Introduction

In Ramon Alvarado, Jr. v. Julio Ithier and Teana Jackson, No. 22-2860 (7th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025), a panel of Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Maldonado affirmed (1) summary judgment in favor of Officer Teana Jackson on Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force and failure-to-protect claims; (2) dismissal of state-law tort claims for lack of compliance with Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute; and (3) a jury verdict in favor of Officer Julio Ithier on an excessive-force claim arising from his deployment of a taser during a jail altercation. The Seventh Circuit issued a nonprecedential order (citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), deciding the appeal without oral argument.

The decision is noteworthy for its clear reaffirmation of several recurring doctrines in detainee civil-rights litigation and trial practice: the sham-affidavit rule, the controlling effect of video evidence when it “blatantly contradicts” a party’s version of events, the objective reasonableness standard for pretrial detainee force claims under Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the insufficiency of negligence to support constitutional claims, strict and jurisdictional enforcement of Wisconsin’s 120-day notice-of-claim requirement, the high bar for plain-error review of unpreserved issues in civil cases, and the limited availability of appellate relief when a party fails to comply with Rule 50 and preserve objections at trial.

Parties: Plaintiff-appellant Ramon Alvarado, Jr., a pretrial detainee; defendants-appellees Milwaukee County Jail Officers Teana Jackson and Julio Ithier. The district court (Judge Lynn Adelman, E.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to Jackson and partial summary judgment to Ithier, sending only the taser-use claim against Ithier to trial, where the jury returned a defense verdict.

Summary of the Opinion

• Summary judgment for Officer Jackson affirmed: No reasonable jury could find her use of force excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment given Alvarado’s admitted threats, physical aggression, and size disparity; video evidence undermined his account of the handcuffing phase.
• Failure-to-protect against Jackson and failure to intervene by Ithier (as to Jackson or other detainees) rejected: No underlying constitutional violation by Jackson, and at most negligence regarding detainee-on-detainee conduct—insufficient for a constitutional claim.
• State-law tort claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: Alvarado failed to serve a notice of claim within 120 days of the incident as required by Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3), (3m); the statute is strictly enforced and jurisdictional.
• Excessive-force claim against Officer Ithier tried to a jury: Conflicting testimony about whether Alvarado was fighting or shielding himself when tased; defense verdict affirmed. Post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial properly denied due to failure to make a Rule 50(a) motion at the close of evidence and failure to preserve objections.
• Evidentiary and instructional challenges largely waived or unavailing: No plain-error review; sustained objection to psychiatric-history question cured by instruction; the reasonableness instruction tracked Seventh Circuit pattern instructions.
• Use of shackles: No error or prejudice where Alvarado’s restraints were concealed after he threatened counsel; any complaint about shackled detainee-witnesses was waived by lack of objection.

Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The February 2018 altercation unfolded when Officer Jackson, supervising a jail pod, approached Alvarado’s cell to deliver a lunch tray following a lockdown for disobedience. After a verbal confrontation, Alvarado pushed open the door; the parties disputed who struck first. What was undisputed: Alvarado grabbed Jackson by the neck and punched her, pulled her into the cell, pushed her onto the bed, and attempted to take her taser. Other detainees rushed in; a melee ensued. Officer Ithier, observing from the first floor, ran up to assist. He saw Alvarado on the ground amid fighting; he warned Alvarado to stop resisting (disputed) and deployed his taser, with prongs striking Alvarado’s arm and head.

Video captured the immediate aftermath: as detainees dispersed, one detainee returned to stomp Alvarado’s leg; Jackson intervened to stop further stomping, then attempted to handcuff Alvarado. The video showed Alvarado on his stomach with hands behind his head; Jackson tried to move his arms behind his back, encountered resistance, and briefly lifted his torso. Unable to secure a behind-the-back cuff, she cuffed his wrists behind his head.

