Sixth Circuit’s Conscience-Shocking Threshold in State-Created Danger Claims

Introduction

William Myre et al. v. Oxford Community School District, decided March 20, 2025 by the Sixth Circuit, arises from the tragic November 30, 2021 school shooting at Oxford High School in Michigan. A fifteen-year-old student (E.C.) brought a firearm to school, killed four classmates, wounded several others and a teacher. Survivors and families of the deceased sued school officials—specifically counselor Shawn Hopkins and dean of students Nicholas Ejak—under a “state-created danger” theory grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that certain acts and omissions by Hopkins and Ejak increased the risk of violence and thus violated victims’ constitutional rights. The key issues on appeal were whether the plaintiffs plausibly alleged (1) an “affirmative act” by the defendants that increased the risk of harm, (2) a “special danger” to a discrete class of victims, and (3) conduct so egregious as to “shock the conscience,” and whether the officials were entitled to qualified immunity.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). It held that most of the alleged acts—returning the student’s backpack and failing to inform other school personnel of warning signs—could not constitute affirmative acts that increased risk. The court also concluded that Hopkins’ warning to the student’s parents—that he would call Child Protective Services if they did not secure counseling within 48 hours—was driven by a legitimate protective purpose and did not rise to the level of conscience-shocking behavior required for a substantive due process violation. Accordingly, the court directed dismissal of all claims against Hopkins and Ejak.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Doe v. Jackson Local School District, 954 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2020): Articulated the narrow “state-created danger” doctrine and the three-part test—affirmative act, special danger, and conscience shocking.
McQueen v. Beecher Community School, 433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006): Recognized liability where school officials’ affirmative misrepresentations lured a student into harm.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): Defined the “conscience-shocking” standard under substantive due process.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989): Explained that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee protection from private violence unless the state creates or enhances the risk.
Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2003): Held that merely returning a person to pre-existing danger does not satisfy the affirmative act element.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit applied a de novo review to the Rule 12(c) dismissals. It reiterated that surviving a pleadings challenge requires “plausible” allegations that, if true, establish each element of a substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory:

Affirmative Act: The defendant must take an action that creates or increases a risk of private violence. The court found that returning the backpack or withholding information were omissions or neutral acts that did not increase risk.
Special Danger: The harm must be unique to identifiable victims, not a generalized public risk. Here, the plaintiffs did not dispute this element, but it was subsumed into the overall analysis.
Conscience-Shocking: The defendant’s conduct must demonstrate “reckless or callous indifference” to a known risk of serious harm. Hopkins’ 48-hour counseling ultimatum was intended to mitigate, not exacerbate, risk and thus could not be deemed conscience-shocking.

Finally, because the court held no constitutional violation was adequately alleged, it did not need to proceed to the second prong of qualified immunity (whether the right was clearly established).

Impact

This decision tightens the substantive due process state-created danger doctrine in several respects:

It reaffirms that routine safety measures—even if imperfect—will not typically give rise to constitutional liability unless they are inherently shocking.
It discourages plaintiffs from recasting negligence or failure-to-protect claims as constitutional violations absent extraordinary facts.
It provides guidance for school officials and other public employees on the boundary between permissible protective actions and potential liability.

Looking forward, future litigants must identify truly affirmative, risk-increasing acts and show officials acted with a level of moral culpability akin to deliberate indifference or worse before invoking due process protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A shield for government officials, protecting them from suit unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.
Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: A dismissal tool, similar to a 12(b)(6) motion, which tests whether the complaint’s factual allegations, accepted as true, state a plausible claim.
State-Created Danger Doctrine: A narrow theory allowing substantive due process claims when state actors affirmatively create or increase risks of private violence.
Conscience-Shocking Standard: The high bar requiring that official conduct be egregious—“more than negligence or even gross negligence”—to violate substantive due process.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in William Myre v. Oxford Community School District underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to expand constitutional remedies for private violence absent extraordinary official misconduct. By affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-created danger claims, the court clarified that routine risk-management steps—however inadequate in hindsight—do not as a matter of law “shock the conscience.” This ruling will guide both practitioners and public officials in understanding the narrow confines of due process liability and fortify the distinction between tort-based negligence and constitutional claims.