Second Circuit Reaffirms Strict Pleading, Causation, and Timeliness Requirements for Hybrid § 301/Duty of Fair Representation Claims: Goodman v. Local 804 (IBT) & UPS

Note: This disposition is a Summary Order and, under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1 and FRAP 32.1, is non-precedential though citable. It is best understood as a reaffirmation and application of existing doctrine rather than a source of new binding law.

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s September 9, 2025 Summary Order in Goodman v. Local 804 Union of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) and United Parcel Service Inc. (UPS), No. 23-7576. The appeal arose from the Eastern District of New York’s dismissal, with prejudice, of a pro se plaintiff’s hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation (DFR) claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).

Plaintiff-Appellant Leonard F. Goodman, a former UPS employee and member of IBT Local 804, challenged his discharge and the handling of his grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). He alleged that Local 804 and UPS conspired to deny his grievance and backpay, that the union’s participation in the grievance panel created an inherent conflict of interest, and that Local 804 acted arbitrarily, in bad faith, and discriminatorily during his grievance process—including allegedly misrepresenting that an impartial arbitrator had denied his grievance. After multiple amended complaints, the district court concluded that Goodman’s pleadings were time-barred in part and, in any event, failed to plausibly allege a breach of the union’s DFR—a prerequisite to reaching the merits of the contract claim against UPS. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals (Livingston, C.J.; Cabranes and Menashi, JJ.) affirmed de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice. Applying the Iqbal plausibility standard, and construing the pro se complaint liberally, the court held:

Goodman failed to plausibly allege that Local 804 breached its duty of fair representation—he offered only conclusory assertions of conspiracy and failed to show arbitrariness, bad faith linked causally to his injury, or intentional discrimination unrelated to legitimate union objectives.
Goodman’s challenge to the structure of the grievance process (including the claim that a neutral arbitrator voted only upon deadlock and that the union’s dual roles created an inherent conflict) was untimely to the extent he knew of it before or at the hearing, and, in any event, was supported only by conclusory allegations of a wider conspiracy.
As to “bad faith,” even assuming Local 804 misrepresented that an impartial arbitrator denied his grievance, Goodman failed to allege a causal link between that alleged lie and his damages; his injury flowed from the adverse grievance outcome, not the misstatement.
Goodman’s comparator-based discrimination allegations were insufficient because he did not plausibly allege that similarly situated employees were treated differently for reasons unrelated to legitimate union objectives.
Because a union breach is a prerequisite to reaching the § 301 claim against the employer, the court did not address the alleged CBA breach by UPS.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The court reiterated that to survive Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim. Even with liberal construction for pro se litigants (see Sharikov), the complaint cannot rely on conclusory, speculative assertions. Here, Goodman’s assertions of “conspiracy” were exactly the sort of bare conclusions rejected under Iqbal/Mazzei.
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024): The court acknowledged the obligation to interpret pro se filings to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Nonetheless, pro se status does not relax the requirement of factual content that plausibly supports the elements of a DFR breach; liberal construction cannot supply missing facts.
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) and Carrion v. Enterprise Ass’n, Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638, 227 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2000): DelCostello established the hybrid § 301/DFR action and applied a six-month statute of limitations borrowed from NLRA § 10(b). Carrion explicated that an employee may sue both employer and union where the employer allegedly breached the CBA and the union allegedly breached its DFR. The Second Circuit reaffirmed that structure here. It also signaled timeliness constraints: aspects of Goodman’s challenge known before or at the hearing were untimely.
Sanozky v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 415 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2005): Sanozky restates the two essential elements of a hybrid claim: (1) breach of the CBA by the employer and (2) a DFR breach by the union. The plaintiff must establish both. In Goodman, the court affirmed dismissal because the union breach was not plausibly alleged—foreclosing the employer claim.
Air Line Pilots Association v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991): O’Neill sets the demanding “arbitrary” standard for DFR claims: union conduct is arbitrary only if it is so far outside the wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational, measured against the factual and legal landscape at the time. The panel found that a union’s vote against a grievant on a panel, without more, is not arbitrary—undercutting the core of Goodman’s arbitrariness theory.
Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n International, 156 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998): Spellacy anchors two key concepts: (i) “bad faith” encompasses fraud, dishonesty, and intentionally misleading conduct; and (ii) causation—damages must be caused by the union’s breach. The panel assumed arguendo that a misrepresentation occurred but held that Goodman’s damages flowed from the adverse grievance decision, not the alleged lie—so no causal nexus.
Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2012): Conclusory allegations of participation in a conspiracy are insufficient. Goodman’s conspiracy assertions—untethered to specific facts—failed under Anderson News.
Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 604 F.3d 703 (2d Cir. 2010): Vaughn reinforces the causation requirement in DFR claims and the discrimination standard. The panel cited Vaughn to emphasize that, even if certain conduct could be bad faith, the claim fails absent a pleaded causal connection to injury. Vaughn also supports the requirement that alleged discrimination be severe, intentional, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.
Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971): Quoted in Vaughn, Lockridge underpins the discrimination element: the union’s differential treatment must be intentional, severe, and unconnected to legitimate union goals. Goodman’s comparator allegations fell short.
Young v. U.S. Postal Service, 907 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1990): The court relied on Young to reiterate a dispositive structural point: absent a plausible DFR breach, courts will not reach the merits of the § 301 claim against the employer. This barred Goodman’s CBA claim against UPS.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded through the essential elements and pleaded theories of DFR breach.

