Rogers v. Western Governors University: Marketing “Flexibility” as Puffery and the Limits of Disability & Race Claims in Online Higher Education

I. Introduction

In James Paul Rogers v. Western Governors University, No. 25-1470 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), a Seventh Circuit panel (Easterbrook, Sykes, Scudder, JJ.) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Western Governors University (“WGU”) on a variety of federal and state-law claims arising from the experience of a veteran student in an accelerated online information technology program.

Although the decision is labeled a “nonprecedential disposition” (and thus not binding within the Circuit), it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and offers concrete, practical guidance in several areas:

How disability-discrimination claims under Title III of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act operate in the context of a university’s neutral academic policies.
The high bar for a Title VI race-based hostile educational environment claim premised solely on dissatisfaction with institutional Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programming.
The treatment of higher-education marketing language such as “flexible” and “go at your own pace” as non-actionable puffery under Illinois fraudulent misrepresentation law.
The rigorous procedural requirements governing summary judgment practice, Rule 56(d) discovery relief, and requests for adverse inferences based on alleged discovery misconduct.

The plaintiff, James Rogers, is a white military veteran with several medical conditions, including cardiovascular disease, anxiety, sleep apnea, and tinnitus. After enrolling in WGU’s Accelerated Information Technology program, he expected, based on advertising, to complete both a bachelor’s and master’s degree within 12–18 months by taking a heavy course load (6–8 courses at once). WGU, pursuant to a neutral policy, limited him to four concurrent courses, though it allowed him to progress rapidly by starting a new course immediately after finishing one.

Following a serious heart attack and ongoing health concerns, Rogers requested what he viewed as accommodations—principally, being permitted to take additional classes concurrently and to switch to lower-stress courses. He also objected to the university’s DEI programming, ultimately withdrawing from the program and suing WGU for:

Disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Title III) and the Rehabilitation Act.
Race discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
Breach of contract under Illinois law.
Fraudulent misrepresentation based on the University’s marketing of its program.

The district court (Judge J. Phil Gilbert, S.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment for WGU and rejected Rogers’s procedural challenges related to discovery and summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in full.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit’s order, issued without oral argument, can be distilled into several core holdings:

Discovery and procedural issues:
- Rogers’s complaints about post-judgment discovery omissions were not preserved because he failed to raise them via a post-judgment motion (e.g., Rule 59(e)).
- The district court acted within its discretion in:
  - Denying Rogers leave to file a sur-reply, as local rules bar sur-replies.
  - Refusing to consider factual assertions at summary judgment that lacked proper citation, relied on inadmissible material, or relied on unauthenticated documents.
  - Denying Rogers’s Rule 56(d) motion for additional discovery because it lacked the required affidavit, was speculative, and failed to explain how further discovery would defeat summary judgment.
  - Refusing to draw adverse inferences based on alleged discovery misconduct, given the absence of evidence of bad-faith destruction or concealment of documents.
Disability discrimination (ADA Title III & Rehabilitation Act):
- To prevail, Rogers had to show that, but for his disability, he would have been able to access the educational benefits he sought.
- Because WGU applied the same four-course limitation both before and after his heart attack, there was no evidence that he was treated differently “by reason of” his disability.
- Rogers did not cooperate with WGU’s formal accommodation process (he failed to complete required forms despite multiple contacts), and he never explained why his desired accommodation—6–8 courses at once—was reasonable and necessary in light of his disability.
- WGU therefore could not be liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation when it lacked the necessary information from the student.
Race discrimination (Title VI):
- To establish a racially hostile educational environment, conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to deprive a student of educational benefits.
- Rogers admitted he experienced no hostility, harassment, or adverse action based on his race and identified no educational opportunity he was denied.
- His ideological disagreement with DEI programming, without concrete harassment or deprivation, cannot establish a Title VI violation.
Breach of contract (Illinois law):
- There was no evidence that WGU violated any contractual promise contained in its catalogs, bulletins, or handbooks.
- The course-load limitation was a preexisting policy available to Rogers both before and after enrollment; nothing in the contract materials guaranteed unlimited concurrent courses.
Fraudulent misrepresentation (Illinois law):
- Marketing statements that the program was “flexible” and allowed students to “go at [their] own pace” are non-actionable puffery—subjective promotional language whose truth or falsity cannot be precisely measured.
- No reasonable person could interpret such statements as overriding formal academic policies, including caps on concurrent course enrollment.
- Even if not puffery, the statements were not false: WGU did offer flexibility, including accelerated completion of individual courses and immediate enrollment in subsequent courses.
Waiver of new theories on appeal:
- New arguments—alleged violations of 38 U.S.C. § 3696, retaliation for seeking accommodations, issues about a misfiled motion in limine—were not raised below and are therefore waived on appeal.

