Sixth Circuit Clarifies Third-Party Consent at Family Businesses and Reaffirms Broad Discretion in Public Contracting Under “Best-Interest” RFPs

Introduction

In Rockwood Auto Parts, Inc.; Rockwood Towing, Inc.; and Jacques “Jack” Poli v. Monroe County, Michigan; Sheriff Troy Goodnough; Sergeant Michael Preadmore; and Undersheriff Jeffrey Kemp, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (per Judge Karen Nelson Moore) affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on claims arising from a change in administration at the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office. After Sheriff Goodnough took office, he conducted onsite audits of county property at a family-owned business, re-bid the sheriff’s vehicle maintenance work, and restructured the county’s non-preference towing rotation. The plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a Fourth Amendment unlawful search; Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection violations under a class-of-one theory; denial of due process tied to a fleet-maintenance request for proposals (RFP); and municipal (Monell) liability.

The decision is recommended for publication, signaling precedential weight on several recurring issues:

• When and how a non-owner—here, an adult child who is the sole on-site employee—may provide valid consent to search a family business.
• The scope of consent during an announced “audit,” and whether alleged “pretext” undermines consent.
• The stringent requirements for class-of-one equal protection challenges to procurement and operational assignments (towing lists), including what qualifies as a rational basis and what does not constitute impermissible animus.
• Whether an RFP can yield a protected property interest when it reserves broad “best interest” discretion to the county.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on all counts:

• Fourth Amendment: The searches of Rockwood’s business premises and of Jack’s pole barn were consensual. The adult son-employee had both actual and apparent authority to consent to the business search. The scope matched the stated purpose—an audit of county property. Alleged “pretext” (audit versus investigation) did not negate voluntariness.
• Equal Protection (Class of One): Plaintiffs failed to show they were intentionally treated differently from similarly situated comparators without a rational basis. Rationales—lower bid prices for the fleet contract; proximity and response-time efficiency for towing areas; and redundancy to avoid monopolies—sufficed. Speculation about personal animus or favoritism was inadequate.
• Due Process: No protected property interest arose from the RFP because it expressly reserved the County’s right to accept/reject proposals and to act in its “best interest.” Failure to follow internal scoring procedures does not create a property interest.
• Monell Liability: With no underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability failed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Consent Searches and Authority
  • Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (U.S. 1973): Consent must be voluntary under the totality of circumstances. The court applies this baseline to uphold consent absent coercion or trickery that removes choice.
  • United States v. Matlock (U.S. 1974): Third-party consent is valid where the consenter has “common authority.” The court extends this principle to a family business context.
  • United States v. Morgan (6th Cir. 2006): Government bears the burden to show valid consent; apparent authority suffices if officers reasonably rely on it. The opinion emphasizes this dual path—actual and apparent authority.
  • United States v. Ayoub (6th Cir. 2007): Adult daughter and caretaker had actual authority to consent to a home search. The court analogizes: the adult son running on-site business operations has common authority.
  • United States v. Jones (6th Cir. 2003): A handyman lacked authority to consent, especially where the owner refused consent. The court distinguishes Jones because Anthony was a decade-long key employee and family member, and Jack did not object.
  • United States v. King (7th Cir. 2010) and United States v. Sells (7th Cir. 1974): Employees with keys/access/operational control can possess apparent authority; cited to buttress the business-context holding.
  • Florida v. Jimeno (U.S. 1991); United States v. Garrido-Santana (6th Cir. 2004); Painter v. Robertson (6th Cir. 1999): Scope of consent is what a reasonable person would understand from the exchange; consent can be limited or revoked but wasn’t here.
  • United States v. Drayton (U.S. 2002): Mere presence of uniformed officers without force or threats is not inherently coercive; undercuts plaintiffs’ coercion claim.
  • United States v. Hardin (6th Cir. 2008): Trickery can negate consent when it deprives a person of a meaningful choice. The court distinguishes: calling it an “audit” wasn’t the kind of coercive ruse condemned in Hardin.
• Class-of-One Equal Protection
  • Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (U.S. 2000); TriHealth, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners (6th Cir. 2005); Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit (6th Cir. 2023); Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth (6th Cir. 2012); FCC v. Beach Communications (U.S. 1993); Warren v. City of Athens (6th Cir. 2005): Together, these cases impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show intentional differential treatment of similarly situated comparators and to negate every conceivable rational basis. The court leans into that deference.
  • Klimik v. Kent County Sheriff’s Dep’t (6th Cir. 2004) and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Olech: Animus means personal malice unrelated to official duties; negative professional judgments are not illicit animus and can be rational bases.
• Due Process and Public Bidding
  • Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning County Commissioners (6th Cir. 1996); Charlie’s Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Jefferson County (6th Cir. 1999); United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon (6th Cir. 1992): A property interest arises if a bidder is awarded and then deprived of a contract, or if state law meaningfully limits discretion (e.g., “lowest responsible bidder”) and officials arbitrarily disregard it. The opinion finds neither scenario.
  • Higgins Elec., Inc. v. O’Fallon Fire Prot. Dist. (8th Cir. 2016); Sixth Circuit unpublished Leo J. Brielmaier Co. v. Newport Housing Auth.: “Reject any/all bids” and “best interest” clauses preserve discretion and defeat property-interest claims.
  • Charlie’s Towing again: Government’s failure to follow its own procedures does not itself create a property interest.
• Monell Liability
  • Monell v. Department of Social Services (U.S. 1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (U.S. 1986): Without an underlying constitutional violation, no municipal liability lies; the court applies that straightforwardly.
• Summary Judgment Standards
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby (U.S. 1986); Miller v. Maddox (6th Cir. 2017); Kean v. Brinker Int’l, Inc. (6th Cir. 2025): The opinion employs familiar Rule 56 principles—viewing evidence favorably to the nonmovant but requiring more than speculation to create a triable fact issue.

