Satisfying Nemeth in Friction-Product Asbestos Cases: Fourth Department Upholds Causation via Product-Specific Testing and Fiber‑Year Estimates

Introduction

In Skrzynski v. Akebono Brake Corp. (2025 NY Slip Op 04322), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed a plaintiff’s verdict against Ford Motor Company in an asbestos failure-to-warn action. The case centers on Joseph A. Skrzynski’s alleged exposure to chrysotile asbestos from Ford brake friction products while he worked at an automobile dealership. A jury found that Ford failed to provide adequate warnings, and that this failure was a substantial contributing factor in causing Skrzynski’s peritoneal mesothelioma.

On appeal, Ford principally challenged the legal sufficiency of the trial evidence on causation—both general causation (whether chrysotile asbestos from brake products can cause peritoneal mesothelioma) and specific causation (whether this plaintiff’s exposure was sufficient to cause his disease). The majority affirmed under the demanding “utterly irrational” standard that governs post-verdict legal sufficiency review, while Presiding Justice Lindley dissented, concluding the record did not meet New York’s causation benchmarks articulated in Parker and Nemeth.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department affirmed the judgment in favor of Skrzynski against Ford, rejecting Ford’s CPLR 4404(a) challenge to the legal sufficiency of the causation evidence.
The court declined to review the pretrial partial denial of Ford’s summary judgment motion because it did not “necessarily affect” the final judgment (citing Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 38 NY3d 1023).
On general causation, the court held that an epidemiologist’s testimony—grounded in a 2011 publication and worldwide studies, including automotive friction-product research—combined with product-specific testing by an environmental scientist (finding 25%–50% chrysotile content and fiber release during sanding and cleanup), sufficed to show that chrysotile asbestos from brakes is capable of causing peritoneal mesothelioma.
On specific causation, the court found legally sufficient evidence where: (a) the scientist’s testing quantified fiber release (0.8–2.2 f/cc during sanding; 0.9 f/cc with compressed air; 1.7 f/cc during sweeping), (b) Skrzynski testified to frequent presence in a dusty garage during “over a thousand” brake jobs over multiple years, and (c) an epidemiologist and a physician related cumulative exposure using a 0.2 “fiber-years” estimate to increased mesothelioma risk and, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, to the plaintiff’s disease.
The majority emphasized that under Parker and Nemeth, precise dose quantification is not always required when generally accepted scientific methods are used, and that qualitative comparisons and cumulative dose estimates may suffice.
Justice Lindley dissented, concluding the general and specific causation evidence was insufficient under Nemeth and Parker, criticizing the reliance on limited friction-product data and a career-mechanic exposure mean to estimate this plaintiff’s bystander exposure, and highlighting alternative potential causes.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434 (2006): The Court of Appeals requires expert causation opinions to address the toxin, its capacity to cause the illness (general causation), and that the plaintiff’s exposure was sufficient to cause the illness (specific causation). Parker allows for multiple scientifically accepted methods and recognizes that precise quantification or an explicit dose-response curve is not always necessary. The majority anchored its approach in Parker’s flexibility, allowing qualitative and comparative methods, including cumulative dose (“fiber-years”) estimates, when grounded in generally accepted science.
Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am., 38 NY3d 336 (2022): Nemeth tightened scrutiny of expert causation proof in asbestos cases, rejecting conclusory opinions and emphasizing reliable methodology. The majority here distinguished Nemeth by pointing to product-specific testing data, quantified fiber release rates, and a literature-tethered cumulative exposure estimate, taken together as a “valid line of reasoning.” The dissent read Nemeth more stringently, finding the evidence here analogous to what Nemeth rejected.
Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493 (1978), and Campbell v City of Elmira, 84 NY2d 505 (1994): These cases set the appellate legal sufficiency standard post-verdict—whether the jury’s conclusion is “utterly irrational.” The majority leaned heavily on this standard, stressing that the appellate role is limited when any rational line of reasoning supports the verdict.
Matter of Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation, 187 AD3d 1623 (4th Dept 2020): Cited for the principle that precise quantification is not always required for specific causation; a valid, scientifically grounded method may suffice. The majority relied on this to endorse the combination of measured fiber-release data and qualitative exposure testimony.
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Juni), 148 AD3d 233 (1st Dept 2017), affd 32 NY3d 1116 (2018): Referenced as a contrast. Juni is frequently cited to invalidate causation proof deemed too generalized or “every exposure” based. The dissent found this case comparable to Juni; the majority found the record here stronger because it included Ford-specific testing, exposure levels, and cumulative dose tied to epidemiology.
Bonczar v American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 38 NY3d 1023 (2022): Limits appellate review of pretrial interlocutory orders after final judgment to those that “necessarily affect” the final judgment. The court relied on Bonczar to decline review of Ford’s partial summary judgment denial.
Additional authorities cited in support or contrast included Reed v Town of Amherst, 221 AD3d 1454 (4th Dept 2023) (appealability), Pagels v Mullen, 167 AD3d 185 (4th Dept 2018) (assuming facts arguendo to isolate causation), and First Department cases such as Dyer v Amchem Prods. Inc., 207 AD3d 408 (2022), as well as Sean R. v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 26 NY3d 801 (2016) and Cornell v 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC, 22 NY3d 762 (2014), which the dissent invoked to criticize anecdotal or non-specific epidemiologic reliance.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two interlocking steps—general causation and specific causation—filtered through an appellate lens that asks only whether the jury’s conclusion was rational rather than whether the court would reach the same conclusion de novo.

