Separate Estate, Marital Earnings, and “Property Acquired During Marriage”: The Wyoming Supreme Court’s Framework for Interpreting Postnuptial Agreements in Young v. Jones

I. Introduction

In Bethany D. Young v. Jeremy D. Jones, 2025 WY 130, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed a wide range of issues arising out of a divorce governed in part by a postnuptial agreement executed two days after the parties’ wedding. The case is significant for Wyoming family and contract law because it clarifies:

• How postnuptial agreements are interpreted under ordinary contract principles;
• What is (and is not) “separate estate” when a spouse owns a pre‑marital business but earns income from working in that business during the marriage;
• How a broadly worded catchall clause for “all other property acquired during the marriage from any source whatsoever” interacts with more specific provisions of a marital agreement;
• The evidentiary and procedural standards for challenging a marital agreement as unconscionable or void based on unilateral mistake at the summary judgment stage; and
• The scope of a district court’s discretion in valuing and distributing marital real property in divorce, including the choice of valuation date.

Husband (Jeremy Jones) appealed the district court’s interpretation of the parties’ postnuptial agreement and its valuation and division of the marital residence. Wife (Bethany Young) cross‑appealed, challenging the enforceability of the postnuptial agreement itself, claiming unconscionability and unilateral mistake.

The Supreme Court affirmed across the board: it upheld the postnuptial agreement as enforceable, endorsed the district court’s interpretation of the agreement as permitting equitable judicial distribution of property acquired during the marriage, and approved the court’s valuation and distribution of the marital home.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

The parties married in 2014, executed a postnuptial agreement two days later, and separated in late 2020. Husband filed for divorce in 2021. The district court:

• Granted Husband partial summary judgment that the postnuptial agreement was valid and enforceable;
• Denied a second summary judgment motion that the agreement disposed of all distribution issues, finding that certain property acquired during the marriage remained subject to equitable division under section 1(d) of the agreement;
• After a bench trial, entered a decree in 2023 dividing the parties’ assets, including six vehicles and a substantially improved marital residence; and
• Later entered a revised decree in 2024 fixing the home’s value and equity after an additional appraisal, to make the decree final and appealable (following dismissal of an earlier appeal for lack of finality in Jones v. Young, 2024 WY 64).

Husband then appealed the revised decree; Wife cross‑appealed on the enforceability of the postnuptial agreement. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.

B. Holdings

1. Enforceability of the postnuptial agreement: The agreement is enforceable. Wife failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on unconscionability or unilateral mistake, even assuming her “verified brief” could be treated as evidentiary material under W.R.C.P. 56(c).
2. Interpretation of the agreement: The court interpreted section 1(d) as controlling all property acquired during the marriage “from any source whatsoever,” thereby authorizing the court to divide such property in a just and equitable fashion if the parties could not agree. Husband’s argument that his post‑marriage earnings were “income” from his pre‑marital business and therefore separate property under section 1(b) was rejected.
3. Valuation of the marital residence: The district court did not clearly err in valuing the marital home at $925,000, nor did it abuse its discretion by valuing it as of the time of trial (2023) rather than at separation. The record—including Husband’s own expert’s testimony—supported the $925,000 figure, and the use of the trial date was within the court’s broad discretion under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑114(a).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

1. Summary Judgment Standards and Rule 56(c)

The Court reaffirmed and applied its established summary judgment framework, citing:

• Drewry v. Brenner, 2025 WY 121, 579 P.3d 49 and Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, 569 P.3d 1120: Summary judgment is reviewed de novo; the appellate court looks at the record in the same light as the district court, favoring the non‑movant and granting all reasonable inferences.
• Bain v. City of Cheyenne, 2025 WY 67, 570 P.3d 725: An appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any basis supported by the record.
• Braunstein v. Robinson Family Ltd. Partnership LLP, 2010 WY 26, 226 P.3d 826, and Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 18, 150 P.3d 1194: Compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure in summary judgment practice is mandatory.
• Gumpel v. Copperleaf Homeowners Ass’n, 2017 WY 46, 393 P.3d 1279, and Rivers v. Moore, Myers & Garland, 2010 WY 102, 236 P.3d 284: Summary judgment materials must be as professionally correct as trial evidence.
• Lovato v. Tim Case, 2022 WY 151, 520 P.3d 1144, and Lewis v. Francis, 2025 WY 109, 577 P.3d 433: Conclusory assertions, speculation, or unsupported opinions cannot defeat summary judgment; the non‑movant must present specific admissible facts.