The Seventh Circuit thus fully affirmed the district court’s judgment.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural and Discovery Rulings

1. Post-judgment discovery complaints and preservation (Rule 59(e))

Rogers argued on appeal that WGU engaged in discovery misconduct by omitting certain records from a disclosure sent sixteen days after the district court entered judgment. He acknowledged, however, that those records had already been produced during discovery, before summary judgment.

The Seventh Circuit held that such an argument was not preserved for appellate review because Rogers did not raise it in a timely post-judgment motion. Citing Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2021), the court noted that Rule 59(e) provides a mechanism to seek relief from a judgment when new facts or alleged misconduct emerge shortly after judgment. Under Kathrein v. City of Evanston, 752 F.3d 680, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2014), failing to invoke Rule 59(e) (or another appropriate post-judgment vehicle) generally forfeits the issue.

The panel further observed that, even on the merits, it was unclear how an omission from a post-judgment disclosure—where the documents had already been produced earlier—could have altered the summary judgment outcome. This underscores a recurring principle: discovery grievances that could not have affected the judgment, or that are not preserved through proper post-judgment motions, typically will not support reversal.

2. Sur-replies and local rules

Rogers filed a motion for leave to submit a sur-reply to WGU’s summary judgment reply, arguing that it was necessary to correct perceived deficiencies in his earlier response. The district court denied the motion based on the Southern District of Illinois’s Local Rule 7.1(a)(4), which does not authorize sur-replies.

The Seventh Circuit upheld that decision, emphasizing that:

District courts have broad discretion to enforce their local rules.
Parties are not entitled to sur-replies as of right; they are the exception, not the norm.

This reinforces a practical lesson: litigants must conform to the local procedural regime, and attempts to use sur-replies to “fix” previously inadequate briefing are unlikely to succeed where local rules say otherwise.

3. Summary judgment evidentiary requirements

The district judge declined to consider portions of Rogers’s factual submission that were:

Not supported by citations to the record.
Supported only by inadmissible material.
Supported only by unauthenticated documents.

The Seventh Circuit approved this approach, citing:

Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020): courts may disregard factual assertions unsupported by record citations.
Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Financial & Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 955–56 (7th Cir. 2021): inadmissible evidence cannot create a genuine dispute at summary judgment.
Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 578 (7th Cir. 2015): unauthenticated documents may be disregarded when a party fails to show they could be presented in admissible form at trial.

These cases collectively highlight that even pro se litigants (if Rogers was pro se; the opinion does not say but the reasoning applies to all parties) must conform to the evidentiary standards of Rule 56. Mere assertions in briefs, unsupported or supported by inadmissible or unauthenticated materials, will not forestall summary judgment.

4. Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery

Rogers moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to delay ruling on WGU’s summary judgment motion, claiming the University was unresponsive to discovery and tampering with records. Rule 56(d) allows a nonmovant to seek more time for discovery when it “cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of this motion on multiple grounds:

No required affidavit: Rule 56(d) explicitly requires a supporting affidavit or declaration. Rogers submitted none. The court cited Alicea v. County of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209, 1219 (7th Cir. 2023) for the importance of this requirement.
Speculation about misconduct: Rogers’s claim of evidence “tampering” rested on speculation, which is insufficient. The court referenced Helping Hand Caregivers, Ltd. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 900 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2018), where speculative assertions did not justify Rule 56(d) relief.
No explanation of how further discovery would matter: Rogers failed to articulate how additional discovery would enable him to defeat summary judgment. The court cited F.C. Bloxom v. Tom Lange Co. Int'l, 109 F.4th 925, 936 (7th Cir. 2024), reaffirming that Rule 56(d) relief requires a concrete showing of what information is sought and why it is essential to opposing summary judgment.

This ruling underscores the disciplined structure of Rule 56(d): a party must (1) formally support the request, (2) identify specific discoverable facts sought, and (3) explain how those facts will create a genuine issue for trial. Mere dissatisfaction with the opponent’s production is not enough.

