Respondeat Superior in Commute/Remote-Jobsite Cases: Workers’ Compensation “Going-and-Coming” Rule Not Dispositive; Summary Judgment Limited to Relief Requested

I. Introduction

Rebecca Skala (as special administrator of her child’s estate and guardian of her injured child) and James Gardner (as special administrator of the estate of the daycare-van driver) sued Comfort Systems USA, Inc. and Comfort Systems USA (Arkansas), Inc. (collectively, “Comfort Systems”) and employee Cody Conboy after a fatal collision.

The accident occurred while Conboy drove from his home in Greenbrier to a remote jobsite in Ash Flat. The central issue was whether Comfort Systems could be held vicariously liable under respondeat superior—i.e., whether Conboy was acting within the scope of employment—and whether the circuit court could dispose of plaintiffs’ separate direct-negligence theories against the employer (e.g., allegedly overworking employees) on summary judgment.

The circuit court granted summary judgment to Comfort Systems, adopting a workers’ compensation “going-and-coming rule” framework to preclude respondeat superior liability and dismissing direct-liability claims as well. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that, in a tort case alleging respondeat superior, Arkansas applies its traditional scope-of-employment analysis, not the workers’ compensation going-and-coming rule as a categorical bar. Even though the relevant facts were largely undisputed, the court concluded that reasonable minds could draw inconsistent conclusions about scope of employment given evidence such as Comfort Systems’ travel requirements, travel-compensation policy, and ability to discipline for policy violations. Summary judgment on vicarious liability was therefore inappropriate.

Separately, the court held that the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ direct-liability claims because Comfort Systems’ motion sought summary judgment only on vicarious liability. Under Arkansas law, a trial court cannot grant summary-judgment relief beyond what is requested in the motion.

Disposition: Reversed and remanded; court of appeals opinion vacated.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Workers’ compensation “going-and-coming” cases and their limited role in tort

Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997)
Role in the opinion: The majority acknowledged the general formulation of the going-and-coming rule in workers’ compensation (“an employee traveling to and from the workplace is generally said not to be acting within the course of employment”), but treated it as non-controlling for tort respondeat superior.
Frank Lyon Co. v. Oates, 225 Ark. 682, 284 S.W.2d 637 (1955)
Role in the opinion: Identified as a workers’ compensation case addressing the going-and-coming rule. The majority emphasized that reliance on such workers’ compensation doctrine does not dictate the respondeat superior analysis in tort.
Van Dalsen v. Inman, 238 Ark. 237, 379 S.W.2d 261 (1964)
Central influence: The court treated Van Dalsen as the clearest Arkansas statement that workers’ compensation standards (“arising out of and in the course of employment”) are not the test for master-servant tort liability. Van Dalsen expressly said “workmen’s compensation cases are not applicable to a master and servant case,” and the majority used that to reject the circuit court’s attempt to “extend” the going-and-coming rule into tort as a controlling rule.

2. Tort scope-of-employment framework for respondeat superior

Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 120 S.W.3d 587 (2003)
Role in the opinion: Restated the foundational principle: an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s torts if committed within the scope of employment.
J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Doss, 320 Ark. 660, 899 S.W.2d 464 (1995)
Role in the opinion: Supplied the functional test: scope of employment turns on whether the employee is carrying out the “object and purpose of the enterprise” rather than acting exclusively in the employee’s own interest, and it is not dependent solely on the location (“situs”) of the occurrence.
Knighton v. International Paper Co., 246 Ark. 523, 438 S.W.2d 721 (1969)
How the majority used it: Comfort Systems argued Knighton applied the going-and-coming rule to tort. The majority read Knighton differently—acknowledging that Knighton mentioned the going-and-coming rule and exceptions, but emphasizing that the decision ultimately analyzed control/scope under respondeat superior rather than importing workers’ compensation doctrine as a dispositive bar.

3. Summary judgment standards

Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Role in the opinion: The court anchored its review in the rule’s requirement that there be no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Crockett v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 2011 Ark. 208, 381 S.W.3d 793; Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 818 S.W.2d 940 (1991); Flentje v. First National Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000)
Role in the opinion: These cases support the court’s key procedural move: even where “facts are undisputed,” summary judgment is improper if those facts permit “inconsistent hypotheses” and reasonable minds could differ.

4. Limits on granting summary judgment beyond the motion

Young v. Staude, 280 Ark. 298, 657 S.W.2d 542 (1983)
Central influence: The majority relied on Young for the rule that a trial court cannot grant summary-judgment relief beyond that requested. Because Comfort Systems moved on vicarious liability, the circuit court erred by also disposing of direct-liability theories.

5. Review posture

Whaley v. Beckham, 2016 Ark. 196, 492 S.W.3d 65
Role in the opinion: Once review was granted, the Supreme Court treated the appeal as though originally filed there.

