Securing Stepladders at ≥10 Feet: Second Department Reaffirms Specificity of 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(e)(3) and Underscores Fact-Intensive Nature of Ladder-Fall Claims under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes Rosario v. Horizon Networks, Inc. (2025 NY Slip Op 04031), a July 2, 2025 Decision & Order of the Appellate Division, Second Department. The case arises from a ladder fall during the installation of exterior security cameras at premises owned by Horizon Networks, Inc. and leased to Cara Mia Restaurant, Inc. The injured worker, Jose L. Rosario, was engaged by Paragon Technology Group, Inc., an IT services vendor that sold the cameras to Cara Mia. Separate personal injury and derivative actions were consolidated and proceeded on claims under New York Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and on a cross-claim for common-law indemnification.

Three core issues dominated the appeal:

Whether the worker was entitled to summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) arising from a fall from an allegedly unsecured A‑frame (stepladder).
Whether the owners/tenants were entitled to dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim premised on Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3) (securing stepladders when working from a step 10 feet or more above the footing).
Whether the owner/tenant were entitled to common‑law indemnification from Paragon, the IT vendor that hired plaintiff, on the ground that Paragon supervised or controlled the injury‑producing work.

The decision refines how courts approach ladder-fall disputes at the summary judgment stage, clarifies the continued viability of 12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3) as a predicate regulation under § 241(6), and reiterates that common-law indemnification hinges on proof of actual supervision—not mere authority.

Summary of the Judgment

Labor Law § 240(1): The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The record contained unresolved factual disputes as to whether the A‑frame ladder collapsed or whether the plaintiff slipped or slid down the ladder due to a loss of balance. These factual disputes precluded summary judgment for the worker—and, notably, also precluded the court from “searching the record” to award summary judgment dismissing the claim for the defendants.
Labor Law § 241(6): The court modified the order below by reinstating the § 241(6) claim against Horizon and Cara Mia. It held that Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3) is sufficiently specific to support a § 241(6) cause of action and that triable issues exist as to violation, proximate cause, and whether the worker’s conduct was the sole proximate cause. The court declined to “search the record” to dismiss the § 241(6) claim against Paragon.
Common-law indemnification: The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Horizon/Cara Mia’s cross‑motion for summary judgment on their common‑law indemnification claim against Paragon. The movants failed to eliminate factual disputes regarding whether Paragon actually supervised, directed, or controlled the injury-producing work. The court applied the “Winegrad” rule to deny the motion irrespective of the opposition’s sufficiency.
Costs: One bill of costs was awarded to Paragon, payable by both the plaintiffs and the Horizon defendants.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The decision synthesizes a number of recent and foundational authorities in New York’s scaffold law jurisprudence and common-law indemnification doctrine:

Labor Law § 240(1) standards
- Saint v Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117: Establishes that § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty and absolute liability for elevation-related risks when the failure to provide proper safety devices is a proximate cause of injury.
- Paiba v 56-11 94th St. Co., LLC, 228 AD3d 881; Valentin v Stathakos, 228 AD3d 985: Reiterate the absolute-liability principle and the need for a causal link between the statutory breach and injury.
- Cioffi v Target Corp., 188 AD3d 788; Hugo v Sarantakos, 108 AD3d 774: Distinguish between evidence of a defective/unstable ladder (or one that shifts, slides, tips, or collapses “for no apparent reason”)—which supports § 240(1)—and mere loss of balance where no defect or inadequacy is shown, which does not.
- Joseph v 210 W. 18th, LLC, 189 AD3d 1384; Yao Zong Wu v Zhen Jia Yang, 161 AD3d 813: Emphasize that unclear or conflicting accounts of how the ladder fall occurred (collapse vs. slip) generate triable issues that defeat summary judgment.
Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code predicates
- Lopez v NYC Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 123 AD3d 982: § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care on owners/contractors across construction, excavation, or demolition zones.
- Doran v JP Walsh Realty Group, LLC, 189 AD3d 1363: Plaintiff must link the injury to a specific and applicable Industrial Code provision.
- Ochoa v JEM Real Estate Co., LLC, 223 AD3d 747; McNamara v Gusmar Enterprises, LLC, 204 AD3d 779: Confirm that 12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3)—requiring a stepladder to be secured when work is performed from a step 10 feet or more above the footing—is sufficiently specific to support § 241(6) liability and can present triable issues on violation and causation.
Common-law indemnification
- McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369: Liability for common-law indemnification requires proof that the indemnitor exercised actual supervision, direction, or control over the injury-producing work.
- Debennedetto v Chetrit, 190 AD3d 933; Chapa v Bayles Props., Inc., 221 AD3d 855; Aponte v Airport Indus. Park, LLC, 202 AD3d 895: Clarify that mere authority to supervise is insufficient; motion practice fails where factual disputes remain on control.
Summary judgment framework
- Winegrad v NYU Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851: Movant’s failure to make a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition.

