SB 483 Resentencing Must Apply Prop 36’s Public-Safety Override for Nonserious, Nonviolent Third Strikes

Commentary on People v. Superior Court (Guevara), California Supreme Court (Oct. 9, 2025)

Introduction

In People v. Superior Court (Guevara), the California Supreme Court resolved a high-stakes collision between a voter-enacted initiative (the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, Proposition 36) and a later legislative resentencing mandate (Senate Bill No. 483, codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). The core question: when a prisoner’s sentence is recalled under section 1172.75 because prior prison term enhancements are now invalid, may the court also replace an indeterminate third-strike term with a determinate second-strike term under Prop 36 without following Prop 36’s own resentencing gatekeeping rule—the court’s discretionary finding that resentencing does not pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”?

The Court holds that the two schemes can and must be harmonized: section 1172.75’s command to apply “changes in law that reduce sentences” incorporates Proposition 36’s public-safety override for nonserious, nonviolent third-strike cases. Thus, an inmate whose indeterminate third-strike term is “opened” for resentencing by SB 483 gains access to Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions only if the resentencing court determines—under Prop 36’s substantive framework—that resentencing would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. The holding avoids an unconstitutional legislative amendment of a voter initiative by reading the statutes to function in tandem.

The Court reverses the Court of Appeal (which had invalidated the trial court’s application of Prop 36 at an SB 483 resentencing), and remands for a new public-safety determination under Prop 36, expressly instructing that a prior dangerousness finding is not binding; the trial court must reassess public safety on current facts.

Summary of the Opinion

• Case posture: Guevara received a 25-years-to-life third-strike sentence in 2009 for a nonserious, nonviolent felony, plus three one-year prior prison term enhancements. In 2013, his section 1170.126 (Prop 36) resentencing petition was denied on public-safety grounds.
• In 2021, SB 483 (section 1172.75) retroactively invalidated most prior prison term enhancements and mandated recall and resentencing for judgments including such enhancements. The trial court recalled Guevara’s sentence under section 1172.75 and imposed a determinate second-strike term (8 years) under Prop 36’s prospective penalty provisions, concluding it had “no choice” despite “concern for public safety.”
• The Court of Appeal majority held this was an unconstitutional legislative amendment of Prop 36 because it bypassed Prop 36’s discretionary public-safety override, petition requirement, and two-year filing window.
• The California Supreme Court reverses. Applying constitutional-avoidance and harmonization canons, it interprets section 1172.75’s “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” to incorporate Prop 36’s public-safety determination and factors when an SB 483 resentencing seeks to apply Prop 36’s revised third-strike penalties.
• However, the Court draws a line between substantive and procedural aspects of Prop 36: the public-safety override and its factors are incorporated as substantive conditions to relief, but the standalone petition mechanics (including the two-year filing window and petition formality) are not required when the resentencing vehicle is section 1172.75.
• Remand instructions: The trial court must conduct a current public-safety assessment under section 1170.126(f)-(g). If the court finds resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, it must reimpose the indeterminate term; if not, and the inmate is otherwise eligible, the court must resentence under Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions.

Factual and Procedural Background

Guevara was convicted in 2009 of felony corporal injury to a co-parent (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a)) and misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a(b)). With two prior strikes and three prior prison terms, he received 25-to-life plus three one-year enhancements. His 2013 Prop 36 resentencing petition was denied on dangerousness grounds; denial was affirmed on appeal.

