Sixth Circuit Adopts Sentencing‑Package Doctrine for First Step Act Resentencings: Non‑Covered Offenses May Be Reduced Only If Interdependent with a Covered Offense

Sixth Circuit Adopts Sentencing‑Package Doctrine for First Step Act Resentencings: Non‑Covered Offenses May Be Reduced Only If Interdependent with a Covered Offense

Introduction

In United States v. Gregory Brown (consolidated with United States v. Edward Dale, Gene Polk, and John Gordon), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a published decision clarifying the scope of a district court’s authority to reduce sentences under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The defendants—members of the “Best Friends” gang—were convicted in the mid-1990s of a crack/powder drug conspiracy (a “covered offense” under the First Step Act) along with several violent homicides under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), and multiple 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts. Originally sentenced to life on the drug and homicide counts (with mandatory consecutive terms on § 924(c)), they later moved for sentence reductions under the First Step Act after the Fair Sentencing Act reduced penalties for crack offenses.

The district court reduced not only the drug-conspiracy sentences but also the homicide sentences—although those homicide offenses are not “covered offenses.” The government appealed, arguing that: (1) homicide sentences cannot be reduced because they are non-covered; (2) the homicide sentences were not part of a cohesive “sentencing package” with the drug sentences; (3) the district court violated the mandate from a prior appeal as to Gordon; and (4) the reduced sentences were substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit held that Section 404 permits reductions of some non-covered sentences, but only if they formed part of a “sentencing package” with a covered offense. Because the district court did not sufficiently explain how the homicide sentences were interdependent with the covered drug count, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Judge Helene White (joined by Judge Stranch) announced a precedential rule: Section 404(b) of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce sentences for non-covered offenses only when those sentences are interdependent with a covered offense as part of a single sentencing package. The Court:

  • Rejected the defendants’ broad view that Section 404 allows reduction of any sentence once a covered offense is present.
  • Formally adopted the sentencing-package doctrine in the First Step Act context, aligning the Sixth Circuit with the Seventh and Fourth Circuits on this point.
  • Explained that such authority exists only if the record shows the sentences were interdependent (e.g., a global sentencing plan, grouping, or explicit interrelation at the original sentencing).
  • Held that the government did not waive or forfeit its challenges, and that the prior mandate in Gordon’s appeal did not bar the district court from considering package-based relief for non-covered counts.
  • Vacated the resentencings and remanded for the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether each defendant’s homicide sentence was part of a sentencing package with the covered drug offense.

Judge Murphy dissented, concluding that the First Step Act never authorizes reductions of sentences for non-covered offenses, and that in any event these homicide sentences (mandatory life under then-mandatory Guidelines) were not interdependent with the drug sentences. He would have reversed outright rather than remand.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act Framework
    • Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. 486 (2021): Clarified eligibility under Section 404 hinges on whether the offense’s statutory penalties were modified by sections 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.
    • Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022): Emphasized broad district court discretion in First Step Act resentencings, subject only to Section 404(c)’s explicit limits; informs the majority’s refusal to graft extra-textual limits, while still requiring statutory eligibility.
  • Sentencing Package Doctrine and Analogous Authorities
    • Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017): Recognizes a court may consider mandatory consecutive sentences on one count when selecting a sentence on another count—underscoring interdependence in sentencing.
    • Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008): Appellate courts may vacate all sentences when some convictions are reversed, allowing reconfiguration of the sentencing plan—reflects practical “package” sentencing.
    • Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997): In the § 2255 context, when one component of a package falls, the court may revisit the entire aggregate sentence—key Sixth Circuit foundation embraced by the majority to analogize the First Step Act context.
    • Guidelines grouping principles (U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D, Intro. cmt.) reflect that some offenses are so intertwined that sentencing is functionally integrated.
  • Scope of Remand and Mandate Rule
    • United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Purdy, 870 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2017): Distinguish general from limited remands; mandate rule forbids revisiting issues expressly or implicitly decided. The prior remand in Gordon’s case was general, permitting consideration of package-based relief for non-covered counts.
  • Procedural Doctrines: Waiver, Forfeiture, and Reconsideration
    • Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services, 583 U.S. 17 (2017); United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014): Clarify waiver vs. forfeiture. The court finds no waiver, and prudentially overlooks any arguable forfeiture given the district court’s merits engagement and full appellate briefing.
    • United States v. Dotz, 455 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2006): No inherent authority to reconsider a final sentence; relevant to the district court’s denial of the government’s reconsideration motion post-resentencing.
  • Contrasting Circuit Law on Non‑Covered Offenses
    • Adopting package relief: United States v. Curtis, 66 F.4th 690 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Richardson, 96 F.4th 659 (4th Cir. 2024). These decisions emphasize the practical integration of sentences and reject reading extra-textual limits into § 404.
    • Rejecting package relief: United States v. Young, 998 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Gladney, 44 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Baptiste, 834 F. App’x 547 (11th Cir. 2020). These decisions stress that each count receives a separate sentence and that § 3582(c) requires express statutory authority to modify a sentence, which they do not find in § 404 for non-covered counts.
  • Other References
    • United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2020): Distinguish legal eligibility from discretionary reduction under § 3553(a); reaffirm broad discretion once eligibility exists.
    • United States v. Smith, 508 U.S. 223 (1993): Congress’s choice not to include narrowing language is meaningful; informs textual reading.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s analysis proceeds in two steps.