6. Dissent’s authorities (illustrating the competing framework)

The dissent agreed workers’ compensation doctrine should not control, but argued Arkansas’s “general principle” still denies respondeat superior liability for an employee’s commute as a matter of law on these facts. It relied on:

Sweeden v. Atkinson Imp. Co., 93 Ark. 397, 125 S.W. 439 (1910); Davis v. Kukar, 235 Ark. 139, 357 S.W.2d 275 (1962) (scope/control principles).
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7.07, cmt. e (2006) (commute generally outside scope; exceptions where employer provides vehicle/control or employee performs an employer task while traveling).
Jones v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349 (Iowa 1986); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1994) (remote travel and travel reimbursement not necessarily enough to create control/scope).
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wheeling Pipeline, Inc., 263 Ark. 711, 567 S.W.2d 117 (1978) (personal mission taking employee outside scope).
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229, cmt. d (1958); Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460 (N.J. 2003) (commute treated as employee’s own responsibility).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rejection of a categorical “going-and-coming” bar in tort

The circuit court’s dispositive legal error, in the Supreme Court’s view, was treating the workers’ compensation going-and-coming rule as the governing rule for respondeat superior. The majority reframed the commute fact as relevant but not determinative: Conboy being “en route” is “just one of the issues to analyze” under traditional scope-of-employment doctrine.

Van Dalsen provided the doctrinal boundary: workers’ compensation standards do not dictate tort master-servant liability. Knighton, rather than contradicting Van Dalsen, was read as an application of scope/control reasoning in a travel context—not as a wholesale importation of workers’ compensation doctrine into tort.

2. How the court found summary judgment improper despite “undisputed” facts

The Supreme Court’s crucial move was procedural: it agreed “the facts are undisputed” but held the undisputed record still allowed competing reasonable inferences on scope of employment. The court identified facts suggesting that travel was entwined with the enterprise:

Conboy had to authorize access to his driving record.
The job required the “ability to travel, as needed, for projects.”
Comfort Systems’ model depended on sending field employees to remote jobsites.
Comfort Systems adopted a travel policy compensating travel time (and offered per diem options tied to travel behavior).
Comfort Systems could discipline for travel-policy violations and did reprimand Conboy in connection with commuting while taking per diem.

From those facts, the majority concluded a factfinder could reasonably view the commute as sufficiently connected to Comfort Systems’ enterprise (and arguably subject to some employer governance) to support scope-of-employment—making summary judgment inappropriate under Flentje v. First National Bank of Wynne and related cases.

3. Direct-liability claims: the “relief requested” constraint

Even if Comfort Systems ultimately prevails on direct negligence at trial, the circuit court could not end those claims on summary judgment absent a motion targeting them. The court treated this as a due process/fair-notice problem in motion practice: plaintiffs must have an opportunity to respond to the grounds on which judgment is sought. Young v. Staude made the rule explicit.

C. Impact

Doctrinal clarification: Arkansas trial courts may not treat the workers’ compensation going-and-coming rule as controlling in tort respondeat superior cases. The governing framework remains the traditional scope-of-employment inquiry.
Litigation effects: Employers facing accidents during travel to remote jobsites should expect more fact-intensive scope-of-employment litigation, especially where employer travel policies, travel compensation, discipline mechanisms, or safety screening (e.g., driving record checks) can be characterized as employer involvement in travel.
Procedure and motion practice: The decision reinforces that summary judgment must be claim-targeted. If an employer wants to eliminate direct-negligence theories (e.g., negligent supervision, training, or fatigue/overwork practices), it must actually move on them.
Open questions: The majority did not declare that remote travel plus travel pay automatically places an employee in the scope of employment; it held only that these facts can permit competing reasonable inferences, defeating summary judgment.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Respondeat superior / vicarious liability: A rule that can make an employer legally responsible for an employee’s negligence if the employee was acting within the scope of employment.
Scope of employment: A practical test asking whether the employee’s conduct was carrying out the employer’s enterprise (serving the employer’s objectives), rather than being purely personal. Control, benefit to the enterprise, and the nature of the employee’s assignment often matter.
Going-and-coming rule: Commonly used in workers’ compensation to deny coverage for injuries during ordinary commuting. This decision holds that, in Arkansas tort cases, that rule is not automatically controlling; courts must still apply traditional tort scope-of-employment principles.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends claims without a trial, appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even undisputed facts cannot support summary judgment if reasonable people could draw different conclusions from them.
Direct liability vs. vicarious liability: Vicarious liability attributes the employee’s negligence to the employer based on scope of employment. Direct liability alleges the employer’s own negligence (e.g., unsafe practices, negligent supervision). They are distinct theories and must be addressed distinctly in motions.

V. Conclusion

Skala v. Comfort Systems USA, Inc., 2025 Ark. 183, establishes two practical rules with broad significance: (1) Arkansas courts deciding tort respondeat superior claims must apply traditional scope-of-employment principles rather than treating the workers’ compensation going-and-coming rule as a categorical bar; and (2) summary judgment may not dispose of claims not actually put at issue by the motion. In commute-to-jobsite cases—especially involving remote assignments and employer travel policies—the decision makes clear that scope of employment may be a trial question when undisputed facts support competing reasonable inferences.