Sixth Circuit Clarifies Narrow Judicial Review of I‑751 Good‑Faith Marriage Waivers: Credibility and Weight-of-Evidence Challenges Are Unreviewable

Introduction

In Nathaniel Kumedzro v. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision upholding the denial of an I‑751 waiver premised on a good‑faith marriage that later ended in divorce. The case centers on a conditional lawful permanent resident from Ghana who, after multiple filings and denials at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), sought Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA review asserting that he had entered his marriage to a U.S. citizen in good faith.

The key issue on petition for review was narrow: whether the BIA erred in holding that the petitioner failed to prove he entered his marriage in good faith. The Sixth Circuit framed the inquiry within the strict jurisdictional limits Congress imposed for reviewing I‑751 hardship waivers under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). Those limits preclude the court from revisiting credibility determinations and the weight assigned to evidence and also bar review of the government’s discretionary denial of a waiver. Only certain legal questions embedded in the eligibility determination, and a highly deferential substantial-evidence review of ineligibility, remain within the court’s purview.

Although the opinion is not recommended for publication, it provides a clear application of recent circuit law on the permissible scope of judicial review and underscores the evidentiary demands on applicants seeking a good‑faith marriage waiver.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held:

It lacked jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s challenges to the IJ’s and BIA’s credibility and weight-of-evidence determinations regarding whether the marriage was entered in good faith.
To the extent the petition raised a substantial-evidence challenge to the eligibility determination, the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the marriage was not proven bona fide at inception.
Because the agency’s denial rested on lack of credible and corroborated proof of a good‑faith marriage, the petitioner could not meet the “any reasonable adjudicator” substantial-evidence standard.

In reaching that result, the court emphasized that arguments attributing testimonial inconsistencies to nervousness, cultural differences, or memory lapses still amount to challenges to credibility—issues that are statutorily committed to the immigration authorities and are unreviewable on petition for review.

Factual and Procedural Background

2010: Petitioner, a Ghanaian national, marries a U.S. citizen (Ester Thorne) in Virginia and becomes a conditional lawful permanent resident.
2012: Files I‑751 seeking to remove conditions with a waiver based on battery or extreme cruelty; USCIS denies the petition for lack of credible supporting evidence.
2013: Files a joint I‑751 with spouse; USCIS denies after spouse fails to appear for interview and insufficient evidence of cohabitation/good‑faith marriage.
2015: Marriage ends in divorce.
2016: Files I‑751 waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) (good‑faith marriage ending in divorce); USCIS denies.
IJ proceedings: After a hearing, the IJ denies the waiver and orders removal, finding the petitioner not credible and insufficiently corroborated. BIA affirms.
Petition for review: The Sixth Circuit denies the petition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Elgebaly v. Garland, 109 F.4th 426 (6th Cir. 2024): The court relies on Elgebaly for the two‑step structure of § 1186a(c)(4) waivers and the limits on judicial review:
- Step One (Eligibility): The agency determines whether the applicant satisfies a statutory ground for a waiver (e.g., good‑faith marriage ending in divorce). Courts may review embedded legal questions in this eligibility determination.
- Step Two (Discretion): Even if eligible, the Secretary of Homeland Security may grant or deny the waiver in her discretion. Courts lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
- Crucially, Elgebaly confirms that credibility and weight‑of‑evidence determinations are unreviewable because § 1186a(c)(4) expressly commits those determinations to the agency.
Johns v. Holder, 678 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2012): Johns supplies the core jurisdictional rule repeated here: courts cannot review “what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence” in I‑751 waiver determinations. The Sixth Circuit quotes and follows Johns to foreclose the petitioner’s credibility-based arguments.
Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2020): Marqus articulates the “highly deferential” substantial‑evidence standard: the agency’s findings stand unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. The panel applies this standard to the remaining, limited aspect of review the petitioner attempted—an overall sufficiency challenge to the eligibility finding.
Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023): Cited in a footnote for the modern usage of “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” This plays no substantive role in the outcome but reflects terminological clarity.

Collectively, these precedents channel the court’s analysis away from factual reweighing and toward a threshold, jurisdiction‑screened inquiry: are there reviewable legal issues, and does substantial evidence support the ineligibility finding once the agency’s credibility and weight determinations are taken as given?

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two stages.