5. Adverse inferences and spoliation (Reed & Everett)

Rogers also asked the court to draw negative (adverse) inferences because of WGU’s supposed misconduct with records—specifically, certain documents he had received earlier in discovery that were not included in a later, post-judgment disclosure.

The Seventh Circuit, citing Reed v. Freedom Mortgage Corp., 869 F.3d 543, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2017), and Everett v. Cook County, 655 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2011), made two key points:

Adverse inferences typically require evidence that documents were intentionally destroyed or withheld in bad faith to hide adverse information.
Here, the documents were not destroyed—they were produced during discovery and then omitted from a later, post-judgment disclosure. Rogers offered no evidence showing bad faith or concealment of adverse information.

This is an important practical marker: clerical or harmless errors in later disclosures, absent proof of intentional misconduct for a strategic purpose, do not justify the potent sanction of an adverse inference.

B. Disability Discrimination: ADA Title III & Rehabilitation Act

1. Applicable legal framework

Rogers asserted disability discrimination claims under:

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), which prohibits disability discrimination by places of public accommodation, a category that includes private educational institutions.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), which prohibits disability discrimination by entities receiving federal financial assistance.

The Seventh Circuit applied a unified standard referenced in A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Association, 881 F.3d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 754 (7th Cir. 2006):

the plaintiff must present evidence that, “but for” his disability, he would have been able to access the services or benefits desired.

Thus, Rogers needed to show:

He is a qualified individual with a disability.
He was denied the full and equal enjoyment of WGU’s educational services or benefits.
This denial occurred by reason of, or but for, his disability.
With respect to reasonable accommodation, that the requested accommodations were necessary and reasonable in relation to his disability.

2. Neutral course-load limit and lack of but-for causation

Central to the court’s reasoning was WGU’s neutral policy limiting students to four concurrent classes. Rogers wanted 6–8, believing that the advertised “flexible” and “go at your own pace” language entitled him to that option.

Critically, the court noted:

WGU enforced the four-course limit on Rogers before his heart attack (and resulting disability) and continued to enforce it after.
There was no evidence that WGU made exceptions for non-disabled students while denying them to Rogers.

Because the policy applied identically regardless of disability status, Rogers could not show that, but for his disability, he would have had access to the heavier course load he desired. In other words, the alleged barrier (the four-course cap) was not caused by or linked to his disability; it was a general academic rule.

3. Failure to engage with the accommodation process

Rogers also argued that WGU failed to accommodate his disabilities, including cardiovascular disease and anxiety following a severe heart attack. The facts, however, showed:

WGU’s disability-services office contacted Rogers in July 2023 to initiate the accommodation process.
The office explained that to receive accommodations he needed to complete specific forms and told him how to access them.
Rogers never completed the forms and never responded to follow-up communications.
WGU closed his file but informed him how to reopen the process. He did not do so.
He also never informed WGU of his tinnitus.

On appeal, Rogers characterized the system as a “circular bureaucracy” and claimed he was told to work through his mentor. The court rejected this framing:

WGU “repeatedly reached out” explaining that formal accommodations had to be requested through disability services via the designated process.
Rogers did not comply with that process and provided insufficient information.

The Seventh Circuit emphasized a key doctrinal point: an institution generally cannot be liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation when it lacks the information necessary to identify and implement such an accommodation. This concept echoes the “interactive process” doctrine in employment law, discussed in Youngman v. Peoria County, 947 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 2020), which requires a causal nexus between the disability and the requested accommodation and cooperation by both sides.

4. Reasonableness and necessity of the requested accommodation

Rogers’s primary requested accommodation was permission to take six to eight courses simultaneously, far exceeding the four-course cap.

The court highlighted two defects:

Rogers “never explained to the University why his requested accommodation … was a reasonable and necessary accommodation.” The connection between his heart condition, anxiety, or other disabilities and an increased course load was not self-evident.
WGU did exercise some flexibility by allowing him to finish existing courses at an accelerated pace and immediately enroll in new ones, facilitating rapid progress without violating the four-course cap.

Under A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller and Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002), the reasonableness of a requested accommodation is a fact-specific balancing inquiry. Here, on the undisputed record, no reasonable jury could conclude that allowing 6–8 concurrent courses was a necessary, disability-related accommodation as opposed to a personal preference to finish degrees more quickly.