These authorities frame the Court’s decision to treat Wife’s “verified brief” as inadequate to create a triable issue, even putting aside technical questions about whether such a document qualifies under Rule 56(c).

2. Unconscionability of Contracts and Marital Agreements

On unconscionability, the Court drew heavily from:

• Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, 413 P.3d 117:
  • Whether a contract is unconscionable is a question of law.
  • Courts are cautious not to lightly interfere with freedom of contract.
  • Unconscionability involves both substantive and procedural components, evaluated together.
• Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. v. Boyd, 2017 WY 122, 403 P.3d 1014, and Pittard v. Great Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64, 156 P.3d 964:
  • Unconscionability is assessed at the time of contracting, not in hindsight.
  • The two‑prong test: (1) provisions unreasonably favor one party (substantive); and (2) the disadvantaged party lacked meaningful choice (procedural).
• Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209 (Wyo. 2000): Most courts require evidence of both substantive and procedural unconscionability, and apply a balancing approach.

The Court reinforced Long’s principle that even very one‑sided bargains are not necessarily unconscionable; courts do not rescue parties from merely “unwise” agreements.

3. Consideration, Unilateral Mistake, and Postnuptial Agreements

On the enforceability of postnuptial agreements and consideration, the Court relied on:

• Long v. Long and Combs v. Sherry‑Combs, 865 P.2d 50 (Wyo. 1993):
  • Postnuptial agreements must be supported by consideration; the marriage itself is not sufficient consideration once the marriage has already occurred.
  • There must be some “other identifiable consideration,” which can take the form of acts, forbearances, or changes in legal relations.
• Kindred Healthcare and Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 WY 120, 35 P.3d 1232: consideration includes performance, forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of legal relationships.
• McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 2003 WY 2, 60 P.3d 1277 and Givens v. Fowler, 984 P.2d 1092 (Wyo. 1999): A unilateral mistake ordinarily does not justify relief unless it was caused by the other party’s fraudulent or inequitable conduct.
• Williston on Contracts § 7:11 (4th ed.): The opinion adopts Williston’s nuanced distinction between lack of consideration (no contract ever formed) and failure of consideration (a pre‑existing valid contract later breaches when promised performance fails).

The Court also cited out‑of‑state authorities—Hollar v. Hollar, 403 So.3d 843 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), and Hershkowitz v. Levy, 139 N.Y.S.3d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)—for the proposition that mutual waivers of rights in each other’s property and estates constitute valid consideration for postnuptial agreements.

4. Contract Interpretation and Marital Agreements

The interpretation of the postnuptial agreement relied heavily on Wyoming’s general contract‑interpretation jurisprudence:

• Morrison v. Hinson‑Morrison, 2024 WY 96, 555 P.3d 944 and Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, 537 P.3d 751:
  • Marital agreements are governed by the same rules as other contracts.
  • The goal is to ascertain parties’ intent from the contract’s plain language, viewed within the “four corners” of the document when unambiguous.
  • Ambiguity exists only if the language is obscure due to indefiniteness or double meaning.
• Eiden Construction, LLC v. Hogan & Associates Builders, LLC, 2024 WY 138, 561 P.3d 304; Wallop Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Goodwyn, 2015 WY 81, 351 P.3d 943:
  • Contracts must be read as a whole; courts strive to give effect to all provisions and avoid interpretations that render any term meaningless or inconsistent.
• In re CDR, 2015 WY 79, 351 P.3d 264 (quoted in Morrison): If a contract is silent on an issue that could easily have been included, courts should not “supply” the missing language under the guise of interpretation.

This framework is central to the Court’s rejection of Husband’s attempt to read his employment income as “income from separate estate,” and its insistence that the broad “all other property acquired during the marriage” clause must be given full effect.

