Reyes v. State: Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies that “Intent Not to Return” Is NOT a Separate Element of the Duty-to-Stop Statute

Introduction

In Reyes (Fernando) v. State, No. 88011 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2025), the Nevada Supreme Court faced a multifaceted appeal arising from a catastrophic New-Year’s-Day driving spree that left two pedestrians dead and multiple motorists injured. Appellant Fernando José Reyes was convicted by a jury of four counts each of:

Driving Under the Influence (DUI) resulting in death and/or substantial bodily harm,
Reckless driving resulting in death and/or substantial bodily harm, and
Leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury.

On appeal Reyes launched a broad attack on the evidence, jury instructions, admission of alleged “bad-act” testimony, Fifth-Amendment implications, procedural rulings, and cumulative-error claims. The Court unanimously affirmed, but in doing so it clarified an important point of statutory construction: Nevada’s duty-to-stop statute (NRS 484E.010) does not require the State to prove that a defendant departed an accident scene “with the intent not to return.” The duty is breached the moment a motorist knowingly leaves without immediately coming back—regardless of subjective future intent. That clarification, together with the Court’s application of evidentiary and harmless-error doctrines, will shape future prosecutions of hit-and-run crimes and trial practice generally.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying the familiar “rational-trier-of-fact” standard from Koza v. State, the Court found overwhelmingly sufficient evidence that Reyes: (1) proximately caused the second collision; (2) inflicted “substantial bodily harm” upon the drivers of both colliding vehicles; and (3) fled the scene. Alleged evidentiary errors—mention of Reyes’s lack of insurance, reference to his post-arrest silence, and lay opinion on his flight—were deemed either not errors or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also upheld the trial judge’s refusal to deliver Reyes’s proposed “intent not to return” instruction, holding that the statutory language is self-executing and was already covered by the given charges. Finally, Reyes’s late-filed motion to set aside the verdict was time-barred, and with no individual errors established, his cumulative-error claim failed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245 (1984) – Provided the lens for sufficiency-of-evidence review.
Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536 (2002) – Defined “proximate cause” and clarified that contributory negligence of others does not exonerate a defendant. The Court used this to reject Reyes’s attempt to shift blame to the Prius driver.
Collins v. State, 125 Nev. 60 (2009) – Explained “prolonged physical pain” for “substantial bodily harm.” Guided the Court’s conclusion that even soft-tissue injuries and year-long migraines qualify.
Smith v. State, 110 Nev. 1094 (1994), and Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924 (2002) – Set the harmless-error framework for admission of prior bad-act evidence.
McLellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263 (2008) – Imposed duty on prosecutor to request limiting instructions when prior bad acts are introduced. The Court distinguished Reyes because the defense expressly waived such an instruction.
Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511 (2005) – Bars prosecutorial comment on post-arrest silence. Reyes relied on it, but the Court found the violation (if any) harmless.
Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43 (2015); Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172 (2008) – Provided the “plain-error” yardstick applied to unpreserved objections.
Collins v. State, 133 Nev. 717 (2017) – Clarified permissible lay opinion; used to uphold eyewitness description of Reyes’s flight.
Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744 (2005); Runion v. State, 116 Nev. 1041 (2000); Langford v. State, 95 Nev. 631 (1979) – Governed jury-instruction challenges and underscored that instructions must accurately state existing law.
Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 (2000) – Articulated that without individual errors there can be no cumulative error.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Proximate Cause. The Court reiterated that a defendant’s conduct need only be a “natural and continuous” cause of the harm; another driver’s potential negligence is irrelevant to criminal liability. Black-box data showing 55 mph through a red light, eyewitness accounts, and the low speed of the Prius furnished ample proof.
Substantial Bodily Harm. Relying on NRS 0.060 and Collins, the Court emphasized that the injury’s duration, not its medical label, controls. Year-long migraines and a week-long work absence satisfied the “prolonged physical pain” prong.
Harmless & Plain Error. Any misstep about insurance coverage, post-arrest silence, and lay opinion testimony was washed away by overwhelming evidence of guilt. Because Reyes failed to object, he bore the “plain-error” burden, which he could not carry.
Jury Instruction on NRS 484E.010. Reyes proposed an instruction adding an “intent not to return” element to the hit-and-run statute. The Court performed a straightforward textual analysis: the statute commands a driver to “forthwith return” and “in every event remain.” The breach occurs when the driver fails to comply, rendering subjective intent immaterial. Since the jury was already instructed using the statute’s verbatim language, the Court found no abuse of discretion in rejecting the extra requirement.
Procedural Deadlines. NRS 175.381(2) allowed 7 days to move to set aside the verdict; Reyes acted on day 11 and sought an extension only after the fact. The Court enforced the bright line, signalling strict adherence to post-verdict timelines.

3. Potential Impact of the Decision

Hit-and-Run Prosecutions: Defense arguments predicated on the driver’s “eventual intent to return” are effectively foreclosed. Prosecutors need only show that the defendant knowingly left without immediate return.
Substantial-Bodily-Harm Threshold: The opinion reinforces that even injuries lacking dramatic medical evidence can meet the statutory threshold if pain lasts beyond the immediate moment of impact. This broadens exposure in DUI and reckless-driving cases.
Trial Practice: The case is a primer on:
- when failure to request (or the tactical waiver of) a limiting instruction neutralizes appellate relief;
- how plain-error and harmless-error analyses interplay; and
- the importance of preserving objections and meeting statutory filing deadlines.
Appellate Strategy: The decision cautions counsel that cumulative-error claims are non-starters without distinct, individually significant errors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Proximate Cause: A link in an unbroken chain; if you remove the defendant’s act, the harm would not have happened.
Contributory Negligence (Criminal Context): Even if someone else also acted carelessly, the defendant remains liable if his conduct was a substantial factor.
Substantial Bodily Harm: Serious injury or pain that lasts considerably longer than the immediate sting of the event.
Harmless Error: A mistake at trial that, given the weight of other evidence, could not have swayed the verdict.
Plain Error Review: Appellate fallback when no objection was lodged. Relief is granted only for obvious errors that affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Lay Opinion Testimony: Non-expert witnesses may describe what they perceived if it helps the jury; they cannot pronounce the defendant “guilty.”
Cumulative Error: Small mistakes sometimes add up, but only if each qualifies as an error in the first place.

Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes v. State does more than affirm a high-profile conviction. It cements doctrinal clarity in three areas: (1) Duty-to-Stop violations require no proof of an “intent not to return,” (2) “Prolonged physical pain” remains a flexible but expansive pathway to proving “substantial bodily harm,” and (3) procedural and evidentiary missteps—when confronted with overwhelming evidence—will rarely justify reversal. Practitioners should heed the case as both a cautionary tale on preserving appellate issues and a blueprint for prosecuting vehicular-crime cases under Nevada law.