Rogers Overrules Carter: North Carolina Adopts a State Constitutional Good-Faith Exception and Limits § 15A‑974’s Good-Faith to Statutory (Chapter 15A) Violations

Introduction

In State v. Rogers, the Supreme Court of North Carolina confronted the scope of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in the digital surveillance era. The case arose from an investigation into suspected cocaine trafficking in New Hanover County that relied on a court order to obtain cell-site location information (CSLI) for the defendant’s phone, ultimately leading to the discovery of large quantities of cocaine. After the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on the ground that the CSLI order lacked probable cause and that no good-faith exception existed under the North Carolina Constitution, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether North Carolina’s statutory good-faith provision—N.C.G.S. § 15A-974—applies to constitutional violations.

The Court’s opinion (Newby, C.J.) is consequential in two distinct respects. First, as a matter of statutory construction, the Court holds that the good-faith sentence in § 15A-974 applies only to “substantial violation[s]” of Chapter 15A and does not apply when exclusion is sought on constitutional grounds. Second—and far more significantly—the Court expressly overrules State v. Carter (1988) and adopts a state constitutional good-faith exception, equivalent to the federal good-faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon (1984). Although the Court “assume[s] without deciding” that Article I, Section 20 contains a state constitutional exclusionary rule, it definitively holds that any such rule includes a Leon-style good-faith exception.

The case thereby recalibrates suppression litigation in North Carolina: statutory good faith is confined to statutory violations; constitutional good faith exists under both the Fourth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution; and officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on court orders—including § 2703(d) orders for CSLI—will generally trigger the exception.

Summary of the Opinion

The statutory good-faith exception in § 15A-974 applies only to evidence obtained in “substantial violation of” Chapter 15A; it does not extend to evidence obtained in violation of the federal or state constitutions.
Nevertheless, exclusion of the CSLI was not required by the United States Constitution, because officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a court-issued § 2703(d) order; the federal good-faith exception (Leon and progeny) therefore applies.
Exclusion was also not required by the North Carolina Constitution. The Court expressly overrules State v. Carter’s pronouncement that the state constitution contains an exclusionary rule without a good-faith exception and adopts a state constitutional good-faith exception equivalent to the federal rule.
On this basis, the Court reverses the Court of Appeals and upholds the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion.
Unresolved question reserved for a future case: whether Article I, Section 20 itself creates a freestanding state constitutional exclusionary rule (the Court assumes without deciding that it does).

Background and Procedural History

In July 2019, a known confidential source told Detective Donald Wenk that Marty Douglas Rogers trafficked cocaine in New Hanover County, described visits to Rogers’s residence where cocaine was observed, and reported repeated trips to Hayward, California, to procure trafficking quantities. The source provided Rogers’s phone number, which Detective Wenk corroborated with a law enforcement database.

On 2 August 2019, Detective Wenk applied for and obtained a sealed order authorizing: (1) a pen register/trap and trace device, (2) GPS and geo-location under N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-260 to -264, and (3) production of records and other information under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)—including historical CSLI for a 60-day window (30 days before and 30 days after the order). The court found probable cause to believe Rogers was trafficking cocaine and that his phone was used in that activity.

The carrier’s CSLI updates (about every 15 minutes) showed the phone’s travel from Wilmington to Hayward, California, on August 20 (linger of 20–30 minutes) and return toward North Carolina. Officers intercepted Rogers’s vehicle upon reentry to North Carolina and, after a stop on the Cape Fear Memorial Bridge, found trafficking quantities of cocaine. Rogers was indicted and moved to suppress the CSLI and derivative evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and Rogers entered an Alford plea while preserving his suppression challenge.

The Court of Appeals held that, under Carpenter v. United States, historical CSLI collection required probable cause; Detective Wenk’s affidavit was insufficient; the § 2703(d) order was unconstitutional; and suppression was mandated. Bound by Carter, the court rejected a state constitutional good-faith exception, while inviting the Supreme Court to revisit Carter in light of the General Assembly’s 2011 amendment to § 15A-974 referencing good faith.

The Supreme Court allowed review to address “whether the good faith exception under N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 applies.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and their Influence

