Minimal Due Process for Ten-Day-or-Less Student Suspensions Reaffirmed; Evidence Sufficiency Review and Role-Separation Not Required (Doe & Roe v. Levittown Public Schools, 2d Cir. 2025)

Case: John Doe and Jane Roe v. Levittown Public Schools Board of Education, et al. (No. 25-230-cv)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order)

Date: November 3, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Denny Chin, Eunice C. Lee, and Beth Robinson

Disposition: Affirmed (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)

Note: This is a non-precedential Summary Order. It may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, but it does not have precedential effect.

Introduction

This appeal arises from two short-term suspensions imposed by a Long Island middle school on a sixth-grade student, “M,” for allegedly calling a classmate a racial epithet. The student’s parents (pseudonymously, John Doe and Jane Roe) sued the Levittown Public Schools Board of Education and two administrators—Principal John Zampaglione and Dean Daniel Agovino—alleging, among other things, that the suspensions violated M’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.

The district court (E.D.N.Y., Shields, M.J.) dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On de novo review, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, assuming due process protections applied to these short suspensions, the school satisfied the minimal process required by Goss v. Lopez for suspensions of ten days or less.

The decision addresses four core issues:

• Whether New York students have a protected property interest in public education (they do).
• Whether very brief suspensions are “de minimis” such that due process does not attach (the court assumed without deciding that due process applied here).
• What process is due for ten-day-or-less suspensions under Goss v. Lopez (notice of the charge and an opportunity to present the student’s side).
• Whether the court should evaluate the sufficiency of the school’s evidence or require role separation between investigator and decisionmaker in short suspensions (it should not and does not).

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the parents’ procedural due process claims. The court:

• Recognized New York’s statutory and constitutional property interest in public education.
• Assumed, without deciding, that a three-day in-school suspension and a five-day out-of-school suspension are not “de minimis” and therefore trigger due process protections.
• Applied Goss v. Lopez and found the school provided the required process: (1) oral and written notice of the charges, and (2) an explanation of the evidence along with an opportunity for M to present his side of the story before each suspension took effect.
• Rejected the argument that courts must assess the sufficiency or “credibility” of the school’s evidence for ten-day-or-less suspensions, noting Goss does not contemplate such judicial review at that level of discipline.
• Rejected bias allegations because, for brief suspensions, Goss contemplates a “rudimentary” process in which the same administrator may investigate and decide discipline; combining those roles does not, without more, plausibly show unconstitutional bias.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975): The foundational case for student due process in short suspensions. It holds that for suspensions of ten days or less, due process requires “oral or written notice of the charges” and, if denied, “an explanation of the evidence” and “an opportunity to present [the student’s] side of the story.” Goss also emphasizes the need for flexible, informal procedures and declines to impose formal, trial-type hearings for brief suspensions.
• Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972): Establishes that property interests are created by state law, not by the Constitution itself.
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): Cited in Goss for the proposition that once due process applies, the question becomes “what process is due,” a functional inquiry balancing interests.
• Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006): Recognizes that New York’s laws create a property interest in education protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2018): Recites the tripartite structure of due process claims (identifying a property right, deprivation by the state, and deprivation without due process).
• Rosenfeld v. Ketter, 820 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1987): Confirms that Goss does not require a formal hearing for short suspensions.
• Brewer ex rel. Dreyfus v. Austin ISD, 779 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1985); Lamb v. Panhandle CUSD No. 2, 826 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1987): Persuasive authorities approving the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions by school administrators in the context of brief suspensions.
• Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971): Indicates that due process may apply even to mild penalties, though the precise “de minimis” line remains unresolved.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) & Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Govern pleading standards; complaints must plausibly allege entitlement to relief.
• Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023) & Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021): Articulate de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and the approach to drawing inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.

Legal Reasoning

1) Property Interest and Applicability of Due Process

The court reaffirmed that New York’s Constitution and statutes create a protected property interest in public education. The defendants argued that the three-day in-school and five-day out-of-school suspensions were too minor—“de minimis”—to trigger due process. The Second Circuit did not resolve the outer boundary of “de minimis” for school discipline. Instead, it assumed without deciding that due process protections applied, following Goss’s observation that exclusion from the educational process for “more than a trivial period,” and certainly ten days, is not de minimis.

