Robinson v. Lammer and the End of the Seventh Circuit’s Savings‑Clause Workaround after Jones v. Hendrix

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Julius O. Robinson v. Brian Lammer, No. 24‑3040 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), marks a decisive realignment of the circuit’s habeas corpus jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Easterbrook holds that federal prisoners may not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to circumvent the limitations on second or successive motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), and he expressly disclaims the continuing authority of two earlier Seventh Circuit decisions, Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc), and Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2001).

The case arises from Julius Omar Robinson, a federal prisoner originally sentenced to death in the Northern District of Texas for murders committed in the course of drug offenses. After affirmance on direct appeal and the denial of his initial motion under § 2255, Robinson attempted to attack his convictions and sentence through a petition under § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, where federal death‑row inmates are confined. He advanced five clusters of claims, ranging from alleged defects in the indictment, to ineffective assistance of counsel, to purported violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

The district court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 2255(e)’s “savings clause,” concluding that Jones v. Hendrix foreclosed use of § 2241 in these circumstances. The Seventh Circuit affirms, using Robinson’s case as the vehicle to (1) apply Jones and the circuit’s intervening decision in Agofsky v. Baysore, and (2) declare unequivocally that Webster and Garza are no longer authoritative in the wake of Jones.

In addition, the court rejects Robinson’s attempt to invoke the Suspension Clause on the theory that his indictment was jurisdictionally defective. Relying on United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), and prior Seventh Circuit authority, the panel explains that a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment does not raise a jurisdictional defect and that the Suspension Clause does not guarantee unlimited rounds of post‑conviction review.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Conviction and Sentence

Robinson was convicted in the Northern District of Texas of murders committed during drug‑trafficking activity and sentenced to death. His conviction and death sentences were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in 2004. He then sought collateral relief under § 2255 in the sentencing court; that motion was denied by the district court in 2008, and the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.

Robinson later attempted to reopen his § 2255 proceedings. The Fifth Circuit treated that effort as a request for permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion under § 2255(h) and denied authorization in 2019. Thus, as of 2019, Robinson had exhausted the conventional path for federal prisoners to collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence: one direct appeal and one full § 2255 proceeding, plus an unsuccessful request to pursue a second or successive § 2255 motion.

B. The § 2241 Petition in the Southern District of Indiana

After those setbacks in the Fifth Circuit, Robinson turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filing a habeas petition in the Southern District of Indiana, the district of his confinement at USP Terre Haute. He raised five broad claims:

The trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the death‑eligible offenses because the superseding indictment did not charge a capital offense.
The prosecutor allegedly presented false and misleading evidence at the penalty phase, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge that evidence.
Trial counsel was allegedly ineffective for failing to object to racially motivated peremptory strikes of prospective jurors.
Trial counsel was allegedly ineffective in other respects at the penalty phase.
Robinson asserted violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man at both the guilt and penalty phases, contending that these violations warranted habeas relief.

The district court concluded that none of these claims could be pursued via § 2241 due to § 2255(e), the “savings clause,” which states that a federal prisoner who is “authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section” may not use habeas under § 2241 unless the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Citing Jones v. Hendrix, the district court found that the unavailability of a second or successive § 2255 motion does not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.

C. Appeal and Intervening Developments

Robinson appealed to the Seventh Circuit. While the appeal was pending, President Biden commuted Robinson’s death sentences to life imprisonment. The panel deferred resolution of the case to await a decision in Agofsky v. Baysore, a similar case already argued, and then called for supplemental briefing on the impact of Agofsky.