5. Property Division and Valuation in Divorce

On the division and valuation of marital property, the Court cited:

• Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑114(a): The district court must make a “just and equitable” disposition of the property, considering the merits of the parties, the condition in which they will be left, the source of the property, and burdens imposed on the property.
• Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 WY 65, 550 P.3d 537:
  • Property division is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be disturbed only on clear grounds—i.e., if it “shocks the conscience” and is so unfair that reasonable people cannot abide it.
• Morrison: Factual findings are reviewed for clear error; appellate courts defer to the trial court’s superior position in weighing evidence.
• Williams v. Williams, 2016 WY 21, 368 P.3d 539 (overruled on other grounds), and Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 88 P.3d 1022:
  • Wyoming has not fixed a mandatory valuation date for marital property; the timing is within the trial court’s broad and sound discretion.

These precedents underpin the Court’s deference to the district court’s choice to value the marital home as of the trial date and its reliance on the comparative market analysis in the record.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Enforceability of the Postnuptial Agreement

a. The “verified brief” and Rule 56(c)

Wife filed a written opposition to Husband’s summary judgment motion, attaching a “Verification” in which she swore that the contents of the brief were true. The brief itself contained essentially narrative assertions and legal argument, but:

• Did not cite “particular parts of materials in the record” as required by W.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A); and
• Did not attach separate affidavits or evidentiary documents.

The district court explicitly faulted Wife for failing to support her assertions with admissible evidence and treated Husband’s factual showing as undisputed, particularly regarding consideration.

On appeal, Wife argued the court should have treated her verified brief as the functional equivalent of an affidavit. The Supreme Court declined to resolve that technical question. Instead, it assumed for purposes of analysis that even if the verified brief could count as summary judgment evidence, its contents were too conclusory and unsupported to create genuine disputes of material fact on the key issues (unconscionability and unilateral mistake).

Thus, the enforceability analysis rests on a more substantive point: even if procedural defects in the brief were overlooked, Wife’s assertions still fell short under Rule 56 standards.

b. Unconscionability

The Court approached unconscionability under the familiar two‑pronged test:

• Substantive unconscionability: whether the contract provisions unreasonably favor one party.
• Procedural unconscionability: whether the disadvantaged party lacked meaningful choice, considering factors such as opportunity for negotiation, access to counsel, bargaining power, education, and surprise.

Crucially, the Court limited its review to the arguments and evidence presented in the district court—emphasizing its rule against considering new theories or evidence on appeal (citing Sharpe v. Evans, 2025 WY 70; WyoLaw, LLC v. Office of Attorney General, 2021 WY 61; and Holding v. Luckinbill, 2022 WY 10).

In the district court, Wife’s substantive unconscionability argument consisted essentially of a single sentence: that the agreement favored Husband because “all his assets prior to marriage, and during the marriage, notably his lucrative business and various vehicles are covered under the Agreement.”

• On appeal, she attempted to construct detailed valuation comparisons using online tools and county records to quantify how much more property Husband protected than she did—but these were never presented below and therefore were disregarded.
• The Court characterized the original argument as “perfunctory” and “conclusory,” insufficient to preserve or prove substantive unconscionability.

For procedural unconscionability, Wife had originally asserted that:

• Husband’s attorney drafted the agreement;
• She did not have counsel and purportedly did not have an opportunity to consult counsel;
• She lacked bargaining power and an opportunity for meaningful negotiation.

On appeal, she reframed her claim to emphasize emotional pressure: she allegedly felt compelled to sign two days after the wedding, for fear of losing a week‑old marriage. Again, this theory had not been presented to the district court and was unsupported by record evidence, so it was rejected as a new, unpreserved argument.

Substantively, the Court focused on the agreement’s own recitals:

• The agreement explicitly states that each party either had counsel or knowingly waived that right;
• It specifically recites that Wife was advised by Husband’s attorney to seek independent counsel and chose not to.

Given these express stipulations and the absence of specific contrary evidence, the Court held:

• Wife’s bare assertion that she “did not have an opportunity” to consult counsel was too conclusory to create a factual dispute;
• Her statements about bargaining power and negotiation opportunity were also conclusory and unsupported; and
• She herself conceded on appeal that she is educated and successful professionally, undercutting any claim that she is the kind of vulnerable party typically associated with procedural unconscionability.

