to enter final judgment: trustee-duty claims challenging estate administration “stem from the bankruptcy itself,” and, informed by the Barton doctrine, fall within the bankruptcy court’s final adjudicatory authority without running afoul of Stern.
3. Professional employment and fees: Tindall challenged Sweet’s attorney’s-fee award by attacking the local rule under which Sweet acted as attorney for the estate, and he separately challenged limitations on his own fees. The court affirmed the award to Sweet on forfeiture grounds because Tindall failed to contest the alternative holding that Sweet’s filing satisfied Rule 2014 even if the local rule were invalid. As to Tindall’s own fees, the court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the bankruptcy court had not entered a final compensation order (the amount remained unresolved and sanctions were pending).
4. Recusal: The court affirmed denial of the motion to recuse the district judge who had previously issued the reciprocal disbarment order as chief judge. That administrative act did not evince the kind of bias or prejudice necessitating recusal under § 144 and Liteky.

Bottom line: affirmed in part; appeal of Tindall’s fee issues dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Stewart v. IHT Insurance Agency Group, LLC, 990 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2021), and Blick v. Ann Arbor Public Schools District, 105 F.4th 868 (6th Cir. 2024): These cases supplied the appellate forfeiture rule applied twice in this opinion—once to uphold the denial of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion (untimeliness as an unchallenged, independent ground) and again to affirm the fee award to the trustee (the unchallenged alternative holding that Sweet’s filing satisfied Rule 2014).
• In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. granted sub nom. Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 145 S. Ct. 2775 (2025), and United States v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2003): The panel relied on Vista-Pro (and Dailide before it) to reiterate that Rule 60(b)(4) motions alleging void judgments—even for claimed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—must be brought within a “reasonable time” under Rule 60(c)(1). This foreclosed Tindall’s attempt to evade timeliness by repackaging his challenge as jurisdictional.
• Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 1994); Pittman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2018); Rayfield v. American Reliable Insurance Co., 641 F. App’x 533 (6th Cir. 2016): These authorities framed Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy and abuse-of-discretion review. They supported allowing the trustee to amend to assert immunity where delay was minimal or attributable to unrelated appellate detours, and no prejudice existed given the sparse litigation activity.
• Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012): Cited by Tindall to argue forfeiture of unpled defenses, but the opinion correctly notes Wood contemplates amendment as a cure—defenses are forfeited if not pled “in an amendment thereto.”
• Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), and Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012): The panel distinguished these cases—each involving a debtor’s state-law claims arising outside bankruptcy—because Tindall’s fiduciary-duty counterclaims targeted the trustee’s court-supervised administration of the estate, which “stems from the bankruptcy itself.”
• Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1993); In re McKenzie, 716 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2013); and Farrier v. Leicht, 2020 WL 13017227 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2020): The Barton doctrine’s gatekeeping for suits against court-appointed fiduciaries underscored why these counterclaims are intrinsic to the bankruptcy case and therefore suitable for final adjudication in the bankruptcy court.
• In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 841 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2016): The court aligned with Yellowstone’s reasoning that claims within Barton’s ambit fall outside Stern’s constraints, reinforcing the bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority here.
• 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), (d); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014; E.D. Mich. LBR 2014-1(c): These provisions governed the trustee’s employment as attorney. The court avoided deciding any conflict between the local and national rules by embracing an alternative holding: Sweet’s filing satisfied Rule 2014 even apart from the local shortcut.
• Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015); Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35 (2020); In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1991): These cases supply the finality framework for bankruptcy appeals, leading to dismissal of Tindall’s fee appeal because the bankruptcy court had not conclusively fixed his compensation (and sanctions remained pending).
