Settlement-Induced Mootness and Discovery Confidentiality: The Sixth Circuit’s Clarification in McGhee-Twilley v. CoreCivic

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Lakenya McGhee-Twilley v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC confronts a recurring post-settlement skirmish: may a plaintiff who has settled all claims continue to litigate the status of discovery materials—here, documents marked “CONFIDENTIAL” by non-parties— in order to make them public? The panel (Judge Readler, joined by Judge Davis; Judge Clay concurring in part) answers “no,” reinforcing the principle that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice usually extinguishes Article III jurisdiction over ancillary discovery disputes.

Although designated “Not Recommended for Publication,” the decision builds upon recent Sixth Circuit cases (Garton v. Crouch; Grae I & II) and Supreme Court authority (Acheson Hotels v. Laufer, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez), sharpening the contours of “settlement-induced mootness.” It thus serves as an important cautionary tale for litigants, counsel, journalists, and public-interest groups who seek post-settlement access to discovery.

Summary of the Judgment

McGhee-Twilley sued CoreCivic after her son was killed by inmates in a privately run prison. During discovery, third parties (District Attorney Jason Lawson and the Tennessee Department of Correction, TDOC) produced documents under a Rule 26(c) protective order and labeled them confidential.
Before the magistrate could rule on McGhee-Twilley’s motion to de-designate those documents, she and CoreCivic settled and stipulated to dismissal with prejudice, leading the district court to close the case.
McGhee-Twilley nevertheless appealed, arguing that she still needed the documents to monitor public agencies and to aid a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot: once the substantive claims disappeared, no live case or controversy remained and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023)
Confirmed that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal moots a case. The panel leaned heavily on this fresh Supreme Court signal to treat settlement dismissals as jurisdiction-obliterating events.
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (2016)
Provided the “personal stake” / “effectual relief” language that frames modern mootness analysis; quoted to show that no relief could be granted after settlement.
Garton v. Crouch, 2024 WL 3569520 (6th Cir. 2024)
Procedurally indistinguishable: plaintiff settled §1983 claims yet pursued de-designation of discovery. McGhee-Twilley treats Garton as binding roadmap: same protective-order context, same outcome—dismissal.
Grae v. CCA (“Grae I” 57 F.4th 567 (2023); “Grae II” 134 F.4th 927 (2025))
Intervenors sought CoreCivic documents after settlement. Those cases inform the court’s skepticism toward informational-injury theories that lack a personal, concrete stake.
Additional citations—Seattle Times v. Rhinehart (protective-order discretion), Nashville Ry. v. United States (1885) (consent decrees moot appeals), Powell v. McCormack/Camenisch (live money claims can survive settlement)— all differentiate circumstances where mootness is not triggered, thereby accentuating why it was here.

Legal Reasoning

Article III Requirement. The Constitution confines federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” A party must retain a concrete, personal stake in the outcome.
Settlement as Jurisdictional Extinguisher. A voluntary dismissal with prejudice “bargains away” any cognizable interest in the litigation’s outcome, mooting ancillary motions unless an independent legal interest survives.
No Surviving Personal Interest. • Oversight of TDOC/CoreCivic and • Assistance to the DOJ investigation were deemed “generalized” or speculative interests — ones shared by the public, not uniquely by McGhee-Twilley.
Moreover, the DOJ already wields subpoena power under 42 U.S.C. §1997a-1, so a de-designation order would make no practical difference, failing the “effectual-relief” test.
Protective Order’s Continued Existence ≠ Live Controversy. The order may still bind parties, but absent a live claim (or contempt threat directed at McGhee-Twilley), it cannot resuscitate jurisdiction.
Finality vs. Mootness. Appellant argued the district court had not entered a “final” decision because discovery motions remained unresolved. The panel sidestepped the §1291 debate, holding that even if not final, the matter is moot, and an appellate court cannot remand a case it lacks power to review.

Potential Impact

Timing of Access Motions. Litigants who want discovery materials unsealed must press those motions before settlement or carve explicit exceptions into settlement papers.
Press & Public-Interest Interventions. Journalists or advocacy groups seeking CoreCivic-related discovery may need to intervene directly (as in Grae II) rather than rely on a settling plaintiff.
Strategic Use of Protective Orders. The decision may embolden producing parties to withstand post-settlement disclosure demands, knowing that jurisdiction will likely evaporate.
Clarification of Sixth Circuit Doctrine. Alongside Garton, the case cements within the circuit a bright-line rule: a settlement-induced dismissal with prejudice presumptively moots all unresolved discovery disputes, even when they involve third-party confidentiality designations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Mootness: Even if a court once had jurisdiction, it loses power when events (like settlement) erase the parties’ real stakes. Courts cannot issue “advisory opinions.”
Rule 26(c) Protective Order: A discovery-phase mechanism allowing parties or non-parties to mark materials confidential upon a showing of “good cause.” It protects materials from public disclosure during litigation but does not guarantee permanent secrecy.
Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice: A filing (usually under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)) ending the lawsuit for good; the claims cannot be re-filed.
Effectual Relief Test: A case is moot if the court’s decision will not change the parties’ legal position or grant them a practical benefit.
“Generalized Grievance” vs. “Personal Stake”: Concern shared by all citizens (e.g., wanting good prison oversight) is inadequate; the plaintiff must show an injury distinct from the public at large.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision underscores a decisive lesson: once parties settle and dismiss their claims with prejudice, the courthouse doors close not only on the merits but also on unresolved discovery skirmishes—unless a concrete, personal, and still-remediable interest survives. In McGhee-Twilley, no such interest remained, so the appeal was dismissed as moot. For future litigants, the opinion lights a clear procedural beacon: if public access to discovery matters, secure it before the settlement ink dries or ensure that any surviving interest is explicitly carved out of the dismissal. Absent that foresight, the protective order will stand, the materials will stay confidential, and appellate jurisdiction will vanish.