Weeks v. United States (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio (1961): Establish the federal exclusionary rule; Mapp incorporates it against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wolf v. Colorado (1949): Incorporates the core of the Fourth Amendment but not yet the exclusionary rule, setting the stage for Mapp.
United States v. Leon (1984); Herring v. United States (2009); Davis v. United States (2011); Hudson v. Michigan (2006): Articulate the modern, deterrence-centered, prudential nature of the federal exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception’s contours. Leon identifies when reliance is not objectively reasonable (Franks violations; abandonment of neutrality; “bare bones” affidavits; facial deficiency).
Carpenter v. United States (2018): Treats acquisition of historical CSLI as a Fourth Amendment “search” requiring probable cause—critical to the Court of Appeals’ probable cause analysis.
North Carolina history and cases:
- McGee (1938); Vanhoy (1949): Before Mapp, North Carolina excluded evidence only pursuant to statute, not by constitutional command.
- Statutory evolution: 1937 (first exclusionary statute), 1951 and 1957 expansions; comprehensive 1973 recodification as § 15A-974 with two distinct bases for suppression—constitutionally required exclusion and “substantial violation” of Chapter 15A.
- Arrington (1984): Noted that North Carolina had not held Article I, Section 20 creates a constitutional exclusionary rule.
- Carter (1988): Proclaimed, without robust analysis, a state constitutional exclusionary rule and rejected a state good-faith exception; today expressly overruled on that point.
- Garner (1992): Emphasized the text of Article I, Section 20 concerns general warrants and cautioned against expansive interpretations; foreshadowed skepticism toward Carter’s breadth.
- Welch (1986): Applied federal good-faith to reliance on a non-testimonial identification order—key support for extending good faith to judicial authorizations beyond traditional warrants.
- Richardson (1978): If exclusion is not constitutionally mandated, § 15A-974(1) does not require suppression.
- Julius (2023): Reiterates that suppression is a “last resort” and deterrence governs the exclusionary analysis.

Legal Reasoning

1) Statutory Construction: § 15A‑974’s Good-Faith Exception

The Court reads § 15A-974 according to its plain text and session law history. The statute creates two distinct suppression triggers:

§ 15A-974(a)(1): exclusion “required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina,” and
§ 15A-974(a)(2): exclusion for evidence obtained in “substantial violation of” Chapter 15A.

The concluding sentence, which provides that “[e]vidence shall not be suppressed under this subdivision [i.e., (a)(2)] if the person committing the violation of the provision or provisions under this Chapter acted under the objectively reasonable, good faith belief that the actions were lawful,” by its terms attaches only to subdivision (a)(2). It does not govern subdivision (a)(1).

This interpretation is bolstered by separation-of-powers principles: the legislature may define statutory remedies and exceptions for statutory violations, but cannot dictate the presence or scope of remedies required by the state constitution. Accordingly, § 15A-974’s good-faith provision does not insulate evidence when a defendant seeks suppression on federal or state constitutional grounds.

2) Federal Constitution: Leon/Herring/Davis Good-Faith Applies

Although § 15A-974’s statutory good faith is inapplicable to constitutional claims, the Court separately asks whether the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion. Under the incorporated federal exclusionary doctrine, suppression is a prudential, deterrence-based remedy, not an individual right. The question becomes whether officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a judicial authorization—and whether any of Leon’s exceptions apply.

The Court holds that Detective Wenk’s reliance on the § 2703(d) order was objectively reasonable. The affidavit identified a known confidential source with specific information about drug trafficking and travel to California; the phone number was corroborated; and a superior court judge issued an order authorizing CSLI over defined time parameters. The order was not facially deficient, the affidavit was not “bare bones,” there was no suggestion of falsehood or reckless disregard (Franks), and the issuing judge did not abandon a neutral role.

Consistent with Welch, the good-faith exception extends to reliance on judicial orders beyond traditional warrants—including orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Because exclusion would not appreciably deter misconduct where officers sought and followed a court order, the federal Constitution does not require suppression.

3) North Carolina Constitution: Carter Overruled; State Good-Faith Adopted

Turning to state law, the Court reassesses Carter. It recounts North Carolina’s historical practice—excluding evidence by statute prior to Mapp, and never clearly holding that Article I, Section 20 itself created an exclusionary rule. Carter’s contrary declaration lacked textual, historical, and precedential grounding and contained internal inconsistencies (notably suggesting the General Assembly could create a constitutional good-faith exception—an impossibility under Bayard v. Singleton).

The Court expressly overrules Carter’s rejection of a state good-faith exception and adopts, for Article I, Section 20, a good-faith exception equivalent to Leon. Importantly, the Court does not resolve whether Article I, Section 20 independently creates an exclusionary rule—it “assume[s] without deciding” that it does, and holds that any such rule includes good faith. Because Detective Wenk’s reliance satisfies Leon’s objective-reasonableness standard, exclusion is not “required by … the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.”

