Rule 12(b)(6) Limits on Using Recordings: Only Blatant Contradictions of Factual Allegations—Not Legal Characterizations or Credibility Judgments—Permit Dismissal

Case: Dyanie Bermeo v. Blake Andis Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Date: 2025-12-30 Disposition: Vacated and remanded

1. Introduction

Bermeo addresses a recurring procedural pressure point in civil-rights litigation: whether, and how, a district court may rely on an audio/video recording at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage to reject a plaintiff’s account. Dyanie Bermeo alleged that Washington County, Virginia law-enforcement officials coerced her into recanting a report of sexual assault, then used that “confession” to arrest and prosecute her for filing a false report, and publicized her alleged admission through a press release. She brought nine federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and two Virginia tort claims against Sheriff Blake Andis, Captain Jamie Blevins, and Detectives Scott Adkins and Brad Roop.

The district court dismissed all claims after listening to an audio recording of the October 13, 2020 interview in which Bermeo recanted, concluding the recording “plainly” showed “no coercion whatsoever” and contradicted Bermeo’s allegation that she felt she had no choice but to agree. The Fourth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court exceeded the narrow recording-based exception recognized in Doriety for Estate of Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670 (4th Cir. 2024).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the default rule: on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts evaluate plausibility based on the complaint (and attachments/incorporations), accepting well-pled factual allegations as true and avoiding factual contests and credibility judgments. It then applied Doriety’s narrow exception allowing consideration of a recording only when it is authentic, integral to the complaint, and it blatantly contradicts the plaintiff’s factual allegations such that the allegations become implausible.

The panel held that the district court erred in using the recording to dismiss because:

Much of what the district court treated as “contradicted” involved the label “coercion,” which the Fourth Circuit characterized as a legal characterization of facts rather than a fact itself—so a recording cannot “blatantly contradict” it in the way Doriety requires.
The one identified factual allegation—Bermeo’s statement that she “did not think that she had any choice but to tell Roop and Adkins what they wanted to hear”— was not blatantly contradicted by the audio. At most, the recording might make the allegation seem less likely, but that is a credibility call forbidden at the pleading stage.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded for the district court to decide whether the complaint survives on its face, and to consider alternative defenses (including qualified immunity) in the first instance.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

A. Pleading-stage baseline: plausibility and the “complaint-only” rule

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
The opinion anchors itself in the modern plausibility framework: courts accept non-conclusory factual matter as true and ask whether it plausibly states a claim. The cited language also supports the panel’s distinction between facts and conclusory statements/legal labels—a distinction that becomes decisive when the district court treated “coercion” as though it were a record-verifiable fact rather than a legal conclusion derived from surrounding circumstances.
Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151 (4th Cir. 2023)
Used to restate the Fourth Circuit’s repeated admonition that Rule 12(b)(6) review is confined to the complaint and attachments/incorporations and that courts may not resolve factual contests or the merits at that stage.
Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2016)
Provides the conventional “exhibit-prevails-over-allegation” principle when a plaintiff attaches a document and the document conflicts with bare allegations. The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court initially relied on this approach, but later (properly) shifted to Doriety, which supplies the relevant standard for recordings and “blatant contradiction.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)
Cited for the proposition that Rule 12(b)(6) “does not countenance” dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of factual allegations—directly undercutting the district court’s reliance on the recording to discredit Bermeo’s asserted subjective experience of having “no choice.”

B. The recording exception: “blatant contradiction” and its narrowness

Doriety for Estate of Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670 (4th Cir. 2024)
This is the doctrinal centerpiece. Doriety authorizes consideration of a recording at the motion-to-dismiss stage only if it is authentic, integral, and it “clearly depicts” facts contrary to the complaint—i.e., it “blatantly contradicts” the plaintiff’s version so as to render allegations implausible. Bermeo reinforces that this is a narrow carve-out, not a license to weigh competing inferences or draw credibility conclusions.
Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995 (6th Cir. 2024)
Quoted via Doriety to articulate the two-part recording test and the “blatantly contradicts” framing, reflecting inter-circuit convergence on the concept and underscoring that the exception polices only extreme contradictions—not ordinary disputes.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
Supplies the original “blatantly contradicted by the record” concept in the summary-judgment setting. The opinion notes that Doriety adopts an identical standard for recordings at the pleading stage, but Bermeo stresses that identical wording does not expand the pleading stage into summary judgment: “blatant contradiction” remains a high bar.
Rambert v. City of Greenville, 107 F.4th 388 (4th Cir. 2024)
Cited to confirm that the Scott principle applies to audio recordings (not only video), validating the district court’s ability to consider audio if the Doriety conditions are met—while simultaneously highlighting that admissibility of the recording is not the same as dispositive effect.
Alexander v. Connor, 105 F.4th 174 (4th Cir. 2024)
Even at summary judgment, courts cannot disregard contrary evidence merely because a recording seems to align with the government’s narrative or makes the plaintiff’s story less likely. By analogy, the panel used Alexander to reject the district court’s move: the audio may cast doubt, but doubt is not “blatant contradiction.”

C. Coercion/involuntariness and the relevance of subjective experience

United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997)
The panel acknowledged that a suspect’s testimony about subjective impressions can warrant careful scrutiny because of self-interest. Crucially, however, the opinion uses Braxton to draw a line: skepticism about subjective claims does not authorize credibility determinations on a motion to dismiss.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Cited for the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to voluntariness: whether the accused’s will was overborne depends on surrounding circumstances, including characteristics of the accused and details of interrogation. This citation matters because it underscores why a “civil tone” on an audio recording may not be dispositive; coercion can be psychological, situational, or inferential rather than overtly threatening.

