Saunders v. State: Abandonment of Ineffective-Assistance Claims and Appellate Limits on “Thirteenth Juror” Review

I. Introduction

In Saunders v. State, S25A1091 (Ga. Dec. 9, 2025), the Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously affirmed the conviction and life-without-parole sentence of Eptwarnd Saunders for the malice murder of James Jones. The opinion, authored by Justice LaGrua, is doctrinally important in two main respects:

• It reinforces and sharpens Georgia’s appellate rule that poorly developed ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims—unsupported by argument, authority, and record citation—are deemed abandoned on appeal.
• It reaffirms the sharply limited role of the Georgia Supreme Court in reviewing denials of motions for new trial on the “general grounds,” emphasizing that the trial judge’s “thirteenth juror” decision is not subject to merits review on appeal.

Beyond those points, the Court applies familiar Strickland v. Washington principles to reject two specific ineffective-assistance allegations:

1. Trial counsel’s refusal of an alibi jury instruction; and
2. Trial counsel’s characterization of Saunders as an “ex-convict” during opening statement.

The decision therefore serves as a useful case study in the interaction between substantive ineffective-assistance doctrine, appellate briefing requirements, and Georgia’s distinctive “general grounds” regime.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Overview

On January 29, 2018, James Jones was found shot to death next to his pickup truck in the driveway of a house at 790 Freedman Grove Road in Liberty County, Georgia. Witnesses observed:

• A school bus driver and other motorists saw Jones’s truck in the driveway with the driver’s door open and a “large man” lying face down in a pool of blood.
• Shortly before discovering the body, another witness, Ashley Rye, had pulled over nearby when her car malfunctioned and heard a gunshot. She then saw a man in “a red sweater or a hoodie” and blue jeans running out of a nearby driveway.

The medical examiner determined Jones died from “a shotgun wound to the neck.” No weapon was found.

Investigators collected extensive circumstantial evidence tying Saunders to Jones and to the crime scene:

• Phone evidence:
  • Between January 26–29, 2018, there were multiple calls between Jones’s cell phone and a number later identified as Saunders’s.
  • On January 29 alone, there were nine calls between the two phones, with the last call—an incoming call from Saunders’s phone to Jones’s phone—at 2:58 p.m., minutes before the time window of the murder.
  • When investigators searched Saunders’s phone pursuant to a warrant, most of the call history between Saunders and Jones for January 26–29 had been deleted from Saunders’s device.
  • Saunders’s browser history, beginning January 31, showed searches for law-enforcement information, news, and media coverage relating to Jones’s death.
  • Cell tower records indicated that Saunders’s phone pinged off a tower near the Freedman Grove Road area between 3:22 p.m. and 3:31 p.m. on January 29.
• Work and clothing evidence:
  • Surveillance footage at Saunders’s workplace, a diner frequented by Jones, showed Saunders arriving for work around 6:30 a.m. on January 29 in a red sweatshirt and blue jeans.
  • Jones visited the diner briefly at about 8:30 a.m. the same day.
  • Co-workers testified Saunders worked until about 2:30 p.m.; one coworker, Douglas Saxxon, drove Saunders home, dropping him off around 2:35–2:37 p.m.
• Timeline after work:
  • Jones’s brother, Moses, saw Jones around 3:00 p.m. driving his truck with another person inside.
  • Saunders’s aunt, Myrtle Jones (no relation to the victim), testified that around 3:30–4:00 p.m. Saunders appeared at her sister’s house at 1067 Freedman Grove Road, “sweaty” and “waiting on a ride.” This location is about 1,500 feet from where Jones’s body was found.
  • Myrtle offered Saunders a ride home. As she turned onto Freedman Grove Road, a school bus passed, and just down the road the bus stopped next to a police car—matching the sequence of events described by the school bus driver who had just reported Jones’s body.
• Burning of the sweatshirt and confession evidence:
  • Later, sometime after 4:00 p.m., co-worker Freddy Easley picked Saunders up at his house to spend time with friends.
  • Around 5:30 p.m., Easley and Saunders were at Easley’s camper, where Easley was burning pine straw. Easley testified that Saunders threw the red sweatshirt he had worn that day into the fire.
  • At about 6:30 p.m., while driving around with Easley, Saunders allegedly confessed, saying “I blew his damn head off.”
• DNA evidence:
  • After Saunders’s arrest on February 5, he waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement, admitting he called Jones around 3:00 p.m. on the day of the murder but denying he saw Jones or was in the Freedman Grove area.
  • Saunders consented to provide a DNA sample. Testing later determined he was the “major contributor” to DNA found on the front interior handle of the passenger-side door of Jones’s truck.

