Self‑Executing Voluntary Dismissals Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i): Converting a “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice” into a Notice in Connelly v. Daystar Builders, Inc.

Self‑Executing Voluntary Dismissals Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i): Converting a “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice” into a Notice in Connelly v. Daystar Builders, Inc.

I. Introduction

In Robert D. Connelly v. Daystar Builders, Inc., No. 24‑2148 (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025) (unpublished), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated a district court’s order dismissing a personal injury action with prejudice and held that the case had already been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice by operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

The central issue on appeal was unusual: not the substantive law of Maryland workers’ compensation exclusivity or the diversity jurisdiction question the district court focused on, but rather the procedural effect of a plaintiff’s pre‑answer “motion to dismiss without prejudice”. The Fourth Circuit held that, notwithstanding its label and the absence of any citation to Rule 41, the motion qualified as a self‑executing notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). As a result, the district court lacked authority to enter any subsequent merits ruling, and its later dismissal with prejudice was void.

Although the opinion is unpublished and thus not binding precedent within the Fourth Circuit, it is a significant and clarifying statement on:

  • How courts should treat mis‑styled requests for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a);
  • The self‑executing character of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissals; and
  • The jurisdictional consequence that all later court activity is null.

The case highlights a recurrent and deceptively simple procedural trap: what happens when a plaintiff, before the defendant has answered or moved for summary judgment, asks the court to dismiss the case “without prejudice,” but does so by motion rather than by “notice”?

II. Background of the Case

A. The Underlying Accident and Workers’ Compensation

In July 2021, plaintiff Robert D. Connelly suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell approximately 20 feet from an attic area to a concrete floor while working on a renovation project at the LaVale Library in Allegany County, Maryland. At age 28, Connelly was left paralyzed from the waist down.

Connelly was employed by A&M Fire Protection, LLC, a subcontractor on the project. As an injured employee, he sought and received Maryland workers’ compensation benefits through his employer’s insurer, Erie Insurance Company. The opinion notes that he had received at least $1,050,000 in workers’ compensation benefits, allegedly paid by Erie.

B. The Federal Diversity Action Against the General Contractor

Rather than suing his employer—a course generally barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity—Connelly sued the general contractor on the project, Daystar Builders, Inc. On March 11, 2024, he filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, based on:

  • Connelly’s citizenship in West Virginia, and
  • Daystar’s citizenship in Maryland.

The original complaint asserted:

  1. Negligence;
  2. Strict liability; and
  3. Punitive damages.

On April 15, 2024, Daystar moved to dismiss the original complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), seeking a dismissal with prejudice. Daystar argued that Maryland’s workers’ compensation scheme barred Connelly’s civil claims against the general contractor, effectively invoking the state law doctrine of workers’ compensation exclusivity.

C. The Amended Complaint and Strategic Addition of Erie

On April 30, 2024, Connelly filed:

  • An amended complaint, and
  • A separate “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice.”

The amended complaint:

  • Maintained the same three claims against Daystar (negligence, strict liability, punitive damages);
  • Added Erie Insurance Company as a plaintiff; and
  • Asserted a subrogation claim on Erie's behalf, evidently based on its payment of workers’ compensation benefits.

Crucially, the motion to dismiss without prejudice:

  • Described Erie as “a Maryland based workers’ compensation carrier,”
  • Argued that the addition of Erie as a plaintiff destroyed complete diversity, and
  • “Respectfully requested” that the district court dismiss the case without prejudice so it could be refiled in state court.

The motion cited 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (the diversity statute) but did not mention Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), and it was styled as a motion, not a “notice of dismissal.”

D. Daystar’s Response and District Court Ruling

On May 10, 2024, Daystar responded in two ways:

  1. It filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), renewing its argument that Maryland’s workers’ compensation scheme barred both Connelly’s and Erie’s claims.
  2. It opposed Connelly’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, arguing:
    • The amended complaint did not adequately establish Erie’s Maryland citizenship;
    • Erie had been added solely to destroy diversity (a fraudulent joinder concern); and
    • The court should deny dismissal and reject the joinder of Erie.

Neither party invoked Rule 41(a) in their briefing, and the district court likewise did not raise it sua sponte. Instead, the court treated Connelly’s request as turning on subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1332.

On October 21, 2024, the district court:

  1. Denied Connelly’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that Erie was a citizen of Pennsylvania, not Maryland, and therefore that complete diversity existed; and
  2. Granted Daystar’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, finding the claims barred by Maryland’s workers’ compensation scheme.