In 2023, CDCR identified Guevara for section 1172.75 recall because his prior prison term enhancements were invalid. The trial court struck the enhancements, recalled the sentence, and imposed an 8-year determinate term under Prop 36’s prospective penalty scheme for nonserious, nonviolent third-strike offenses. The District Attorney sought writ relief, arguing the resentencing unlawfully amended Prop 36 by circumventing its public-safety screen. The Court of Appeal agreed. The Attorney General, as amicus, supported the trial court’s application of Prop 36 at a section 1172.75 resentencing. The Supreme Court granted review.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646: Held that Prop 36 provides a “special mechanism” (section 1170.126) for already-sentenced inmates; Estrada’s automatic retroactivity does not apply on direct appeal to non-final sentences. Emphasized Prop 36’s twin goals—mitigating punishment and protecting public safety—and its public-safety override as central to the balance struck by voters.
• People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225: Allocates burdens in Prop 36 resentencing proceedings: People must plead and prove disqualifying factors beyond a reasonable doubt; People must prove facts underlying public-safety determinations by a preponderance of the evidence.
• People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564 and People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008: Define when a statute “amends” an initiative (authorizes what the initiative prohibits or prohibits what it authorizes) and clarify that the Legislature may legislate in related but distinct areas without amending an initiative.
• Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894; People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617: Standard tools of statutory interpretation—give statutory text its ordinary meaning in context; look to ballot materials if ambiguous.
• People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347; Pacific Palisades Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783: Statutes on the same subject must be harmonized where reasonably possible; reconcile seeming inconsistencies to give effect to all provisions.
• Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818; People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498; Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519; People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792; People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318: Constitutional-avoidance canon—adopt a reasonable construction that avoids serious constitutional doubt, presuming the Legislature acted within constitutional bounds.
• Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53: General-reference doctrine—where a statute refers generally to “any rights or remedies,” the reference dynamically incorporates that body of law as it evolves unless the text indicates otherwise. Critical to reading section 1170.126(k)’s preservation of “any rights or remedies otherwise available.”
• People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152: Modern resentencings apply current law where sentence has been vacated; cited to illustrate that alternative vehicles (e.g., habeas corpus) may lead to resentencing under current regimes.
• Additional authorities: People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (subdivision (k) preserves other remedies); People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (catalog of ameliorative resentencing statutes); People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (remand when discretion misunderstood). The Court also notes, but does not decide, issues addressed in People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340 (Romero at section 1172.75 resentencing) and Court of Appeal cases such as Kimble, Santos, and Terwilligar that favored reinstating the prior third-strike term after striking prison priors.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) No exclusivity: Prop 36 did not foreclose other resentencing vehicles

The Attorney General and Real Party in Interest argued—persuasively to the Court—that Prop 36’s section 1170.126 petition procedure is not the “exclusive means” to obtain relief. Two textual features led the Court to this view:

• Subdivision (a) (“exclusively”) of section 1170.126 limits who may file such petitions (those “presently serving” indeterminate third-strike terms whose sentence would not be life under the Act), rather than declaring the petition procedure the exclusive avenue for relief for those persons.
• Subdivision (k) (savings clause) preserves “any rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant,” a broad, general reference that—under Palermo—incorporates not only preexisting but future procedural vehicles for sentencing relief (e.g., CDCR/Board referrals under former § 1170(d), later renumbered; medical recall; habeas corpus; and, later, SB 483’s section 1172.75).

Thus, Prop 36 did not impliedly repeal other mechanisms that could lead to resentencing; rather, it coexists with them.

2) The constitutional problem to avoid: legislative amendment of a voter initiative

Article II, section 10(c) of the California Constitution forbids the Legislature from amending an initiative without the electorate’s approval unless the initiative itself permits amendment on stated terms. Prop 36 allows amendments only via a supermajority vote (two-thirds of each house and concurrence of the Governor) or voter approval.

Reading section 1172.75 to compel resentencing to a second-strike term while wholly bypassing Prop 36’s discretionary public-safety override would, in practical effect, “authorize what the initiative prohibits”—resentencing dangerous third-strike inmates—and thus amend Prop 36 unconstitutionally. The Court would not adopt that construction when it could reasonably avoid the conflict.

3) Harmonization by constitutional avoidance: SB 483 carries Prop 36’s public-safety override with it

The pivotal interpretive move is to read section 1172.75’s directive to “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” to include the Prop 36 regime for third-strike sentences as a package—both its revised penalty provisions (second-strike term for nonserious, nonviolent third strikes) and its substantive gatekeeper (the court’s discretionary public-safety determination and factors under § 1170.126(f)-(g)). In short:

• Yes, a section 1172.75 resentencing may apply Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions to third-strike cases;
• But only if the resentencing court also performs—and the inmate satisfies—Prop 36’s public-safety override; otherwise, the indeterminate term is reimposed.

This reading aligns with the voters’ stated intent to mitigate excessive third-strike sentences without releasing dangerous offenders, as reflected in ballot materials and the statute’s structure (Conley).

4) Substantive vs. procedural: what carries over, and what does not

The Court distinguished Prop 36’s substantive conditions for relief (public-safety override and the factors to consider) from its procedural mechanics designed for standalone section 1170.126 petitions (e.g., filing a petition, two-year deadline, petition contents, waiver of appearance). When the resentencing vehicle is section 1172.75, the inmate need not file a Prop 36 petition or satisfy the two-year window with “good cause”; those mechanics govern the section 1170.126 procedure, not all other remedies preserved by subdivision (k).

At the same time, allowing nonserious, nonviolent third-strike inmates to access Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions via section 1172.75 without applying Prop 36’s public-safety override would undercut the electorate’s core safety concern. Hence, the override and factors are incorporated, while petition-specific mechanics are not.