Balancing these factors—and given the Court’s general reluctance to invalidate contracts as unconscionable—it concluded that Wife had not presented specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue on either substantive or procedural unconscionability. Thus, the agreement remained enforceable.

c. Unilateral Mistake and Consideration

Wife argued that:

• The agreement recited that it was “made in consideration of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) exchanged between the parties”;
• She wrote a $100 check to Husband believing it was to pay the drafting attorney, not as consideration for the agreement; and
• Her unilateral mistaken belief about the purpose of the check, allegedly induced by Husband’s representations, undermined consideration and therefore enforceability.

The Court rejected this argument on two levels:

1. Even apart from the $100, there was independent, sufficient consideration.
   The postnuptial agreement involved mutual promises whereby:
   • Each spouse relinquished rights to the other’s pre‑marital property; and
   • Each waived statutory elective share rights in the other’s estate.
   These reciprocal waivers of significant legal rights are classic forms of consideration under Wyoming law (Combs, Long, Kindred Healthcare) and in other jurisdictions (Hollar, Hershkowitz).
2. Even if the $100 was misunderstood or not exchanged as recited, that would be a potential failure of consideration, not a lack of consideration.
   By invoking Williston, the Court emphasized:
   • Lack of consideration means no contract arises at all.
   • Failure of consideration means a contract was valid when made, but one party later fails to perform a promised act (here, the nominal $100 exchange).
   • A failure of consideration might support a claim of breach by the other party—but it does not by itself render the entire contract void or unenforceable.
   In this case, Husband did not even allege breach based on any failure to exchange the $100. More importantly, the existence of independent legal consideration (mutual waivers) made the nominal $100 irrelevant to enforceability.

Therefore, Wife’s unilateral misunderstanding about the $100 could not defeat the agreement. Her unilateral mistake, even if assumed true, was not material to the existence of consideration and did not render the postnuptial unenforceable.

2. Interpretation of the Postnuptial Agreement

a. Key contractual provisions

Section 1 of the postnuptial agreement contained four key subsections:

• § 1(a): In the event of divorce, “all real and personal property owned by either of the parties as of the date set forth below, shall be his or her respective separate property/debt and not marital property/debt.” The date was two days after the wedding, i.e., immediately after marriage. This clearly applied to pre‑marital assets as of that date.
• § 1(b): “Any assets obtained by either party as a consequence of the use, investment, reinvestment or any transfer of any portion of his or her separate estate, and any income therefrom, and any appreciation in the value thereof, shall remain part of his or her separate estate.”
• § 1(c): Addressed commingling, stating that pooling of assets would not imply abandonment of the agreement; each party would own a proportionate share of any commingled fund or asset in accordance with the proportion of separate property they contributed.
• § 1(d): “All other real and personal property that either party may acquire from any source whatsoever during their marriage (except future inherited property), shall be distributed as agreed between the parties and if the parties are not able to agree, as decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Section 1(d) is the linchpin of the Court’s interpretive analysis.

b. Husband’s theory and the Court’s rejection

Husband’s interpretation sought to keep virtually all of his economic gains during the marriage as separate property by leveraging §§ 1(b) and 1(c):

• He owned his chiropractic business, Laramie Spinal Care Center, before marriage. He argued that because his income during the marriage came from his work in that pre‑marital business, that income was “a consequence of the use” of his separate estate and thus fell under § 1(b) as “income therefrom.”
• On that view, any assets he purchased with that income—such as five of the six vehicles and his contributions to constructing and refinancing the marital residence—were either:
  • Direct extensions of his separate property under § 1(b); or
  • “Commingled” separate property under § 1(c), giving him a proportionate separate interest.

The Court rejected this reading as inconsistent with the agreement as a whole and with the plain meaning of its terms.

First, the Court held that § 1(d) speaks directly and broadly to property acquired during the marriage:

“By its plain terms, section one (d) governs disposition of real or personal property the parties acquired during their marriage ‘from any source whatsoever.’”

If Husband’s interpretation of §§ 1(b) and 1(c) were accepted, § 1(d) would be largely rendered “meaningless,” contrary to Wyoming’s rule that contracts should be read to give effect to all provisions.

