Retroactive Two‑Year Probation Cap Reaches Nonfinal Revocation Cases and Unwinds Executed Sentences: Commentary on People v. Faial (Cal. 2025)

Introduction

In People v. Faial, the California Supreme Court resolved a split among the Courts of Appeal over how Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1950) applies to defendants whose probation had been revoked and terminated before AB 1950 became operative on January 1, 2021, but whose cases were still on direct review. AB 1950 reduced most felony probation terms to a maximum of two years, with specified exceptions. The key question was whether this ameliorative change retroactively shortens a probation term in a nonfinal case even when the trial court had already revoked and terminated probation and executed a suspended sentence before January 1, 2021.

Justice Jenkins, writing for a unanimous court, held that AB 1950 applies retroactively under the Estrada presumption to nonfinal cases and that, as a “collateral effect” of the statute’s retroactive application, courts must unwind revocation and termination orders (and executed suspended sentences) when the alleged violations occurred outside the retroactively shortened two-year probationary window. The Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Case Overview

Parties: The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) v. Jerry Anthony Faial (Defendant and Appellant).
Court: Supreme Court of California.
Date: July 31, 2025.
Opinion by: Justice Jenkins (joined by Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, and Evans).
Procedural posture: Defendant’s probation revoked (summary revocation on May 15, 2019), probation terminated and previously suspended 12-year term executed (November 2019). Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, AB 1950 became operative on January 1, 2021. The Court of Appeal affirmed; the Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that AB 1950’s two-year cap on most felony probation terms applies retroactively to nonfinal cases under the rule of In re Estrada. Because Faial’s appeal from the order revoking and terminating probation and executing the suspended sentence remained pending on January 1, 2021, his case was not final. Consequently, AB 1950 retroactively shortened his probation term to two years from the date probation was imposed (May 4, 2017), meaning his probation expired on May 4, 2019.

Acts occurring after May 4, 2019, could not serve as a lawful basis to revoke or terminate probation. Nor could the court revive jurisdiction to execute the suspended sentence based on such conduct. The Court characterized this result as a “collateral effect” of AB 1950’s retroactive application, analogous to Proposition 47’s collateral effects discussed in People v. Buycks. The Court rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that AB 1950 aids only “active” probationers, that it cannot “unwind” executed sentences, or that legislative purpose forecloses relief after a revocation and termination predating the statute’s effective date. The decision reverses the Court of Appeal and remands for proceedings consistent with the ruling.

Factual and Procedural Background

October 6, 2016: Trial court finds Faial guilty of petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666, subd. (a)), two counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), and first-degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)); enhancement findings include § 12022.1 and prior strikes/serious felonies.
May 4, 2017: Imposes 12-year sentence, suspends execution, and grants four years’ probation with residential treatment conditions.
November 2017: Probation violation admitted; probation revoked and reinstated under same terms.
May 15, 2019: Summary revocation for alleged violations occurring January–May 2019.
November 2019: Probation violations found true; probation terminated; suspended 12-year sentence executed.
Appeal: Defendant timely appeals revocation/termination and execution order.
January 1, 2021: AB 1950 operative, reducing most felony probation terms to two years.
Court of Appeal: Affirms; holds AB 1950 inapplicable to defendants whose probation had been revoked and terminated before Jan. 1, 2021.
Supreme Court: Grants review; reverses Court of Appeal.

Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740: Establishes the presumption that ameliorative legislation applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases absent a clear contrary intent. Central to the Court’s conclusion that AB 1950 applies to Faial’s nonfinal case.
People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671: Clarifies finality; a case with a suspended execution of sentence remains nonfinal while direct review of the order executing sentence is ongoing. This anchors the Court’s determination that Faial’s case was not final on Jan. 1, 2021.
People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961: Confirms AB 1950 is ameliorative and retroactive under Estrada; addresses remedy in plea-bargain cases. The Court relies on Prudholme’s articulation of AB 1950’s purpose and retroactivity.
People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40: A defendant appealing a probation revocation and sentence may benefit from ameliorative changes effective during the appeal. Supports allowing Faial to invoke AB 1950 during his direct appeal.
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857: Establishes that retroactive ameliorative measures may have “collateral effects,” such as negating enhancements predicated on convictions reclassified under Prop. 47. The Court analogizes to justify unwinding revocation/termination and execution orders here.
People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295 and People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208: Apply Estrada to complete decriminalization; emphasize that retroactivity extends even to the elimination of all punishment. Undercuts the Attorney General’s argument against “extinguishing” accountability in nonfinal cases.
People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498: Conduct outside the probationary term cannot support revocation; once probation ends, the court’s power to punish under probation mechanisms ceases. Critical to the result that post–two-year conduct cannot sustain revocation.
People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771: Explains the court’s waning authority after probation ends and the contours of §§ 1203.2 and 1203.3. Supports the conclusion that after retroactive expiration, revocation/termination cannot stand.
People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618; People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128; People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152; People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791: Reinforce Estrada’s broad retroactivity principle and its application to ameliorative changes absent clear contrary intent.
People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388; People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264: On finality and the “singular, final judgment” concept; used to delineate when a case becomes final.
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685: Notes that determining retroactivity does not resolve how the statute operates; informs the Court’s separate analysis of remedy and operation.
People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415: On remand after reversal of probation termination, trial court may modify terms or terminate probation; supports feasibility of relief.
People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66: Courts should not base retroactivity on idiosyncratic case facts; pushes back on the Attorney General’s “windfall” concerns.
Courts of Appeal recognizing AB 1950 retroactivity for those on probation: People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609; People v. Lord (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 241; People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943; People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874.
Conflicting Court of Appeal decisions on revoked/terminated probationers: People v. Faial (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 738 (no retroactivity) (disapproved by this decision); cases with review granted: People v. Jackson (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 207; People v. Canedos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 469; People v. Butler (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 216; cf. Kuhnel v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 726 (all pending at the time and resolved by this ruling’s reasoning).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

2.1. AB 1950 Is Ameliorative and Retroactive to Nonfinal Cases

Building on Prudholme, the Court reaffirmed that AB 1950 is an ameliorative statute: although it does not reduce penalties for particular offenses, it materially curtails the liberty-restricting conditions and supervision exposure of probationers by capping felony probation terms at two years (with exceptions). Under Estrada, such ameliorative changes apply to all nonfinal cases absent a clear contrary legislative intent, which is lacking here.

2.2. Finality: Appeals from Execution Orders Keep Cases Nonfinal

Under Esquivel, a case with a suspended execution of sentence remains nonfinal through direct review of any order executing the sentence. Faial’s appeal from the revocation/termination and execution order was pending on January 1, 2021; therefore, his case was nonfinal when AB 1950 became operative.

2.3. Application and Remedy: Shortening the Probation Term and Its Consequences

Because the case was nonfinal, AB 1950 presumptively applied. The Court held that the statute retroactively shortened Faial’s probation to two years from the date of imposition (May 4, 2017), causing probation to expire on May 4, 2019. Under Leiva, conduct occurring outside the probationary period (after expiration) cannot furnish a valid basis to revoke or terminate probation. Here, the summary revocation occurred May 15, 2019, after the retroactively shortened term expired; thus, the orders revoking and terminating probation and executing the suspended sentence cannot stand.

Critically, the Court treated the “unwinding” of these orders as a permissible collateral effect of retroactive application, analogizing to Buycks: just as redesignating a felony to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 can negate enhancements and other consequences predicated on the prior felony, so too the shortening of a probation term can nullify revocation and execution orders predicated on conduct that, retroactively, fell outside the lawful probation period.

