Sita v. Department of Labor (2025): Clarifying “Good-Cause” Standards and Preservation Rules in Vermont Unemployment Appeals

1. Introduction

In Keren Sita v. Department of Labor, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed whether a claimant’s self-initiated investigation into potential discrimination constitutes “good cause” for failing to complete mandated reemployment services within the statutory deadline. The decision arose from claimant Keren Sita’s one-week denial of unemployment benefits after she missed the deadline to finish an online Re-Employment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) orientation. The principal actors were:

Claimant: Ms. Keren Sita, a self-represented unemployed worker.
Respondent: Vermont Department of Labor (DOL).
Tribunals: Claims Adjudicator ⟶ Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ⟶ Employment Security Board ⟶ Vermont Supreme Court.

Key issues included:

Whether Ms. Sita’s delay—which she attributed to concerns of racial bias in her RESEA selection—constituted “good cause” under 21 V.S.A. § 1343(a)(3)(B).
Whether alleged procedural-due-process and discrimination arguments were preserved for appellate review.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the Employment Security Board. It held that:

The Board’s finding that claimant had notice of the RESEA deadline and failed to meet it was supported by the record.
Her desire to investigate potential discrimination before participating in RESEA did not amount to “good cause” for non-participation under § 1343(a)(3)(B).
Constitutional due-process, notice, and discrimination claims were unpreserved because they were not adequately raised below; therefore the Court declined to reach them.

Consequently, Ms. Sita remained ineligible for benefits for the single week ending November 25, 2023.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Blue v. Dep't of Lab., 2011 VT 84 – Reiterated the limited scope of Supreme Court review over Board decisions.
Worrall v. Dep't of Lab., 2022 VT 46 – Confirmed deference to factual findings unless clearly erroneous.
863 To Go, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab., 2014 VT 61 – Established presumption that agency expertise is correct absent a clear showing otherwise.
Pratt v. Pallito, 2017 VT 22 – Articulated preservation rule: issues must be raised with specificity before the agency.
Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53 (1994) – Example of insufficient specificity failing to preserve a due-process claim.
Bouchard v. Dep't of Emp. & Training, 174 Vt. 588 (2002) – Mandated construing Board findings, if possible, to support its judgment.
Cook v. Dep't of Emp. & Training, 143 Vt. 497 (1983) – Declared that weight and credibility of evidence lie with the fact-finder.
Pcolar v. Casella Waste Sys. Inc., 2012 VT 58 – Emphasized briefing obligations even for pro se litigants.

These precedents jointly shaped two central doctrines applied here: (1) agency deference to factual findings and statutory interpretation, and (2) issue preservation as a prerequisite for appellate consideration.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a. Statutory Framework

21 V.S.A. § 1343(a) lists cumulative conditions for weekly eligibility for unemployment benefits. Two subsections were pivotal:

§ 1343(a)(3)(A) – Must be “available for work.”
§ 1343(a)(6) – Must “participate in reemployment services” if flagged by the Commissioner’s profiling system.

§ 1343(a)(3)(B) imposes a sanction: failure to participate “without good cause … results in ineligibility for each week the failure continues.” Hence, the Supreme Court merely had to decide (i) whether participation was required, (ii) whether the claimant actually failed to participate by the deadline, and (iii) whether her reason amounted to good cause.

b. Factual Determinations

The ALJ—and later the Board—found that:

The Department sent timely notice designating Ms. Sita for RESEA with a November 20 deadline.
Department exhibits showed a November 13 phone call where she was upset by the requirement, indicating actual knowledge.
She completed the orientation on November 29, nine days late.
The only explanation offered was her investigatory pause over perceived bias.

Under Cook, credibility determinations were for the Board; the Supreme Court found no clear error.

c. “Good Cause” Analysis

The term “good cause” is not statutorily defined, so the Court interpreted it in context:

It must be objective and reasonable, not merely subjective reluctance.
Concern about discrimination without evidentiary support and without pursuing formal remedies (e.g., filing a discrimination complaint) does not excuse statutory non-compliance.
Allowing self-directed delays would undermine the profiling system and frustrate labor-market reintegration objectives built into § 1343.

d. Preservation Doctrine

The claimant attempted to raise new constitutional and discrimination arguments on appeal. The Court cited Pratt and Ben-Mont to reiterate that issues not properly presented to the agency are barred from appellate review. Because Ms. Sita’s Board appeal focused solely on needing extra time for her investigation, the Court declined review of procedural-due-process, unequal-treatment, and “administrative gaslighting” claims.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although designated an Entry Order by a three-justice panel (and technically “not precedent” under Vermont’s special rule for such orders), in practice these orders are frequently cited for persuasive value. The ruling’s significance lies in three areas:

Clarification of “Good Cause” – The Court sets an objective benchmark: personal investigations or subjective discomfort—without timely evidence—do not suffice. This tightens the standard, guiding ALJs and the Board in future unemployment cases.
Reaffirmation of Preservation Requirements – The judgment underscores that all theories (constitutional or otherwise) must be articulated below. Pro se parties now have explicit reminder that superficial or abandoned arguments cannot be resurrected on appeal.
Operational Certainty for RESEA Program – The decision shields the Department’s profiling system from ad-hoc delays, preserving its gatekeeping role in unemployment compensation.

Practical Takeaway: Claimants must comply with RESEA or similar requirements in real time. If they believe a selection was discriminatory, they must both (1) lodge a contemporaneous objection with supporting facts, and (2) still satisfy the orientation in order to retain ongoing benefits, unless and until an official ruling excuses them.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

RESEA (Re-Employment Services and Eligibility Assessment) – A federal-state program wherein certain unemployment claimants are “profiled” (statistically identified) as likely to exhaust benefits and therefore required to complete orientation, job-search workshops, and career assessments.
Profiling System – A data model that scores claimants on factors such as industry, education, tenure, and regional demand to decide who needs extra reemployment assistance.
Good Cause – A legally acceptable excuse judged by a “reasonable person” standard. It usually involves circumstances beyond claimant’s control (e.g., illness, computer outage, family emergency) rather than strategic delay.
Issue Preservation – The rule that appellate courts hear only those grounds specifically presented to and ruled on by the lower tribunal. Merely hinting at an issue or raising it for the first time on appeal is insufficient.
Entry Order (Three-Justice Panel) – A shorter, expedited decision format in the Vermont Supreme Court. By rule, it lacks formal precedential weight, but it can still guide lower tribunals as persuasive authority.

5. Conclusion

Sita v. Department of Labor contributes a clearly articulated boundary for the “good-cause” exception in Vermont unemployment law: subjective, unsubstantiated concerns about discrimination are not enough to excuse non-participation in required reemployment services. It also reinforces the vital procedural axiom that appellate review is confined to issues properly preserved below. Going forward, both claimants and counsel must (1) comply promptly with RESEA mandates, or (2) develop and record substantive evidence if they seek an exemption. Administrators and ALJs, armed with this decision, can rely on objective criteria and demand timely participation, confident that the Supreme Court will not second-guess fact-based determinations absent clear error.