The district court: (1) granted summary judgment to Jackson on excessive force and failure to protect; (2) granted partial summary judgment to Ithier on failure-to-intervene claims; (3) dismissed state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction due to untimely notice; and (4) denied summary judgment to Ithier on the taser excessive-force claim, which proceeded to a jury with appointed pro bono counsel for Alvarado. The jury returned a defense verdict. The court denied Alvarado’s post-trial motions based on procedural defaults and lack of preserved objections.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015): Anchors the Fourteenth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard governing pretrial detainee excessive-force claims. The panel applied this to assess Jackson’s conduct during the altercation and handcuffing and to frame the jury instruction on reasonableness for Ithier’s taser use.
• Leibas v. Dart, 108 F.4th 1021 (7th Cir. 2024): Reaffirms the sham-affidavit rule; a party cannot create a factual dispute by submitting an affidavit contradicting prior deposition testimony. Used to discount later statements by Alvarado that conflicted with his deposition admissions about the threat he posed.
• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), as cited in Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359 (7th Cir. 2025): When a video “blatantly contradicts” a party’s account, the court adopts the video’s depiction for summary judgment. Applied to reject Alvarado’s assertions about hair-pulling, fingernail cuts, and face-slamming during handcuffing.
• Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2020): Recognizes that significant force can be reasonable to subdue a resisting or violent detainee. Supports the conclusion that Jackson’s force in attempting to handcuff was not excessive.
• Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010): Addresses factors relevant to reasonableness in corrections settings, including size disparity and perceived threat, informing the panel’s view of Jackson’s response to an imminent attack.
• Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009): A failure-to-intervene claim generally requires an underlying constitutional violation by another officer. Because Jackson committed no violation, the failure-to-intervene theory against Ithier failed.
• Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2020): Violation of departmental policy is not itself a constitutional violation. Undercuts Alvarado’s effort to use training materials or disciplinary records to prove a constitutional breach.
• Oney v. Schrauth, 541 N.W.2d 229 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995): No “discovery rule” for Wisconsin’s § 893.82(3) deadline; notice must be served within 120 days of the event causing injury. Applied to reject Alvarado’s timing argument tied to later video review.
• Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010); Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480 (7th Cir. 2021): Strict, jurisdictional nature of § 893.82’s notice requirement. Grounds dismissal of state-law claims.
• Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc): Standard for recruiting counsel for indigent civil litigants—case complexity versus the plaintiff’s capacity. Supports denying counsel at summary judgment.
• Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887 (7th Cir. 2023); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 758 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2014): Preservation requirements; unobjected-to trial errors are forfeited.
• Jiminez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2013); Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2005): Rare availability of plain-error review in civil cases; requires exceptional circumstances and a risk of miscarriage of justice. Not met here.
• Pryor v. Corrigan, 124 F.4th 475 (7th Cir. 2024): Standards of review—abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings; de novo for questions of law.
• Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2012): Presumption that juries follow curative instructions. Used to dispose of prejudice claim tied to a psychiatric-history question to which an objection was sustained.
• Marvin v. Holcomb, 72 F.4th 828 (7th Cir. 2023); Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2011): Approval of pattern jury instructions on reasonableness. Supports the district court’s jury charge.
• Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014): Use of restraints in civil trials; steps to minimize prejudice. Endorses concealing Alvarado’s shackles after he threatened counsel.
• Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006): Waiver of issues not raised below; applied to shackled-witness argument.

C. Legal Reasoning

1) Excessive Force and Failure to Protect Claims Against Jackson

The court held no reasonable jury could find Jackson’s force excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Critically, Alvarado’s deposition conceded that Jackson could reasonably perceive an imminent threat: he had been shouting obscenities and threats, pushed open his cell door, and was much larger than Jackson. Under Kingsley and cases like Forrest and Turner, those facts justified a forceful response to an immediate security threat.

On the handcuffing phase, Alvarado’s affidavit asserted hair-pulling, fingernail cuts, and face-slamming, but the surveillance video “blatantly contradicts” these claims. Under Scott/Smith, the video controls at summary judgment. The footage showed Jackson trying to move Alvarado’s arms from behind his head to behind his back, encountering resistance, and briefly lifting his torso; when unable to secure a behind-the-back cuff, she stopped using escalating force and cuffed him behind his head. Given the preceding violence and ongoing resistance, this was not objectively unreasonable.

The court also rejected a failure-to-protect claim against Jackson. During the chaotic altercation, she was focused on protecting herself from Alvarado’s attack; the other detainees initially intervened to protect her. Once Alvarado was subdued, the video shows Jackson preventing an additional stomp to his leg. On these facts, a failure-to-protect theory could not succeed.

2) Failure to Intervene/Protect Claims Against Ithier

The district court granted partial summary judgment to Ithier on claims that he failed to prevent Jackson or other detainees from harming Alvarado. Under Lewis v. Downey, a failure-to-intervene claim generally requires an underlying constitutional violation; because Jackson committed none, that theory failed. As for detainee-on-detainee violence, the court characterized any failure to order a stop (a disputed fact) as, at most, negligence—insufficient for a Fourteenth Amendment claim post-Kingsley, which requires at least objective unreasonableness and more than mere carelessness.

3) Excessive Force Claim Against Ithier (Taser Deployment) and Trial Rulings

The taser claim proceeded to trial because factual disputes remained: defense witnesses said Alvarado continued fighting; two detainees and Alvarado said he was shielding himself; experts disagreed about whether the prong locations implied a prone, non-resisting detainee. The jury credited the defense evidence and found for Ithier.

Post-trial, Alvarado’s Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied because he had not moved under Rule 50(a) at the close of the evidence; without that predicate motion, a Rule 50(b) renewal is unavailable. His Rule 59 new-trial motion failed because most claimed trial errors were unpreserved: absent contemporaneous objections, the Seventh Circuit will not ordinarily reverse.