Robinson argued that Agofsky did not control his appeal; the Warden argued that it did. The panel ultimately agreed with the Warden, treating Agofsky as having cemented the circuit’s post‑Jones view of § 2255(e) as a jurisdictional limitation and not a substantive escape hatch.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Seventh Circuit affirms the district court’s dismissal of Robinson’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction:

The court holds that § 2255(e) denies subject‑matter jurisdiction to district courts over § 2241 petitions that challenge a federal conviction or sentence unless the petitioner shows “unusual circumstances” of the narrow type recognized in Jones v. Hendrix (for example, the dissolution of the sentencing court). Because the Northern District of Texas still exists and remains open to receive § 2255 motions, Robinson cannot satisfy the savings clause.
The court squarely rejects Robinson’s argument that the presence of “new evidence or new arguments” automatically makes § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective.” It explains that this theory—supported in part by language in Webster and Garza—cannot survive Jones.
To remove any ambiguity, the court explicitly declares that neither Webster v. Daniels nor Garza v. Lappin “can be considered authoritative after Jones.” This is a major doctrinal clarification within the Seventh Circuit.
On Robinson’s Suspension Clause argument, the panel follows Jones and earlier Seventh Circuit authority (Lindh v. Murphy), holding that the Clause protects the core of the 1789 habeas writ—essentially, protection from arbitrary executive detention without trial— not an indefinite right to re‑litigate criminal judgments. Robinson is not facing detention without trial; he has been tried, convicted, and repeatedly reviewed.
The court also explains that Robinson’s complaint about the indictment goes to its sufficiency, not to subject‑matter jurisdiction. Relying on United States v. Cotton, it emphasizes that defects in an indictment do not strip a federal district court of its jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Finally, while the court notes Robinson’s reliance on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, it indicates that such international instruments have no enforceable status in U.S. federal criminal prosecutions, citing Medellín v. Texas and Breard v. Greene.

The ultimate holding is succinct: Robinson’s inability to meet the statutory conditions for a second or successive § 2255 motion under § 2255(h) does not authorize a new collateral attack under § 2241. The district court properly dismissed his petition, and the judgment is affirmed.

IV. Doctrinal and Statutory Framework

A. § 2255, § 2241, and the “Savings Clause”

Historically, federal prisoners challenged their convictions and sentences through habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, typically filed in the district of confinement. In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, creating a substitute remedy: a motion filed in the sentencing court, functionally equivalent to habeas corpus for federal prisoners.

Section 2255(e), often called the “savings clause,” says:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

The key question in Robinson’s case is what “inadequate or ineffective” means. After AEDPA (1996) added strict limits on “second or successive” § 2255 motions in § 2255(h), many prisoners argued that these restrictions make § 2255 “inadequate” and thus open a path to § 2241. Some courts—including the Seventh Circuit in Webster and Garza—accepted variations on that theory.

Jones v. Hendrix rejected that approach, holding that the inability to satisfy § 2255(h)’s conditions does not make § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of § 2255(e). Instead, § 2255(e) preserves § 2241 only for unusual situations in which the sentencing court is unavailable in a practical sense (for example, if the court no longer exists).

B. AEDPA and § 2255(h)

AEDPA added § 2255(h), limiting when a federal prisoner may file a “second or successive” § 2255 motion. The statute allows such a motion only if it is based on:

newly discovered evidence proving actual innocence, or
a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law recognized by the Supreme Court.

A prisoner must obtain authorization from the court of appeals before the district court can entertain such a second or successive motion. Robinson unsuccessfully sought that authorization from the Fifth Circuit.

C. The Suspension Clause

The Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of the Constitution, provides:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

The core debate in modern habeas law is whether restrictions on post‑conviction review (like AEDPA’s strict limits) effectively “suspend” the writ. The Supreme Court in Jones, and earlier in cases like Lindh v. Murphy (Seventh Circuit), held that the Suspension Clause protects the historic writ as it existed in 1789, which focused on preventing arbitrary executive detention. It does not guarantee that all forms of post‑conviction collateral review created later by statute must remain available in perpetuity or in any particular form.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023)

Jones is the fulcrum of the court’s reasoning. The Supreme Court held that § 2255(e) does not allow a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition simply because a new statutory interpretation indicates that his conduct is not criminal and because he cannot satisfy § 2255(h)’s requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion.

The key passage quoted in Robinson reads:

Section 2255(h) specifies the two limited conditions in which Congress has permitted federal prisoners to bring second or successive collateral attacks on their sentences. The inability of a prisoner … to satisfy those conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause [§ 2255(e)]. It means that he cannot bring it at all. Congress has chosen finality over error correction in his case.