Challenge to the Grievance Structure and Panel Composition (Timeliness and Substantive Sufficiency): Goodman attacked the CBA’s grievance process, including that a neutral arbitrator voted only upon deadlock and that the union’s service on panels supposedly created a structural conflict. The court held:
- To the extent Goodman was aware of these features before or at the hearing, any challenge was untimely.
- Substantively, merely following the CBA-mandated process does not plausibly allege union arbitrariness or bad faith; the allegations of a system-wide conspiracy were conclusory.
The ruling underscores that structural objections known to the grievant must be raised within the applicable limitations period and must be supported by concrete factual allegations.
Arbitrariness: Applying O’Neill, the panel emphasized the breadth of the union’s “range of reasonableness.” Voting against a grievant, without more, is not arbitrary. The complaint lacked factual content indicating that the union’s actions were irrational in light of contemporaneous facts and law.
Bad Faith and Causation: Even assuming Local 804 falsely told Goodman that an “impartial arbitrator” denied his grievance, the claim failed because he did not plead that this misstatement caused his loss. The adverse panel outcome—not the alleged lie—was the source of his damages. Spellacy and Vaughn make causation an indispensable element; the complaint contained no facts showing that the misrepresentation altered the grievance outcome or caused a separate, compensable injury.
Discrimination: The court found no plausible allegation of intentional discrimination unrelated to legitimate union objectives. Goodman referenced another discharged employee who received back pay, but he did not allege facts showing the comparator was similarly situated in all material respects or that the differential outcome reflected impermissible motives rather than legitimate union decision-making.
Conspiracy Allegations: The court rejected conclusory claims of collusion between union and employer. Under Anderson News, bare assertions of “conspiracy” or “participation” are insufficient. The complaint did not supply specific acts, communications, or coordinated steps that would nudge the claim from conceivable to plausible.
Gatekeeping Function of the DFR Element: Reaffirming Young and DelCostello/Sanozky, the panel concluded that because Goodman failed to plausibly plead a DFR breach, the court could not reach whether UPS breached the CBA. In hybrid § 301/DFR actions, the union breach is a prerequisite to proceeding against the employer on the contract claim.
Procedural Posture and Pleading Standard: The dismissal was reviewed de novo. The court expressly applied Iqbal’s plausibility standard and acknowledged pro se liberal construction (Sharikov). However, multiple opportunities to amend did not yield non-conclusory facts satisfying the DFR elements, supporting dismissal with prejudice.