At trial, Saunders testified. On cross-examination, he ultimately admitted he had been in the Freedman Grove Road area that afternoon—contradicting his earlier denial to police. He claimed he went there only to meet someone “on the corner of Freedman Grove” to sell marijuana but turned away when he saw a deputy because he had drugs on him. He said he then continued down the road to Myrtle’s house, never encountering Jones.

B. Procedural History

• Indictment: On December 4, 2018, Saunders was indicted in Liberty County on:
  • Malice murder (Count 1);
  • Felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); and
  • Aggravated assault (Count 3).
• Trial and verdict: Jury trial took place November 29–December 2, 2021. Saunders was found guilty on all counts.
• Sentencing: He received life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on Count 1. The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
• Post-trial motions:
  • Saunders filed a timely motion for new trial, later amended through new counsel on January 19, 2023.
  • After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion on February 7, 2025, including denial on the “general grounds” under OCGA §§ 5‑5‑20 and 5‑5‑21.
• Appeal: Saunders filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the August 2025 term and submitted on the briefs.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Saunders’s conviction and sentence, rejecting all claims of error. In particular:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel:
   • The Court held that most of Saunders’s ineffective-assistance claims were abandoned on appeal because they were not supported with argument, citation to authority, and citation to the record, applying Byrd v. State and Supreme Court Rule 22(1).
   • As to the two properly argued claims:
     • Counsel’s decision to decline an alibi jury instruction was not deficient performance, given that Saunders himself admitted being on the same road as the murder scene around the relevant time and the defense theory was “actual innocence” and “insufficient evidence,” not true alibi.
     • Counsel’s decision to describe Saunders as an “ex-convict” in opening statement was a reasonable strategic choice to preempt and blunt the impact of impeaching prior convictions that counsel knew the State could use if Saunders testified.
2. General grounds for new trial:
   • On the motion for new trial under OCGA §§ 5‑5‑20 and 5‑5‑21, the trial court expressly exercised its discretion as a “thirteenth juror” and found the verdict supported by the weight of the evidence.
   • The Supreme Court held that, absent “affirmative evidence to the contrary,” it must presume the trial court properly exercised that discretion. Because the merits of such a ruling “are not subject to our review,” Saunders’s general-grounds claim could not succeed on appeal.

The judgment of conviction and sentence was therefore affirmed, with all Justices concurring.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Abandonment of Ineffective-Assistance Claims on Appeal

Saunders attempted to raise multiple instances of alleged ineffective assistance but only developed two of them. The Court succinctly applied an increasingly strict doctrine on appellate briefing:

“Saunders only presents argument and citations to authority on two ineffectiveness claims… As to the other claims, Saunders did not include any supporting argument or citations to authority to demonstrate how trial counsel's acts or omissions amounted to deficient performance or prejudiced the outcome of Saunders's trial. As such, Saunders has abandoned most of his ineffectiveness claims.”

The Court then cites:

• Byrd v. State, 321 Ga. 222 (2025): quoted for the proposition that “litigants must do more than just make an argument or cite authority, but must now ensure that argument, citation to authority, and citation to the record are all present to avoid having an enumeration deemed abandoned.”
• Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 22(1): governing the form and content of briefs, including requirements for citations and argument.

The key doctrinal reinforcement here is that bare enumeration of error—even coupled with passing reference to case law—is no longer sufficient. Appellants must:

1. State the alleged error with some clarity;
2. Provide argument explaining why it is error in light of governing legal standards; and
3. Support that argument with:
   • Relevant authority (cases, statutes, rules); and
   • Citations to the specific portions of the record supporting the claim.

In the ineffective-assistance context, this is particularly consequential: defendants often assert multiple failures by trial counsel. Saunders, building on Byrd, signals that the appellate courts will enforce abandonment strictly, especially for multifaceted Strickland claims.

