Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court situates its decision within a well-developed body of Washington and federal double jeopardy jurisprudence, emphasizing that the legislative definition of offenses controls and that Blockburger supplies a strong—but rebuttable—presumption about legislative intent when different statutes are involved.

Foundational Federal Cases

• Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): The same-elements test—two offenses are not the same if each requires proof of an element the other does not. The core analytic tool for multiple-punishment cases involving different statutes.
• Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980): Double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same offense; Blockburger reflects an assumption about legislative intent.
• Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993): Clarifies that Blockburger is concerned with legal elements, not the evidence actually presented; the “same evidence” label can be misleading.

Key Washington Supreme Court Decisions

• State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784 (2019): Distinguishes analytical approaches for multiple prosecutions vs. multiple punishments; reaffirms legislative intent as the touchstone and sets out the structure used here.
• State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577 (2019) (plurality): Emphasizes applying Blockburger to elements “as charged and proved,” not abstract statutory possibilities; Blockburger creates a strong presumption of legislative intent.
• In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795 (2004): Reiterates the Blockburger standard and Washington’s approach to the “same offense” inquiry.
• State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769 (1995): Multiple convictions can violate double jeopardy even when sentences run concurrently; a defendant must show offenses are the same in law and fact; convictions themselves carry collateral harms.
• State v. Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975 (2014): Confirms differing analyses depending on whether multiple convictions arise under the same statute vs. different statutes.
• State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72 (2010): Clear legislative intent (e.g., firearm enhancements) can end the double jeopardy inquiry.
• State v. Louis, 155 Wn.2d 563 (2005): The Blockburger result strongly presumes legislative intent.
• State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604 (2003): Recognizes the legal significance that a threat to kill is categorically more serious than a threat to cause bodily injury.
• State v. Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d 808 (2014): The State can distinguish acts during closing argument to separate counts; relevant here to the “same in fact” analysis.

Washington Court of Appeals Decisions

• State v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. 712 (2011): Rejected a double jeopardy claim involving assault and harassment on case-specific grounds; found differences in aim and purpose. The legislature did not amend the statutes afterward.
• State v. Leming, 133 Wn. App. 875 (2006): Found that in some circumstances, assault and harassment may be the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Again, no legislative amendment followed. The Supreme Court treats this as mixed evidence of legislative intent.

Statutory References

• RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c): Second-degree assault with a deadly weapon.
• RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (2)(b)(ii): Harassment—threats to kill (felony elevation).
• RCW 9A.46.060: Harassment elevation provisions referencing prior assault offenses.
• RCW 9A.52.050: Burglary anti-merger statute (a model of express legislative intent to allow cumulative punishment).
• RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a): “Same criminal conduct” for sentencing—distinct from constitutional double jeopardy analysis.

Legal Reasoning

The Court articulates and applies a structured four-part analysis for multiple-punishment double jeopardy claims when the convictions are under different statutes. Legislative intent governs, and the Blockburger test is the principal tool for discerning intent absent clear statutory direction.

1) Express or Implicit Legislative Intent (Step One)

The Court looks first to whether the legislature expressly authorized or prohibited cumulative punishments for the conduct at issue. Unlike contexts where explicit anti-merger or enhancement statutes resolve the question (e.g., burglary anti-merger; firearm enhancements), the assault and harassment statutes contain no express statement. Implicit indicators—particularly legislative inaction following decisions like Mandanas (rejecting a double jeopardy claim) and Leming (accepting one in certain circumstances)—are mixed and inconclusive. Result: no clear legislative intent; proceed to Blockburger.

2) Blockburger Same-Elements Comparison (Step Two)

The Blockburger test asks whether each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not. Critically, Washington applies this test to the elements “as charged and proved”—that is, the elements the jury was instructed to find beyond a reasonable doubt in the to-convict instructions, not the abstract statutory universe of potential elements.

Here, the to-convict instructions required:

• Assault (RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c)): Proof that Ray “intentionally assaulted” Kristin “with a deadly weapon” by committing an act intended to, and that did, place her in reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury.
• Felony Harassment (RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (2)(b)(ii)): Proof that Ray “knowingly threatened to kill” Kristin by directly or indirectly communicating his intent to kill, using words or conduct that placed her in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out.

The offenses are the same in fact: the State invited the jury to consider the entire 20-minute incident as a single, continuous episode for both charges. It neither elected discrete acts for separate counts nor sought a “separate acts” instruction. Indeed, in closing the State explicitly argued both counts from the same course of conduct. Thus, the conduct overlapped.