2) The Goss Framework for Ten-Day-or-Less Suspensions

Once due process applies, Goss prescribes a deliberately “rudimentary” process for short suspensions:

• Oral or written notice of the charges and their basis;
• Explanation of the evidence if the student denies the charge; and
• An opportunity for the student to present his or her side of the story.

Goss also allows the timing to be immediate; often, the disciplinarian may speak to the student minutes after the alleged misconduct. No formal hearing, separation of functions, or delay is required for ten-day-or-less suspensions.

3) Notice Was Adequate

Before each suspension, the school provided notice to M and his parents:

• For the first (three-day in-school) suspension, the dean informed M that a report alleged he used a racial epithet. The principal sent a written notice on September 7, 2023, initiating suspension the next day, and the dean spoke with M’s mother by phone.
• For the second (five-day out-of-school) suspension, the dean told M’s mother by phone on September 20, 2023 that M had again used a racial epithet. That same day, the principal and dean met with M and his mother to discuss the allegation and suspension; a letter dated September 20 notified the parents that the suspension would begin on September 21.

These communications satisfied Goss’s notice requirement by informing M of the charge and the basis for it.

4) Opportunity to Be Heard Was Provided

Before each suspension took effect, M was given a chance to respond:

• First suspension: M repeatedly and firmly denied using the epithet and offered his account of the interaction (“monkey” usage and provocation by shoulder poking).
• Second suspension: In a meeting with administrators and his mother, M denied addressing the other student and explained he was speaking with a friend in the hallway; he also described how he and friends sometimes call each other “monkeys.” He asked the dean to speak with that friend, which the dean did; the friend stated that “M talks strangely and does make racial remarks.”

The September 20 letter also advised the parents of their right to schedule an immediate informal conference with the principal at which they could present M’s version and question the complaining witnesses, and it set out steps to appeal the decision. The parents did not exercise that right. Collectively, these opportunities satisfied Goss’s requirement that M be allowed to present his side before the suspension was imposed.

5) No Judicial Review of Evidence Sufficiency for Short Suspensions

The parents argued the school lacked “credible evidence.” The Second Circuit declined to entertain an “evidence sufficiency” review for ten-day-or-less suspensions, reasoning that Goss does not require courts to weigh the school’s proof in such cases. The Supreme Court in Goss emphasized administrative practicality, warning that formalizing brief school suspensions could overwhelm school resources and undermine the educational purpose of discipline. Thus, for short suspensions, the constitutional inquiry focuses on whether minimal procedural steps occurred—not on whether the school’s evidence would satisfy judicial standards of sufficiency.

6) No Viable Bias Claim Under the Goss Standard

The parents alleged bias, pointing to the administrators’ dual role as investigator and decisionmaker and to purported tactics in eliciting M’s version. The Second Circuit held that, even accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, they did not plausibly show unconstitutional bias for purposes of a ten-day-or-less suspension. Goss itself anticipates that the “disciplinarian”—including the principal—may investigate and make the disciplinary decision after an informal exchange. Other circuits have similarly held that combining investigative and adjudicative roles in this context is not per se unconstitutional. Without specific facts demonstrating prejudgment or an unacceptable risk of bias, the claim failed under Iqbal/Twombly.

7) Bottom Line

Assuming due process protections applied to both suspensions, the school provided all process due under Goss: timely notice, an explanation of the basis for the accusations, and a real-time chance for M to tell his side. The court therefore affirmed dismissal of the procedural due process claims.