B. The Strickland Framework and Standard of Review

The Court recites the classic two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):

• Deficient performance: Counsel must have performed in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms.
• Prejudice: There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Citing Moss v. State, Winters v. State, and Nesbit v. State, the Court emphasizes:

• All factual findings by the trial court in the ineffective-assistance context are reviewed for clear error.
• The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is assessed from counsel’s perspective at the time, considering the circumstances and strategy, not with hindsight.
• Strategic and tactical decisions—jury instructions, witness choices, opening statement framing—are not second-guessed unless they are “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.”
• If either prong (deficiency or prejudice) is not met, courts need not address the other.

In Saunders, the Court disposes of both fully-argued ineffective-assistance claims on the deficiency prong alone; it never reaches prejudice. This reinforces how heavily Georgia courts lean on the “wide range of reasonable professional conduct” standard to insulate plausible trial strategies from post-conviction attack.

C. Counsel’s Refusal of an Alibi Jury Instruction

1. The claim

Saunders claimed his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in declining an alibi jury instruction that the trial court was apparently willing to give. He argued that his trial testimony that he was “miles away” from where Jones’s body was found entitled him to such an instruction.

2. Trial counsel’s rationale

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel explained why he rejected the alibi instruction:

• “There was no alibi.” Saunders ultimately testified he was on the same road where the murder occurred, near the relevant time, just for a different purpose (drug dealing) rather than with the victim.
• Alibi was not the theory of defense; counsel pursued “actual innocence” based on alleged “insufficient evidence” connecting Saunders to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
• He did not want to “mislead” the jury by advancing a formal alibi theory inconsistent with Saunders’s own testimony.
• He was concerned that an alibi instruction could be used against Saunders in deliberations, highlighting inconsistencies in his account.

3. The Court’s application of Strickland

The Court holds that Saunders failed to show deficiency:

“Saunders has not shown that his trial counsel performed in an ‘objectively unreasonable way’ in declining the alibi instruction, especially in light of Saunders's trial testimony that he was in the area where Jones was shot around the time of the murder.”

The Court cites Blalock v. State, 320 Ga. 694 (2025), which approved counsel’s strategic decision not to present an alibi where the evidence was conflicting and counsel doubted its strength. Blalock supports the principle that counsel may reasonably choose not to pursue a jury instruction, even when arguably available, if it would:

• Conflict with the defendant’s own testimony;
• Expose the defense to greater credibility problems; or
• Distract from the main theory (here, “you cannot be sure beyond a reasonable doubt”).

In other words, alibi is not a “have to” but a “may” defense, and counsel need not request an alibi charge merely because the defendant offers some distance from the scene. The Court defers to counsel’s strategic choice and refuses to second-guess it.

D. Counsel’s Description of Saunders as an “Ex-Convict” in Opening Statement

1. The challenged statement

In opening, trial counsel told the jury:

“My client, Mr. Saunders, is an ex-convict. He has served time in jail. He knows the importance of having a lawyer. But … during this investigation of Mr. Jones, my client, Mr. Saunders, did not ask for an attorney. He cooperated. He talked to the police.”

Counsel also painted Saunders as gainfully employed, married, and a father who cooperated with law enforcement and voluntarily provided a DNA sample. Saunders argued this “ex-convict” admission was ineffective assistance because it prejudiced the jury.

2. Strategic disclosure of prior convictions

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, counsel explained:

• He knew the State had prior convictions from North Carolina and that Saunders likely would testify.
• Once Saunders testified, those convictions could be used to impeach him.
• Counsel therefore chose to disclose the prior conviction himself in a controlled way, to mitigate its impact and present Saunders as having “nothing to hide.”

3. The Court’s reasoning and precedents

The Court concluded this was a reasonable strategic choice, not deficient performance. It relies on a line of Georgia cases approving similar tactics:

• Collins v. State, 276 Ga. 726 (2003): Recognizes that placing “damaging information” before the jury in opening or direct examination, to portray the defendant as truthful and transparent, can be a sound strategy where otherwise the same information would emerge more damagingly on cross-examination.
• Terry v. State, 284 Ga. 119 (2008): Held it was not deficient for defense counsel to admit in opening that the defendant was “out there pimping” where counsel understood the evidence would reveal it anyway; controlling the presentation of damaging facts can be reasonable.
• Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213 (2009): Found no deficiency in counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s mention of the defendant’s prior felonies in opening when counsel knew the defendant intended to testify and would be impeached with those convictions.

