Seventh Circuit Endorses “Search-for-Truth” Reasonable-Doubt Language Under AEDPA Deference:
Commentary on Michael Williams v. Michael Meisner (7th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

On 16 June 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit delivered its opinion in Michael Williams v. Michael Meisner, No. 23-3268. The decision addresses two perennial flashpoints in criminal procedure:

• Whether a jury instruction telling jurors “You are not to search for doubt, you are to search for the truth” impermissibly lowers the State’s burden of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt; and
• Whether a prosecutor’s closing rebuttal—arguing the defence had “no answer” for key evidence—unconstitutionally shifts the burden of persuasion to the accused.

Petitioner-appellant Michael Williams, convicted in Wisconsin of first-degree reckless homicide and felon-in-possession, sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief, and the Seventh Circuit now affirms, holding that:

“Under AEDPA’s deferential standard, Wisconsin’s appellate court reasonably concluded that the ‘search-for-truth’ instruction and the prosecutor’s remarks did not contravene clearly established Supreme Court precedent.”

The ruling effectively cements, within the Seventh Circuit, the constitutional acceptability of the contested instruction when coupled with conventional burden-of-proof language, and clarifies the latitude prosecutors retain in commenting on evidentiary gaps.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rovner, Scudder & Lee, JJ.; opinion by Judge Lee) upheld the district court’s denial of habeas relief on two independent grounds:

1. Reasonable-Doubt Instruction. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Cage v. Louisiana, Sullivan v. Louisiana, or Victor v. Nebraska when it found no “reasonable likelihood” that jurors misunderstood the instruction to allow conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Prosecutorial Comments. Nor did the state court unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Darden, Young, Griffin) in concluding the prosecutor’s “no-answer” rebuttal did not shift the burden of proof and was neutralised by curative instructions.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Cage v. Louisiana (1990) & Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993)
  Both condemned instructions equating reasonable doubt with “grave” or “substantial” doubt and requiring “moral certainty.” The Seventh Circuit distinguished those cases because the Wisconsin instruction lacked such terminology and, taken as a whole, properly located doubt within “reason and common sense.”
• Victor v. Nebraska (1994)
  Victor approved a definition using “substantial doubt” when contextualised with other clarifying language. The Seventh Circuit analogised Wisconsin’s pattern instruction, stressing its repeated reminders that the State carried the entire burden of proof.
• In re Winship (1970)
  Established the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as a matter of due process. The appellate court measured the challenged instruction against Winship via the Victor “reasonable likelihood” test.
• United States v. Young (1985), Darden v. Wainwright (1986)
  Provide the framework for evaluating whether prosecutorial misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness” as to constitute a due-process violation. The Seventh Circuit found no such infection here, especially in light of prompt curative instructions.
• Griffin v. California (1965)
  Forbids comment on a defendant’s silence. Because the prosecutor focused on evidentiary gaps, not Williams’s failure to testify, Griffin was deemed inapposite.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. AEDPA Deference. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts may not grant relief unless the state court’s decision is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court law. The Seventh Circuit emphasised that “unreasonable” means beyond the range of fair-minded disagreement—an intentionally high bar (Harrington v. Richter).
2. Reading Instructions in Context. Citing Victor, the court refused to isolate the phrase “do not search for doubt.” Instead, it considered accompanying language reminding jurors to “pause or hesitate” before acting and stressing the State’s burden. In context, the instruction directed jurors to decide the case on evidence, not speculation, while still honouring the presumption of innocence.
3. Empirical Critiques Discounted. Williams introduced a law-review study suggesting “search-for-truth” language doubles conviction propensity among mock jurors. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged but discounted the study because it did not replicate the full set of instructions given at trial, reiterating that constitutional analysis focuses on how this jury would reasonably interpret these instructions.
4. Prosecutor’s “No Answer” Rebuttal. The panel viewed the comments as permissible “summary of evidentiary weaknesses” rather than an unlawful invitation to shift the burden. It differentiated between highlighting absence of evidence and commenting on a defendant’s silence.
5. Curative Instructions. Trial-court admonitions that counsel’s arguments are not evidence, coupled with explicit burden-of-proof reminders, were deemed sufficient to dispel any lingering confusion.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Validation of Pattern Instruction. Wisconsin and other jurisdictions employing the “search for truth” clause can continue to do so—at least within the Seventh Circuit—without fearing federal habeas reversal.
• Narrowing Habeas Relief. The ruling underscores AEDPA’s stringent standard. Even instructions that some judges or scholars view as sub-optimal will survive, so long as they do not unreasonably contradict Supreme Court holdings.
• Prosecutorial Latitude. Prosecutors may argue that the defence “has no answer” to key evidence, provided they do not explicitly refer to the defendant’s silence and the court issues clarifying instructions.
• Trial Strategy for Defence Counsel. Defence lawyers must proactively request tailored curative instructions and preserve objections, but they should be realistic about the limited federal review available later.
• Potential Supreme Court Interest. Because several circuits have expressed discomfort with “search for doubt” wording, a cert petition might raise the question whether Victor left too much variability. However, AEDPA’s deference makes this case a poor vehicle for a broad constitutional ruling.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Williams v. Meisner reinforces two doctrinal pillars:

1. A jury charge exhorting jurors “to search for the truth” does not, in itself, dilute the State’s burden, so long as the instruction—viewed in its entirety—affirms the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Prosecutorial argument pointing to the defence’s “no answer” on critical facts is permissible advocacy, not unconstitutional burden shifting, particularly where the trial judge issues swift corrective instructions.

Practitioners should note the decision’s practical message: in the post-AEDPA landscape, only egregious or clearly forbidden instructional errors will justify federal habeas relief. State courts retain broad room to craft jury charges and manage closing arguments, provided they stay within the outer boundaries marked by Supreme Court precedent.