C. Race Discrimination under Title VI and DEI Programming

1. Legal standard for hostile educational environment

Rogers brought a race discrimination claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, alleging that WGU’s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programming discriminated against white students by promoting “white guilt” and favoring non-white students.

The court evaluated this under the framework for a racially hostile educational environment, borrowing standards from Title IX and student-on-student harassment cases. Citing:

Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 640–41 (1999) (Title IX), and
Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 613–14, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2014),

the court reiterated that conduct must be:

Severe or pervasive,
Objectively offensive, and
Such that it deprives the victim of access to educational opportunities or benefits.

2. Application to Rogers’s DEI objections

The record fatally undercut Rogers’s Title VI claim:

He “acknowledges that he did not experience any hostility or harassment based on race.”
He “never reported racial discrimination” to WGU.
He did not “identify any educational benefit that he was denied.”

His complaint was essentially ideological disagreement with DEI content—claiming that programming “forced” white students to accept ideas like “white guilt.” But the court made clear:

the mere existence of diversity initiatives [does not] create[] a racially hostile educational environment.

Without concrete evidence of race-based harassment or exclusion from educational benefits, Title VI provides no remedy. This decision thus illustrates an important doctrinal boundary: Title VI does not police ideological tone or viewpoint of university programming; it addresses discrimination “on the ground of race,” typically reflected in adverse treatment, harassment, or denial of opportunities.

D. State-Law Claims: Breach of Contract and Fraudulent Misrepresentation

1. Breach of contract (Illinois law)

Under Illinois law, as summarized in TAS Distributing Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2007), a breach-of-contract claim requires:

A valid and enforceable contract.
Substantial performance by the plaintiff.
Breach by the defendant.
Resulting damages.

In the university context, students often point to catalogs, bulletins, and handbooks as forming part of their contract with the institution. Here, however, the district court (and the Seventh Circuit) found:

No provision in WGU’s formal materials promised unlimited course loads.
The four-course cap was an existing policy, clearly applicable to all students, and was never contradicted by the formal documents.

Therefore, “no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the University breached its contract with Rogers.” The key takeaway is that student expectations generated by marketing or personal interpretations are not enforceable unless grounded in specific contractual language in the institution’s official documents.

2. Fraudulent misrepresentation and “puffery”

Rogers also claimed that WGU fraudulently misrepresented its program—particularly the “flexible” nature of the Accelerated IT track and statements that students could “go at [their] own pace.”

Illinois law on fraudulent misrepresentation, as set out in Doe v. Dilling, 888 N.E.2d 24, 35–36 (Ill. 2008), requires:

A false statement of material fact.
Knowledge or belief by the speaker that the statement is false.
Intent to induce the plaintiff to act.
Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.
Damages resulting from that reliance.

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that WGU’s statements were classic puffing. Quoting Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910, 926 (Ill. 2007):

“Puffing” denotes the exaggerations reasonably expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his or her product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined.

“Flexible” and “go at your own pace” are quintessential examples:

They are subjective, open-ended, and context-dependent.
Their truth cannot be “precisely determined” because there is no objective metric for “flexible enough.”

Rogers interpreted this language to mean that he could:

Take 6–8 courses at once, and
Finish a bachelor’s degree in one semester, earning both degrees in 12–18 months.

The court held that “no reasonable person would understand the University's marketing to mean that a student is exempt from University policy.” The marketing did not promise a course load unconstrained by academic regulations. Moreover:

The course-limitation policy was available to Rogers before and after he enrolled.
WGU actually did offer flexibility by allowing him to progress rapidly through courses sequentially.

Hence:

The statements were puffing and therefore cannot support a fraud claim.
Even if they were not puffing, there was no actionable falsity because WGU’s program was, in fact, flexible in a reasonable sense.

E. Waiver of Additional Theories on Appeal

On appeal, Rogers advanced new contentions, including:

A claim that a motion in limine had been misfiled by the clerk.
An argument that WGU violated 38 U.S.C. § 3696 by misrepresenting program flexibility, affordability, and veteran-friendliness (a statute governing approval of educational institutions for veterans’ benefits).
An assertion that WGU retaliated against him for seeking a disability accommodation.