Impact

Immediate doctrinal shift: Carter is overruled. North Carolina now recognizes a state constitutional good-faith exception, aligned with federal doctrine. Suppression motions premised on state constitutional violations will face the same good-faith framework as federal challenges.
Statutory vs. constitutional pathways clearly separated: § 15A-974’s good faith is confined to “substantial violation[s]” of Chapter 15A. Where a defendant claims a constitutional violation, lawyers must brief and litigate the constitutional good-faith doctrine, not the statute’s good-faith sentence.
Reliance on judicial authorizations: Rogers reinforces that good-faith reliance extends beyond warrants to other judicial orders—such as § 2703(d) orders and non-testimonial identification orders—if reliance is objectively reasonable.
CSLI and emerging technologies: Carpenter remains the governing Fourth Amendment rule that CSLI acquisition is a “search” requiring probable cause; however, Rogers makes clear that suppression will not follow if officers reasonably rely on a judicial order later found deficient.
Unresolved—existence of a state exclusionary rule: The Court reserved whether Article I, Section 20 contains an exclusionary rule at all. Future cases may invite a definitive ruling. Rogers nevertheless fixes the content of any such rule by grafting in a Leon-equivalent good-faith exception.
Separation of powers clarified: The General Assembly’s 2011 request that the Court “reconsider and overrule” Carter is acknowledged, but the Court emphasizes that only the judiciary defines constitutional remedies; the legislature’s § 15A-974 amendment cannot predetermine constitutional exceptions.
Practical litigation effects:
- For the State: Build a thorough record of the officer’s steps to seek judicial authorization, the order’s scope and specificity, and the absence of any Leon “red flags.”
- For defendants: To defeat good faith, develop evidence of one or more Leon exceptions: misstatements/omissions (Franks), abandonment of neutrality, a “bare bones” affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that reliance was unreasonable, or facial deficiency (lack of particularity).
- For judges: The opinion reiterates the need for careful probable-cause determinations—especially in novel digital contexts—while recognizing that “searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness.”
- For law enforcement: Rogers encourages continued reliance on judicial orders, meticulous affidavit drafting, and training keyed to Leon’s objective-reasonableness benchmarks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusionary rule: A court-made remedy that suppresses evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. Federally, it is prudential and deterrence-focused, not a personal right. In North Carolina, Rogers assumes a state rule may exist under Article I, Section 20, but holds that any such rule includes a good-faith exception.
Good-faith exception: Allows admission of evidence when officers reasonably rely on a judge’s authorization later found defective. It does not apply if (1) the affidavit contains knowing or reckless falsity (Franks), (2) the judge abandons neutrality, (3) the affidavit is “so lacking” in probable-cause indicia that belief was unreasonable, or (4) the warrant/order is facially deficient in particularity.
CSLI (Cell-Site Location Information): Historical records from a cellular provider indicating a phone’s connections to cell towers over time, enabling location reconstruction. Under Carpenter, obtaining historical CSLI is a Fourth Amendment “search” generally requiring a probable-cause showing.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order: A federal statutory mechanism allowing law enforcement to obtain certain records upon court order. Post-Carpenter, CSLI ordinarily requires probable cause. Rogers treats officers’ reasonable reliance on such orders as eligible for good-faith protection.
“Bare bones” affidavit: An affidavit so conclusory and devoid of factual support that no reasonable officer could believe it established probable cause. Such affidavits cannot support good-faith reliance.
Facial deficiency: A warrant or order lacking particularity (e.g., failing to specify the place to be searched or the items to be seized), making it unreasonable for officers to presume its validity.
Franks v. Delaware issue: If an affidavit contains intentional or reckless falsehoods material to probable cause, good faith cannot save the search.
Alford plea: A guilty plea in which a defendant acknowledges the State’s evidence is sufficient for conviction but does not admit factual guilt.

The Dissent

Justice Earls (joined by Justice Riggs) would reaffirm Carter and maintain that Article I, Section 20 requires exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence without a good-faith exception. The dissent grounds its view in:

Judicial integrity: Courts should not sanction constitutional violations by admitting their fruits; public confidence is diminished when courts do so.
Right to a remedy (Art. I, § 18): Every injury—including constitutional violations—must have a remedy; civil remedies are inadequate in practice.
Institutional deterrence: The exclusionary rule drives police training and systemic compliance; a good-faith exception risks encouraging “thin” affidavits and constitutional shortcuts.
Methodological critique: The majority “assumes without deciding” that a state exclusionary rule exists but simultaneously crafts an exception, which the dissent characterizes as logically and constitutionally incoherent.

Conclusion

State v. Rogers is a watershed decision in North Carolina search-and-seizure law. It clarifies that § 15A-974’s statutory good-faith clause is limited to substantial violations of Chapter 15A—but more profoundly, it reshapes the constitutional landscape by expressly overruling Carter and adopting a state constitutional good-faith exception coextensive with the federal rule. Officers’ objectively reasonable reliance on judicial authorizations—including § 2703(d) orders—will generally preclude suppression, even if a later court finds the authorization lacked probable cause.

While the Court leaves open whether Article I, Section 20 itself contains a freestanding exclusionary rule, Rogers ensures that any such rule carries a Leon-style good-faith exception. The decision aligns North Carolina’s constitutional remedy with federal doctrine, emphasizes separation-of-powers limits on legislative attempts to define constitutional remedies, and provides a clear framework for litigating suppression in cases involving modern digital surveillance techniques. Going forward, the fulcrum of suppression disputes will increasingly be the reasonableness of officers’ reliance on judicial authorizations and the presence (or absence) of Leon’s limiting conditions.