The panel declined plain-error review, noting that civil litigants have no right to “effective assistance” of counsel and that general complaints about pro bono performance do not constitute exceptional circumstances. Even on the preserved issues:

• Psychiatric-history cross-examination: The objection was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard; courts presume jurors follow such instructions (Sanchez).
• Reasonableness instruction: The charge mirrored Seventh Circuit pattern instructions and appropriately left to the jury whether rapidly evolving events affected the reasonableness of force (Marvin; Clarett).
• Shackles: After Alvarado threatened his lawyer, the court concealed his restraints with a table skirt, minimizing prejudice consistent with Maus. The visibility of shackles on detainee-witnesses was not objected to and thus waived (Naeem).

4) Wisconsin State-Law Claims and Jurisdictional Notice-of-Claim

Wisconsin’s § 893.82(3), (3m) requires notice “within 120 days of the event causing the injury.” Alvarado’s notice—filed nearly a year later—was untimely. The Seventh Circuit reiterated that:

• There is no discovery rule for the § 893.82 clock (Oney); the period runs from the event, not when the full extent of injury becomes known.
• The notice requirement is jurisdictional and strictly enforced (Badger Catholic; Robinson), leaving the district court without authority to entertain the state-law claims.

The panel also noted that violations of jail policy—even if proven—do not establish constitutional torts (Pulera), and that the record did not support Alvarado’s assertion that Jackson had been disciplined for the incident.

D. Practical Impact and Significance

While nonprecedential, the ruling carries practical weight for detainee litigation, particularly in the Seventh Circuit:

• Video evidence is determinative when it squarely contradicts a party’s narrative, affecting both summary judgment outcomes and trial strategies.
• The sham-affidavit doctrine remains a potent gatekeeping tool; litigants should anticipate that post-hoc affidavits conflicting with earlier sworn testimony will be disregarded.
• Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force analysis remains firmly “objective,” with attention to rapidly evolving circumstances, perceived threats, and detainee resistance. Force used to subdue a violent or resisting detainee can be “significant” yet reasonable.
• Negligence cannot sustain constitutional claims—especially failure-to-protect/intervene claims—where the facts reflect, at most, imperfect but not objectively unreasonable conduct.
• Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute is unforgiving: missing the 120-day window is fatal to state-law claims in any forum, regardless of later revelations about injury severity.
• Trial preservation matters: failure to object contemporaneously, request proper instructions, or move under Rule 50(a) sharply limits appellate review. Plain error is an exceedingly narrow and seldom-used safety valve in civil cases.
• Court management of restraints in civil trials focuses on minimizing prejudice rather than outright prohibition; concealment measures and the reasons for restraints (e.g., threats to counsel) will typically suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Objective reasonableness (Fourteenth Amendment): For pretrial detainees, the question is whether the officer’s force would have appeared reasonable to a reasonable officer on the scene, considering the severity of the security problem, the threat perceived, active resistance, and whether the officer tried to temper the force—without requiring proof of the officer’s subjective intent.
• Sham-affidavit rule: You cannot create a genuine factual dispute by submitting a later affidavit that contradicts your own earlier, sworn deposition testimony. Courts will disregard the contradictory parts of the affidavit.
• Video override (Scott v. Harris rule): When clear video evidence shows events differently than a party describes, courts adopt the video’s version for purposes of summary judgment.
• Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant—but not when the nonmovant’s account is blatantly contradicted by video.
• Failure to intervene/protect: Liability generally requires an underlying constitutional violation (for intervene claims) and conduct beyond mere negligence. Officers must have a realistic opportunity to intervene and fail to do so.
• Wisconsin notice-of-claim (Wis. Stat. § 893.82): A prerequisite to suing certain public officers/employees. Notice must be served within 120 days of the injury-causing event. It is a jurisdictional bar; late notice usually cannot be excused.
• Rule 50 and Rule 59: To challenge a jury verdict as legally insufficient, a party must move under Rule 50(a) at the close of evidence; otherwise, post-verdict Rule 50 relief is unavailable. Rule 59 permits new-trial motions, but errors must be preserved by timely objections.
• Plain error in civil cases: A very narrow doctrine allowing review of unpreserved errors only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice; rarely granted.
• Pattern jury instructions: Standardized instructions approved by a circuit for common issues; using them generally weighs against finding instructional error absent case-specific misfit.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential affirmance in Alvarado v. Ithier crystallizes several durable lessons for detainee civil-rights litigation and trial practice. Substantively, it reinforces that force used to subdue a violent or resisting detainee can be reasonable under Kingsley, that video evidence can decisively shape outcomes, and that negligence will not support constitutional liability. Procedurally, it highlights the perils of attempting to generate factual disputes with affidavits that contradict prior testimony, the critical importance of preserving trial objections and making Rule 50(a) motions, and the near-impossibility of obtaining plain-error relief in civil appeals. For state-law claims in Wisconsin, it is a stark reminder that § 893.82’s 120-day notice is jurisdictional and strictly enforced.

Though nonprecedential, the opinion provides persuasive guidance: litigants should build records that align with objective evidence, carefully preserve issues for review, and strictly comply with pre-suit statutory prerequisites. On those axes, Alvarado’s case ultimately failed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board.