Second, the Court clarified that § 1(b) is aimed at the internal growth and transformation of existing separate property, not wages from labor:

• Section 1(b) protects, for example, appreciation, reinvestment returns, or transformed forms of the same capital (e.g., selling a pre‑marital asset and buying another).
• Husband’s employment income as a chiropractor is different: it is compensation for labor, not a “use” of the business asset itself in the contractual sense.
• The Court noted that:
  • Wages are not naturally commonly understood as “income therefrom” in this context; and
  • If the parties had wished to treat all earnings from employment during the marriage as separate property, they could have easily said so. Their failure to do so is dispositive under Morrison/In re CDR.

Thus, income from employment—even when the employer is a pre‑marital business asset—is not automatically captured by § 1(b).

Third, the Court addressed Husband’s reliance on “commingling” under § 1(c):

• “Commingling” (per Black’s Law Dictionary) means a “mixing together” of existing funds or assets, such that their identity as separate or marital might be blurred.
• Section 1(c) provides a regime for situations where pre‑marital funds from both spouses are mixed—for example, into a joint investment account—by preserving each party’s pro rata share.
• This is conceptually different from acquiring entirely new property during the marriage with marital earnings. The latter is governed by § 1(d), not § 1(c).

Accordingly, the marital residence and the Ford Raptor, which were acquired during the marriage, fell squarely within § 1(d)’s realm of property acquired “from any source whatsoever” during the marriage. The district court therefore correctly treated them as marital assets subject to equitable distribution under § 1(d), consistent with the statute and the agreement.

c. Key interpretive takeaway

The Court concluded that:

• The agreement unambiguously preserves each party’s pre‑marital property and its internal growth as separate;
• But it does not designate wages or employment income earned during the marriage as separate property; and
• All property (other than future inheritance) acquired during the marriage from any source—including wages—remains subject to division by agreement or, failing that, by a court “of competent jurisdiction,” i.e., the divorce court under § 20‑2‑114(a).

Thus, the postnuptial agreement permitted, rather than precluded, a just and equitable judicial division of property acquired during the marriage.

3. Valuation and Division of the Marital Residence

a. Evidentiary support for the $925,000 valuation

The record contained three relevant valuation data points:

1. 2021 appraisal by John Bayer (Husband’s appraisal witness):
   
   • Valued the marital home at $775,000 shortly after separation;
   • Conceded that the real estate market had changed “somewhat dramatically” by 2023.
2. February 2023 comparative market analysis (CMA) by realtor Robert Schutterle (also Husband’s witness):
   • Valued the home in a range from $890,000 to $925,000;
   • Identified a neighboring property listed at $957,000 as the best comparable;
   • Testified that he would have recommended listing the home at $925,000 as of trial.
3. October 2023 post‑trial appraisal:
   • Valued the home at $850,000 (filed at the district court’s direction after the first appeal was dismissed for lack of a fixed value).

The district court chose $925,000, the high end of the CMA range, and the Supreme Court held this was not clearly erroneous:

• Husband’s own realtor testified that $925,000 was the appropriate listing price at the time of trial;
• Given the testimony about a hot market and strong comparables, the trial court was entitled to credit that figure over the later $850,000 appraisal, especially since the district court was not required to adopt any one expert’s figure slavishly;
• The appellate court was not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that a mistake had been made.

Although the original decree required the new appraisal to be “no less than $925,000,” the Supreme Court read that language not as dictating the appraiser’s conclusion but as reflecting the trial court’s own determination—based on the trial evidence—that the value was at least $925,000. The later appraisal could only have increased that figure.

b. Choice of valuation date

Husband also argued the court should have valued the residence as of separation (around 2020–2021) because:

• He had exclusive possession of the home after separation;
• He alone had paid the mortgage and maintained the property during that period; and
• He felt it unfair that the division was based on a later, higher value largely attributable to his efforts and payments.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Wyoming law leaves the choice of valuation date to the district court’s broad and sound discretion (Williams, Wallop). There is no fixed rule requiring valuation as of:

• the date of filing;
• the date of separation; or
• the date of trial.

