Samarov v. Bondi: Abandonment for Inadequate Briefing and Harmless Correction of an IJ’s Overly Stringent Nexus Standard

Introduction

In a non-precedential summary order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the petition for review in Samarov v. Bondi, No. 24-771 (Nov. 4, 2025), affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to Suhrob Mukhidinovich Samarov, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan. The panel (Judges Michael H. Park, Beth Robinson, and Myrna Pérez) not only addressed the merits in the alternative but also foregrounded two practice-shaping points: (1) the strict application of abandonment when an appellant’s brief fails to identify legal or factual error, and (2) how an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) misstatement of the “nexus” standard is rendered harmless where the BIA applies the correct “at least one central reason” test and the record lacks evidence of motive tied to a protected ground.

The case sits at the intersection of asylum law’s core elements—persecution threshold, nexus to a protected ground, and pattern-or-practice claims—and appellate procedure governing issue preservation and briefing sufficiency. Although summary orders are non-precedential, the court’s reasoning offers clear guidance to practitioners about briefing obligations, error preservation, and the evidentiary demands of asylum claims involving harms that resemble criminal or regulatory enforcement rather than persecution on a protected ground.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review on two principal grounds:

Abandonment: The petitioner’s brief largely recited law and reproduced portions of testimony, closing statements, and the IJ’s decision without articulating any specific legal or factual errors. The court deemed all claims—including CAT—abandoned under Debique v. Garland and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A).
Alternative merits analysis: Even crediting the petitioner’s conclusory assertions, the court upheld the agency’s findings that:
- The incidents alleged—harassment of his children, inability to file a second police complaint regarding car theft, two-day detention at customs without physical harm, and two minor assaults by a loan shark’s assistant—did not cumulatively rise to “persecution.”
- There was no nexus between the harms and petitioner’s Tajik ethnicity; the record suggested regulatory enforcement motives (import laws) and a private debt dispute, not persecution on a protected ground.
- No “pattern or practice” of persecution of Tajiks in Uzbekistan was established; country conditions indicated millions of Tajiks live in Uzbekistan with equal rights and rare incidents of violence or discrimination.

The panel also flagged that the IJ had applied an overly stringent nexus standard (“the one central reason”), but found the error harmless because the BIA expressly applied the correct legal standard (“at least one central reason”) and the evidentiary record did not support nexus in any event. Finally, the court issued a pointed admonition to petitioner’s counsel that future briefing of similar quality may warrant discipline.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Wangchuck v. Department of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2006): Authorizes the court to consider both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions where appropriate. Here it allowed the panel to acknowledge the IJ’s error but rely on the BIA’s correct application of the law.
Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): Establish the standards of review—substantial evidence for factual findings and de novo for legal questions; administrative fact findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise.
Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023) and Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A): Provide the abandonment rule: claims not developed with legal/factual arguments are deemed abandoned. The court applied Debique to find abandonment of all issues, including CAT, because petitioner did not identify errors or develop arguments with citations to law and record.
Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2006), Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011), Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820 (2d Cir. 2011): Clarify the persecution threshold. Persecution is an “extreme concept”; the difference between harassment and persecution is contextual, but minor physical harm or brief detention without significant injury typically falls short. The court used these to hold the cumulative harms here did not constitute persecution.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1): A presumption of future persecution arises only upon a showing of past persecution. Because past persecution was not established, no presumption attached.
Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022), Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2014): Define the REAL ID Act’s nexus standard: the protected ground must be “at least one central reason,” not “the central reason.” The IJ misstated the standard; the BIA corrected it, and the court found harmless error because the record lacked evidence of a protected-ground motive.
INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005): Require evidence (direct or circumstantial) of persecutor motive tied to a protected ground; motive is “critical.” The record showed import-law enforcement and a private debt dispute, not anti-Tajik animus.
Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999): “General crime conditions” are not a ground for asylum. This undercuts reliance on a loan shark’s assaults as persecution on a protected ground.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b): Govern burdens of proof for asylum and withholding of removal; both require proof of persecution or well-founded fear “on account of” a protected ground (and a higher likelihood for withholding).
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007): Pattern-or-practice claims require “systemic, pervasive, or organized” persecution of a group. Country conditions showing general equality and rarity of discrimination defeated petitioner’s pattern-or-practice theory for Tajiks in Uzbekistan.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in layers: procedural disposition via abandonment and alternative merits affirmance.