Connelly appealed from this judgment, and the Fourth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

On appeal, Connelly for the first time invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), arguing that his earlier “motion to dismiss without prejudice” should have been treated as a self‑executing notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) because it was filed:

  • Before Daystar filed an answer, and
  • Before any motion for summary judgment.

The Fourth Circuit agreed. Relying heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s influential decision in Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976), and its own unpublished decisions (Jackson v. United States and Satterfield v. Vaughn), the court held that:

  • The label attached to the filing—“motion” vs. “notice”—is a “distinction without a difference” where the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) are satisfied; and
  • Connelly’s April 30, 2024 filing should be construed, as a matter of law, as a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal.

Consequently:

  • The action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice as of April 30, 2024, immediately upon the filing of the “motion”;
  • All subsequent district court activity—including the October 21, 2024 order dismissing with prejudice—was void; and
  • The case had to be remanded with instructions to recognize the earlier voluntary dismissal and treat all post‑April 30 activity as a nullity.

The panel vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with explicit instructions:

[T]he action was voluntarily dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) as of April 30, 2024, voiding all case activity that followed.

The court also stressed that it did not criticize the district court. Rather, it faulted plaintiff’s counsel for not citing or relying on Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in the first instance, noting that a correct invocation of the rule would have spared the district court, the Fourth Circuit, and the client substantial unnecessary litigation effort.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Legal Framework: Rule 41(a) Voluntary Dismissals

Rule 41(a) governs a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of an action. The opinion quotes the relevant portion in full, but the core structure is:

  • Rule 41(a)(1)(A) — Dismissal without a court order:
    • (i) The plaintiff may dismiss an action by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment;
    • (ii) The parties may file a stipulation of dismissal, signed by all parties who have appeared.
  • Rule 41(a)(1)(B) — Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice, subject to the “two‑dismissal” rule.
  • Rule 41(a)(2) — After an answer or summary judgment motion, or where Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply, dismissal is only “at the plaintiff’s request by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”

The Fourth Circuit emphasizes a key doctrinal point long accepted in this and other circuits: a proper Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal is:

  • “Available as a matter of unconditional right”; and
  • “Self‑executing,” effective upon filing, without any need for judicial approval.

That characterization comes from Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 1993), which the court cites for the proposition that a notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i):

is available as a matter of unconditional right and is self‑executing, i.e., it is effective at the moment the notice is filed with the clerk and no judicial approval is required.

In essence, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) gives the plaintiff a one‑time, unilateral, no‑questions‑asked right to walk away from the lawsuit early, provided the defendant has not yet filed an answer or a summary judgment motion.

B. The Central Dispute: Motion vs. Notice

On appeal, Connelly argued that his “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice” should have been treated as a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice. Daystar responded with two main objections:

  1. Issue Preservation: Connelly did not raise Rule 41(a) in the district court, and appellate courts generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances (citing Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 603 (4th Cir. 2004)).
  2. Waiver / Election of Procedure: By asking the district court to dismiss the case via a “motion” rather than filing a “notice,” Connelly supposedly elected to proceed under Rule 41(a)(2), which makes dismissal discretionary with the court. On this view, he “waived” the unilateral right to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

The Fourth Circuit rejected both positions, holding that the substance and timing of the filing control, not its label, and that the legal consequences of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) attach regardless of the parties’ or the court’s characterization.

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1993)

Marex Titanic provides the foundational statement that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal is a self‑executing, unconditional right effective upon filing. The Connelly panel uses this to underscore that, once the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) are satisfied, the district court loses authority to proceed to the merits. The rule divests the court of jurisdiction to do anything but, at most, address collateral matters (e.g., sanctions under Cooter & Gell, discussed below).

2. Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976)

The panel explicitly identifies the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Ezell as “persuasive” and closely analogous. In Williams:

  • Plaintiffs filed what they styled a “Motion for Dismissal” before the defendant filed any answer or summary judgment motion;
  • The motion did not cite Rule 41; and
  • The district court purported to deny dismissal, then proceed to dismiss the case with prejudice on the merits.

The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ filing, despite its label, was a Rule 41(a)(1) notice, explaining:

Although Rule 41(a)(1) was not cited in the Motion for Dismissal, there is no question that plaintiffs were acting pursuant to it. … [T]he [defendant] neither filed an answer to the complaint nor a motion for summary judgment before plaintiffs sought their voluntary dismissal. … [I]t is a distinction without a difference that the [request] was styled a “Motion for Dismissal” rather than a “Notice of Dismissal.”

