Rule 33.1 Specificity Controls: Self-Defense Sufficiency Not Preserved by Intent-Only Motion; Figurative, Non‑Matching Threats Are Admissible to Prove Intent; 4‑3(a) Review Permitted on State’s Adverse‑Rulings List

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Christopher McDaniels v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 139 (Sept. 25, 2025), affirming a first-degree murder conviction and life sentence arising from the fatal stabbing of James Petty, the husband of McDaniels’s grandmother. The case presents three doctrinally significant points:

• Preservation: A sufficiency challenge asserting that the State failed to disprove justification/self-defense is unpreserved on appeal unless the defendant specifically raised that ground in a directed-verdict motion under Rule 33.1; an “intent-only” argument does not suffice.
• Evidence/Intent: A defendant’s pre-homicide threat—here, a figurative threat to “get him and burn down the house”—is relevant and admissible to prove intent even if the threat contemplates a different type of violence than the charged offense and even if a witness perceived it as figurative.
• Mandatory review: Despite the appellant’s noncompliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(a), the court proceeded with its mandatory life-sentence review by relying on the State’s provided list of adverse rulings; the Chief Justice dissented, urging rebriefing.

The opinion—authored by Associate Justice Nicholas J. Bronni—addresses the sufficiency of the evidence as to purposeful intent, the admissibility of threat evidence under Rules 401 and 403, and the contours of appellate preservation under Rule 33.1. It also includes a mandatory-review discussion under Rule 4-3(a), with a dissent advocating enforcement via rebriefing.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the conviction and sentence on two principal grounds:

• Sufficiency of the evidence: The State presented substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find that McDaniels acted “purposely,” including twenty-five sharp-force wounds (some penetrating bone), defensive wounds, evidence of repeated stabbing after the victim fell facedown, pre- and post-crime conduct exhibiting hostility and consciousness of guilt, and McDaniels’s own statements.
• Evidentiary ruling: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting neighbor Neal Charleston’s testimony that McDaniels said he would “get [Petty] and burn down the house” if his grandmother was not there. The statement was relevant to show intent, motive, and ill will; its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

On preservation, the court declined to reach McDaniels’s argument that the State failed to negate self-defense because his directed-verdict motions challenged only the State’s proof of purposeful intent and did not specifically assert failure to disprove justification. Finally, although McDaniels’s brief omitted the Rule 4-3(a) list of adverse rulings, the court proceeded with mandatory review using the State’s list; Chief Justice Baker dissented, contending that rebriefing should have been ordered, as in a recent case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Preservation and specificity under Rule 33.1:
  • Bridges v. State, 2023 Ark. 157: Reinforces that a defendant is bound by the scope and nature of the directed-verdict motion and cannot change grounds on appeal. The court relied on Bridges to hold that a general sufficiency claim or an intent-only claim does not preserve a distinct argument that the State failed to negate self-defense.
  • Hayes v. State, 2020 Ark. 297: Requires advising the circuit court of the exact element allegedly unproven to preserve a sufficiency challenge.
  • Haynie v. State, 2025 Ark. 46: Directly on point; held that arguing only purposeful intent does not preserve a claim that the State failed to negate self-defense. The court treated Haynie as controlling.
  • Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1: The rule itself demands specific grounds; failure results in waiver.
• Justification burdens:
  • Gentry v. State, 2021 Ark. 26 and Humphrey v. State, 332 Ark. 398 (1998): Establish that once a defendant puts forth any evidence of justification, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The court acknowledged this black-letter law but refused to apply it because McDaniels did not preserve the specific sufficiency ground.
  • Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(a) and § 5-1-102(5)(c): Statutory framework for justification and burden-shifting when justification is put in issue.
• Inferring purposeful intent:
  • Wyles v. State, 2024 Ark. 128: Clarifies the sufficiency standard—view evidence in the light most favorable to the State and defer to the jury on credibility—and supports inferring intent from the number and nature of stab wounds.
  • Calkins v. State, 2024 Ark. 23: Intent may be inferred from weapon type, manner of use, and nature, extent, and location of wounds; presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of acts.
  • Cone v. State, 2022 Ark. 201 and Wofford v. State, 2023 Ark. 138: The nature and extent of wounds alone can support an inference of purposeful killing, particularly where there is a prolonged struggle and repeated application of deadly force.
  • Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68 and Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313 (2006): Post-crime conduct such as avoiding apprehension suggests consciousness of guilt and supports intent.
  • Cypert v. State, 2025 Ark. 11: Failure to render aid after using deadly force is indicative of intent.
• Relevance and prejudice:
  • Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99 (2000): Pre-homicide threats are relevant to intent, motive, and ill will; directly supports admitting the threat here.
  • Teague v. State, 328 Ark. 724 (1997): Threats with different imagery (“gut her like a deer”) were relevant in an aggravated-assault prosecution using a firearm; supports the court’s holding that non-matching threats are admissible to show intent.
  • Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917 (1996), United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014), United States v. Rivera Calderon, 578 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2009): Explain the low threshold for relevance—any tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable.
  • Webb v. State, 327 Ark. 51 (1997): Objections that go to weight rather than admissibility are for the jury to sort out.
  • Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 243, Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223 (1986), United States v. Neeley, 189 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1999), United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2001), United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438 (8th Cir. 1994): Distinguish ordinary prejudice (inherent in relevant evidence) from “unfair prejudice” that suggests decision on an improper or emotional basis; frame the Rule 403 analysis applied here.
  • Laswell v. State, 2012 Ark. 201: Example of upholding admission of defendant’s statements over Rule 403 objections.
• Rule 4-3(a) review:
  • Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(a): Mandates that in life-sentence cases, the appellant must provide a list of all adverse rulings to facilitate the court’s required review for prejudicial error.
  • Overton v. State, No. CR-24-21 (Ark. Mar. 19, 2025) (referenced by the dissent): Illustrates the court ordering rebriefing to enforce Rule 4-3(a) when an appellant failed to comply.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in three steps.