D. Procedural side-issues: appeal posture and invited error

Benjamin v. Sparks, 986 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2021)
Cited for de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
United States v. Naum, 134 F.4th 234 (4th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74 (4th Cir. 1994)
The defendants argued invited error because Bermeo did not object to consideration of the recording. The panel narrowed any “invitation” to the threshold questions (integral/authentic), not to whether the recording meets the “blatant contradiction” test—treating the latter as a legal constraint the court must apply correctly regardless of party acquiescence.
Santen v. Tunhill, 578 S.E.2d 788 (Va. 2003)
Provides the Virginia appellate-trial framework explaining how Bermeo’s initial conviction was annulled upon appeal and followed by a de novo trial ending in acquittal. Although not central to the federal procedural holding, it clarifies the underlying criminal-case sequence relevant to malicious prosecution-type theories.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three moves.

Reaffirm the default constraint of Rule 12(b)(6): The district court must not resolve disputes over what happened or decide who is more believable; it tests only whether the complaint’s well-pled facts plausibly state claims.
Cabin the recording exception to its designed function: Under Doriety, recordings can defeat pleadings only when the contradiction is unmistakable—so unmistakable that the plaintiff’s version becomes implausible as a matter of law. “Blatant contradiction” is not “the recording seems more persuasive,” “the plaintiff might be exaggerating,” or “the officers sound polite.”
Differentiate facts from legal characterizations and reject credibility adjudication: The district court relied heavily on the conclusion “no coercion whatsoever.” The panel treated “coercion” as a legal characterization drawn from circumstances, not a discrete record-checkable fact. For the specific factual allegation—Bermeo’s subjective sense of having no choice—the audio may provide competing inferences, but it does not render the allegation impossible or inherently unbelievable. Therefore, dismissal based on the recording improperly imported credibility weighing into a motion to dismiss.

Operational rule from the decision: even when a recording is authentic and integral, a court may use it to override the complaint only where it blatantly contradicts the plaintiff’s factual account; a recording cannot be used to negate legal characterizations (like “coercion”) or to reject a plaintiff’s subjective allegation through implicit credibility determinations.

3.3 Impact

Tightening (and clarifying) Doriety: Bermeo is a pro-plaintiff clarification without repudiating Doriety. It emphasizes that the exception is not a general “recording controls” rule; it is a narrow, high-threshold gatekeeper for only the clearest contradictions.
Practical effect in police-misconduct pleadings: Many coercion and interrogation claims turn on context, implied pressure, the suspect’s vulnerabilities, and subtle threats or inducements. Bermeo signals that recordings that “sound calm” will rarely justify dismissal if the complaint alleges contextual pressure that is not directly negated by the audio.
Strategic effect on motion practice: Defendants will still attach or reference recordings, but Bermeo limits their utility at 12(b)(6). The likely battleground shifts to early summary judgment (after discovery tailored to authenticity, completeness, and context) or to targeted qualified-immunity arguments based on the complaint’s allegations rather than a competing narrative derived from recordings.
Institutional effect on district court methodology: The opinion cautions that courts must separate (a) deciding whether they may look at a recording from (b) deciding whether it is so contradictory that it may displace pleaded facts. This encourages more explicit two-step analyses and reduces “backdoor” credibility determinations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 What does “integral to the complaint” mean?

A recording is “integral” when the complaint’s allegations depend on it—e.g., the complaint describes an interview and the recording captures that interview— so it is effectively part of the story the complaint tells. But “integral” does not mean “case-dispositive.”

4.2 What is “blatant contradiction”?

“Blatant contradiction” means the recording leaves no room for a reasonable factfinder to accept the plaintiff’s version of a specific factual point. If the recording merely makes the plaintiff’s allegation debatable, unlikely, or subject to competing inferences, it is not “blatant.”

4.3 Why can’t a recording “contradict” coercion?

“Coercion” (and “involuntariness”) is typically a legal conclusion derived from multiple facts—tone, setting, misrepresentations, isolation, implied threats, vulnerabilities, duration, and psychological pressure. A recording may bear on some of those facts, but it rarely answers the ultimate characterization by itself. At 12(b)(6), courts must avoid converting that characterization into a factual contest resolved against the plaintiff.

4.4 Why does the plaintiff’s subjective belief matter?

Under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach referenced through Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a suspect’s perception can be relevant to whether their will was overborne. That does not guarantee success on the merits, but it means subjective experience is not automatically dismissible as “contradicted” unless the recording makes the claimed perception impossible (a rare case).

5. Conclusion

Dyanie Bermeo v. Blake Andis reinforces a disciplined approach to recordings at the pleading stage. Building on Doriety for Estate of Crenshaw v. Sletten, the Fourth Circuit held that district courts may not use recordings to dismiss complaints unless the recordings blatantly contradict the plaintiff’s factual allegations—an exacting standard. The court further clarified that recordings cannot be used to negate legal characterizations like “coercion” or to make implicit credibility judgments about a plaintiff’s subjective account. The result—vacatur and remand—positions Bermeo as an important procedural precedent protecting the complaint’s fact allegations from premature displacement by recordings that are merely persuasive rather than decisively contradictory.