On general causation, the court found that the confluence of (1) an epidemiologist’s methodology—reviewing studies and case reports globally, including those involving automotive friction products—and (2) an environmental scientist’s product-specific testing of Ford brakes (demonstrating 25%–50% chrysotile content and fiber release during ordinary activities like sanding, compressed air cleaning, and sweeping) could permit rational jurors to find that chrysotile asbestos from brake friction products is capable of causing peritoneal mesothelioma. This holding is noteworthy for explicitly framing general causation in the friction-product context and in terms of peritoneal, not merely pleural, mesothelioma.

On specific causation, the court observed that the scientist’s measurements produced concrete exposure values in the breathing zone of workers during tasks archetypal of brake maintenance—0.8 to 2.2 f/cc when sanding, 0.9 f/cc with compressed air cleanup, and 1.7 f/cc when sweeping. The plaintiff testified to frequent presence in the garage—two or more hours daily, over years—and to being present for “over a thousand” brake jobs in a dirty, dusty environment. The jury also heard expert evidence translating occupational exposures into a cumulative dose expressed as “fiber-years,” with the epidemiologist estimating 0.2 fiber-years for garage workers and a physician opining, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that this cumulative dose substantially contributed to the plaintiff’s mesothelioma.

In situating this proof within Parker and Nemeth, the majority emphasized two doctrinal points:

New York law does not invariably require precise quantification or a formal dose-response curve if the expert’s method is generally accepted; qualitative and comparative approaches can suffice when reliably tied to scientific literature and facts in evidence.
Post-verdict sufficiency review is deferential. If a “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” exists, the verdict stands; only an “utterly irrational” verdict warrants reversal as a matter of law.

The dissent took a contrasting methodological view. It criticized the epidemiologist’s reliance on a case-control study broadly associating “all types of asbestos” with mesothelioma, and on a 2011 article that referenced only limited friction-product data (one mechanic case report and six plant workers), as insufficient to show that chrysotile in brake products can cause peritoneal mesothelioma. On specific causation, the dissent argued that the expert’s use of a career-mechanic mean exposure (0.04 f/cc-years) multiplied over five years (yielding 0.20 fiber-years) “was not remotely consistent” with this plaintiff’s bystander status and sporadic presence in the garage, rendering the estimate non-scientific for Parker/Nemeth purposes. The dissent also pointed to alternative potential causes—household exposure from a parent employed at a steel plant, plaintiff’s own employment at Bethlehem Steel, home renovation, and prostate radiation—to underscore the need for a robust causal link to Ford’s products.

Ultimately, the majority treated the totality of plaintiff’s proof as crossing the sufficiency threshold—particularly given product-specific fiber-release data and testimony translating cumulative exposure into a medically meaningful dose—while the dissent would have required a tighter fit between the science and the plaintiff’s individualized exposure profile.

