Self‑Evident Rationale and Reasonable‑Suspicion Digital Search Conditions on Supervised Release: The Second Circuit’s Affirmance in United States v. Miller

Note: This decision was issued as a Summary Order by the Second Circuit and, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, does not have precedential effect. It may, however, be cited and has persuasive value, particularly because it synthesizes and applies several recent published Second Circuit decisions.

Introduction

United States v. Miller involved a challenge to two special conditions of supervised release imposed after Aaron Miller pled guilty to a violent Hobbs Act robbery. The key appellate issues were whether the district court (Marrero, J., S.D.N.Y.) committed procedural error by imposing (1) a broad, reasonable‑suspicion search condition that explicitly covered Miller’s person, residence, vehicles, papers, and electronic devices (including computers, phones, data storage, and cloud accounts), and (2) a substance‑abuse treatment and testing condition with an ability‑to‑pay cost provision, without making individualized, on‑the‑record findings.

The panel (Judges Raggi, Lynch, and B. Robinson) affirmed. Applying plain‑error review because Miller did not object below, the court held that the record made the justification for both conditions “self‑evident,” and that each condition involved no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. In doing so, the court drew on a cluster of recent Second Circuit authorities clarifying the contours of supervised‑release conditions, particularly where digital searches are at issue.

Summary of the Judgment

Disposition: Affirmed the sentence, including two challenged special conditions of supervised release.
Standard of Review: Plain error, because Miller did not object to the conditions in the district court.
Search Condition: Upheld. The Second Circuit concluded that, even absent explicit, individualized findings, the rationale was self‑evident in the record given Miller’s offense conduct, recidivism, use of a phone around the time of the robbery, and social‑media evidence linking him to the offense. The condition was further cabined by a reasonable‑suspicion trigger and reasonableness in time and manner.
Substance‑Abuse Condition: Upheld. The record reflected a history of substantial marijuana use, recent treatment participation, counsel’s own argument about risk of future abuse, and Miller’s expressed willingness to attend treatment if needed. Testing and ability‑to‑pay cost‑sharing were therefore permissible.

Factual and Procedural Background

Miller participated in a group armed robbery of a Bronx jewelry store in August 2022. While one co‑robber used bear spray and another brandished a firearm, Miller and others used hammers to smash display cases; the team escaped with approximately $470,000 in jewelry. Miller later pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 & 2). The district court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release and imposed special conditions. The two challenged conditions were:

A reasonable‑suspicion search condition enabling probation (with law‑enforcement assistance if needed) to search Miller’s person and effects, including digital devices and cloud storage, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
An outpatient substance‑abuse treatment condition, including testing, with contributions required based on his ability to pay.

Miller did not object at sentencing but argued on appeal that the conditions lacked individualized justification, exceeded what was reasonably necessary, and were inconsistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025): Reaffirms district courts’ “wide latitude” to impose special conditions. This set the backdrop that conditions are reviewed deferentially, subject to statutory and Guidelines constraints.
United States v. Farooq, 58 F.4th 687 (2d Cir. 2023): Conditions must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. Miller invoked this to argue the Guidelines recommend search conditions in sex cases; the court clarified that such recommendations are non‑exclusive.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1): Special conditions must be reasonably related to the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s correctional needs. The court used this framework for both challenged conditions.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2): Conditions must not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Central to the tailoring analysis, especially for digital searches.
United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025): When a fundamental liberty interest is implicated, the condition must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. The court measured the digital search condition against this more exacting principle and found it satisfied by the reasonable‑suspicion/rational‑time‑manner limits.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024): District courts must make individualized assessments and state reasons on the record. Miller relied on Oliveras to fault the district court’s silence; the panel answered with Betts (below), emphasizing that where reasons are “self‑evident,” the condition can stand.
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Appellate courts may affirm if the rationale for a condition is self‑evident from the record even if the district court did not spell out reasons. This was the doctrinal fulcrum for affirming both conditions under plain‑error review.
United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010) and United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2020): Plain‑error framework applied because there was no contemporaneous objection. The demanding four‑part test made reversal unlikely absent obvious error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings.
United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104 (2d Cir. 2025): Approved a similarly expansive search condition—covering digital media—based on recidivism and dishonesty, even though the offense did not involve electronics. Robinson squarely supports the “self‑evident” rationale for digital search conditions in non‑cyber offenses when the record shows need.
United States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2025): Upheld a search condition including computers where the defendant used a cell phone in drug sales. Lawrence underscores that limited digital involvement can justify digital search authority.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C): The Guidelines recommend search conditions in sex‑offense cases but expressly state such conditions “may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases.” The panel relied on this to reject the argument that search conditions are confined to sex offenses.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(4): Endorses substance‑abuse treatment and testing where there is evidence of substance use issues. The court found the record adequate to support this condition for Miller.
United States v. Chaklader, 232 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000): Treatment conditions may be imposed even if there is no evidence of current drug use; a history and risk suffice. This case directly supports the treatment/testing condition.
United States v. Rasheed, 981 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2020): Ability‑to‑pay limits on cost‑sharing make financial contribution conditions lawful. The court relied on Rasheed to reject Miller’s cost objection.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of Review: Plain Error Drives the Outcome

Because Miller did not object in the district court, he had to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of proceedings. This threshold is intentionally high. The “self‑evident rationale” doctrine from Betts, combined with recent published decisions approving expansive but tailored digital search conditions (Robinson, Lawrence), made it difficult to establish any “clear or obvious” error.