5) Unresolved issues and careful limits

• Standard of proof for public safety. The Court highlights that section 1172.75(d)(1) uses a “clear and convincing evidence” endangerment standard for denying a lesser sentence in general section 1172.75 resentencings, whereas Prop 36 jurisprudence (Frierson) describes a preponderance standard for facts underlying dangerousness under section 1170.126(f). The opinion emphasizes incorporating the Prop 36 “public-safety determination and factors,” but does not explicitly reconcile the burden-of-proof mismatch. Expect litigation and trial-level briefing on which standard governs the dangerousness inquiry at a section 1172.75 resentencing seeking to apply Prop 36.
• “Presently serving.” The Court finds the phrase in section 1170.126(a) ambiguous and declines to decide whether it means “as of 2012” or “as of the resentencing,” because the constitutional-avoidance resolution moots the question for purposes of these proceedings.
• Disqualification mechanics. The Court expressly does not decide whether section 1172.75 imports section 1170.126(f)’s method for disqualifying nonserious, nonviolent third-strike offenders (or the allocation of proof on disqualifying factors). It preserves those questions for future cases.
• Romero/1385 at 1172.75 resentencings. The Court does not decide whether trial courts may strike prior strikes under Romero and section 1385(a) during section 1172.75 resentencing (see People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340).

The Dissent

Justice Corrigan, joined by Chief Justice Guerrero, dissents. The dissent argues:

• No ambiguity, no avoidance. Section 1172.75’s phrase “changes in law that reduce sentences” plainly refers to provisions that reduce sentences (e.g., Prop 36’s revised prospective third-strike penalties), not to Prop 36’s public-safety limitation on resentencing. Reading the public-safety override into “changes in law that reduce sentences” is neither natural nor plausible.
• Even if grafted, amendment persists. Importing Prop 36’s public-safety override doesn’t cure the constitutional problem because section 1172.75 still circumvents Prop 36’s expressly voter-mandated petition, two-year deadline, and good-cause requirement.
• Initiative sovereignty. The electorate reserved control over amendments to Prop 36; the Court should “jealously guard” that power. The majority’s selective incorporation rewrites the statute and undermines the voters’ conditions.
• Remedy. The proper harmonization, in the dissent’s view, is to strike the invalid prison prior enhancements under section 1172.75 but reinstate the original third-strike term—consistent with several Court of Appeal decisions (Kimble, Santos, Terwilligar)—unless the inmate qualifies for resentencing through Prop 36’s own petition process.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Immediate effects

• “Second look” for third-strike inmates flagged under SB 483. Nonserious, nonviolent third-strike inmates whose sentences are recalled under section 1172.75 due to invalid prison priors may obtain resentencing to a second-strike term if and only if they satisfy a current public-safety determination under section 1170.126(f)-(g). Prior denials of Prop 36 petitions do not bind the resentencing court; the court must consider up-to-date evidence (rehabilitation, age, health, disciplinary record).
• No need to file a new Prop 36 petition or show “good cause” for lateness. Because the resentencing vehicle is section 1172.75, the inmate need not comply with Prop 36’s standalone petition mechanics, including the two-year filing window. That window governed petitions under section 1170.126, not section 1172.75 proceedings.
• Public safety is the fulcrum. For these SB 483 resentencings, the question shifts from “Do invalid enhancements require resentencing?” (yes) to “Does applying Prop 36’s revised penalty scheme risk public safety?” If yes, the court reimposes the life term; if no (and the inmate is otherwise eligible), the court imposes the determinate second-strike term.

Standards and burdens: anticipate litigation

• Burden of proof. The opinion does not squarely resolve whether the endangerment finding in this context uses section 1172.75(d)(1)’s “clear and convincing” standard or Prop 36 (Frierson)’s preponderance framework for the facts supporting dangerousness. Given the Court’s repeated references to section 1170.126(f)-(g) and citations to Frierson and section 1170.126, litigants should be prepared to brief which standard controls until appellate guidance clarifies the issue.
• Disqualifying factors. The People’s duty to plead and prove disqualifying factors under Prop 36 (beyond a reasonable doubt) may come into play if the court must decide eligibility under the amended Three Strikes law. The Supreme Court did not decide whether that allocation and method carry into SB 483 resentencings; trial courts may see motion practice on the point.