Because these arguments were not raised in the district court, the Seventh Circuit deemed them waived, citing Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University, 36 F.4th 755, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2022). Appellate courts generally do not consider issues and legal theories introduced for the first time on appeal; the trial court must have had an opportunity to address them.

This reiterates a crucial strategic point: plaintiffs must bring all potentially viable theories and statutory bases before the district court. Holding some back, or failing to frame them clearly, will usually foreclose them later.

F. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion relies on a range of prior decisions, each playing a distinct role in shaping the outcome:

Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2021) – Establishes how Rule 59(e) motions function as the vehicle to challenge or supplement the record post-judgment. It underpins the holding that Rogers’s post-judgment discovery complaints were not preserved.
Kathrein v. City of Evanston, 752 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014) – Supports the rule that issues not raised in a Rule 59(e) motion (when they could have been) are generally forfeited on appeal.
Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2020) – Affirms a district court’s authority to disregard statements of fact that lack record citations.
Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Financial & Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2021) – Clarifies that inadmissible evidence cannot create a triable factual dispute at summary judgment.
Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 786 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2015) – Addresses problems with unauthenticated documents at summary judgment, directly relevant to Rogers’s submissions.
Alicea v. County of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209 (7th Cir. 2023) – Illustrates the strict requirement of an affidavit or declaration in Rule 56(d) motions.
Helping Hand Caregivers, Ltd. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 900 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2018) – Rejects speculative claims about withheld evidence as a basis for Rule 56(d) relief.
F.C. Bloxom v. Tom Lange Co. Int’l, 109 F.4th 925 (7th Cir. 2024) – Stresses that a Rule 56(d) movant must specify how additional discovery would enable them to survive summary judgment.
Reed v. Freedom Mortgage Corp., 869 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2017) & Everett v. Cook County, 655 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2011) – Together, they articulate the requirement of bad faith destruction or concealment for spoliation-based adverse inferences.
A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Association, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018) & Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006) – Provide the “but-for causation” framework and general structure for ADA Title II/III and Rehabilitation Act claims in the access-to-services context.
Youngman v. Peoria County, 947 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2020) – In the Title I (employment) context, explains the needed “causal nexus” between disability and accommodation, analogously applied here to emphasize that the requested accommodation must be reasonably tied to the disability.
Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2002) – Provides the “highly fact-specific” standard for evaluating accommodation reasonableness.
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) & Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014) – Supply the template for assessing hostile educational environments, focusing on severity/pervasiveness and denial of educational access.
Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 2007) – Defines “puffery” as non-actionable marketing language, central to the court’s rejection of Rogers’s fraud claim.
Doe v. Dilling, 888 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 2008) – Sets out the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation in Illinois, guiding the evaluation of Rogers’s state-law fraud theory.
TAS Distributing Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2007) – States the elements of breach of contract under Illinois law, used to frame Rogers’s contract claim.
Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University, 36 F.4th 755 (7th Cir. 2022) – Emphasizes the waiver rule for issues not raised below, supporting the rejection of new appellate theories.

Collectively, these authorities show that the Rogers opinion does not create new doctrine so much as it applies settled standards rigorously to a modern online-education fact pattern.

G. Impact and Significance

While nonprecedential, Rogers v. Western Governors University has several important implications for higher education, disability law, and litigation practice.

1. Disability accommodations in online higher education

Neutral academic policies (like course-load caps) that apply equally to disabled and non-disabled students are unlikely to be deemed discriminatory under Title III or the Rehabilitation Act, absent evidence that they disproportionately exclude disabled students in a way attributable to their disability.
Universities may reasonably require students to utilize formal disability-services processes (forms, documentation, official channels), and a student’s failure to engage with that process can be fatal to a later accommodation claim.
Requests to circumvent core academic norms (e.g., drastically increased course loads) must be justified as both necessary and reasonable in light of the specific disability; personal preference for speed alone is insufficient.

2. Title VI, DEI, and ideological disagreement

Challenges to DEI programming framed as Title VI claims face a steep climb where there is:
- No concrete harassment or hostility directed at the plaintiff, and
- No specific educational benefit or opportunity denied on the basis of race.
Generalized discomfort with institutional speech about race or privilege does not satisfy the severe-or-pervasive harassment standard under Davis and Galster.