The Seventh Circuit in Robinson emphasizes that this reasoning is not confined to the context of “new statutory interpretation” cases. Instead, the holding of Jones is structural:

If the sentencing court exists and the prisoner could, in principle, file a § 2255 motion there, then § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective”— even if AEDPA’s successive‑petition bar prevents the prisoner from filing another motion or prevailing on it.
Only the narrow “unusual circumstances” recognized in Jones—such as the dissolution of the sentencing court—can render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective and thus open the door to § 2241.

Robinson thus applies Jones to foreclose a very broad class of savings‑clause arguments that had survived in some circuits, including the Seventh, prior to 2023.

B. Agofsky v. Baysore (7th Cir. 2025)

Although the opinion in Agofsky v. Baysore is not reproduced in the text, the Robinson panel describes Agofsky as:

“acknowledg[ing] that Jones supersedes contrary decisions from this circuit,” and
holding that § 2255(e) “limits district courts’ subject‑matter jurisdiction.”

That characterization is significant. It confirms that, in the Seventh Circuit, § 2255(e) is not a mere exhaustion‑type rule or prudential doctrine; it is a jurisdictional bar. A district court lacks power to entertain a § 2241 petition challenging a conviction or sentence unless the narrow savings‑clause conditions are met. Robinson simply applies this jurisdictional understanding to another prisoner whose claims fall outside Jones.

C. Webster v. Daniels and Garza v. Lappin

Robinson’s main doctrinal argument rested on Webster and Garza, both Seventh Circuit cases that had previously interpreted § 2255(e) more expansively:

Garza v. Lappin (2001) allowed some room for using § 2241 when § 2255 was unavailable or inadequate in more than just “sentencing‑court‑unavailable” situations.
Webster v. Daniels (2015) (en banc) further developed the idea that “new evidence” or certain kinds of claims (particularly in capital cases) might justify resort to § 2241 despite prior § 2255 proceedings.

Robinson invoked language from these decisions to argue that his new arguments about the indictment and other issues took his case outside § 2255(e)’s bar. The panel acknowledges that “some language in those decisions favors Robinson,” but holds that neither case survives Jones. It then removes any lingering doubt:

To avoid any possibility of confusion, we now make clear that neither Webster nor Garza can be considered authoritative after Jones.

This explicit disavowal is perhaps the most important doctrinal move in the opinion. It closes a previously significant path for federal prisoners in the Seventh Circuit—especially those raising new evidence or novel legal theories—to seek review via § 2241 when successive § 2255 motions were barred by § 2255(h).

D. Medellín v. Texas and Breard v. Greene

Robinson’s fifth claim relied on alleged violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted by the Organization of American States in 1948). The Seventh Circuit does not analyze these contentions in detail. Instead, it briefly notes that:

Arguments based on the Declaration “have been available, for whatever they are worth, throughout these proceedings,” which undercuts any claim that § 2255 was unable to test the legality of his detention.
It cites Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), and Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), which held that certain international law obligations, including those arising from treaties, were not self‑executing and did not automatically create individually enforceable rights in state or federal criminal proceedings.

By analogy, the court signals that the American Declaration is not a source of enforceable rights in U.S. federal criminal prosecutions and therefore cannot ground habeas relief.

E. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)

Robinson attempted to recast his indictment challenge as a jurisdictional defect, presumably to fit within the more protected sphere of arguments that might implicate the Suspension Clause. The panel responds by invoking United States v. Cotton, where the Supreme Court held that defects in an indictment (such as failure to allege an element) do not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

In Robinson, the Northern District of Texas had statutory jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Any alleged failure of the superseding indictment to properly charge a capital offense goes to sufficiency, not to subject‑matter jurisdiction. Thus, Robinson cannot leverage the language of “jurisdiction” to transform a thoroughly litigable trial issue into a constitutional entitlement to endless habeas review.

F. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc)

On the Suspension Clause, the panel quotes Lindh for the proposition that:

The historic writ in 1789 focused on pre‑trial detention and prevented arbitrary executive custody without trial.
A judgment of conviction by a court with jurisdiction was “conclusive proof that confinement was legal” and “prevented issuance of a writ.”
The Suspension Clause is “not a ratchet”; it does not bar Congress from restricting or reshaping the forms of post‑conviction review that developed after 1789.