Impact and Implications

Skrzynski is significant in at least four respects:

Friction-product asbestos claims: The decision confirms that, in the Fourth Department, plaintiffs can meet Nemeth’s general and specific causation demands in brake cases with a combination of product-specific testing, quantified fiber-release measurements, credible qualitative exposure testimony, and a literature-grounded cumulative dose analysis expressed in fiber-years, coupled with a medical opinion tying the dose to the disease.
Peritoneal mesothelioma: The court expressly treated evidence as sufficient for peritoneal mesothelioma, a point of persistent controversy in chrysotile friction-product litigation. Plaintiffs can cite this case to argue that general causation in this specific disease context is a jury question when supported by both laboratory and epidemiologic evidence.
Appellate posture matters: By framing the question as post-verdict legal sufficiency under the “utterly irrational” test, the majority highlights the importance of developing a record that offers jurors a coherent, literature-tethered pathway to causation—even if alternative interpretations exist. Defendants seeking to attack methodology may find greater traction pretrial (Frye) or on a weight-of-the-evidence challenge, rather than on bare legal sufficiency after a plaintiff’s verdict.
Interdepartmental tension post-Nemeth: The dissent’s reliance on Juni, Dyer, and Nemeth illustrates an ongoing dialogue across Departments about what, concretely, satisfies Parker/Nemeth in asbestos cases. Skrzynski tilts toward a pragmatic, evidence-synthesis approach; others have demanded tighter epidemiologic correspondence to the precise product and exposure setting. This split suggests future petitions for leave to appeal and continued calibration by the Court of Appeals.

Practitioners can take several lessons:

Plaintiffs should marshal product-specific testing that quantifies fiber release during realistic work practices, and should pair that data with an exposure reconstruction that translates to cumulative dose benchmarks recognizable in the literature.
Qualitative testimony (frequency, proximity, duration) remains vital, especially when the plaintiff was a bystander rather than a mechanic.
Medical experts should explicitly connect the cumulative exposure to an increased risk threshold and to the disease “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”
Defendants should rigorously contest the fit of literature-derived estimates to the plaintiff’s actual work history, highlight alternative exposures, and preserve Frye and weight-of-the-evidence objections in addition to legal sufficiency arguments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

General vs Specific Causation:
- General causation asks: Can the toxin cause the disease at all? Here, whether chrysotile asbestos from brake friction products can cause peritoneal mesothelioma.
- Specific causation asks: Did this plaintiff’s exposure reach a level sufficient to cause the disease?
Fiber-years (cumulative dose):
- A way to express total exposure over time. Roughly, the average concentration of fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc) multiplied by years of exposure. For example, 0.04 f/cc-years per year over five years equals 0.20 fiber-years. Experts may compare such totals to epidemiologic thresholds associated with increased disease risk.
“Utterly irrational” appellate standard:
- After a jury verdict, a court can set the verdict aside for legal insufficiency only if no rational juror could have reached that verdict on the record. If there is any valid, legally permissible line of reasoning supporting the verdict, it stands.
Reviewability of pretrial orders after final judgment:
- Under CPLR 5501(a)(1) and Bonczar, only orders that “necessarily affect” the final judgment are reviewable on appeal from that judgment. Denials of summary judgment that simply permit issues to go to trial generally are not reviewable at that stage.
Failure-to-warn theory:
- Liability may arise when a manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable care to warn foreseeable users (or foreseeable bystanders) of product hazards. Causation in this context requires proof that the inadequacy of warnings was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury.

Conclusion

Skrzynski v. Akebono Brake Corp. marks a consequential affirmation of plaintiff-side causation proof in New York asbestos litigation, especially for friction-product claims involving chrysotile and peritoneal mesothelioma. The Fourth Department held that product-specific testing demonstrating substantial chrysotile content and fiber release, combined with an exposure reconstruction expressed in fiber-years and qualitative testimony about frequent, proximate presence during brake work, can satisfy Parker and Nemeth at the level of legal sufficiency. The court’s reliance on the “utterly irrational” standard underscores the deferential posture of post-verdict review and the value of presenting jurors with a coherent, scientifically grounded narrative of causation.

The robust dissent signals that the boundaries of acceptable methodologies—particularly the use of broad epidemiology, case reports, and literature-derived exposure means for bystander plaintiffs—remain contested. For now, Skrzynski provides a clear template in the Fourth Department for building and defending asbestos causation cases in the friction-product context, while also highlighting strategic pressure points for both sides as Nemeth’s legacy continues to be refined across New York’s appellate courts.