Here, the district court justified its approach by looking at the broader fairness of the distribution:

• Although Husband made mortgage payments after separation, Wife remained a co‑obligor on the mortgage;
• She testified that her credit remained tied up in the marital mortgage, preventing her from buying her own home or even another vehicle, thus impairing her ability to build equity elsewhere;
• Both parties incurred housing costs during the separation (Husband via the mortgage; Wife via alternative housing and lost credit capacity).

Balancing these factors, the court valued the home as of trial but:

• Credited Husband with his $200,000 contribution from the sale of pre‑marital property plus $9,000 toward refinancing, for a total of $209,000;
• Credited Wife with her $26,500 initial land contribution and $9,000 refinancing contribution, for a total of $35,500;
• Then split the remaining equity equally.

The Supreme Court found this approach consistent with § 20‑2‑114(a)’s mandate to consider:

• Respective merits of the parties;
• The condition in which the divorce leaves them;
• The source of property; and
• Burden on property for the benefit of the parties.

Given the trial court’s superior vantage point in balancing these equities, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion.

C. Impact and Future Significance

1. Drafting and Interpreting Postnuptial Agreements in Wyoming

The decision provides important guidance for attorneys drafting marital agreements in Wyoming:

• Be explicit about marital earnings. If spouses intend that earnings from employment during the marriage (including salary from a pre‑marital closely held business) remain separate property, the agreement must say so clearly. General language about “income from separate estate” and appreciation is insufficient.
• Coordinate specific and catchall provisions. Broad “all other property acquired during the marriage from any source whatsoever” clauses, like § 1(d), will be read to encompass post‑marital acquisitions unless other clauses plainly and consistently carve out exceptions.
• Preserve pre‑marital property growth, but recognize its limits. Provisions like § 1(b) will protect the evolution of pre‑marital assets (e.g., asset swaps, reinvestments, appreciation), but will not automatically extend to compensation for labor.
• Waivers of statutory and inheritance rights matter. This case confirms that such waivers are independently sufficient consideration for a marital agreement, regardless of whether nominal cash is actually exchanged.

2. Litigation Strategy: Unconscionability and Summary Judgment

For litigators challenging or defending marital agreements:

• Develop the record thoroughly in the trial court.
  • Unconscionability is fact‑sensitive. To preserve arguments, counsel must offer specific evidence—affidavits, documents, deposition excerpts—on both substantive inequity and procedural defects (e.g., duress, lack of counsel, rushed timing).
  • Perfunctory assertions such as “my client had no bargaining power” or “the deal was unfair” will not survive summary judgment.
• Do not rely on “verified briefs” as evidence.
  • Even if a court were to treat a verified brief as akin to an affidavit, its statements must still satisfy Rule 56’s demand for particularized, admissible facts.
  • General, self‑serving, or conclusory statements are not enough.
• Preserve issues for appeal with cogent legal arguments below.
  • The Court’s refusal to consider Wife’s more nuanced appellate theories underscores that new legal arguments and new evidentiary theories will be disregarded unless they are jurisdictional or fundamental.

3. Property Valuation and Equitable Division

Young v. Jones confirms and refines several points about property division:

• Trial courts have wide discretion in choosing the property valuation date. Whether property is valued as of separation, filing, or trial depends on what is “just and equitable” in context.
• Contributions after separation and credit constraints both matter. A spouse who makes post‑separation mortgage payments is not automatically entitled to treat subsequent appreciation as separate; the court can weigh those payments against the other spouse’s ongoing credit encumbrance and inability to purchase a new home.
• Use of creditors’ rights and credit capacity as equitable factors. The Court’s explicit mention of Wife’s impaired credit demonstrates that “burdens imposed upon the property” under § 20‑2‑114(a) include the ongoing effects of being a co‑obligor on a mortgage, even when not in possession of the property.