2.4. Rejection of the Attorney General’s Limiting Arguments

“Active probation only” theory: The Attorney General argued AB 1950 aids only those who remained on “active” probation on January 1, 2021. The Court disagreed, emphasizing that because the appeal kept the case nonfinal, the probation term remained “extant” for Estrada purposes, and the trial court’s authority under §§ 1203.2 and 1203.3 would be fully operative on remand after reversal.
No authority to “unwind” executed sentences: The Court found no textual or historical bar to the collateral effect of unwinding an executed suspended sentence when revocation/termination was predicated on conduct outside the retroactively valid probation window. Buycks demonstrates that ameliorative laws can produce such collateral consequences in nonfinal cases.
Legislative purpose and “accountability” concerns: The Court recognized that AB 1950 was designed to reduce over-supervision, technical violations, and incarceration, while frontloading rehabilitative services. Those purposes are furthered by retroactively relieving defendants from prison terms triggered by conduct that, under current law, is beyond the permissible period of probation supervision.
“Windfall” and statute-of-limitations concerns: The Court rejected arguments that some defendants might receive a windfall where prosecutors opted for revocation in lieu of new charges and the limitations period has run. Estrada and its progeny contemplate that ameliorative changes may eliminate punishment in nonfinal cases, and legislative goals cannot be defeated by speculative case-specific concerns.

3. The Statutory Framework and Its Interaction

Penal Code § 1203.1 (as amended by AB 1950): Caps most felony probation terms at two years. Exceptions include violent felonies listed in § 667.5, subd. (c), offenses with specified probation lengths, and other legislative carve-outs (not implicated in Faial).
Penal Code §§ 1203.2 and 1203.3: Govern revocation/termination and modification of probation. The Court confirmed that, on remand after reversal, trial courts retain authority to modify or terminate probation and discharge the defendant, consistent with the retroactive two-year cap.

4. Legislative Purpose Reinforcing the Holding

Legislative analyses emphasized that probation’s benefits are frontloaded, prolonged supervision increases detection of minor violations, and shorter terms enable officers to focus on higher-risk individuals. AB 1950 sought to reduce technical violations, avoid unnecessary incarceration, and realize cost savings for reinvestment. Retroactively applying the two-year cap to nonfinal revocation cases directly advances these aims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Estrada presumption: When the Legislature reduces punishment or otherwise ameliorates consequences, courts presume the change applies to all cases not yet final, unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise.
Final vs. nonfinal cases: A criminal case is nonfinal while direct appellate review remains available. If a sentence was previously suspended and later executed, an appeal from the execution order keeps the case nonfinal until direct review concludes.
Suspended execution of sentence (ESS): The court imposes a sentence but does not carry it out; instead, it grants probation. If probation is later revoked and terminated, the court can order the previously imposed sentence into effect. During an appeal from that order, the case remains nonfinal.
Collateral effects: Retroactive application of a new law can have knock-on consequences not expressly described in the statute (for example, negating enhancements or revocation orders) when those consequences are fairly contemplated by the statutory change.
Probation expiration and revocation: Once probation expires, conduct after expiration cannot be used to revoke probation. Any revocation must be ordered within the probationary term; if the term is retroactively shortened, the expiration date moves accordingly.

Impact and Practical Implications

Who Benefits

Defendants whose probation was revoked and terminated, and whose suspended sentences were executed before January 1, 2021, but whose appeals from those orders remained pending on that date.
Defendants whose underlying offenses fall within AB 1950’s scope (i.e., not violent felonies listed in § 667.5, subd. (c), and not otherwise excluded or subject to specific probation terms).

Scope Limitations

Cases final before January 1, 2021, do not benefit from AB 1950 under Estrada.
Excluded offenses (e.g., violent felonies under § 667.5(c)) and offenses with statutorily prescribed longer probation terms remain outside AB 1950’s two-year cap.
Faial does not decide whether alleged violations that actually occurred within the retroactively shortened two-year period would support revocation if the court had timely revoked within that period; the Court noted the early-2019 conduct but emphasized that revocation was not ordered before the two-year expiration.