Legal Reasoning

Fourth Amendment

The court’s core contribution is its careful delineation of third‑party consent in a small, family-run business context. It proceeds in three steps.

1. Authority to Consent:
   • Actual authority. Anthony (the adult son) was the only employee on site, managed the business’s email and tax records, submitted RFP bids, and even served as the corporate representative in litigation. These facts supply “common authority” over the premises under Matlock/Ayoub, particularly where the owner was absent and had entrusted day-to-day operations to the son.
   • Apparent authority. Objectively, officers encountered an adult family member with full access, operating the premises, demonstrating detailed knowledge of inventory and county property. He never sought the owner’s permission to admit the officers to the business, and when asked about an item stored at the owner’s residence (the boat trailer), he consulted the owner—highlighting that he knew when permission was needed and when it was not. The owner later allowed entry at the residence. A reasonable officer could rely on Anthony’s apparent authority.
   • Key refinement. The court explicitly permits consideration of “actual authority” facts learned in discovery that officers may not have known at the time, distinguishing that from the “apparent authority” inquiry, which is measured by what officers reasonably perceived. This sharpens analytical clarity between the two doctrines and will aid district courts in summary-judgment practice.
2. Scope of Consent:
   • The officers stated the “expressed object” was to audit Sheriff’s Office property. Under Jimeno, the scope is what a reasonable person would understand from that exchange. Searching areas where county-marked vehicles and equipment might be found—including the north lot and VIN checks—fit the audit’s purpose.
   • No revocation or limitation occurred: Anthony accompanied the officers; he did not ask them to stop or narrow the search. Under Painter and Garrido-Santana, consent can be limited or withdrawn, but was not.
   • Coercion was not shown: Under Drayton, uniformed presence alone is not coercive; there were no threats, commands, or shows of force that would negate voluntariness.
3. Pretext and “Audit” Terminology:
   • Even if the audit might later feed into a criminal investigation, calling it an audit did not amount to the kind of deceptive ruse that vitiates consent under Hardin. The officers looked for exactly what they said they would—county property. That alignment undercuts any claim of a coercive misrepresentation.
   • The court emphasizes that post-search consequences (e.g., a referral to state police) do not retroactively taint the original consensual entry absent evidence of coercion or a lie depriving the person of a meaningful choice.

Equal Protection (Class of One)

The court applies highly deferential rational-basis review and demands precise comparator evidence.

• Fleet-Maintenance Contract:
  • Rational basis: The County selected Gerweck Nissan because—after clarifications—its prices were lower than Rockwood’s on 5 of 6 compared items (e.g., brakes and oil changes). That alone satisfies rational-basis review.
  • Process differences: Even assuming the County called only Gerweck to clarify, that does not negate every conceivable rational basis for awarding Gerweck the contract. Under TriHealth and Beach Communications, the government need not produce evidence; rational speculation suffices.
  • Animus theory fails: The email plaintiffs rely on (criticizing Jack’s interactions with staff and a citizen) post-dated the award and reflects professional concerns, not personal malice. Negative operational experience can itself be a rational basis, not proof of illicit animus.
  • Decisionmaker point: The record indicates the CFO (Bosanac) made the final award; no evidence shows he harbored animus.
• Non-Preference Towing Rotations:
  • Area Four: Removing Rockwood because it was located farther away than others and deputies complained of slow response times is rational. Plaintiffs did not dispute the distance fact and offered only generalized reputational critiques of other providers.
  • Areas Five and Six: Adding providers to avoid monopoly and ensure a backup is rational. The Sheriff expressly stated the policy of avoiding sole-provider control.
  • Animus theory again fails: Assertions of favoritism or campaign ties lacked concrete, outcome-determinative evidence. Even if some providers were friendly with officials, that does not establish intentional discrimination against plaintiffs because of personal malice.

Due Process

The plaintiffs had no protected property interest in a prospective contract. Two pathways were closed:

• No awarded-then-revoked contract. Rockwood had no existing contract; prior work was informal and uncontracted.
• No state-law limitation on discretion. The RFP reserved the County’s right to accept/reject any proposal and to award in the County’s “best interest.” That language preserves broad discretion and defeats any claim of a property interest based on an entitlement to award. Internal evaluation criteria and scoring procedures, even if not meticulously followed, do not create property rights.