Impact

For Schools and Administrators

• Minimal steps suffice for brief suspensions: For suspensions of ten days or less, schools that provide prompt notice, a brief explanation of the basis for the charge, and an opportunity—often immediate—for the student to respond, are well positioned to defeat procedural due process claims at the pleading stage.
• No obligation to present or prove “sufficient evidence” in court: In short-suspension cases, the constitutional inquiry is procedural, not evidentiary. Schools need not produce videos or live witnesses at this stage, provided the student was told the basis of the charge and allowed to respond.
• Role-combination is permitted: Administrators who investigate can also decide discipline for ten-day-or-less suspensions, absent facts indicating actual bias or an unacceptable risk of unfairness.
• Document the process: Letters, phone calls, and notes of meetings help demonstrate compliance. Offering an immediate informal conference and clearly stating appeal rights (as occurred here) strengthens the record.

For Students and Parents

• Use the informal conference and appeal: When offered, these are meaningful opportunities to contest the charge, ask questions of witnesses where permitted, and create a record. Declining them may undercut later claims of inadequate process.
• Plead specific procedural defects: Future complaints should point to concrete failures in notice, the explanation of evidence, or the opportunity to be heard. Alleging that the school’s evidence was “not credible,” without more, will likely be insufficient.

For Litigators and Courts

• Pleading-stage filter: This order reinforces that Goss-based claims are vulnerable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where the pleadings show minimal procedures occurred.
• Open question preserved: The Second Circuit again declined to define the “de minimis” line. Whether very short in-school suspensions alone trigger due process remains an unresolved issue in the Circuit.
• Non-precedential but persuasive: While not binding, the order provides a clear, recent articulation of Goss’s “rudimentary” process in the Second Circuit’s view.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural due process: A constitutional guarantee that, before the government deprives a person of a protected interest (like the state-created property interest in public education), it must follow fair procedures. For short student suspensions, those procedures are minimal: notice, explanation of the evidence if the student denies the charge, and an opportunity to respond.
• Property interest in education: Not created by the federal Constitution but by state law. In New York, statutes and the state constitution confer an entitlement to public education, which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.
• De minimis: A legal concept meaning “too trivial to merit consideration.” In this context, a deprivation so minor that due process protections may not attach. The Supreme Court has said a suspension of “certainly” ten days is not de minimis; the exact lower limit remains unsettled.
• Goss hearing: Not a formal hearing. It can be a quick conversation with the disciplinarian—sometimes within minutes of the incident—so long as the student is told the charge and basis and allowed to explain.
• Investigator/decisionmaker role-combination: For ten-day-or-less suspensions, the same administrator may investigate and decide on discipline. This is acceptable absent additional facts showing bias.
• Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: A case can be dismissed if the complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim even assuming the alleged facts are true. Conclusory assertions and legal conclusions, without concrete supporting facts, will not suffice.
• Assume without deciding: A judicial technique where the court proceeds as if a legal point is true for purposes of the decision but expressly does not resolve that point, preserving the issue for another day.
• Summary Order: An appellate disposition that, in the Second Circuit, is non-precedential but citable under specified rules.

Conclusion

In this non-precedential but instructive order, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the core of Goss v. Lopez: for student suspensions of ten days or less, due process is minimal and flexible. The school’s obligations are to communicate the charge and its basis and to give the student a prompt chance to respond—often in an informal conversation with the very administrator who will render the decision. The court declined to open the door to judicial reweighing of the school’s evidence at this level of discipline and rejected a categorical requirement that investigators and decisionmakers be different people for short suspensions.

Key takeaways:

• New York students possess a protected property interest in public education.
• The “de minimis” threshold remains unresolved; the court assumed due process applied to three- and five-day suspensions.
• Goss’s minimalist procedures—notice, explanation of evidence, and opportunity to respond—were satisfied on these facts.
• Courts will not review the sufficiency of school evidence for ten-day-or-less suspensions; role-combination does not, by itself, show unconstitutional bias.

For school districts, the order underscores that thoughtful, well-documented adherence to Goss’s minimal process will generally withstand procedural due process challenges to brief suspensions. For students and parents, it highlights the importance of engaging promptly in offered informal conferences and appeals, and of pleading concrete procedural deficiencies if litigation ensues. Although non-precedential, the order provides a clear, practical roadmap for handling short-term school discipline within constitutional bounds in the Second Circuit.