1) Preservation under Rule 33.1: Self-defense sufficiency was not preserved

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 requires specificity. A defendant must identify the precise deficiency in the State’s proof in a directed-verdict motion to preserve that argument for appeal. McDaniels’s motions—both at the close of the State’s case and at the close of all evidence—argued only that the State failed to prove he acted “purposely.” Even after testifying to self-defense, he expressly declined to add grounds when asked to supplement his motion.

Applying Bridges, Hayes, and Haynie, the court held that an argument that the State “failed to negate self-defense” is a distinct sufficiency ground that must be specifically raised in a directed-verdict motion. Because McDaniels did not do so, that argument was waived. The court acknowledged that once justification is in issue the State bears the burden to disprove it, but emphasized that rule-based preservation principles still govern appellate review.

2) Sufficiency on purposeful intent: Substantial evidence supported the verdict

Reviewing the record under the deferential standard—considering only the evidence supporting the verdict and viewing it most favorably to the State—the court found the evidence of purposeful intent overwhelming:

• Forensic proof: Twenty-five sharp-force injuries across vital and defensive areas, including wounds penetrating bone and chipping the skull; defensive forearm injuries; repeated stabbing after the victim fell face down; and exsanguination due to cumulative wounds. These facts alone permitted an inference of purposeful killing. The court underscored that “it is hard to believe that anyone would inflict twenty-five stab and cut wounds without intending to cause death.”
• Pre-crime statement: Hours before the killing, McDaniels told a neighbor that if his grandmother weren’t home, he would “get [Petty] and burn down the house.” Even if the neighbor assumed the statement was figurative, the jury could reasonably treat it as evidence of hostility and intent toward Petty.
• Post-crime conduct: Dragging the body into the street, sitting on the victim, warning passersby to stay away, trying to interfere with the 911 caller, and resisting arrest. These actions evidenced consciousness of guilt and, under Cypert, a failure to render aid consistent with intent.

3) Admissibility of the threat under Rules 401 and 403

On relevance, the court applied Rule 401’s “any tendency” standard and its own precedent in Gaines and Teague to hold that pre-homicide threats are relevant to prove intent, motive, and ill will—even when the threatened act (arson) differs from the charged act (stabbing). Whether a witness perceived the threat as figurative went to weight, not admissibility, and was for the jury to evaluate in context with other evidence, including McDaniels’s own admission that he was “pissed off.”

On prejudice, the court emphasized the distinction between ordinary, case-strengthening prejudice and “unfair” prejudice that prompts decisions on an improper basis. Citing Berry and related authorities, the court concluded nothing about the statement suggested the jury would decide on an improper or purely emotional basis; rather, it was directly probative of intent. Therefore, the circuit court acted within its discretion in admitting the testimony over a Rule 403 objection.

4) Rule 4-3(a) mandatory review and the dissent

Because McDaniels received a life sentence, the court was obligated by Rule 4-3(a) to review the record for all prejudicial error. Although McDaniels’s brief failed to include the required list of adverse rulings, the State supplied the list, and McDaniels did not dispute it. The court proceeded with the mandatory review and found no prejudicial error.

Chief Justice Baker dissented, arguing that it was premature to reach the merits without a compliant brief and that the court should have ordered rebriefing—consistent with the court’s handling of a similar omission in Overton earlier that year. The dissent underscores an internal tension between the court’s commitment to ensuring comprehensive review in life-sentence cases and the enforcement of briefing rules designed to facilitate that review.