This is used to rebut Robinson’s claim that applying § 2255(e) to his case would constitute a suspension of the writ. Since he had a trial, a conviction, direct review, and a § 2255 proceeding in a court with jurisdiction, the Constitution does not entitle him to further collateral review simply because he has new arguments or evidence.

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Why § 2255 Is Not “Inadequate or Ineffective” in Robinson’s Case

The opinion’s central reasoning is straightforward:

Robinson was sentenced in the Northern District of Texas, which still exists and is open to receive § 2255 motions.
He has already used his one full § 2255 motion and sought authorization for a second or successive motion, which the Fifth Circuit denied.
His current arguments—about the indictment, alleged false evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, jury selection, and the American Declaration— are precisely the types of claims that are regularly raised and adjudicated on direct appeal and in an initial § 2255 proceeding.
The fact that his prior attempts were unsuccessful, or that AEDPA blocks him from bringing another § 2255 motion, does not mean the § 2255 remedy is structurally “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” It means only that he cannot file another collateral attack.

As the court puts it, Robinson’s problem is not an “inability to litigate but inability to prevail.” Under Jones, that is precisely the situation in which Congress “has chosen finality over error correction.” The savings clause cannot be invoked to override that legislative choice.

B. Rejection of the “New Evidence / New Arguments” Savings‑Clause Theory

Robinson argued that because he had “new legal arguments,” his case fell outside § 2255(e). He invoked Webster and Garza, which had suggested that certain kinds of new evidence or claims might justify relief under § 2241.

The Seventh Circuit rejects this argument for two reasons:

Textually and structurally, Jones interprets § 2255(e) to mean that the unavailability of relief under § 2255(h) “does not authorize resort to § 2241, when the sentencing court is open to the prisoner.” This applies regardless of whether the claim rests on new statutory interpretation, new evidence, or new legal theories.
Precedents like Webster and Garza, which had taken a more expansive view of the savings clause, cannot coexist with the Supreme Court’s construction of § 2255(e) in Jones. To the extent those cases suggested that new evidence or arguments alone could render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective,” they are now overruled in substance (even if not formally named by the Supreme Court).

The panel thus uses Robinson’s case to formally align the Seventh Circuit with Jones, eliminating lingering doctrinal tension between pre‑ and post‑Jones law.

C. Formal Displacement of Webster and Garza

One of the opinion’s most notable features is its explicit statement about the status of Webster and Garza:

True enough, neither Jones nor Agofsky expressly overrules Webster or Garza. But they did not need to. … To avoid any possibility of confusion, we now make clear that neither Webster nor Garza can be considered authoritative after Jones.

This is functionally an overruling at the circuit level, grounded in the Supreme Court’s later interpretation of the statute. It clarifies that:

District courts and litigants in the Seventh Circuit may no longer rely on Webster or Garza to justify § 2241 petitions that attack the conviction or sentence on the basis of new evidence, new rules, or alleged “actual innocence,” unless the case fits into the narrow Jones exception.
To the extent earlier cases suggested that § 2241 could be used as a broad “safety valve” when § 2255(h) barred successive motions, those suggestions are now disapproved.

D. Suspension Clause and Jurisdiction

Robinson contended that applying § 2255(e) to bar his § 2241 petition, particularly regarding his challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction, violated the Suspension Clause. The court responds in two steps.

1. Jones and Lindh on the Scope of the Protected Writ

First, Jones had already addressed a similar Suspension Clause argument, holding that:

The Clause protects the writ as it existed historically at the Founding, not all subsequent statutory expansions of post‑conviction review.
Congress may impose reasonable limits on post‑conviction review mechanisms like § 2255, so long as the core function of preventing arbitrary executive detention is preserved.

The Seventh Circuit, echoing Lindh, notes that the historic writ did not include the power to re‑examine criminal judgments rendered by courts with jurisdiction. A conviction in such a court was “conclusive proof” of the legality of detention for habeas purposes.

