Introduction

In United States v. Walden (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime). The appeal turned on whether defense counsel’s incorrect assurance that the defendant would not be treated as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)—and would therefore face only five years—rendered the plea unknowing or involuntary.

The panel held that it did not. Anchoring its analysis in the “fair and just reason” standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) and applying the Eleventh Circuit’s Buckles factors, the court emphasized the curative effect of a thorough Rule 11 colloquy. Because Walden repeatedly acknowledged under oath that the court was not bound by any sentencing predictions, that no one could know the guideline range before the PSR, and that he faced a potential sentence up to life imprisonment, the court concluded that his plea was knowing and voluntary notwithstanding counsel’s earlier misprediction.

The decision reinforces a settled but consequential principle in federal plea practice: when the district court’s Rule 11 warnings are clear and comprehensive, a defendant generally cannot withdraw a plea based on counsel’s erroneous estimate of the advisory guideline range, including predictions about career offender status.

Summary of the Opinion

Walden was indicted on three counts: (1) felon-in-possession; (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine; and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The indictment also identified prior convictions that could have supported Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) treatment on the felon-in-possession count. Represented by appointed counsel, Walden entered a plea agreement to the § 924(c) count in exchange for dismissal of the other two counts. In both his agreement and during the plea colloquy, Walden affirmed that he understood:

• He faced a mandatory minimum of five years and a maximum of life imprisonment on the § 924(c) count;
• The court was not bound by any guideline estimates;
• He could not withdraw his plea if the PSR later yielded a different guideline range.

The PSR subsequently classified Walden as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), producing an advisory range of 262–327 months. Walden moved to withdraw his plea, arguing his attorney had incorrectly promised the career offender enhancement would not apply and that he would receive only five years. After an evidentiary hearing in which counsel testified he had conveyed his belief—but also warned the issue would not be certain until the PSR and final court decision—the district court denied the motion and later imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory range (262 months).

On appeal, applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Considering the totality of circumstances under United States v. Buckles, the court held:

• Walden had the close assistance of counsel;
• His plea was knowing and voluntary under Rule 11’s core concerns;
• Given those conclusions, the remaining Buckles factors (judicial economy and government prejudice) need not be weighed heavily, though the district court permissibly found prejudice from the delay.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Symington, 781 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2015): Established abuse-of-discretion review for denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas. This frames the deferential lens: the appellate court does not reweigh evidence de novo but asks whether the district court made a reasonable decision.
• United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994): “No absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” This precedent underscores that the Rule 11(d)(2)(B) standard is intentionally demanding.
• United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1988): Articulates the four-factor, totality-of-circumstances test for whether a defendant has shown a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a plea: (1) close assistance of counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) conservation of judicial resources; and (4) government prejudice. It also emphasizes that trial courts assess the credibility and good faith of a defendant’s assertions.
• United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1987): Creates a “strong presumption” that statements made under oath during the plea colloquy are true. This presumption is pivotal: it makes it difficult to undo a plea by contradicting sworn colloquy admissions.
• United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996): Offers practical guideposts for determining “close assistance of counsel,” including representation, utilization, consultation time, and overall adequacy shown in the record.
• United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003): Clarifies Rule 11’s three core objectives: free from coercion; understanding of the nature of the charges; understanding of the consequences of the plea. Satisfaction of these concerns typically validates a plea.
• United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2001): A central authority for the proposition that a plea remains voluntary despite counsel’s sentencing estimate if the court informs the defendant he cannot rely on predictions, warns of the maximum penalty, and the defendant acknowledges understanding. The panel relied on Pease to hold that Walden’s awareness of the maximum sentence and the inherent uncertainty of the guideline calculation defeated his misadvice argument.

Legal Reasoning Applied to the Record

The court proceeded through the Buckles framework, giving primacy to the first two factors.

1) Close Assistance of Counsel

The record showed that Walden was represented by counsel throughout, reviewed the indictment and plea agreement with counsel, discussed constitutional rights, and affirmed his satisfaction with counsel’s performance. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel explained he believed the aggravated assault prior had been dismissed and, therefore, that career offender status likely would not apply; however, counsel also told Walden that the PSR would determine the prior-record landscape and that the district court would make the final decision. The district court likewise warned Walden on the record that “no one knows with certainty” what the advisory range would be and that it could be higher than expected.

Against this backdrop, the panel held the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding “close assistance”: the attorney consulted extensively and advised Walden of the uncertainty and the court’s sentencing authority, even if his prediction about career offender status ultimately proved wrong. Under Eleventh Circuit law, mistaken predictions about guidelines do not, standing alone, negate “close assistance” where the client is warned of uncertainty and the court’s control.

2) Knowing and Voluntary Plea

The panel then assessed the Rule 11 core concerns. Walden swore he understood English, the nature of the plea proceeding, the relevant § 924(c) charge, and—critically—the sentencing exposure: a mandatory minimum of five years and a potential maximum of life. He also affirmed that:

• The probation office would prepare a PSR;
• No one could know the guideline range before the PSR;
• He could not withdraw his plea simply because the ultimate range exceeded counsel’s estimate.

The district court memorialized these points on the record, explicitly stating that if the range “were to turn out to be different than you now expect it to be and you plead guilty, you would not be able to withdraw your plea of guilty on that basis.” Walden said he understood. In line with Pease, those acknowledgments—combined with the maximum-penalty warning—meant Walden could not later claim that counsel’s sentencing prediction rendered the plea unknowing or involuntary.