Operational Effects on the Criminal Justice System

Trial courts: Must recognize that AB 1950 can retroactively shorten probation terms in nonfinal cases and that conduct outside the retroactively valid term cannot sustain revocation/termination or execution of suspended sentences. On remand, courts may terminate probation by operation of law and discharge the defendant, coordinating with custody authorities as appropriate.
Prosecutors: Should account for AB 1950’s retroactive reach when deciding whether to pursue revocation or file new criminal charges. Where revocation is unavailable due to retroactive expiration, prosecution of independently criminal conduct may still proceed if not time-barred.
Defense counsel: Should identify clients with nonfinal revocation/termination appeals as of January 1, 2021, and seek relief under AB 1950 to vacate revocations based on post-expiration conduct and unwind executed sentences.
Probation departments: Expect fewer revocations tied to technical violations occurring late in supervision; resources can be concentrated in the initial two years, consistent with legislative intent.

Roadmap for Applying Faial

Determine whether the offense qualifies for AB 1950’s two-year cap (i.e., not a § 667.5(c) violent felony and not otherwise excluded).
Identify the date probation was imposed and calculate the two-year expiration date.
Assess finality: Was the case nonfinal on January 1, 2021 (e.g., appeal pending from revocation/termination and execution order)? If yes, AB 1950 applies.
Ask whether the court ordered any revocation before the retroactively shortened two-year expiration. If not, post-expiration conduct cannot support revocation/termination.
Remedy: Set aside revocation and termination orders and any execution of the suspended sentence predicated on post-expiration conduct; terminate probation by operation of law and discharge the defendant as appropriate.

What People v. Faial Does Not Decide

Violations within two years: The Court did not decide whether alleged probation violations occurring before the two-year expiration (and timely revocation within that period) would deny relief; it noted early-2019 allegations but pointed out the court did not revoke until after May 4, 2019.
Time-barred prosecutions: While rejecting the Attorney General’s policy argument about windfalls, the Court did not opine on particular statute-of-limitations scenarios; it simply held such concerns do not defeat retroactivity in nonfinal cases.
Excluded offenses and specific probation statutes: The decision does not alter AB 1950’s enumerated exceptions or statutes prescribing specific probation terms beyond two years.

Key Takeaways

AB 1950’s two-year cap on most felony probation terms applies retroactively to all nonfinal cases under Estrada.
A case remains nonfinal for Estrada purposes while a defendant’s appeal from an order executing a suspended sentence is pending.
Retroactive shortening of a probation term can produce collateral effects: revocation/termination and execution orders predicated on conduct outside the retroactively valid period must be set aside.
Legislative purpose—reducing technical violations, frontloading services, and decreasing incarceration and costs—supports broad retroactivity, even where it undoes executed suspended sentences in nonfinal cases.
Courts cannot rely on conduct occurring after the retroactively shortened probation period to revoke or terminate probation. Once probation ends, the court’s probation-related punishments cease.

Conclusion

People v. Faial establishes a clear, statewide rule: AB 1950’s two-year cap on felony probation terms applies retroactively to nonfinal cases, even where the trial court revoked and terminated probation and executed a suspended sentence before the statute’s effective date. The Court grounds its decision in Estrada’s retroactivity presumption, clarifies finality under Esquivel, and embraces Buycks’ conception of “collateral effects” to authorize unwinding revocation and execution orders predicated on conduct occurring beyond the retroactively shortened term.

By aligning operation of AB 1950 with its rehabilitative and cost-saving purposes, the Court reduces the reach of late-occurring technical violations and recalibrates probationary supervision to the period the Legislature deemed most effective. Faial is thus a significant refinement of California’s retroactivity jurisprudence and probation law: it ensures that the Legislature’s chosen two-year limit governs whenever constitutionally and procedurally permissible, and it provides a remedial blueprint for courts and practitioners confronting nonfinal revocation cases in the wake of AB 1950.