Importantly, the panel does not decide whether a self-imposed RFP limitation (if present) could ever create a property interest. It holds only that the RFP here did not do so because of its broad reservation of discretion and absence of a “lowest responsible bidder”-type mandate.

Monell Liability

Without a predicate constitutional violation, municipal liability cannot attach. Plaintiffs’ Monell theory therefore fails as a matter of law.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Law enforcement and audits/inventories:
  • Consent from an adult family-member employee who demonstrably manages day-to-day operations at a family business can suffice for both actual and apparent authority. Officers should document observed indicia of authority (keys, alarm codes, access, operational control, knowledge of property).
  • Clearly state the purpose (e.g., “audit of county property”) and adhere to it to cabin scope and to guard against “pretext” arguments.
  • To avoid disputes, memorialize consent and any limitations; note any owner acquiescence or non-objection when later contacted.
• Small and family-run businesses:
  • If owners wish to control consent decisions, they should adopt and communicate clear internal policies limiting employee authority to admit officers without the owner’s express approval.
  • During consensual encounters, employees may limit or revoke consent in real time; silence and cooperation will be treated as continuing consent.
• Public procurement and operational contracting:
  • “Best interest of the County” and “reject any/all bids” clauses provide robust discretion that undercuts due-process and equal-protection claims. Retaining such clauses—and using them consistently—reduces litigation exposure.
  • Even where agencies informally “clarify” one bidder’s pricing, a rational-basis showing (e.g., lower clarified price, capacity, efficiency) can defeat class-of-one claims. Still, equal treatment in bid communications is a best practice to minimize challenges.
• Towing rotations and similar operational lists:
  • Neutral, operationally grounded factors—distance, response time, redundancy, avoiding monopolies—are classic rational bases. Agencies should contemporaneously record these reasons.
  • Exclusive assignments are disfavored where redundancy safeguards public service; written policy to that effect will support rational-basis defenses.
• Litigation strategy for vendors:
  • Class-of-one claims require rigorous comparator analysis and proof that the government’s reasons are irrational. Anecdotes about favoritism or broad accusations of “animus” rarely suffice.
  • Due-process claims require a textual/legal entitlement to the contract; RFPs that preserve discretion will generally foreclose such claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Actual vs. Apparent Authority (Consent Searches):
  • Actual authority: The person truly has joint control or sufficient relationship to the place searched (e.g., adult child running the business).
  • Apparent authority: Even if actual authority is lacking, officers may rely on what reasonably appears to be authority (keys, access, operational control, familiarity) at the time.
• Scope of Consent: What a reasonable person would think the search covers based on what officers said they were looking for. You can narrow or revoke consent, but you must say or do so clearly.
• Pretext vs. Deception: Saying “audit” when looking for government property is not coercive deception; consent is invalidated only by lies that strip choice (e.g., pretending to be maintenance to gain entry where the occupant would not have admitted police).
• Class-of-One Equal Protection: To win, show you were singled out from truly comparable peers and that no rational reason explains the difference—or prove decisions were driven by personal malice unrelated to official duties. It is a very high bar.
• Due Process Property Interest in Bidding: You need a genuine legal entitlement to award (e.g., a statute requiring award to the lowest responsible bidder). If the RFP reserves “best interest” discretion, there’s usually no protected property interest.
• Monell Liability: Cities/counties are not liable just because an employee erred; there must be an underlying constitutional violation attributable to a policy, custom, or policymaker’s act.

What the Decision Does Not Decide

• Whether, in a different case, a self-imposed, genuinely limiting RFP (e.g., binding scoring rules with no “best interest” override) could create a protected property interest.
• Whether treating bidders differently during “clarifications” can ever, by itself, support a class-of-one claim; here, rational bases independently supported the award.
• Whether nepotism or political favoritism, if proven with specificity and tied to discriminatory purpose against a disfavored party, could establish a constitutional violation. The evidence here was insufficient.

Conclusion

Rockwood Auto Parts v. Monroe County offers two principal doctrinal clarifications with practical reach. First, in the Fourth Amendment context, the court endorses a commonsense approach to third-party consent at family businesses: an adult child-employee with operational control can possess both actual and apparent authority to consent; a clearly articulated “audit” purpose properly channels scope; and alleged investigative interest does not invalidate otherwise voluntary consent absent coercive trickery. Second, the decision reinforces the formidable hurdles facing class-of-one and due-process challenges to public procurement and service rotations. “Best-interest” RFP reservations preserve wide discretion; operational reasons like price, proximity, timeliness, and redundancy readily satisfy rational-basis review; and professional criticisms are not the kind of personal malice that shows unconstitutional animus.

The case thus provides a durable template for law enforcement audits of government property stored offsite, for municipal procurement drafting and defense, and for vendors evaluating the viability of constitutional claims arising from the loss of government work. Its doctrinal through-line is deference: to voluntary consent when supported by objective indicators of authority, and to municipal choice where rational, even if imperfectly executed.