Williams further held:

At the time plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss[,] the case was effectively terminated. The [district] court had no power or discretion to deny plaintiffs’ right to dismiss or to attach any condition or burden to that right. That was the end of the case and the attempt to deny relief on the merits and dismiss with prejudice was void.

The Fourth Circuit in Connelly adopts this reasoning wholesale. The “distinction without a difference” quote and the conclusion that the district court’s later order was “void” are both directly traced to Williams.

3. Jackson v. United States, No. 05‑7935, 2007 WL 2349339 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2007) (unpublished)

In Jackson, the Fourth Circuit had previously, albeit in an unpublished opinion, applied Williams in an analogous setting. There, the plaintiff:

  • Filed a “motion for voluntary dismissal,” rather than a “notice,”
  • Cited Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), and
  • Did so prior to any response from the government.

The court held that this filing operated as a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal, rendering the district court’s subsequent dismissal with prejudice “in error” and “void.” The panel in Connelly relied on Jackson to reinforce the notion that:

  • Form (the name of the filing) is not controlling where timing and substance satisfy Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), and
  • Subsequent district court orders on the merits are jurisdictionally invalid.

4. Satterfield v. Vaughn, No. 24‑6298, 2024 WL 3633581 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (unpublished)

In Satterfield, decided just months before Connelly, the Fourth Circuit again faced a plaintiff who filed a document labeled as a request for dismissal, without citing Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), before the defendant had filed an answer or summary judgment motion. The district court treated the filing as a motion, but the Fourth Circuit held:

[A] request for voluntary dismissal filed within the limits of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) should be construed as a notice of dismissal under that rule, regardless of how it is styled.

The court in Satterfield underscored that:

Because a voluntary dismissal is effective upon the filing of the notice with the clerk of the district court, the action terminated when [the plaintiff] filed his notice, thereby divesting the district court of jurisdiction and rendering a subsequent court order “void.”

This logic transparently underlies Connelly, which cites Satterfield as part of a coherent, emerging Fourth Circuit line (albeit in unpublished opinions) aligning with Williams.

5. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)

Cooter & Gell is cited indirectly via its partial abrogation of Williams. The Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell held that a district court retains jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions even after a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal, clarifying the scope of “self‑executing” dismissal.

The Connelly opinion acknowledges this partial abrogation but maintains that Williams remains good law on the pivotal point: a properly timed filing that qualifies under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) terminates the action and strips the court of authority to adjudicate the merits.

6. Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2004)

Daystar relied on Volvo for the general rule that issues not raised in the district court are usually not considered on appeal absent “exceptional circumstances.” The Fourth Circuit in Connelly implicitly treats the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) question as precisely such an exceptional circumstance because:

  • It is a pure question of law based on undisputed procedural facts (the dates and types of filings);
  • It goes to the authority and jurisdiction of the district court to enter the judgment appealed from; and
  • Ignoring it would risk upholding a void judgment.

Although the panel does not explicitly articulate this as a jurisdictional exception to the waiver rule, its reasoning and reliance on prior cases treating post‑dismissal orders as void make that logic implicit.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Was the Filing Within Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)’s Scope?

The rule requires that the plaintiff:

  1. File a notice of dismissal,
  2. Before the opposing party serves:
    • an answer, or
    • a motion for summary judgment.

The key uncontested facts:

  • Daystar had filed only Rule 12(b)(6) motions (first attacking the original complaint, then the amended complaint);
  • It had not filed an answer; and
  • It had not filed a motion for summary judgment.

Under long‑settled procedure, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not an “answer” and does not defeat the plaintiff’s unilateral right to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The rule enumerates only “answer” and “motion for summary judgment” as cut‑off points; other motions (including motions to dismiss) do not affect the plaintiff’s unilateral right under subdivision (a)(1).

Thus, the only remaining question was whether Connelly’s filing, styled a “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice,” could count as a “notice of dismissal.”

2. Label vs. Legal Effect

Following Williams, Jackson, and Satterfield, the Fourth Circuit held that the substance and timing of the filing, not its caption, controls. Specifically:

  • It unambiguously expressed the plaintiff’s desire to dismiss the action;
  • It sought dismissal “without prejudice” (consistent with Rule 41(a)(1)(B)); and
  • It was filed before any answer or summary judgment motion.

Therefore, it fell “within the limits of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)” and must be construed as a notice of dismissal notwithstanding its label or its failure to cite the rule. The court reiterates the principle from Satterfield:

[A] request for voluntary dismissal filed within the limits of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) should be construed as a notice of dismissal under that rule, regardless of how it is styled.