But they are not the same in law:

• Different mental states (mens rea): The assault count required intent; harassment required only knowledge. That difference matters; an assault conviction would not necessarily flow from proof of harassment, and vice versa, because the jury must find different states of mind.
• Different threatened harms: Harassment, as charged, required a threat to kill; assault, as charged, required fear of bodily injury. The law recognizes the categorical difference in gravity: fear of being killed is more serious than fear of bodily injury (see State v. C.G.).

Because each offense contained an element the other lacked, neither conviction necessarily proved the other. Under Blockburger, the offenses are not the same in law. That creates a strong presumption that the legislature intended to allow separate punishments.

3) Merger Doctrine (Step Three)

The Court notes that the merger doctrine applies in the context of lesser-included offense relationships. It does not apply here, as neither offense is a lesser-included of the other, and the parties did not contend otherwise. This step, therefore, does not alter the Blockburger result.

4) Other Indicators of Legislative Intent (Step Four)

Finally, the Court tests the Blockburger presumption. It looks to legislative history and statutory context to see if there is “clear evidence” to overcome the presumption. The evidence is mixed and insufficient:

• Legislative inaction: The legislature did not amend the statutes in response to cases finding double jeopardy in some assault/harassment contexts (Leming) or rejecting it (Mandanas). That ambivalence cuts both ways.
• Statutory structure: Assault and harassment reside in different chapters, serving different protective aims; harassment was codified as a distinct offense in 1985. Harassment also cross-references assault for felony elevation—factually recognizing overlap but not expressly forbidding dual punishment. The context is not sufficiently “clear” to displace the Blockburger presumption.

With no clear contrary legislative intent, the Blockburger presumption stands, and separate punishments are permitted.

Impact and Practical Significance

For Prosecutors

• Charging and instructions strategy: State v. Ray confirms that, even when a single incident underlies both a deadly-weapon assault and a threat-to-kill harassment, concurrent convictions can survive double jeopardy so long as the to-convict instructions meaningfully differentiate elements (e.g., intent vs. knowledge; threat to kill vs. fear of bodily injury).
• Election of acts: To avoid “same in fact” debate (and other unanimity issues not at play here), prosecutors can elect specific acts or use closing argument to differentiate counts (Peña Fuentes). Ray shows that failure to elect may render counts the “same in fact” but does not doom them if they are not the “same in law.”
• Enhancement and aggravator stacking: The Court again recognizes legislative authorization for cumulative firearm enhancements even where a firearm is an element of the underlying crime (Kelley).

For Defense Counsel

• Focus on “as charged and proved”: The Blockburger analysis turns on the elements embedded in the to-convict instructions. Defense should scrutinize proposed instructions and object where they collapse mens rea or harm elements, and request “separate acts” instructions where appropriate.
• Develop the “same in fact” record: If the State’s theory aggregates a continuous course of conduct without election, that can satisfy the “same in fact” prong—half of the double jeopardy equation. Counsel must then demonstrate “same in law.”
• Do not conflate sentencing and double jeopardy: “Same criminal conduct” under RCW 9.94A.589 is a distinct, statutory scoring concept, not a constitutional bar to multiple convictions.

For Trial Courts

• Instructional precision is pivotal: The to-convict instructions define the elements for the Blockburger inquiry. Clear demarcation between mens rea and harm elements aids review and reduces double jeopardy risk.
• Record clarity on acts: Where multiple discrete acts could support different counts, encourage the State to elect or to delineate in closing the specific acts supporting each count.

Doctrinal Clarifications

• “Same evidence” vs. “same elements”: The opinion reiterates that the Blockburger test is about legal elements, not trial evidence. The label “same evidence test” can mislead; the controlling inquiry is whether each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.
• “As charged and proved” matters: Washington’s approach ensures the analysis reflects what the jury was actually asked to find beyond a reasonable doubt—not hypothetical permutations of the statutes.

Likely Influence on Future Cases

• Domestic violence prosecutions: Ray offers a roadmap for sustaining assault and threat-to-kill harassment convictions from a single episode, so long as instructions preserve the distinct elements.
• Pending and future “same-statute” cases: The Court flags that a different, more fact-intensive analysis applies when multiple convictions arise under the same statute (e.g., the pending State v. Lee noted in the opinion). Ray’s holding is limited to the “different statute” context.
• Mens rea design choices: Prosecutors’ selection and articulation of mental states in instructions may determine the Blockburger outcome. Conversely, defense counsel may argue that alternative formulations (e.g., if assault were to be framed or instructed differently) would alter the double jeopardy analysis.