Broader resentencing landscape

• Other “changes in law” still apply. Section 1172.75(d)(2) requires courts to apply “sentencing rules of the Judicial Council” and “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” to promote uniformity. Thus, other ameliorative laws (e.g., discretion to strike enhancements, youth-related mitigation statutes, AB 518, section 1385(c) preferences, etc.) may also be in play at the same resentencing—subject to case-specific limits and any unresolved questions (e.g., Romero at section 1172.75 resentencing).
• Case management. Trial courts should plan for evidentiary hearings focused on section 1170.126(g)’s factors: criminal history, victim harm, prison disciplinary record, rehabilitative progress, and any other relevant evidence of present risk.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Three Strikes vs. Prop 36. The original Three Strikes law (1994) mandated a life term for any new felony if a person had two prior serious or violent felonies. Prop 36 (2012) changed that: a third strike triggers a life term only if the new felony is serious or violent (with exceptions). If the new felony is not, the person is treated like a second striker (double the base term). For those already serving life terms, Prop 36 created a resentencing petition, but only if a judge decides resentencing won’t pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
• SB 483 (section 1172.75). This law made certain one-year “prior prison term” enhancements invalid and ordered courts to recall and resentence anyone serving a sentence that includes such enhancements. At resentencing, courts must apply later changes in law that reduce sentences, in the name of uniformity.
• Constitutional amendment of initiatives. The Legislature cannot change a voter initiative unless the initiative allows it on specified terms (e.g., supermajority vote or voter approval). If a law effectively reverses a core rule of an initiative, it “amends” it and is invalid unless properly approved.
• Constitutional-avoidance canon. If a statute can reasonably be read two ways—one creating constitutional problems and one avoiding them—courts choose the latter to respect both the Legislature and the Constitution.
• Substantive vs. procedural requirements. Substantive rules define who is eligible for relief and the conditions of entitlement (here, the public-safety override). Procedural rules govern how to ask for it (filing a petition, deadlines). The Court holds that section 1172.75 resentencings carry Prop 36’s substantive condition (public safety), but not its standalone petition procedures.

Key Takeaways

• Section 1172.75 resentencings may apply Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions to nonserious, nonviolent third-strike cases—but only if the resentencing court finds, under section 1170.126(f)-(g), that resentencing does not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
• Prop 36’s petition mechanics (filing requirement, two-year deadline, petition contents) do not apply to resentencings conducted under section 1172.75; section 1170.126(k) preserves alternate remedies with their own procedures.
• Prior dangerousness determinations do not bind the section 1172.75 resentencing court; the court must reassess current risk, accounting for changed circumstances (rehabilitation, age, health) and any relevant evidence.
• The Court leaves unresolved the precise standard of proof for the dangerousness finding at a section 1172.75 resentencing seeking to apply Prop 36. Counsel should brief whether section 1172.75’s “clear and convincing” endangerment clause or Prop 36/Frierson’s preponderance framework governs.
• The decision preserves voter intent by ensuring dangerous inmates are not automatically released while still allowing SB 483 resentencings to reflect Prop 36’s sentence reductions in appropriate cases.

Why the Decision Matters

Guevara establishes a durable blueprint for integrating voter initiatives with later legislative resentencing reforms. It affirms that:

• Voter-enacted conditions—like Prop 36’s public-safety override—carry special constitutional weight and cannot be bypassed by ordinary legislation.
• At the same time, initiatives that preserve “any rights or remedies otherwise available” permit later legislative remedies (like SB 483) to operate, so long as they honor the initiative’s substantive safeguards.
• Practically, many third-strike inmates whose sentences are reopened by SB 483 will now receive a meaningful, updated public-safety review, with the possibility of receiving a second-strike term if they no longer pose an unreasonable risk.

Conclusion

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) is a careful effort to honor both democratic sources of California criminal law reform: voter initiatives and legislative amelioration. The Court’s holding—that section 1172.75 resentencings must incorporate Prop 36’s public-safety override before applying Prop 36’s revised penalty provisions to nonserious, nonviolent third strikes—preserves the electorate’s safety guarantee while permitting resentencing to reflect current law. Although the opinion leaves some operational details open (particularly the standard of proof for dangerousness and the precise handling of disqualifying factors), it supplies a clear organizing rule: SB 483 resentencing is a gateway, not an automatic pass; Prop 36’s public-safety screen still stands between a life term and a second-strike sentence.

On remand, courts must squarely assess present dangerousness under section 1170.126(f)-(g). If the inmate no longer poses an unreasonable risk, Prop 36’s doubled-term sentencing applies; if risk persists, the indeterminate term remains. In striking this balance, Guevara remains faithful to the electorate’s design: mitigate excess while protecting the public.