The Court synthesizes these precedents under the broader principle that:

It can be reasonable for trial counsel “to place disagreeable information before the jury in a manner which he can control rather than allow the subject matter to be presented in a more damaging fashion.”

Applying that logic, the Court holds that labeling Saunders an “ex-convict,” in context, was an attempt to reduce the sting of impeachment and to frame Saunders’s cooperation as especially meaningful coming from someone familiar with the criminal justice system. This falls comfortably within the “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and so the Strickland deficiency prong is not met.

E. Motions for New Trial on the “General Grounds” and the “Thirteenth Juror” Role

1. The statutory framework

Saunders also argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” under:

• OCGA § 5‑5‑20: Permits a new trial when the verdict is “contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity.”
• OCGA § 5‑5‑21: Permits a new trial when “the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence.”

Unlike sufficiency-of-the-evidence review under the Due Process Clause, these “general grounds” are discretionary and allow the trial judge to act as a “thirteenth juror.”

2. The “thirteenth juror” doctrine

Citing King v. State, 316 Ga. 611 (2023), and Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56 (2024), the Court reiterates the following principles:

• When the general grounds are properly raised in a timely motion for new trial, the judge must exercise a “broad discretion” and “sit as a thirteenth juror.”
• As “thirteenth juror,” the judge independently weighs the evidence, considers conflicts in testimony, and evaluates witness credibility.
• The judge may grant a new trial even if the evidence is legally sufficient, if the judge believes the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence or to justice and equity.
• However, on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court does not review the merits of that weighing; it only examines whether the trial court understood and exercised its discretion.

The opinion is emphatic:

“The merits of the trial court’s decision on the general grounds are not subject to our review, and the decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is vested solely in the trial court.”

3. Application in Saunders

In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court explicitly:

• Found the evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt;
• Found the weight of the evidence supported the verdict; and
• Stated that, after “due consideration of any conflicts in testimony or conflicts in evidence and weighing all the evidence,” it declined to overturn the verdict while “exercising its discretion as the ‘thirteenth juror.’”

The Supreme Court then applied a presumption recognized in Anderson:

“Absent affirmative evidence to the contrary—and there is none here—we presume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying a motion for new trial on the general grounds.”

The Court then, quoting Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531 (2024), held that Saunders’s general-grounds claim “is not subject to review on appeal.” The key point is that the appellate court will:

• Check that the trial court recognized its role as thirteenth juror; and
• Look for any “affirmative evidence” that the court declined to exercise or misunderstood that discretion.

But it will not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the trial judge’s conclusions about credibility and weight. In Saunders, once the trial judge’s order clearly showed that the thirteenth-juror function was performed, appellate review was effectively at an end.

V. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel under Strickland

Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must prove:

1. Deficient performance: The lawyer’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This is not about whether the strategy was successful, but whether it was reasonable when made. Courts heavily defer to strategic and tactical choices.
2. Prejudice: There is a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed effectively, the result of the trial would have been different. This does not require certainty, but it must be more than speculative.

In practice, ineffective-assistance claims are very difficult to win because:

• Courts presume counsel acted reasonably.
• Strategic decisions—such as which defenses to request instructions for, and whether to disclose damaging facts proactively—are particularly protected.
• If the evidence of guilt is strong, it is hard to show that any error would have changed the outcome.

B. Alibi Defense and Alibi Jury Instructions

An alibi defense is a claim that the defendant was at another location at the time of the crime and therefore could not have been the perpetrator. An alibi instruction tells the jury how to consider such evidence—often emphasizing that the State still bears the burden to disprove the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt.

However:

• The defendant must actually present evidence placing him elsewhere at the time of the crime.
• When the defendant admits being at or near the crime scene (as Saunders did by testifying he was on the same road around the relevant time), an alibi charge can become inconsistent or even harmful.
• Counsel is not required to request an alibi charge just because the defendant claims not to have committed the crime from that location; the defense might instead be “insufficient proof,” not “I was somewhere else entirely.”