The court also emphasized the “strong presumption” of verity for sworn plea-colloquy statements (Gonzalez-Mercado). Walden’s after-the-fact assertion that he misunderstood the severity of his sentence could not overcome his prior admissions.

3) Judicial Resources and 4) Government Prejudice

Once the first two Buckles factors favor the government, the Eleventh Circuit does not require district courts to give substantial consideration to the remaining factors. Even so, the district court found that allowing plea withdrawal more than a year later would prejudice the government, which had relied on the plea to wind down trial preparation and witness coordination. Citing Buckles, the panel endorsed the district court’s consideration of the “time, money, and effort” necessary to reassemble witnesses and evidence after acceptance of the plea.

Standard of Review and Deference

Finally, the panel applied abuse-of-discretion review (Symington) and deferred to the district court’s evaluation of the parties’ credibility and the weight of the withdrawal arguments (Buckles). This deference was pivotal, especially where the district court relied on clear plea-colloquy admissions and heard live testimony during an evidentiary hearing.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding, the opinion is a clear and practical reaffirmation of Eleventh Circuit law on plea withdrawals when sentencing estimates go awry.

• Defense Counsel Practice: Counsel should rigorously verify a client’s prior convictions before advising on career offender exposure. But even with best efforts, uncertainty often remains before the PSR. The safest course is to document the uncertainty, emphasize the court’s ultimate authority, and avoid categorical assurances. Written plea memos and explicit disclaimers (as used here) remain essential.
• Client Counseling: Defendants should understand that guideline ranges are advisory and that the PSR can materially change expectations—particularly in career offender scenarios. A realistic, risk-based discussion of statutory maximums is critical.
• District Courts: A robust Rule 11 colloquy is key. Clear warnings that the court is not bound by estimates, that the PSR controls the guideline calculus, and that the defendant cannot withdraw the plea based on a higher-than-expected range will typically foreclose later withdrawal.
• Sentencing under § 924(c) with Career Offender Status: This case illustrates the dramatic effect of the career offender guideline on § 924(c) cases. Even where the statutory minimum is five years, the career offender provisions can generate a much higher advisory range (here, 262–327 months). Defendants need to be prepared for that possibility.
• Plea Negotiation Strategy: Where career offender exposure is plausible, the defense may consider negotiating charge combinations or stipulations that minimize § 4B1.1’s impact, though options can be limited and case-specific. The government’s willingness to dismiss non-§ 924(c) counts may not reduce guideline exposure if § 4B1.1(c) still applies.
• Appellate Landscape: The decision harmonizes with longstanding Eleventh Circuit authorities (Pease, Buckles, Gonzalez-Mercado, Freixas) and will likely be cited for its clear application of those rules to the recurring problem of career offender mispredictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 11(d)(2)(B): After a plea is accepted but before sentencing, a defendant may withdraw it only by showing a “fair and just reason.” This is a high bar; mere regret or surprise at the guideline outcome is usually insufficient.
• The Buckles Factors: The court considers (1) close assistance of counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) conservation of judicial resources; and (4) prejudice to the government. The first two are typically decisive.
• Strong Presumption of Verity: Statements made under oath during a plea colloquy are presumed true. Later claims that contradict those statements are viewed skeptically.
• Career Offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A defendant is a career offender if (a) he was at least 18 at the time of the instant offense; (b) the instant offense is a felony that is a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (c) he has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Career offender status substantially increases the advisory guideline range, including in cases involving § 924(c) via § 4B1.1(c).
• ACCA vs. Career Offender: ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) is a statutory enhancement applicable to § 922(g) felon-in-possession offenses and requires three qualifying prior convictions (“violent felony” or “serious drug offense”). Career offender is a guideline classification, not a statute, and can apply across various federal offenses, including § 924(c). In Walden’s case, ACCA became irrelevant when the § 922(g) count was dismissed; career offender status, determined by the PSR, drove the advisory range for the § 924(c) count.
• Advisory Guidelines vs. Statutory Penalties: The guidelines suggest a range; the statute sets the minimum and maximum. Here, § 924(c) carries a minimum of five years and a maximum of life. The court remained free to impose a sentence anywhere within that statutory span, with guidelines as advisory guidance.
• Abuse of Discretion: An appellate standard where the reviewing court asks whether the district court’s decision was reasonable and not arbitrary. The appellate court defers to the district court’s credibility findings and weighing of evidence.

Conclusion

United States v. Walden underscores a durable rule in Eleventh Circuit plea jurisprudence: when a defendant is clearly warned during the Rule 11 colloquy that sentencing predictions are non-binding, that the guideline range cannot be known before the PSR, and that the statutory maximum controls, later claims of counsel’s misadvice about the guideline range—including career offender predictions—will not typically justify plea withdrawal. Applying Buckles, Pease, and related authorities, the panel affirmed that Walden received close assistance of counsel and entered a knowing, voluntary plea. The court’s analysis shows the practical power of a meticulous Rule 11 colloquy to cure pre-plea mispredictions and preserve the finality of pleas.

For practitioners, the case is a blueprint: counsel should communicate uncertainty and avoid categorical promises; judges should deliver clear, comprehensive Rule 11 warnings; and defendants should recognize that guideline surprises—especially regarding career offender status—rarely supply a “fair and just reason” to undo a guilty plea once accepted. Although unpublished, the decision cogently synthesizes Eleventh Circuit doctrine and will be persuasive in similar disputes over sentencing misadvice and plea withdrawals.

Key takeaway: A thorough Rule 11 colloquy that squarely addresses sentencing uncertainty and the court’s authority will usually foreclose plea withdrawal claims premised on counsel’s mistaken guideline predictions, including career offender misadvice.