First, the Court rejects the defendants’ unbounded interpretation of § 404(b). While the statute authorizes a court to “impose a reduced sentence” and contains only two textual limitations (in § 404(c)), its text and purpose do not allow a district court to reduce “any” sentence for any offense simply because a covered offense is also being resentenced. The statutory command to impose a reduced sentence “as if” sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act had been in place at the time of the covered offense anchors the resentencing to the changes in crack penalties, not to unrelated or free-floating sentences.

Second, the Court formally adopts the sentencing-package doctrine for First Step Act resentencings. The Court reasons that:

  • The ordinary meaning of “sentence” can encompass the punishment imposed in a global sense, and § 404 refers to a “sentence for a covered offense” in a way that can include a sentence comprised of interdependent components.
  • Congress did not insert language restricting reductions to the covered count alone; in Concepcion, the Supreme Court cautioned against reading extra-textual limits into § 404 beyond those in § 404(c).
  • Longstanding sentencing practice recognizes that sentences are often crafted as a package—especially where mandatory consecutive terms, grouping, or other structural features lead the court to calibrate a total punishment.
  • The analogy to § 2255 resentencing is instructive: when a component of a package is vacated, the court may revisit the whole to achieve a coherent sentence. Though § 404 is not § 2255, both operate against the same practical reality that multi-count sentences are not hermetically sealed from one another.

The Court acknowledges circuit disagreement but finds the Seventh and Fourth Circuits’ package-based reading of § 404 more persuasive than the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ contrary approach. It underscores that adopting the doctrine does not compel reductions on non-covered counts; it merely confers discretion if, and only if, the record shows genuine interdependence.

Applying these principles, the Court concludes the record below did not sufficiently explain how the homicide sentences were part of a sentencing package with the drug-conspiracy sentence. Because the government’s late posture contributed to the lack of development, the Court remands to let the district court make that determination in the first instance.

The Court also resolves two threshold issues:

  • Waiver/Forfeiture: Although the government failed to timely engage portions of the defendants’ arguments (e.g., the sentencing-package theory), the district court addressed the merits and the issue was fully briefed on appeal. The Court exercises its prudential discretion to reach the merits.
  • Mandate Rule (Gordon): The prior remand was general, not limited; it did not bar consideration of package-based relief for non-covered counts (though homicide remains a non-covered offense). The district court remained free to consider alternative bases for relief consistent with the prior mandate.

Impact

This decision sets a binding rule in the Sixth Circuit: District courts may reduce sentences for non-covered offenses under § 404 of the First Step Act only if those sentences were interdependent with a covered offense as part of a single “sentencing package.” It carries several practical implications:

