Respondeat Superior Liability of Supervising Physicians for Medical Students’ Negligence

Introduction

In Statham v. Quang (S24G0842), decided May 13, 2025 by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court addressed whether physicians who supervise medical students during surgery can be held vicariously liable for the student’s negligence. Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham sued Dr. David Quang, Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen, and their medical practice after a supervised medical student allegedly mis-placed a sponge stick, causing Statham a rectal injury that developed into a rectovaginal fistula. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the sole issue of vicarious liability under three legal theories: OCGA § 51-1-38 (statutory immunity for students), general agency principles (respondeat superior), and the borrowed servant doctrine. The trial court granted defendants’ motion and denied plaintiff’s motion. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in part, clarifying statutory interpretation and agency doctrines in the medical-supervision context.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held:

OCGA § 51-1-38 — The statute immunizes medical students but does not impose vicarious liability on supervising physicians or affect their common‐law liability.
Borrowed Servant Doctrine — This doctrine remains a defense to respondeat superior, not an independent basis for imposing liability on a supervising physician.
Respondeat Superior (General Agency) — Under ordinary agency principles, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student’s negligence if (1) the student was acting within the scope of the physician’s business and in furtherance of the physician’s goals, and (2) the student was the physician’s “servant” by virtue of the physician assuming or having the right of control over the student’s work.
A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant physicians assumed control over the student’s manipulation of the sponge stick during surgery. Accordingly, summary judgment on respondeat superior liability was improper and must be reversed.

Analysis

Precedents and Statutes Cited

OCGA § 51-1-38 (Medical student immunity statute)
OCGA § 51-2-2 (Respondeat superior / master‐servant rule)
OCGA § 51-2-4 (Independent contractor rule)
Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744 (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (agent immunity does not shield principal)
Farmer v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 245 Ga. 734 (266 SE2d 922) (1980) (right to control test)
Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375 (276 SE2d 572) (1981) (borrowed servant framework)
Ross v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 258 Ga. 234 (367 SE2d 793) (1988) (hospital escape of liability)
Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Cath. Church, 313 Ga. 558 (870 SE2d 365) (2022) (scope of employment analysis)
Tim’s Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796 (604 SE2d 763) (2004) (contractual allocation of control)
Hoffman v. Wells, 260 Ga. 588 (397 SE2d 696) (1990) (borrowed servant exception)

Statutory Interpretation of OCGA § 51-1-38

OCGA § 51-1-38(a) grants medical students immunity for civil damages arising from acts or omissions performed “as a part of an academic curriculum” under supervision, except for willful or wanton misconduct. Subsection (b) provides that this immunity does not “affect or limit the liability of a medical facility, academic institution, or doctor of medicine.” The Court applied traditional rules of statutory construction:

If the text is clear and unambiguous, it controls. The statute immunizes students only and expressly leaves supervising physicians’ liability intact.
Subsection (b) clarifies that student immunity does not extend to, or alter, a supervisor’s common‐law duties or liabilities.

Thus, OCGA § 51-1-38 does not create vicarious liability for supervisors nor confer on them immunity from existing agency‐based liability.

General Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior

The doctrine of respondeat superior imputes an agent’s torts to a principal when:

The agent was acting within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the principal’s business or goals (Saint Joseph’s, Doe).
The agent qualifies as a “servant” rather than an independent contractor, which turns primarily on whether the principal had, or assumed, the right to control the manner and method of the agent’s work (Farmer; Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Windham).

In the medical setting, a supervising physician who directs a student to perform specific intraoperative tasks and visually verifies performance may have assumed control sufficient to create a master-servant relationship. Here, undisputed summary‐judgment evidence showed that the defendant physicians instructed the student to insert and manipulate the sponge stick and confirmed proper initial placement. Those facts support a jury finding that the physicians assumed control over the student’s work and are thus potentially vicariously liable under respondeat superior.

Borrowed Servant Doctrine

Under Georgia law, the borrowed servant doctrine is a narrow defense to respondeat superior, by which a general master (employer) avoids liability if, on the occasion of injury:

The special master (borrower) had complete control and direction of the servant’s actions.
The general master neither controlled nor reserved control over those actions.
The special master had the exclusive right to discharge the servant.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that this doctrine does not create liability but can only defeat it by showing control passed wholly to a borrowing employer. It does not serve as an independent basis to hold a borrowing entity liable.

Contractual Evidence and Control

A contract may grant one party the right to control an agent’s performance and thus give rise to a master-servant relationship even if the controlling party never actively intervenes. However, here the Supreme Court held that the relevant inquiry was not limited to contractual terms. Because a principal may assume control regardless of contractual language, the existence of a control relationship must be assessed based on whether the supervising physician in practice directed and monitored the student’s work. Summary judgment was improper where undisputed evidence of actual supervision created a fact question.

Impact on Future Cases and Medical Education

The decision clarifies three critical points:

Supervisors cannot hide behind student‐immunity statutes when agency principles impose liability.
Borrowed servant arguments remain limited to defending respondeat superior claims and will not support affirmative liability.
Courts must carefully analyze evidence of control—both contractual and actual—rather than mechanically applying written disclaimers.

This precedent will guide trial courts in evaluating vicarious liability in clinical‐training contexts, ensuring that injured patients can pursue claims where supervisors exercised sufficient control over trainees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Respondeat Superior: “Let the master answer.” An employer (master) is liable for an employee’s (servant’s) negligent acts committed within the scope of employment.
Scope of Employment: The student’s actions must further the supervising physician’s business objectives (e.g., assisting in surgery).
Master vs. Independent Contractor: A servant is subject to the principal’s right of control over how the work is done, not merely the result.
Borrowed Servant Doctrine: If an employee is loaned to another employer who gains full control, liability shifts from the lending employer to the borrowing employer—but this doctrine only negates liability, it does not create it.
OCGA § 51-1-38: Immunizes medical students, but leaves supervising physicians’ liability under common law untouched.

Conclusion

Statham v. Quang reinforces that supervising physicians may be held vicariously liable for medical students’ negligent acts under respondeat superior when they assume control over training tasks. The decision limits statutory immunity and the borrowed servant doctrine, clarifies the centrality of actual control in master-servant analysis, and preserves injured patients’ ability to pursue remedies against supervising doctors. Trial courts must now examine whether genuine disputes of fact exist regarding supervision and control before granting summary judgment for supervisors in similar cases.