2) Search Condition: Reasonableness and Tailoring in a Digital World

Connection to the Offense and History: The record showed a violent robbery, recidivism, and meaningful digital threads. Miller used a phone to coordinate with a co‑conspirator around the time of the offense, and he posted social‑media content (a photo showing the same shorts worn during the robbery) that helped identify him. This evidence bridged the gap between a non‑cyber offense and the need for digital search authority.
Tailoring: The condition is tethered to “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful conduct or a supervision violation, and searches must occur at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Those limiting features aligned with Thompson’s narrow‑tailoring principle for fundamental privacy interests and mirrored the parameters approved in Robinson and Lawrence.
Policy Statements: Although the Guidelines specifically “recommend” search conditions for sex‑offense cases, § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) makes plain that similar conditions may be appropriate elsewhere. Miller’s contrary argument failed.
Self‑Evident Rationale: Even without on‑the‑record findings, the panel held the justification was apparent: recidivism, the violent nature of the offense, digital breadcrumbs linked to his criminal activity, and the supervisory need to detect and deter future violations during the high‑risk reentry period.

3) Substance‑Abuse Condition: Record Support and Modest Intrusion

Record Evidence: Miller reported heavy marijuana use starting in his mid‑teens (two to three blunts one or two times daily at peak), participated in treatment while incarcerated in 2023, and told Probation he would attend treatment if needed. Defense counsel also argued he faced elevated risk due to family history of drug abuse. Under Chaklader, this is more than sufficient.
Testing: The Guidelines squarely contemplate testing to monitor possible relapse. Given the record, testing did not exceed what was reasonably necessary.
Cost Contribution: The condition expressly caps contributions by ability to pay, consistent with Rasheed and common practice in the district courts; no undue burden was shown.

Impact

Practical Affirmation of Digital Search Conditions: Together with Robinson and Lawrence, this decision reinforces that courts may impose reasonable‑suspicion digital search conditions even where the underlying crime is not “cyber‑centric,” so long as the record ties digital tools to the defendant’s conduct, recidivism, or supervision risks.
“Self‑Evident” Doctrine’s Continued Vitality: Oliveras insists on individualized assessments and stated reasons, but Betts allows affirmance where the record makes the rationale clear. Miller exemplifies how, on plain‑error review, appellate courts will look for record‑based links and uphold conditions even if the district court did not speak at length.
Tailoring Touchstones: Reasonable‑suspicion triggers and reasonableness in time and manner remain key limiting features that help digital search conditions survive scrutiny under Thompson’s “fundamental interest” rubric. Suspicionless conditions would face steeper headwinds.
Substance‑Abuse Conditions Remain Broadly Permissible: A demonstrated history of use, prior treatment, or credible risk factors can justify treatment and testing even without ongoing abuse. Ability‑to‑pay limitations mitigate fairness concerns about costs.
Preservation Matters: Defendants who wish to challenge conditions—especially digital search conditions—should object at sentencing and propose narrower alternatives (e.g., excluding certain media, requiring advance notice to probation, or limiting the scope to devices reasonably believed to be used for unlawful conduct). Failing to do so leaves only the high bar of plain‑error review.
District Court Practice: Although Miller affirms under a forgiving standard, Oliveras counsels district judges to make brief, individualized findings when imposing intrusive conditions, particularly those implicating digital privacy, to reduce appellate friction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A post‑imprisonment period during which a defendant must comply with court‑imposed conditions, supervised by Probation. Violations can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment.
Special Conditions: Case‑specific obligations (e.g., digital searches, treatment) added to standard conditions. They must be reasonably related to statutory purposes and no more restrictive than necessary.
Plain‑Error Review: When a defendant fails to object in the trial court, the appellate court asks whether there was an obvious error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings. It is intentionally hard for appellants to meet.
“Self‑Evident” Rationale: Even if the court does not articulate reasons for a condition, an appellate court may affirm when the record clearly supplies them—especially under plain‑error review.
Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause: Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause. A search condition triggered by reasonable suspicion is less intrusive than a suspicionless regime and is more likely to be viewed as narrowly tailored.
Guidelines Recommendations vs. Permissions: When the Guidelines “recommend” a condition for certain categories (e.g., sex offenses), that does not mean the condition is forbidden elsewhere. The policy statements expressly allow use “in particular cases” outside the recommended categories.
Ability‑to‑Pay Cost‑Sharing: Courts may require defendants to contribute to treatment costs, but payment must be calibrated to the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Conclusion

United States v. Miller reinforces, in a fact‑sensitive and record‑driven way, three important principles in supervised‑release jurisprudence. First, under plain‑error review, appellate courts will affirm special conditions—particularly digital search conditions—where the justification is self‑evident from the record, even if district courts do not deliver detailed, on‑the‑record findings. Second, digital search conditions that require reasonable suspicion and are bounded by reasonable time and manner are likely to be deemed sufficiently tailored, even in non‑cyber offenses, when the record shows digital involvement or supervision needs. Third, substance‑abuse treatment and testing remain permissible upon evidence of past use and risk, with ability‑to‑pay caps addressing fairness concerns over costs.

While non‑precedential, the order aligns with and operationalizes published Second Circuit decisions—Lewis, Oliveras, Thompson, Robinson, Lawrence, and others—guiding district judges, probation officers, and counsel on how to craft, justify, and challenge conditions in the modern era where digital evidence and reentry supervision often intersect. The key takeaway for litigants is twofold: build or attack the record at sentencing, and focus on tailoring—especially when conditions implicate digital privacy or other fundamental interests.