Consequently, the April 30 filing automatically and immediately dismissed the action without prejudice. No further court action was needed or permitted on the merits.

3. Effect on the District Court’s Later Order: Voidness

Because a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal is self‑executing, the action terminates upon filing. Thus:

  • The district court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate the merits; and
  • Any later order purporting to decide the case on the merits is void, not merely erroneous.

Relying on Williams, Jackson, and Satterfield, the Fourth Circuit held that the October 21, 2024 order dismissing the case with prejudice was void because it was issued after the April 30, 2024 voluntary dismissal had already terminated the action.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals:

  • Vacated the October 21, 2024 judgment, and
  • Remanded with instructions to recognize the April 30, 2024 dismissal and to treat all subsequent activity as a nullity.

4. Response to Daystar’s “Waiver” / Rule 41(a)(2) Argument

Daystar’s position was that by filing a motion—to be decided by the court—Connelly necessarily invoked Rule 41(a)(2), under which dismissal is discretionary. On this view, he had effectively waived or abandoned his unilateral right under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning implicitly rejects this view on several grounds:

  • Rule‑based authority: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not a party’s label, control the legal effect of a filing. A plaintiff cannot “opt out” of the self‑executing effect of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) when its prerequisites are satisfied.
  • Functional interpretation: Courts construe pleadings and motions based on their substantive content, especially where procedural rights and jurisdictional issues are at stake.
  • No requirement that Rule 41 be cited: Williams and Satterfield expressly hold that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) applies even if the rule is not cited at all.

In effect, the court held that once a filing meets the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the plaintiff’s unilateral right is exercised as a matter of law; the court cannot transform that action into a discretionary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).

E. Practical Impact and Broader Implications

1. For Litigators: How to Use (and Recognize) Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)

This opinion is a strong reminder that:

  • A plaintiff retains an absolute, non‑discretionary right to voluntarily dismiss a federal action under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) until:
    • the defendant serves an answer, or
    • the defendant files a motion for summary judgment.
  • That right is not defeated by:
    • a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
    • other pre‑answer motions, or
    • the plaintiff’s failure to cite Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) or use the word “notice.”
  • Once such a filing is made, the case is effectively over as to the merits in federal court, without prejudice (unless the two‑dismissal rule applies).

For plaintiffs, the strategic use of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) can be a powerful tool:

  • To withdraw a case that appears to be heading for an unfavorable merits ruling;
  • To refile in a more favorable forum (often state court) when jurisdictional defects or tactical disadvantages become apparent; and
  • To pause and reconsider claims or evidence without incurring the risk of a dismissal with prejudice.

However, practitioners should also be mindful of:

  • Statutes of limitations: A voluntary dismissal does not toll limitations absent a savings statute or other doctrine.
  • The “two‑dismissal” rule (Rule 41(a)(1)(B)): A second voluntary dismissal—federal or state—of the same claim may operate as an adjudication on the merits.

2. For Defendants: Limits on Pre‑Answer Defense Strategy

From the defense perspective, Connelly underscores the limited capacity of pre‑answer Rule 12(b)(6) motions to “lock in” a federal forum or to preclude voluntary dismissal.

Unless and until an answer or summary judgment motion is filed, the defendant cannot prevent the plaintiff from unilaterally dismissing the action without prejudice, even if a dispositive motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

This raises strategic considerations for defendants deciding:

  • Whether to move under Rule 12(b)(6) before answering, versus answering (thus cutting off the plaintiff’s unilateral right);
  • Whether to negotiate a stipulation of dismissal that includes fee‑shifting or other terms, understanding that absent agreement the plaintiff may simply walk away early; and
  • How to respond when a plaintiff files a “motion” to dismiss that in substance satisfies Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

3. For Courts: Jurisdictional Awareness and Docket Management

Connelly signals that:

  • District courts should be alert to the possibility that a plaintiff’s filing, though styled as a motion, may actually be a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice;
  • Once such a filing is properly recognized, the court lacks authority to rule on the merits or maintain the action, except possibly as to collateral issues (e.g., sanctions); and
  • Failure to recognize the self‑executing nature of the dismissal may result in void judgments that must be vacated on appeal.

The court’s express refusal to criticize the district judge emphasizes that the primary responsibility lies with counsel to correctly frame and cite their procedural requests. Nevertheless, the opinion will likely prompt district courts in the Fourth Circuit to scrutinize any pre‑answer filings by plaintiffs that request unconditional dismissal.