Impact

• Preservation discipline for defense counsel:
  • Defense counsel must expressly assert in a directed-verdict motion that the State failed to disprove justification if they intend to challenge that point on appeal. It is not enough to move on general insufficiency or on a different element (e.g., purpose).
  • Renewed motions must add all additional grounds supported by the defense case; silence will be treated as waiver of any unmentioned deficiencies.
• Prosecutorial use of pre-crime threats:
  • The decision provides strong support for admitting pre-crime threats to show intent and motive—even when the threatened harm differs in kind from the charged offense and even when a witness characterizes the threat as figurative.
  • Prosecutors can argue such threats go to state of mind; challenges that the threat was figurative now more clearly go to weight, not admissibility.
• Trial-court evidentiary rulings:
  • Trial judges have a clear framework to admit pre-offense threat statements under Rules 401 and 403, recognizing that probative value in intent cases is substantial and that unfair prejudice requires a showing of improper-basis decisionmaking risk.
• Appellate practice and Rule 4-3(a):
  • The majority’s approach shows a willingness to proceed with mandatory review when the State supplies the adverse-rulings list and the appellant does not dispute it. However, the dissent signals that future panels may require rebriefing to enforce Rule 4-3(a). Appellants should not rely on the State to cure noncompliance; failure to include the list risks delay or sanctions in other cases.
• Substantive homicide law:
  • The opinion reinforces that multiple, severe, and strategically located stab wounds—especially with defensive injuries and continued attack after the victim falls—support a powerful inference of purposeful intent.
  • Post-crime conduct (e.g., failure to aid, attempts to interfere with responders, resistance to arrest) remains probative of consciousness of guilt and intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Directed-verdict motion and preservation:
  • A directed-verdict motion asks the judge to rule that the State’s evidence is legally insufficient to send the case to the jury. To preserve an argument for appeal, the motion must specifically identify what element the State failed to prove (e.g., “the State did not disprove self-defense”), not just say “insufficient evidence” or attack a different element.
• “Purposely” (first-degree murder):
  • Under Arkansas law, a person acts “purposely” when it is their conscious object to cause a result (here, death). Because intent is internal, juries infer it from circumstances: weapon used, where and how many times the victim was wounded, and how the defendant acted before and after the event.
• Justification/Self-defense:
  • Self-defense applies if the defendant reasonably believes the other person is using or is about to use unlawful deadly force or is committing a violent felony. Once the defendant introduces any evidence of self-defense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. But on appeal, the defendant can only argue the State failed to disprove self-defense if that specific claim was raised in the directed-verdict motion.
• Relevance (Rule 401) vs. unfair prejudice (Rule 403):
  • Evidence is relevant if it makes a consequential fact even slightly more or less probable. Most relevant evidence hurts the other side—that’s ordinary prejudice. Unfair prejudice means a substantial risk the jury will decide for an improper reason (like emotion), not on the facts. Courts exclude evidence only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.
• Rule 4-3(a) mandatory review:
  • In cases with death or life sentences, the Arkansas Supreme Court must review the record for all prejudicial errors. The appellant must include a list of all adverse rulings to facilitate this review. In this case, the majority accepted the State’s list to proceed; the dissent would have required the appellant to rebrief.

Conclusion

McDaniels reinforces three practical and doctrinal points in Arkansas criminal law. First, preservation is paramount: to challenge the State’s failure to disprove self-defense on appeal, defense counsel must specifically raise that deficiency in a directed-verdict motion under Rule 33.1. An intent-only sufficiency motion does not preserve a separate justification challenge. Second, pre-offense threats—even figurative statements and those contemplating a different mode of harm—are relevant and generally admissible to prove intent, motive, and ill will; objections that such statements were figurative go to weight, not admissibility, and Rule 403 exclusion requires a showing of unfair, improper-basis prejudice. Third, while Rule 4-3(a) demands an appellant-supplied list of adverse rulings in life-sentence cases, the court may, at least in some circumstances, proceed with mandatory review relying on the State’s list; the dissent cautions against relaxing this requirement and urges rebriefing.

Taken together, the decision sharpens trial and appellate practice in Arkansas: it encourages precise, element-specific Rule 33.1 motions; affirms a broad, common-sense approach to intent evidence; and highlights an unresolved tension over how strictly to enforce Rule 4-3(a). For prosecutors, the case validates the strategic use of pre-homicide threats to establish intent. For defense counsel, it is a reminder that the failure to preserve specific sufficiency grounds can be fatal on appeal—even where justification has been put in issue at trial.