Introduction

In Webb v. Trombley, No. 24-2582-pr (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2025) (Summary Order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a reduced attorney’s fee award in a prisoner civil-rights case governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). The plaintiff, Michael Webb, prevailed at a jury trial and then sought substantial attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court capped fees at 150% of Webb’s monetary judgment, relying on the Second Circuit’s prior decision in Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 2011). On appeal, Webb asked the Court to overrule Shepherd using the Second Circuit’s internal “mini en banc” procedure. The panel declined and affirmed.

The case involves the familiar tension between the generally generous prevailing party fee-shifting regime of § 1988 and the PLRA’s stringent limitations on attorney’s fees in suits brought by incarcerated litigants. Although the disposition is a non-precedential summary order (citable under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1), it underscores the continued vitality of Shepherd’s interpretation of § 1997e(d)(2), the Court’s adherence to law-of-the-circuit principles, and practical considerations surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220 (2018), regarding mandatory allocation of a portion of the inmate’s recovery toward fees.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Parker and Carney) affirmed the Northern District of New York’s fee award of $22,500—exactly 150% of Webb’s $15,000 total damages judgment ($12,500 against Trombley and $2,500 against Bovair). The district court applied the PLRA’s fee-limiting provision as interpreted in Shepherd, which holds that § 1997e(d)(2) caps the recoverable attorney’s fees from defendants at 150% of the monetary judgment. The Court rejected Webb’s request to overrule Shepherd via the Circuit’s “mini en banc” procedure, noting the panel is bound by circuit precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court, and concluding this case is ill-suited for such internal reconsideration.

In a footnote, the Court observed that the district court’s fee award “appears to conflict” with Murphy v. Smith—because the district court did not allocate 25% of Webb’s recovery toward the fee award—but declined to correct that issue because defendants did not cross-appeal. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Background and Procedural Posture

Webb, an incarcerated plaintiff, initiated a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in 2018 against corrections officials at Great Meadow Correctional Facility. After screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(b), summary judgment rulings, and the appointment of pro bono trial counsel (with later substitution), the case proceeded to a jury verdict for Webb. The jury awarded $12,500 in compensatory damages against Trombley and $2,500 against Bovair. Webb then sought $206,977.50 in § 1988 fees and $5,030.36 in costs. The district court awarded only $22,500 in fees—150% of the $15,000 judgment—based on the PLRA and Shepherd. Webb appealed the reduction; defendants did not cross-appeal.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 2011): The controlling Second Circuit precedent interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) to cap fees recoverable from defendants at 150% of the monetary judgment. Shepherd has guided fee awards in prisoner cases within the Circuit for over a decade.
• Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220 (2018): The Supreme Court held that, whenever a monetary judgment is awarded, district courts must apply up to 25% of the inmate’s recovery to satisfy the fee award; the “portion” is mandatory, not discretionary. The panel noted the district court’s award appeared inconsistent with Murphy because it did not allocate up to 25% of Webb’s damages to fees, but the issue was not reviewable absent a cross-appeal.
• United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2022): Reinforces the law-of-the-circuit rule—panels are bound by prior panel decisions unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. This foreclosed Webb’s request that a panel overrule Shepherd.
• Inter-circuit authority aligning with Shepherd on the 150% cap: Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000); Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2009); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013); Volk v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2001); Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2001); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2001); Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893 (11th Cir. 2020), overruled on other grounds by Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021). The panel emphasized the unanimity across circuits in reading § 1997e(d)(2) as a 150% cap.
• Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds InterCapital, Inc., 732 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1984), citing White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982): Confirms that an order awarding attorney’s fees is separately appealable as a final order—supporting appellate jurisdiction.
• Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 90 n.6 (2d Cir. 2003): Clarifies the cross-appeal requirement. Because defendants did not cross-appeal, the panel declined to address the apparent Murphy error that might have reduced Webb’s net recovery by allocating 25% to fees.

Legal Reasoning

The PLRA modifies fee awards in prisoner civil rights actions in two principal ways:

• § 1997e(d)(1): Fees are recoverable only if “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation” and must be proportionate to the “court ordered relief,” or incurred in enforcing that relief.
• § 1997e(d)(2): When a monetary judgment is awarded, up to 25% of the judgment must be applied to satisfy the fee award; and the defendant pays the remainder, subject to a limit that the fee award recoverable from the defendant cannot exceed 150% of the judgment, as interpreted by Shepherd and consistently by other circuits.

Applying these provisions, the district court awarded fees of $22,500—exactly 150% of the $15,000 judgment. On appeal, Webb invited the panel to overrule Shepherd via the Second Circuit’s internal “mini en banc” procedure. The panel declined, explaining it is bound by law-of-the-circuit doctrine (Peguero), and that this case is not an appropriate vehicle for invoking the internal procedure to reconsider settled precedent—especially where all other circuits align with Shepherd’s interpretation and the Supreme Court’s Murphy decision cuts in favor of stricter PLRA enforcement, not leniency.