Collectively, these precedents shaped the court’s refusal to resolve liability as a matter of law in a factually contested ladder-fall, its reinstatement of a § 241(6) claim grounded in a specific ladder-safety regulation, and its insistence on concrete proof of actual supervision for common-law indemnification.

Legal Reasoning

1) Labor Law § 240(1): Fact disputes on mechanism of fall foreclose summary judgment

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment by contending that the unsecured A‑frame ladder constituted a § 240(1) violation and that the violation proximately caused the fall. The Second Department applied the ladder jurisprudence canon: where a ladder collapses, shifts, slides, tips, or otherwise fails for no apparent reason, liability typically follows; where the worker merely loses balance without proof of defect or inadequacy, § 240(1) does not attach.

Here, competing inferences could be drawn from the record as to whether the ladder failed (collapsing/ shifting) or whether the plaintiff slipped or slid without any ladder failure. Because the plaintiffs’ own submissions did not eliminate those triable issues, summary judgment was properly denied under Winegrad. The panel further declined to “search the record” to grant defense summary judgment, citing unresolved questions about the mechanism of the accident and whether any conduct by the worker was the sole proximate cause—both quintessential jury questions on this record.

2) Labor Law § 241(6): Stepladder securing rule is specific; triable issues revived the claim

The trial court dismissed the § 241(6) claim, but the Appellate Division reinstated it. The governing Industrial Code subsection—12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3)—requires that a stepladder be secured when an employee works from a step that is 10 feet or more above the footing. The court reaffirmed that this provision is sufficiently specific to predicate § 241(6) liability (in harmony with Ochoa and McNamara), and found factual questions as to both:

whether the regulation was violated (e.g., whether the step used was at least 10 feet above the footing and whether the ladder was secured), and
whether any such violation proximately caused the accident.

Critically, the panel acknowledged potential defenses—including whether the worker’s ladder placement or conduct was the sole proximate cause—yet concluded those issues must be resolved by a factfinder, not on summary judgment. As to Paragon, the court again declined a “search the record” dismissal for the same reason: factual disputes remain.

3) Common-law indemnification: “Actual supervision” is indispensable

Horizon/Cara Mia sought common-law indemnification from Paragon. Applying McCarthy v Turner and its progeny, the court required a prima facie showing that Paragon actually supervised, directed, or controlled the injury-producing work. The owner/tenant failed to eliminate factual questions on that element. Mere authority or a contractual right to supervise is insufficient; there must be proof of actual supervisory actions related to the task that caused the injury. Because the movants did not meet their initial burden, the motion was properly denied without regard to the opposition (Winegrad).

Impact and Practical Implications

A) Ladder-fall litigation will continue to turn on well-developed facts

This decision reinforces that summary judgment is rarely appropriate where the mechanism of a ladder fall is disputed. Counsel should expect that inconsistent accounts—collapse versus slip—will defeat motions across both sides. Early, meticulous fact development (preserving the ladder, photographs, witness statements, measurements, and expert affidavits) is decisive.

B) § 241(6) claims premised on 23‑1.21(e)(3) remain robust

Reaffirming that the stepladder securing rule is “sufficiently specific” preserves a key pathway for plaintiffs in ladder cases where step height reaches the 10-foot threshold. Owners/tenants and contractors must treat the regulation as an actionable standard—especially where work from high steps on A‑frames is contemplated. Trial courts are cautioned against dismissing § 241(6) claims prematurely when the record is equivocal on height, securing measures, or causation.

C) Owners/tenants as potential “owners” under the Labor Law

By analyzing the § 241(6) claim against both Horizon (owner) and Cara Mia (lessee), the court’s approach is consistent with established doctrine that lessees who contract for or benefit from the work can be treated as “owners” for Labor Law purposes. Lessees should not assume immunity from §§ 240(1)/241(6) merely by virtue of their tenant status.