4. Broader Doctrinal Themes

The opinion continues several recurring themes in Wyoming appellate jurisprudence:

• Strong respect for freedom of contract. The Court remains reluctant to nullify agreements on unconscionability grounds absent a strong factual record.
• Rigorous enforcement of procedural rules. Rule 56(c)’s requirement for specific record citations is not a formality; courts expect litigants to treat summary judgment as “trial on the papers.”
• Text‑centered contract interpretation. Particularly with sophisticated parties, courts will not “fix” agreements by reading into them terms that could easily have been included but were not.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Unconscionability

“Unconscionability” means a contract is so unfair that a court will refuse to enforce it. Wyoming breaks it into:

• Substantive unconscionability: Are the terms themselves extreme or one‑sided? Example: A clause that gives one spouse everything and leaves the other destitute without explanation.
• Procedural unconscionability: Did the weaker party truly have a choice? Courts look at:
  • Was there a real opportunity to read, understand, and negotiate the contract?
  • Did the party have access to independent counsel?
  • Were they pressured or misled, or surprised by fine print?

To prove unconscionability, you typically need both poor terms and poor process. Simply regretting a bad deal is not enough.

2. Summary Judgment Basics

Summary judgment is a way to resolve a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute over important facts:

• The moving party (here, Husband) must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
• Then the burden shifts to the non‑moving party (here, Wife) to present specific facts—through affidavits, documents, deposition excerpts, etc.—showing a real factual dispute.
• Assertions in briefs, speculation, and vague claims do not count.

3. Separate Estate vs. Marital Property

In this case:

• Separate estate: Property a spouse owned before marriage, plus its appreciation and reinvestments, can be treated as “separate” in a marital agreement.
• Marital property: Property acquired during the marriage—including with wages earned during the marriage—is typically subject to division in divorce, unless the parties clearly agree otherwise in a valid marital agreement.
• Key nuance from this case: Even if one spouse owns a business before marriage, the salary that spouse earns from working in that business after marriage is not automatically “income from separate estate” that remains separate. It is marital earnings unless the contract plainly says otherwise.

4. Consideration and “Failure of Consideration”

Every contract must have “consideration”—a legal benefit or detriment exchanged by the parties:

• Consideration exists when both sides give up something of value or assume some obligation. For marital agreements, mutual promises to give up rights in each other’s property or estates count as consideration.
• Lack of consideration means no valid contract ever formed.
• Failure of consideration means there was a valid contract, but one party later didn’t do what they promised (e.g., didn’t actually pay a nominal sum). That might be a breach, but it doesn’t retroactively destroy the contract if other consideration exists.

Here, even admitting the alleged misunderstanding about the $100, the contract had ample consideration in the parties’ mutual waivers.

5. Commingling

“Commingling” occurs when separate property is mixed with marital property (or with the other spouse’s separate property) so it becomes hard to distinguish. For example:

• Depositing pre‑marital savings into a joint account that is then used freely by both spouses.

In this case, the Court clarified that:

• Simply buying new property during the marriage (like a house or car) with earnings is not “commingling” of separate property; it is an acquisition of new marital property, governed by the agreement’s “all other property acquired during the marriage” clause.

6. Valuation Date in Divorce

Courts must decide when to value property for division:

• There is no fixed rule in Wyoming; judges can pick a date that leads to a fair result.
• Factors may include:
  • Which spouse has possession of the asset;
  • Who is paying for it after separation;
  • Whether the other spouse is still legally on the hook (e.g., on a mortgage) and thus prevented from acquiring other assets.

V. Conclusion

Young v. Jones is an important addition to Wyoming’s jurisprudence on marital agreements and property division. The Supreme Court:

• Reaffirmed that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable when supported by adequate consideration—such as mutual waivers of property and inheritance rights—and not unconscionable;
• Clarified that language protecting separate estate and its “income” does not automatically encompass wages from employment during the marriage, even if the employment is in a pre‑marital business; and
• Held that a broadly worded clause covering “all other property acquired during the marriage from any source whatsoever” will be enforced according to its plain meaning, preserving the court’s discretion to divide such property equitably on divorce.

The decision also underscores procedural discipline: litigants must supply specific, admissible evidence to contest summary judgment and must raise coherent arguments in the trial court to preserve them for appeal. Finally, it confirms the district courts’ broad equitable discretion under § 20‑2‑114(a) to select valuation dates and fashion property divisions that account not just for cash contributions and possession, but also for less visible burdens such as credit encumbrance.

For practitioners, Young v. Jones offers both a cautionary tale—about imprecise drafting and thin evidentiary showings—and a clear roadmap for structuring, litigating, and enforcing postnuptial agreements in Wyoming.