• 28 U.S.C. § 144; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994); United States v. Hartsel, 199 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 1999); Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Angelus, 258 F. App’x 840 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1965); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 1999): These sources establish the recusal standard, the “strong duty to sit,” and the principle that prior judicial actions seldom demonstrate the type of personal bias requiring recusal. The panel applied them to uphold denial of recusal despite the judge’s prior reciprocal disbarment order under E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(g).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Forfeiture and Rule 60(b)(4) timeliness: The bankruptcy court denied Tindall’s motion to set aside the 2012 stipulated judgment both because there was no due-process violation and because the motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement. On appeal, Tindall challenged only the first rationale. Applying Stewart and Blick, the panel deemed the failure to contest the timeliness holding dispositive. Importantly, the court reaffirmed that Rule 60(c)(1) timeliness applies even to voidness attacks predicated on subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Vista-Pro and Dailide.
2. Trustee immunity and Rule 15 amendment: The bankruptcy court’s allowance of Sweet’s late-added immunity defense was within its discretion under Rule 15. The panel credited Sweet’s early invocation of immunity in summary-judgment briefing, the absence of prejudice due to minimal activity in the case, and the fact that much of the elapsed time was attributable to Tindall’s separate, unsuccessful appeal. On the merits, summary judgment was appropriate because the trustee’s challenged actions were taken pursuant to court orders—triggering absolute, quasi-judicial immunity.
3. Article III/Stern challenge rejected: The court held that fiduciary-duty counterclaims against a bankruptcy trustee for conduct administering the estate “stem from the bankruptcy itself” and are entwined with the court’s supervision of the trustee. This characterization, reinforced by the Barton doctrine, brought the claims outside Stern’s prohibition and authorized the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment. The panel found Tindall’s contrary Stern argument conclusory and unpersuasive.
4. Employment of trustee as counsel and fee entitlement: On Tindall’s attack of Sweet’s fee entitlement premised on alleged noncompliance with Rule 2014, the panel again relied on forfeiture. Even assuming a conflict between the local rule (E.D. Mich. LBR 2014-1(c)) and Rule 2014, the bankruptcy court had alternatively held that Sweet’s verified statement sufficed as a Rule 2014 application. Because Tindall did not challenge this independent ground, the fee award stood.
5. Non-finality of Tindall’s fee issues: Tindall’s own fee request remained unresolved—subject to a cap, offsets, and a pending sanctions motion that could result in a denial of all compensation. Under Bullard, Ritzen, and Boddy, the lack of a conclusive compensation determination deprived the district court (and therefore the Sixth Circuit) of jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed in part on that basis.
6. Recusal: The panel concluded that the district judge’s prior reciprocal disbarment order—imposed as an administrative, mandatory function under E.D. Mich. LR 83.22(g) following state discipline—did not suggest the kind of deep-seated antagonism or improper knowledge required by Liteky. Tindall’s affidavit was not “legally sufficient,” so the judge had a “strong duty to sit.” His reliance on procedural protections found in a different subsection of the local rules (LR 83.22(e)) lacked development and likely did not apply to reciprocal discipline.

C. Impact and Practical Significance

Although designated “not for publication,” the decision is a clear, practitioner-focused roadmap with immediate consequences in Sixth Circuit bankruptcy practice:

• Rule 60(b)(4) strategy constrained: Litigants may not deploy “void judgment” rhetoric years later to evade timeliness; Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement applies even to subject-matter jurisdiction challenges. With Vista-Pro currently pending before the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit’s rule remains intact and enforceable in the interim.
• Appellate briefing discipline: When a trial court decision rests on two independent grounds, appellants must squarely challenge both. Failure to do so will forfeit the appeal regardless of the merits of the ground actually briefed. This theme recurs throughout the opinion.
• Trustee protection and forum authority: The reaffirmation of trustee absolute immunity for actions under court orders, coupled with the Barton-informed conclusion that such fiduciary-duty claims “stem from bankruptcy,” fortifies bankruptcy courts’ authority to enter final judgments on these disputes notwithstanding Stern. Parties should expect these counterclaims to be resolved in the bankruptcy forum, not the district court.