The panel also acknowledged, but did not correct, a likely Murphy issue: the district court does not appear to have applied up to 25% of Webb’s damages to the fee award. Under Murphy, that allocation is mandatory. However, because defendants did not cross-appeal, the Court declined to reach or remedy the error, leaving the judgment undisturbed.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Continued force of the 150% cap: Within the Second Circuit, parties and district courts should expect the 150% cap in § 1997e(d)(2), as articulated in Shepherd, to control fee awards in prisoner § 1983 cases involving monetary relief. A panel will not overrule Shepherd absent en banc action or Supreme Court intervention.
• Mandatory 25% allocation under Murphy: District courts must allocate up to 25% of the inmate’s monetary recovery toward the fee award. Counsel should ensure the record and orders reflect Murphy’s requirement; appellees should file a cross-appeal if they seek to correct a failure to allocate.
• Strategic case framing: Because the PLRA tightly limits fees tied to monetary judgments, plaintiffs may consider pursuing or emphasizing injunctive or declaratory relief where appropriate, as § 1997e(d)(1) allows fees proportionate to “court ordered relief,” not exclusively damages.
• Representation considerations: The 150% cap can make it difficult to justify extensive attorney time on modest-damages cases. Pro bono counsel and clinics remain essential, but parties should calibrate litigation effort, staffing, and settlement strategy with the cap in mind.
• Issue preservation: This case illustrates two preservation lessons. First, a party seeking to expand or reduce rights under a judgment must file a cross-appeal. Second, efforts to revisit circuit law should proceed via en banc petitions, recognizing the panel’s institutional constraints and the national unanimity on the fee-cap interpretation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 1983: A federal statute allowing suits against state actors for violations of constitutional rights.
• Section 1988 fees: A fee-shifting provision permitting prevailing civil-rights plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney’s fees from defendants, designed to encourage enforcement of civil rights.
• PLRA (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)): A statute that imposes special limits on attorney’s fees in cases brought by incarcerated plaintiffs. Key features include: fees must be directly tied to proving an actual violation and proportionate to relief; up to 25% of any damages must be applied to fees; and total fees recoverable from defendants cannot exceed 150% of the damages judgment.
• 150% cap: In prisoner cases with money judgments, the amount of fees that can be recovered from defendants is capped at 1.5 times the damages awarded.
• Murphy v. Smith rule: Courts must apply up to 25% of the inmate’s damages to the fee award; the remainder (subject to the 150% cap) is paid by the defendant.
• Pro se vs. pro bono: “Pro se” means a litigant represents himself without a lawyer. “Pro bono” counsel are lawyers who volunteer their services; they can recover market-rate fees under § 1988, but PLRA limits apply in prisoner cases.
• In forma pauperis and screening: Indigent plaintiffs may proceed without prepaying fees. Courts must screen prisoner complaints and may dismiss unmeritorious claims at the outset under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A(b).
• Summary order: A non-precedential appellate disposition. It may be cited (FRAP 32.1; Local Rule 32.1.1) but does not bind future panels.
• Law of the circuit: A panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s published decision; only the en banc court or the Supreme Court can do so.
• “Mini en banc” procedure: An internal Second Circuit process in which a panel may circulate a proposed opinion to the full court in limited circumstances to consider departing from prior circuit law without convening a full en banc argument. The court indicated this case was not a suitable vehicle for using that procedure to overrule Shepherd.
• Cross-appeal requirement: An appellee must cross-appeal to seek to alter the judgment in its favor; absent a cross-appeal, the appellate court typically will not modify the judgment to the appellee’s benefit.

What the Court Did and Did Not Decide

• Decided: The Second Circuit affirmed a fee award capped at 150% of the damages judgment under Shepherd and § 1997e(d)(2).
• Declined: The Court declined to overrule Shepherd via “mini en banc,” reaffirming that panels are bound by existing circuit precedent.
• Not decided (due to no cross-appeal): Whether the district court erred by failing to allocate up to 25% of Webb’s damages toward fees as Murphy requires. The panel flagged the apparent inconsistency but left the judgment intact.
• Not addressed: Hourly-rate caps under § 1997e(d)(3), the treatment of costs, and any nuanced allocation issues among multiple defendants beyond the aggregate 150% cap applied here.

Conclusion

Webb v. Trombley does not change the law, but it reinforces two central points in prisoner fee litigation within the Second Circuit. First, Shepherd remains the governing interpretation of § 1997e(d)(2): fees recoverable from defendants are capped at 150% of the monetary judgment. Second, panels cannot depart from circuit precedent absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention; the Court declined to employ its internal “mini en banc” process to revisit Shepherd, noting the case’s unsuitability and the unanimity among other circuits.

The opinion also highlights a practical but important corollary of Murphy v. Smith: district courts must allocate up to 25% of the prisoner’s damages to the fee award. Because that issue was not preserved via cross-appeal, the panel did not correct an apparent deviation here. The upshot for litigants is clear—fee requests and objections in PLRA cases must be carefully structured to account for both the 25% allocation and the 150% cap, and parties must preserve related issues procedurally. For the broader bar, the decision underscores the continuing constraints the PLRA imposes on fee recovery in prisoner cases and the importance of strategic case development where non-monetary relief or proportionate fee recovery is attainable.