D) Indemnification strategy: Supervision evidence is king

Common-law indemnification remains a potent tool for vicariously-liable owners or tenants, but its availability hinges on evidence that the third-party defendant actually supervised or controlled the injury-producing work. Contract language conferring authority is not enough. Parties should:

Build records that describe who directed on-site methods, means, and safety.
Align indemnity clauses with insurance and supervision realities, and
Recognize that “paper” control does not equal “actual” control for indemnity.

E) Compliance and risk management: Practical takeaways

Do not allow work from a stepladder step at or above 10 feet without securing the ladder (e.g., tying, footing by a second worker, stabilizers) or considering safer alternatives (scaffolds, lifts).
Measure and document the height (from footing to step) when planning the task; use ladders appropriate to the reach and environment.
Train personnel that A‑frame ladders should be fully opened and locked; never use the top cap as a step; maintain three points of contact; and evaluate surfaces and placement.
For owners/lessees: implement site safety protocols even for “service” tasks like camera installation—these can qualify as construction/alteration work.
For vendors/IT service providers: avoid ambiguous control. If you are not supervising means and methods, make that explicit; if you are, ensure compliant safety practices and coverage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Labor Law § 240(1) (Scaffold Law): Imposes absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for elevation-related injuries where the failure to provide proper safety devices is a proximate cause. It is not comparative negligence-based; however, a worker can lose if his/her conduct is the sole proximate cause (e.g., ignoring readily available, adequate safety devices).
Labor Law § 241(6): Imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care but is not strict liability. Plaintiff must prove a violation of a specific Industrial Code rule that applies to the accident and that the violation caused the injury. Comparative negligence applies.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3): A specific ladder-safety rule requiring stepladders to be secured when the worker is performing work from a step 10 feet or more above the “footing” (the base/ground where the ladder stands). “Secured” can mean tied-off, held/footed by another worker, stabilized with devices, etc., depending on the circumstances.
“Sole proximate cause” vs. “comparative negligence”: Under § 240(1), if the worker’s conduct is the only cause, he/she may be barred entirely. Under § 241(6), the worker’s negligence reduces damages, but does not bar the claim if a regulatory violation is also a cause.
“Search the record”: Appellate courts may, in limited circumstances, grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party if the record indisputably warrants it (CPLR 3212[b]). Here, unresolved factual disputes prevented the court from doing so.
Common-law indemnification: A passive tortfeasor who pays the plaintiff may seek full reimbursement from the party actually at fault. In the construction context, that typically requires proof that the indemnitor actually supervised or controlled the injury-producing work.

Key Doctrinal Takeaways

Evidence disputes about whether a ladder collapsed or whether the worker simply slipped will usually defeat summary judgment under § 240(1) on both sides.
12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3)’s stepladder-securing mandate is a sufficiently specific predicate for § 241(6). Whether the 10-foot criterion and violation are met is often a jury question when the record is ambiguous.
Owners/lessees should expect § 241(6) claims to survive where the height and securing facts are contested; early motion practice may be premature.
Common-law indemnity demands proof of actual supervision, not merely contractual authority or a right to oversee.
Winegrad governs motions: if the movant’s proof is deficient, the motion fails irrespective of the opponent’s response.

What This Means for Future Cases

Rosario will be cited to:

Reinforce denials of summary judgment in ladder-fall cases where the mechanism of fall is disputed or unclear.
Support plaintiffs opposing dismissal of § 241(6) claims predicated on 23‑1.21(e)(3), especially in service/installation contexts involving A‑frame ladders and exterior work at heights.
Emphasize that owners/tenants seeking indemnity must marshal concrete proof of actual supervisory control by the third-party defendant; otherwise, indemnity claims will proceed to trial.

Conclusion

Rosario v. Horizon Networks, Inc. delivers three important messages. First, ladder-fall disputes under Labor Law § 240(1) are highly fact-dependent; without unambiguous proof of ladder failure or defect, courts will not summarily impose or dismiss absolute liability. Second, the Second Department reaffirms that 12 NYCRR 23‑1.21(e)(3) is a sufficiently specific Industrial Code regulation to sustain § 241(6) claims, and that factual disputes about height, securing, and causation typically preclude dismissal. Third, common-law indemnification remains available only where there is proof of actual supervision or control over the injury-producing work, not merely contractual authority or generalized oversight.

As New York courts continue to parse ladder accidents, Rosario underscores the imperative of meticulous factual development and compliance with specific ladder-safety rules—particularly the stepladder securing requirement at or above the 10-foot threshold. For litigants and risk managers alike, the decision is both a roadmap to stronger records and a caution against overreliance on motions where key facts remain contested.