  • Record Building at Remand: District courts should make explicit findings on interdependence. Relevant indicators include:
    • Whether the sentencing judge articulated a global sentencing plan (e.g., “I intend an aggregate term of X years, calibrated across counts”).
    • Whether mandatory consecutive terms (including § 924(c)) influenced the selection of terms for other counts.
    • Whether counts were grouped under the Guidelines, and whether the non-covered count’s sentence was driven by offense-level calculations anchored to the covered count.
    • Sentencing-era constraints (pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines) that may have foreclosed interdependence, especially in homicide cases with a mandatory life range under § 2A1.1.
  • Limits on Relief for Violent Non‑Covered Counts: Many pre-Booker homicide sentences—imposed under then-mandatory life Guidelines—may not be “interdependent,” narrowing the practical reach of the doctrine in violent cases.
  • Substantive Reasonableness Review: Because the panel vacated and remanded on authority/eligibility grounds tied to the package doctrine, substantive reasonableness challenges will likely be addressed, if at all, after the district court’s package findings.
  • Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine: The presence of another life sentence does not by itself bar § 404 relief on a covered count, and district courts should not decline relief solely on that basis.
  • Mandate Discipline: The Court’s general/limited remand analysis will guide district courts handling partial remands in § 404 litigation, especially when prior appeals have only resolved the “covered offense” question.
  • Circuit Split and Potential Supreme Court Review: The Sixth Circuit’s alignment with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits deepens a split with the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, making this an issue ripe for further review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Covered vs. Non‑Covered Offense (First Step Act § 404)
    • A “covered offense” is one whose statutory penalties were modified by sections 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act (principally affecting crack cocaine penalties).
    • Non-covered offenses (like homicide under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)) are not directly eligible for reductions under § 404.
  • Sentencing‑Package Doctrine
    • In multi-count cases, judges often impose a “global” sentence: selecting terms on individual counts with an eye toward a total punishment.
    • If one count is later vacated or altered, the remaining counts may be revisited to restore the intended total sentence.
    • Under this decision, the doctrine applies to First Step Act resentencings: non-covered sentences may be reduced if they were interdependent with the covered count.
  • Eligibility vs. Discretion
    • Eligibility is a legal question: Can the court reduce the sentence? (Here, only if non-covered sentences were part of a package with a covered offense.)
    • Discretion is a case-specific judgment: Should the court reduce the sentence in light of § 3553(a) and current information? Concepcion confirms broad discretion at this stage.
  • Mandate Rule
    • On remand, a district court must follow the appellate court’s instructions.
    • A limited remand narrows what the district court can do; a general remand allows broader reconsideration consistent with the appellate ruling.
  • Waiver vs. Forfeiture
    • Waiver: intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture: failure to assert a right in time.
    • Courts may overlook forfeiture in prudential circumstances, particularly when the district court reached the merits and the issue is fully briefed on appeal.
  • Pre‑Booker Mandatory Guidelines
    • Before 2005, Guidelines were mandatory; certain offenses (e.g., first-degree murder under § 2A1.1) effectively required life sentences, often limiting interdependence with other counts.

The Dissent’s Perspective

Judge Murphy’s dissent advances a strict textual reading that would never permit reductions of non-covered sentences under § 404:

  • Section 404(b)’s grammar and the singular “sentence” tether reductions to “the sentence for a covered offense,” not to other sentences.
  • Background law, including 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), generally bars modification of a sentence unless “expressly permitted by statute.” Section 404 “expressly” permits reductions for covered offenses but not non-covered ones; courts should not infer exceptions via background doctrines.
  • Section 2255 is different: its text authorizes vacatur of the “judgment” and a full “resentencing.” Section 404 lacks that language. Sixth Circuit precedent has already recognized this distinction in other contexts.
  • Even if the package doctrine applied, these homicide sentences—mandatory life under then-mandatory Guidelines—were not interdependent with the drug sentences; the record shows no cross-tailoring, so relief is unavailable.
  • The dissent would reverse outright rather than remand, emphasizing the clarity of non-interdependence in cases like this and warning against letting concessions or litigation positions distort statutory interpretation.

Guidance for District Courts on Remand

On remand, the district court should make specific findings about interdependence, count by count and defendant by defendant. Useful inquiries include:

  • Did the original sentencing judge state or signal a total intended term (a “global” sentence) and then allocate across counts to reach that total?
  • Did any mandatory consecutive terms (e.g., § 924(c)) materially influence the selected term on other counts?
  • Were counts grouped under the Guidelines, and if so, how did that affect offense level and the ultimate sentences? (Note: homicide is generally excluded from grouping.)
  • Given pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines, did the homicide Guidelines (e.g., § 2A1.1) independently compel life, such that the drug sentence did not affect the homicide sentence at all?
  • Do the sentencing transcripts, PSRs, or contemporaneous statements indicate that altering the drug sentence would have changed the homicide sentence?

If interdependence is found, the district court may, but need not, reduce non-covered sentences as part of a recalibrated sentencing package. It must then explain any revised aggregate sentence with reference to § 3553(a), updated facts, and Concepcion’s guidance.

Conclusion

United States v. Gregory Brown establishes a significant, binding rule in the Sixth Circuit: district courts may reduce non-covered sentences in First Step Act resentencings only when those sentences were interdependent with a covered offense as part of a sentencing package. The decision rejects both extremes—the government’s plea (in the dissent’s view) to forbid all non-covered reductions and the defendants’ invitation to unbounded resentencing—by rooting the analysis in the practical and textual realities of multi-count sentencing. On remand, the district court must determine whether the homicide sentences here were truly part of an interdependent package with the covered drug count. The ruling both harmonizes First Step Act resentencings with longstanding sentencing practice and crystallizes a circuit split likely to draw continued attention. The key takeaway for practitioners: establish (or rebut) interdependence with precision, and equip the record to show whether the original sentencing was a package or a set of discrete, self-contained penalties.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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