Robinson, by contrast, is not detained without trial; he had a full trial, a direct appeal, a § 2255 proceeding, and even a request for a second § 2255. Limiting further collateral attacks does not resemble a suspension of the writ as understood in 1789.

2. Indictment Sufficiency Is Not Jurisdictional

Second, the court explains that Robinson’s purported “jurisdictional” challenge is not truly jurisdictional:

The Northern District of Texas had statutory subject‑matter jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States” under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Whether the superseding indictment properly charged a capital offense goes to the sufficiency of the charging instrument, not to the court’s jurisdiction, as Cotton makes clear.

Because Robinson’s argument concerns an issue that could have been—and in principle was—litigated at trial, on direct appeal, and under § 2255, he cannot rebrand that issue as a jurisdictional defect to trigger special Suspension Clause protection.

E. Treatment of the American Declaration Arguments

The court treats Robinson’s human‑rights‑based claims as legally insubstantial for purposes of the savings clause analysis:

Whatever their substantive merit, these arguments were available at every stage of his prior proceedings. Thus, they do not show that § 2255 was unable to “test the legality of his detention.”
By citing Medellín and Breard, the panel signals that the American Declaration does not create domestically enforceable rights in federal criminal cases. Therefore, even if they were new, such claims would not likely satisfy § 2255(h) or justify an alternative route via § 2241.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Federal Prisoners in the Seventh Circuit

Robinson, read together with Agofsky, has profound practical consequences for federal prisoners within the Seventh Circuit:

Closure of the § 2241 “workaround”: Prisoners can no longer rely on Webster or Garza to pursue § 2241 relief based on new evidence, new legal arguments, or changes in statutory interpretation when § 2255(h) bars a second or successive motion.
Jurisdictional barrier: District courts now lack subject‑matter jurisdiction to hear § 2241 petitions that function as disguised § 2255 motions, unless the narrow Jones exception (e.g., dissolution of the sentencing court) applies.
Finality over error correction: The opinion reinforces that Congress has deliberately prioritized finality after a full round of § 2255 review. The inability to obtain further review—even in the face of plausible innocence or novel arguments—is a legislatively chosen feature, not a constitutional flaw.

B. For Capital and Non‑Capital Litigation Strategy

Robinson’s case is emblematic of a broader trend:

Capital cases: For years, Webster had been particularly important in capital litigation as a potential avenue for newly discovered evidence or evolving standards of decency to be raised under § 2241. That avenue is now effectively closed in the Seventh Circuit.
Non‑capital cases: Prisoners asserting “actual innocence” based on new evidence or new statutory interpretation will have to fit strictly within § 2255(h) or rely on executive clemency; § 2241 is no longer a viable back‑up route.

In both capital and non‑capital cases, the strategic emphasis will shift to:

maximizing the quality and scope of the initial § 2255 motion, and
seeking Supreme Court or legislative changes, rather than relying on creative uses of the savings clause at the circuit level.

C. Future of Actual Innocence and New Evidence Claims

Although not expressly about “actual innocence,” Robinson underscores a critical implication of Jones:

Federal courts are institutionally constrained from hearing new innocence‑based claims through § 2241 when § 2255(h) is not satisfied.
Prisoners who discover compelling new evidence after their first § 2255 motion—and who cannot meet the strict “clear and convincing” innocence standard in § 2255(h)(1)—may have no judicial forum for those claims.

Politically and normatively, this may increase pressure on the executive clemency process, especially in capital cases. Judicially, however, Robinson confirms that within the Seventh Circuit, courts will treat such constraints as a consequence of Congress’s policy choice, not as a violation of the Constitution.

D. International Human Rights Instruments

Robinson also reinforces the limited role of international human‑rights instruments (like the American Declaration) in U.S. federal criminal practice:

Such instruments generally are not self‑executing and do not create privately enforceable rights that can serve as the basis for federal habeas relief.
Even where they might inform interpretation, the presence of those arguments in a case does not alter the statutory structure of § 2255 and § 2241.

For practitioners, the bottom line is that human‑rights‑based claims may be rhetorically powerful but will rarely affect the availability of federal post‑conviction remedies absent domestic implementing legislation.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is the Difference Between § 2255 and § 2241?