Abandonment for inadequate briefing: The panel applied Debique and Rule 28(a)(8)(A) to deem all claims abandoned because the petitioner’s brief did not identify any specific legal or factual error by the IJ or BIA, nor did it develop argumentation with citations to authorities and record evidence. The court emphasized that “error cannot be shown by simply repeating the agency’s conclusions and changing words in them,” warning counsel that similar briefing in the future may result in discipline. The CAT claim was abandoned altogether because it was not restated or argued.
Alternative merits analysis—persecution threshold: Even considering petitioner’s conclusory points, the court agreed with the agency that the cumulative incidents did not rise to persecution. The panel relied on Beskovic, Mei Fun Wong, and Jian Qiu Liu to underscore that minor assaults, brief non-abusive detention, and bureaucratic or police inaction (e.g., inability to file a second complaint) generally fall short of persecution in the absence of severe injury or targeted, degrading abuse.
Nexus and the “at least one central reason” standard: The IJ’s articulation (“the one central reason”) misstated the law, as Acharya and Quituizaca make clear. However, the BIA expressly recognized and applied the correct “at least one central reason” standard. Applying that standard, the panel found no evidence—direct or circumstantial—linking customs/court actions to petitioner’s Tajik ethnicity as opposed to import-law violations, and no evidence that the loan shark’s assistant acted for a protected-ground reason rather than debt collection. Under Elias-Zacarias and Yueqing Zhang, this evidentiary shortfall defeats nexus.
Pattern or practice: The court affirmed the agency’s rejection of a pattern-or-practice theory, crediting country conditions indicating that millions of Tajiks in Uzbekistan enjoy equal rights and that violence/discrimination against minorities is rare. Under Mufied, such a record does not meet the “systemic, pervasive, or organized” threshold.
Harmless error framing: While not labeled as such, the court’s reliance on the BIA’s correct statement and application of the nexus standard, despite the IJ’s error, functions as a harmless-error resolution. Because the BIA’s reasoning supplied the correct rule and the outcome would be the same, remand under Acharya was unnecessary.

Impact

Although the order is non-precedential, it carries several practical implications:

Briefing discipline and risk of abandonment: The decision reiterates that appellate briefs must do more than recite facts and law; they must identify specific agency errors, support arguments with authorities and record citations, and distinctly present each claim (including CAT). Failure to do so risks wholesale abandonment and potential professional discipline.
Harmless correction of IJ misstatements: When an IJ articulates an incorrect nexus standard, remand is avoidable if the BIA applies the correct “at least one central reason” test and the record independently supports denial. Advocates should argue materiality if an IJ’s error likely affected the outcome and the BIA did not cure it.
Persecution threshold in cumulative-harm cases: The panel underscores that not every cluster of adverse events crosses the persecution line—especially where detentions are brief and non-abusive, assaults are minor, and state action appears regulatory rather than persecutory. Context still matters (per Beskovic), but the facts here fell short.
Nexus in cases involving private actors and regulatory enforcement: Violence by private creditors and penalties by customs officials are typically viewed as criminal or regulatory unless tied to a protected ground. Applicants must marshal concrete motive evidence (e.g., slurs, patterns of targeting, differential treatment) to meet the “at least one central reason” requirement.
Pattern-or-practice claims: Country conditions stating broad equality and rarity of discrimination are powerful counterweights to pattern-or-practice theories. Petitioners must present documentation of systemic, pervasive, organized targeting of the group; isolated incidents and general discrimination will not suffice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abandonment: If an appellant does not clearly argue a claim with legal analysis and record citations in their brief, the court treats that claim as given up—even if it was raised below.
Persecution vs. harassment: Persecution requires severe harm, often physical or deeply degrading, or sustained serious threats. Harassment, discrimination, brief detentions without abuse, or minor assaults usually do not suffice.
Nexus (“at least one central reason”): The protected ground (e.g., ethnicity) must be one of the primary reasons for the harm—not just incidental or tangential. The applicant must present evidence of the persecutor’s motive.
Pattern or practice of persecution: A substitute for showing you personally will be targeted. Requires proof that the government or forces it cannot control systematically persecute people like you.
Standards of review:
- Substantial evidence: The court defers to the agency’s fact findings unless no reasonable factfinder could agree with them.
- De novo: The court decides legal questions anew, without deference to the agency’s legal conclusions.
Harmless error: Even if the agency made a mistake, the court may deny relief if the error did not affect the outcome, for example because a higher tribunal (the BIA) applied the correct rule and the record still does not support the claim.

Conclusion

Samarov v. Bondi reinforces two messages that matter in immigration appeals. First, appellate briefing must be substantive and precise: courts will deem inadequately developed issues abandoned, and counsel risk professional consequences for perfunctory submissions. Second, on the merits, asylum applicants must satisfy stringent doctrinal elements—especially the persecution threshold and the nexus requirement. Harms stemming from regulatory enforcement or private debts, without motive evidence tied to a protected ground, do not meet those standards; nor do isolated or infrequent discriminatory incidents establish a pattern or practice.

While a non-precedential disposition, the order provides a roadmap for both litigants and adjudicators. It signals that an IJ’s misstatement of the nexus standard does not necessitate remand where the BIA corrects the error and the evidentiary record cannot support nexus. And it underscores that, absent severe harm or a well-supported pattern of group persecution, courts will affirm denials under the deferential substantial evidence standard.