Impact and Practical Implications

For LMRA Hybrid Litigation: The order reinforces that plaintiffs must plead specific, non-conclusory facts showing a union breach—arbitrariness, discrimination, or bad faith—plus a causal link to damages. General dissatisfaction with a grievance outcome, or assertions that a panel “sided with” management, will not suffice.
On Causation: The decision spotlights a frequent pleading gap: even if a plaintiff alleges deceptive or unfair conduct by union representatives, liability requires plausible allegations that the conduct caused the injury (e.g., altered the grievance outcome or caused a separate, concrete harm). Absent that link, DFR claims fail.
Conspiracy and Comparator Allegations: Courts will reject boilerplate allegations of union-employer conspiracy and bare comparator references unless tied to particularized facts (who, what, when, where, and how) showing coordinated conduct or discriminatory intent unrelated to legitimate objectives.
Timeliness of Structural Challenges: Challenges to known features of a grievance system (e.g., when the neutral arbitrator votes, union panel participation) must be brought within the limitations period. Plaintiffs cannot later recast dissatisfaction with those built-in procedures as timely DFR breaches.
Union Decision-Making Latitude: O’Neill’s “wide range of reasonableness” remains a formidable barrier. Unions may exercise judgment during grievance processing, including strategic decisions and panel voting, without incurring DFR liability unless actions are irrational, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
Procedural Endgame: Because a union breach is a prerequisite, failure to plausibly plead a DFR violation will foreclose the § 301 contract claim against the employer at the pleading stage—streamlining hybrid litigation and conserving judicial resources.
Non-Precedential but Persuasive: Although a summary order, the decision is citable and signals continued strict adherence in the Second Circuit to Iqbal pleading standards and to the structural features of hybrid § 301/DFR claims concerning causation and timeliness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hybrid § 301/DFR Claim: A combined lawsuit alleging (1) the employer breached the CBA (Section 301 of the LMRA) and (2) the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling the grievance. Both elements must be proven; the union’s breach is a prerequisite to reaching the employer’s alleged contract breach.
Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): A union’s legal obligation to represent all members fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination. A breach occurs if union conduct is arbitrary (irrational given the context), discriminatory (intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate objectives), or in bad faith (fraudulent or intentionally misleading).
Arbitrariness (O’Neill standard): The union’s conduct must be so unreasonable as to be irrational considering the facts and law at the time. Mere disagreement with the union’s strategy or outcome does not prove arbitrariness.
Bad Faith: Includes fraud, dishonesty, or intentional deceit. But even if bad faith is alleged, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that this conduct caused the injury (e.g., changed the grievance outcome or caused distinct harm).
Discrimination (Lockridge/Vaughn): Requires substantial evidence of intentional, severe differential treatment unrelated to legitimate union objectives. A comparator must be similarly situated in material respects.
Causation: The plaintiff must show the union’s breach caused their damages. If the injury stems from an adverse grievance decision rather than the union’s alleged misstatement or lapse, causation is missing.
Conspiracy Pleading (Anderson News): Allegations of “conspiracy” must be supported by specific facts indicating coordinated action; bare conclusions are insufficient.
Timeliness: Hybrid claims are subject to a short statute of limitations (DelCostello applies a six-month period). Claims based on known grievance-process features accrue when the plaintiff knew or should have known of them and must be filed promptly.
Standard of Review and Pro Se Considerations: Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed de novo. Pro se pleadings receive liberal construction, but plaintiffs still must provide factual content that renders their claims plausible under Iqbal.

Conclusion

Goodman underscores core principles governing hybrid § 301/DFR litigation in the Second Circuit. First, plaintiffs must plead concrete, non-conclusory facts showing that the union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith—and that the alleged breach caused the injury. Second, structural or procedural features of the grievance system known to the grievant must be challenged timely and cannot be repackaged as generalized conspiracy claims. Third, absent a plausible DFR breach, courts will not reach the merits of the § 301 contract claim against the employer.

Although non-precedential, the summary order is a clear reaffirmation of existing doctrine from DelCostello, O’Neill, Spellacy, Vaughn, and related authorities. It serves as a practical guide for litigants: pro se or represented, those bringing hybrid claims must meet exacting pleading standards, allege a tight causal chain, and timely assert challenges. Unions retain broad latitude to make reasoned judgments in grievance handling, and mere adverse outcomes or suspicions of collusion will not open the courthouse doors.