4. Interaction with Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction and Workers’ Compensation Issues

An interesting feature of the case is what the Fourth Circuit did not decide:

  • Whether Erie’s citizenship destroyed diversity jurisdiction;
  • Whether Erie’s joinder was fraudulent or improper; or
  • Whether Maryland’s workers’ compensation scheme actually barred Connelly’s or Erie’s claims against Daystar.

By holding that the case had already been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the court rendered those issues moot in federal court. This illustrates a broader point:

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) can foreclose a federal court’s opportunity to resolve complex jurisdictional and substantive questions if the plaintiff elects to dismiss early.

From a systemic perspective, this respects the plaintiff’s control over his own lawsuit at an early stage and avoids advisory opinions on difficult state‑law and jurisdictional issues.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a “Self‑Executing” Dismissal?

A “self‑executing” dismissal means:

  • The case ends automatically when the required document is filed;
  • No court order is needed to make it effective; and
  • The judge has no discretion to refuse, condition, or modify the dismissal, as long as the rule’s criteria are met.

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is self‑executing in exactly this sense: once a proper notice is filed before an answer or summary judgment motion, the action is terminated.

2. Why Is the District Court’s Later Order “Void” and Not Just Wrong?

A judgment is “void” when the court lacks jurisdiction (authority) to enter it. In the context of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i):

  • Once the plaintiff properly dismisses the action, the court no longer has a live case or controversy before it;
  • The court is thus without jurisdiction to decide the merits; and
  • Any subsequent merits order is treated as a legal nullity—void ab initio.

That is different from a judgment that is merely erroneous: an erroneous judgment is entered within the court’s jurisdiction but applies the law incorrectly; a void judgment is entered without jurisdiction at all.

3. Difference Between Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 41(a)(2)

  • Rule 41(a)(1) — Plaintiff’s unilateral dismissal:
    • Available only before an answer or summary judgment motion;
    • No court order required; dismissal is automatic upon filing;
    • Generally without prejudice (subject to limited exceptions).
  • Rule 41(a)(2) — Court‑ordered dismissal:
    • Applies once an answer or summary judgment motion has been filed, or when 41(a)(1) is unavailable;
    • Dismissal is discretionary, on “terms that the court considers proper,” which can include conditions like payment of fees;
    • Unless stated otherwise, dismissal is without prejudice, but the court may specify with prejudice.

In Connelly, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s filing should be treated under Rule 41(a)(2); the Fourth Circuit held that, because the timing and content satisfied Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), that subdivision controlled, regardless of labels.

4. Why Did the Court Consider an Argument Raised for the First Time on Appeal?

Normally, appellate courts refuse to consider new arguments not raised below. But there are exceptions when:

  • The issue is purely legal and requires no additional factual development;
  • It concerns the court’s own jurisdiction or the validity of the judgment; and
  • Declining to consider it would risk affirming a void judgment.

In Connelly, the Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) issue fit squarely in this category: it turned solely on undisputed procedural history and determined whether the district court’s judgment was valid at all.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Connelly v. Daystar Builders, Inc.

Connelly v. Daystar Builders, Inc. reinforces and clarifies an important procedural doctrine in federal civil practice:

Any plaintiff filing a pre‑answer, pre‑summary‑judgment request to dismiss an action without prejudice—regardless of its label and even without citing Rule 41—effectively invokes Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), resulting in an immediate, self‑executing dismissal, and divesting the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits thereafter.

The case adds to a growing body of persuasive authority (within the Fourth Circuit and beyond) that:

  • The substance and timing of a dismissal request control its legal effect, not the caption or cite line;
  • Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissals are automatic and terminate the court’s role on the merits;
  • Subsequent merits rulings in such cases are void and must be vacated; and
  • Counsel bear primary responsibility to understand and correctly employ the voluntary dismissal mechanism.

While unpublished and non‑precedential, Connelly will likely guide district judges and practitioners in the Fourth Circuit in recognizing mis‑styled voluntary dismissal requests and in respecting the bright‑line protections of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). It also underscores how procedural missteps by counsel—here, the failure to cite and rely on the rule in the first instance—can generate unnecessary litigation and delay, even when the client is ultimately protected by the rule’s operation.

In the broader legal context, the opinion exemplifies the Federal Rules’ commitment to clear, predictable procedural rights. The plaintiff’s early, unilateral control over the continuation of litigation is a deliberate design choice: as long as the defendant has not yet joined issue by answer or summary judgment, the plaintiff may withdraw without judicial permission. Connelly confirms that this right cannot be circumvented by formal labels, strategic characterization, or oversight in citation.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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