• Rule 15 flexibility: Courts may permit late assertion of affirmative defenses like immunity when early notice exists, delay is explained, and prejudice is absent. Litigants should preserve objections with concrete prejudice showings, not formalism.
• Professional employment compliance: The court’s willingness to treat a verified statement as a Rule 2014-compliant application—while side-stepping potential conflicts with a local rule—signals a pragmatic approach. Still, practitioners should hew closely to Rule 2014’s content and service requirements to avoid collateral challenges.
• Appeal timing for fees: Interim fee determinations are not appealable. Wait for a conclusive order setting compensation. Sanctions motions can affect finality and should be factored into appellate planning.
• Recusal standards reaffirmed: Prior judicial acts, including administrative reciprocal discipline, are rarely grounds for recusal. Affidavits under § 144 must allege facts that, taken as true, would lead a reasonable observer to question impartiality. A conclusory or legally inapposite assertion will not suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. On appeal, failing to challenge an independent ground for a judgment is forfeiture and usually fatal.
• Rule 60(b)(4) “void judgment” and Rule 60(c)(1) timeliness: A party can seek to set aside a judgment as “void,” including for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. But in the Sixth Circuit, such motions must still be made “within a reasonable time.” Long delays without good reason are disqualifying, even for voidness claims.
• Stern v. Marshall and “stemming from bankruptcy”: Bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgments on certain state-law claims that are independent of the bankruptcy process. But when a claim is part and parcel of administering the estate—like a fiduciary-duty claim challenging a trustee’s court-directed conduct—it “stems from bankruptcy” and can be finally decided by the bankruptcy court.
• The Barton doctrine: Before suing a court-appointed fiduciary (like a bankruptcy trustee) for acts within official duties, a party must obtain leave from the appointing court. This reflects the court’s supervisory role and supports adjudication of such claims in bankruptcy court.
• Trustee absolute immunity: Trustees are absolutely immune from damages for acts taken under the direction of the court. If the trustee follows a court order, claims for damages typically cannot proceed.
• Rule 15 amendments: Courts “should freely give” leave to amend pleadings when justice requires, considering delay, bad faith, and prejudice. Adding an affirmative defense late can be allowed if the opposing party is not unfairly disadvantaged.
• Professional employment under § 327 and Rule 2014: Trustees must secure court approval to employ professionals. Applications must disclose need, services, compensation arrangements, and connections, accompanied by a verified disinterestedness statement. Some districts have local rules streamlining trustee self-employment as attorney, but filings should still satisfy Rule 2014’s substance.
• Finality in bankruptcy fee appeals: Only final orders are appealable. Interim or tentative rulings capping or conditioning fees—especially with sanctions unresolved—are not final.
• Recusal under § 144 and Liteky: A judge must step aside if a timely, sufficient affidavit shows bias or prejudice. Prior judicial rulings or administrative acts, without more, usually do not establish the deep-seated favoritism or antagonism required for recusal.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision delivers a pointed reminder that procedural rigor often decides appeals. Tindall’s challenges largely failed not because the court engaged novel substantive questions, but because of well-settled doctrines: appellants must confront all independent grounds supporting a judgment; Rule 60(b)(4) motions must be timely; and bankruptcy appellate jurisdiction turns on strict finality. Substantively, the panel reinforced that trustees acting under court orders are absolutely immune and that fiduciary-duty counterclaims tied to estate administration fall squarely within the bankruptcy court’s final adjudicatory ambit under a Barton-informed understanding of Stern.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores best practices: move promptly on Rule 60 relief; plead and preserve defenses while leveraging Rule 15 judiciously; ensure professional employment papers meet Rule 2014’s substance regardless of local streamlining; await final fee determinations before appealing; and reserve recusal motions for truly disqualifying circumstances. Although nonprecedential, the decision is a robust, practical guide to recurring issues in bankruptcy litigation within the Sixth Circuit.