C. Impeachment by Prior Convictions and Strategic Disclosure

In many jurisdictions, a testifying defendant can be impeached (attacked on credibility) with evidence of prior felony convictions or crimes involving dishonesty, within certain limits. This presents a strategic dilemma:

• If counsel says nothing, the prosecutor may reveal the prior convictions on cross-examination, potentially making the defendant appear evasive or untrustworthy.
• If counsel discloses the prior convictions in opening or on direct examination, counsel can:
  • Control the framing and tone;
  • Link the disclosure to a theme of honesty and cooperation; and
  • Try to reduce the shock and stigma when the State later references the record.

Cases like Collins, Terry, Phillips, and now Saunders generally treat such preemptive disclosure as a reasonable strategy, not ineffective assistance, provided counsel has sound reasons to expect the convictions will come in anyway.

D. General Grounds for New Trial vs. Legal Sufficiency

Georgia distinguishes between:

• Legal sufficiency of the evidence: A constitutional question—whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. This is always reviewable on appeal.
• “General grounds” for new trial (OCGA §§ 5‑5‑20, 5‑5‑21): A discretionary remedy where the trial judge, acting as a “thirteenth juror,” may grant a new trial if, in the judge’s own view, the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or contrary to justice and equity, even if it is legally sufficient.

Critical distinctions:

• The “thirteenth juror” review is exercised only by the trial court, not by appellate courts.
• The Supreme Court will generally not second-guess the trial court’s weighing of evidence; it only checks that the court recognized and exercised its discretion.
• Absent “affirmative evidence” that the trial court refused to exercise this role or misapplied the law, the appellate courts must affirm the denial of a new trial on the general grounds.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Appellate Practice and Abandonment Doctrine

Saunders reinforces a tightening standard in Georgia appellate practice: claims not properly fleshed out are lost. Specifically:

• Defense counsel on appeal must thoroughly brief each ineffective-assistance allegation with:
  • Specific references to trial testimony or motions;
  • Clear explanation of why conduct was deficient under Strickland; and
  • Argument on how the outcome would likely have been different.
• Trial courts conducting motion-for-new-trial hearings should create a clear record of counsel’s strategic decisions, as those explanations can later be pivotal in the appellate court’s deference analysis.

The decision also warns defendants against “shotgun” ineffective-assistance claims with minimal development: such claims will be deemed abandoned and will not be revisited.

B. Deference to Trial Strategy

The Court’s treatment of both the alibi-instruction issue and the “ex-convict” statement underscores the breadth of deference afforded to trial strategy:

• Choosing not to request a jury instruction—even one the court is willing to give—is permissible when consistent with the chosen theory of defense.
• Admitting damaging facts, including prior convictions, can be strategically sound where the alternative is more damaging impeachment by the State.

Future ineffective-assistance challenges attacking these types of choices will be difficult to sustain absent strong evidence that counsel’s decisions were uninformed, inconsistent with the client’s rights, or plainly unreasonable under prevailing norms.

C. Solidifying the “Thirteenth Juror” Boundary on Appeal

By relying on King, Anderson, and Sinkfield, Saunders further solidifies the clear line:

• Trial courts must explicitly indicate that they have weighed the evidence and exercised their discretion as thirteenth juror on general-grounds motions.
• Once they do so, appellate courts do not reassess the weight of the evidence; that function is “vested solely in the trial court.”

This will likely encourage:

• More detailed written orders by trial judges addressing the general grounds; and
• Focused appellate arguments on whether the trial court properly exercised discretion, rather than inviting reweighing of evidence (which the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to do).

VII. Conclusion

Saunders v. State does not break new ground in the substantive law of ineffective assistance or motions for new trial, but it significantly reinforces and clarifies existing doctrines:

• Appellants must comprehensively brief each ineffective-assistance allegation with argument, authority, and record citation; otherwise, the claim is abandoned.
• Strategic decisions about jury instructions and disclosure of prior convictions fall within a wide zone of professional reasonableness and rarely constitute deficient performance under Strickland.
• The trial judge’s discretionary role as “thirteenth juror” on the general grounds is unique and insulated: once exercised on the record, its merits are not reviewable on appeal absent clear evidence of legal error or failure to exercise discretion.

Against a background of strong circumstantial and forensic evidence—phone records, cell tower data, eyewitness testimony, DNA, and post-crime behavior—these procedural and doctrinal holdings left Saunders’s malice murder conviction and life-without-parole sentence undisturbed. The decision thus stands as a cautionary precedent for appellate practitioners and an affirmation of wide deference both to trial strategy and to trial judges’ discretionary authority on motions for new trial.