Jurisdictional Gatekeeping: The petitioner’s core complaint was that the IJ and BIA unfairly found him not credible—pointing to nervousness, cultural differences, and memory lapses to explain inconsistencies about the year of marriage, cohabitation in 2011, and household services. Under § 1186a(c)(4) and Johns/Elgebaly, these arguments are directed at credibility and the weight of evidence, which are categorically unreviewable. The court therefore declines to entertain them.
Substantial‑Evidence Review of Ineligibility: To the extent the petitioner pressed a general substantial‑evidence challenge, the court evaluates the record while accepting the agency’s credibility and weight calls. On that constrained view, substantial evidence supports the BIA:
- Documentary proof conflicted with the petitioner’s own version of events. Notably, a 2011 Ohio tax return reflected married‑filing‑separate status and Ohio residence, undermining his sworn claim of living with his spouse in Virginia throughout 2011.
- Assertions of employment in Virginia for 2010–2011 were uncorroborated by payroll records, W‑2s, or other documentation tying him to a shared Virginia residence.
- The “joint” bank account showed sparse use and less than $30 in transactions, which the IJ reasonably viewed as not reflecting genuine commingling of assets/liabilities characteristic of a bona fide marital relationship.
- Affidavits from friends and family were vague or conclusory and lacked independent corroboration.
Given those points, the IJ concluded—and the BIA affirmed—that the petitioner had not carried his burden to show a bona fide marriage at inception. Under the “any reasonable adjudicator” standard, the panel could not say the evidence compelled a contrary finding.

The court also underscores, consistent with Elgebaly, that it would lack jurisdiction to review any second‑step discretionary denial by DHS. Here, the agency’s ruling rested primarily on a failure of proof at the eligibility step, so the panel’s analysis did not need to reach discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and thus non‑precedential, this opinion reinforces and practically operationalizes recent Sixth Circuit authority in Elgebaly and the earlier framework in Johns. Its implications are concrete:

Jurisdictional Constraint Will Decide Many Cases: Petitioners who focus on attacking IJ/BIA credibility findings or evidentiary weight will find those arguments jurisdictionally barred. Reframing such disputes as “legal questions” will not succeed if they remain, in substance, credibility or weight challenges.
Heightened Importance of the Agency Record: Because credibility determinations and the assignment of evidentiary weight are effectively final at the agency level, applicants must build a robust record before USCIS and the IJ:
- Eliminate contradictions between documentary records (e.g., tax filings, addresses, employment) and testimony.
- Provide objective corroboration of cohabitation and financial intertwinement or, if finances were separate, offer persuasive alternative indicia of marital life.
- Ensure affidavits are detailed, specific, and supported by contemporaneous records.
Substantial‑Evidence Review Is a Narrow Aperture: When agency denial rests on credibility and lack of corroboration, it is “very difficult, if not impossible,” to disturb under substantial‑evidence review—a point the Sixth Circuit reiterates by quoting Johns. Petitioners should calibrate appellate strategy accordingly.
Potentially Reviewable Issues Remain: Courts may review legal questions embedded in eligibility (e.g., if the agency applied an incorrect legal standard for “good‑faith marriage” or required proof that the statute does not demand). No such legal misstep was identified or preserved here.
Terminology and Framing: The opinion uses “hardship waiver” as an umbrella for waivers under § 1186a(c)(4), which include three grounds: extreme hardship; good‑faith marriage followed by divorce; and battery or extreme cruelty. The present case concerns only the good‑faith‑marriage ground.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conditional Permanent Residence and I‑751: Spouses who obtain residency through a recent marriage typically receive “conditional” status for two years. To remove the condition, they ordinarily file a joint petition (Form I‑751) with their U.S. citizen or resident spouse and attend an interview.
Waivers of the Joint Filing Requirement (8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)): If the marriage ends or joint filing is impracticable, the noncitizen can seek a waiver on one of several grounds, including that the marriage was entered “in good faith” but ended in divorce. The applicant bears the burden of proof.
Two‑Step Waiver Decision: First, the agency decides if the applicant is eligible (did they prove a good‑faith marriage that later ended?). Second, even if eligible, the agency decides whether to exercise discretion to grant the waiver.
Judicial Review Limits: Courts can review some legal questions about eligibility but cannot reweigh evidence or revisit credibility—Congress gave that task to the agency. Courts also cannot review the agency’s discretionary denial of a waiver.
Substantial‑Evidence Standard: On the limited review that remains, the court asks whether the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the agency’s. If reasonable adjudicators could agree with the agency, the decision stands.
Good‑Faith Marriage Evidence: Common indicators include shared residence, commingled finances, joint documentation (leases, utilities, insurance), consistent tax filings, photographs with time/place context, and detailed third‑party affidavits. No single item is dispositive, but contradictions or thin proof can defeat the claim.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kumedzro underscores a disciplined approach to judicial review of I‑751 good‑faith marriage waivers: credibility and evidentiary weight are off‑limits; discretionary denials are unreviewable; and only narrow legal questions and a deferential substantial‑evidence review of ineligibility remain for the courts. On the facts presented, the petitioner’s documentary submissions clashed with his testimony, the financial commingling evidence was minimal, and affidavits lacked detail—leading the court to affirm the agency’s finding that he failed to prove a bona fide marriage at inception.

While non‑precedential, the opinion reinforces the practical lesson of Elgebaly and Johns: in I‑751 waiver cases, the decisive battle is fought in the agency record. Applicants who cannot present coherent, corroborated, and consistent proof of a good‑faith marriage face steep obstacles on petition for review, where arguments about credibility and the weighing of evidence cannot be heard.