For federal prisoners:

§ 2255: This is the main way to challenge a conviction or sentence after direct appeal. It is filed in the sentencing court. AEDPA allows only one full § 2255 motion, plus very limited second or successive motions under § 2255(h).
§ 2241: This is the general habeas statute, typically used to challenge the execution of a sentence (e.g., good‑time credits, parole), not the validity of the conviction or sentence. It is filed in the district of confinement.

Section 2255(e)’s savings clause says that a prisoner cannot use § 2241 to attack his conviction or sentence unless the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective.” After Jones and Robinson, “inadequate or ineffective” is a very narrow concept:

It does not include situations where § 2255(h) blocks a second motion, where the prisoner lost earlier, or where he has new evidence or new arguments.
It does include rare situations where it is literally impossible or impracticable to seek relief from the sentencing court (e.g., the court no longer exists).

B. What Does “Second or Successive” Mean in Practice?

A “second or successive” § 2255 motion is any later motion filed after the prisoner’s first § 2255 motion has been decided on the merits. To file such a motion, the prisoner must:

Ask the court of appeals for authorization; and
Show either newly discovered evidence proving innocence or a new Supreme Court rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review.

If he cannot make that showing, he cannot file the second motion. Under Robinson’s reading (and Jones), that does not open up § 2241 as a substitute—it simply means no further collateral attacks are allowed.

C. What Is “Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction” and Why Does It Matter?

Subject‑matter jurisdiction is a court’s legal power to hear a type of case. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” As long as an indictment purports to charge a federal offense, the court has jurisdiction.

If an indictment is poorly drafted or fails to include an element, that is a defect in the indictment, but it does not strip the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton made this clear. Robinson tried to treat an indictment defect as a jurisdictional defect to gain stronger constitutional protection; the panel rejects that move as inconsistent with Cotton.

D. What Does It Mean to “Suspend” the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

Historically, “suspending” the writ meant Congress temporarily turning off the ability of courts to hear habeas cases, usually in times of war or rebellion. Modern debates focus on whether restrictive habeas statutes are tantamount to a suspension.

The Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have held that as long as prisoners can:

challenge unlawful executive detention before trial, and
obtain at least one fair opportunity to challenge a conviction in a court with jurisdiction,

Congress may limit additional rounds of collateral review. Such limits, including AEDPA’s successive‑petition bar, do not “suspend” the writ as understood by the Constitution.

IX. Conclusion: The Significance of Robinson v. Lammer

Robinson v. Lammer is a pivotal decision in the Seventh Circuit’s post‑Jones habeas landscape. Its key contributions are:

It fully embraces the Supreme Court’s reading of § 2255(e) in Jones v. Hendrix, making clear that inability to satisfy § 2255(h) does not make § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective,” and therefore does not open a path to § 2241.
It treats § 2255(e) as a jurisdictional limitation, in line with Agofsky v. Baysore, depriving district courts of subject‑matter jurisdiction over § 2241 petitions that functionally attack convictions or sentences absent the narrow Jones circumstances.
It expressly disavows the continued authority of Webster v. Daniels and Garza v. Lappin, erasing a once‑significant savings‑clause doctrine that had allowed some § 2241 challenges based on new evidence or arguments.
It reaffirms that indictment sufficiency is not a matter of jurisdiction, thereby preventing prisoners from recasting ordinary trial‑level challenges as structural defects implicating the Suspension Clause.
It confirms the limited domestic legal effect of international instruments like the American Declaration in federal criminal and habeas proceedings.

In broader perspective, Robinson underscores the contemporary federal habeas regime’s emphasis on finality. Once a federal prisoner has had one full opportunity for direct appeal and one § 2255 motion, further collateral challenges are strictly limited by statute, and § 2241 cannot be used as a general “escape hatch.” For litigants and courts in the Seventh Circuit, Robinson therefore stands as a clear and authoritative statement of the post‑Jones order: § 2255 is the primary and almost exclusive vehicle for federal prisoners’ collateral attacks, and the savings clause is truly narrow, not a broad reservoir for equitable exceptions.