3. Marketing language and student expectations

Common promotional phrases—“flexible,” “go at your own pace,” “accelerated”—are likely to be treated as puffery rather than precise contractual promises, especially when the institution’s official policies (e.g., course caps) are publicly available.
Students’ subjective interpretations of marketing claims will not override written institutional rules unless the marketing language is concrete, verifiable, and directly contradicts those rules.

4. Litigation practice and summary judgment discipline

Parties must support factual assertions with admissible, authenticated evidence and precise record citations.
Rule 56(d) is a powerful but structured tool; it requires:
- a sworn affidavit,
- specific identification of the needed discovery, and
- a cogent explanation of how that discovery will defeat summary judgment.
Spoliation-based adverse inferences require clear proof of bad faith destruction or concealment, not mere speculation or discrepancies in disclosures.
Issues not raised below—whether statutory theories (e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3696) or additional claims (e.g., retaliation)—are almost invariably waived on appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is “summary judgment”?

Summary judgment is a procedure where the court decides a case (or part of it) without a trial because:

There is no genuine dispute about any material fact, and
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

At this stage, a party cannot simply rely on allegations; they must point to actual evidence—documents, sworn statements, deposition testimony—that would allow a reasonable jury to decide in their favor.

2. What is Rule 56(d)?

Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party opposing summary judgment to request:

More time for discovery, or
Another order that allows them to gather evidence.

To use it, the party must file an affidavit or declaration explaining:

What specific facts they hope to discover.
Why those facts are currently unavailable.
How those facts will help them oppose summary judgment.

General complaints about discovery or speculative claims of evidence tampering are not enough.

3. What does “puffery” mean in fraud law?

“Puffery” is non-specific promotional language—e.g., “best,” “high quality,” “flexible,” “go at your own pace”—that:

Represents an opinion or exaggeration rather than a concrete fact.
Cannot be proven true or false in a precise way.

Because puffery is not a factual statement, it usually cannot form the basis of a fraud claim. Courts assume reasonable consumers understand such language as advertising “spin,” not literal promises.

4. What is “but-for” causation in disability law?

“But-for” causation means:

If you take away the person’s disability, the adverse outcome would not have happened.

In the ADA Title III/Rehabilitation Act context, the plaintiff must show that:

He was denied services or benefits, and
He would not have been denied if he did not have the disability.

If the same rule applies to everyone, regardless of disability, and there is no evidence of selective enforcement or disproportionate impact tied to disability, it is hard to satisfy this standard.

5. What is a “hostile educational environment” under Title VI?

A racially hostile educational environment exists when:

The student experiences unwelcome harassment or discriminatory conduct based on race.
The conduct is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies the student access to educational opportunities or benefits.

Mere disagreement with institutional messages (such as DEI programming), without concrete harassment or exclusion, does not meet this threshold.

6. What is a “nonprecedential disposition”?

A “nonprecedential disposition” is an appellate decision that the court designates as not binding precedent. In the Seventh Circuit:

It may be cited under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, but
District courts and later panels are not required to follow it as binding law.

Even so, such decisions are often persuasive, especially when they apply established principles to recurring fact patterns, as in Rogers.

V. Conclusion

Rogers v. Western Governors University is a compact but instructive example of how federal courts approach disability and race claims in the modern, online higher-education environment—while also enforcing strict procedural and evidentiary rules at summary judgment.

On the federal side, the case reinforces that:

Neutral academic policies, like course-load caps, seldom violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act absent evidence of disability-based causation.
Students must meaningfully engage in institutional accommodation processes and articulate how requested accommodations are both necessary and reasonable.
Title VI does not convert ideological disagreement with DEI programming into a viable race-discrimination claim without concrete evidence of harassment or deprivation of educational benefits.

On the state-law side, the decision confirms that:

Student contracts derive from formal institutional documents, not subjective interpretations of marketing slogans.
Vague promotional language (“flexible,” “go at your own pace”) is treated as non-actionable puffery, particularly where official policies are accessible and consistent.

Procedurally, the opinion underscores the importance of:

Complying with local rules on briefing (including sur-replies).
Supporting factual assertions with admissible, authenticated evidence.
Using Rule 56(d) properly and avoiding speculative accusations of discovery abuse.
Preserving issues through appropriate post-judgment motions and raising all theories in the district court.

Although nonprecedential, this decision offers a clear, practical roadmap for universities, students, and litigators navigating the intersection of disability law, race discrimination claims, and marketing representations in the rapidly expanding world of online higher education.