Repeated Unwanted Touching Can Be “Severe or Pervasive” Under § 1983 and NYSHRL; Stray Sexist Remarks Do Not Establish Intent; Remedial Response Defeats Monell Deliberate-Indifference Theory

Case: Arnold v. Town of Camillus, No. 24-2556-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (Summary Order)

Note: This is a nonprecedential Summary Order under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1. While not binding precedent, it offers persuasive guidance on hostile work environment proofs, discriminatory intent, and municipal liability under Monell.

Introduction

In Arnold v. Town of Camillus, the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a mixed judgment arising from a female police officer’s claims of sex discrimination and hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. L. §§ 290 et seq. The plaintiff, Patricia Arnold, served as a police officer for the Town of Camillus for eight years. She sued the Town and multiple senior officials, including Police Chief Thomas Winn and Captain James Nightingale, alleging a pattern of gender-based harassment—particularly repeated, unnecessary touching by Nightingale—and disparate treatment in the form of denied training and instructional opportunities. She also pursued municipal liability under Monell, asserting a policy or custom of sex discrimination and deliberate indifference by policymakers.

The district court dismissed Arnold’s Monell claims and granted summary judgment to defendants on the remaining claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit revived Arnold’s hostile work environment claims, finding the record sufficient to go to a jury, but affirmed the dismissal of her constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and Monell claims. The panel also underscored key evidentiary and doctrinal points: affidavits are cognizable at summary judgment; the continuing-violation doctrine can allow consideration of otherwise time-barred acts for § 1983 and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims; stray sexist remarks unmoored from a specific decision will not show discriminatory intent; and a remedial response that halts the misconduct can defeat a Monell deliberate-indifference theory.

Summary of the Opinion

Hostile Work Environment (HWE): Vacated summary judgment for defendants on Arnold’s HWE claims under § 1983 and the NYSHRL. The court held a reasonable jury could find that a senior officer’s repeated, unnecessary physical touching over an extended period—observed by colleagues and the subject of a “running joke”—was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of employment.
Constructive Discharge: Affirmed dismissal. Even assuming a triable hostile work environment, the record did not support the higher threshold that defendants intentionally created conditions so intolerable as to force Arnold to resign.
Sex Discrimination (Disparate Treatment): Affirmed summary judgment for defendants on claims predicated on denial of training and instructional opportunities. The court did not reach whether Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) lowers the “adverse employment action” threshold for such claims because Arnold failed to adduce sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent.
Monell Liability: Affirmed both the Rule 12(c) dismissal of the “policy or custom” claim as conclusory and the summary judgment on the “policymaker deliberate indifference” theory. Chief Winn’s response to Arnold’s formal 2019 complaint ended the misconduct, which fell short of the “stringent” deliberate-indifference standard.
Remand: The case returns to the district court for further proceedings on the hostile work environment claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 F.4th 55 (2d Cir. 2023) and Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015): Framed the HWE standard: the workplace must be “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of employment. The court reiterated a totality-of-circumstances approach, considering frequency, severity, physical threat/humiliation, and interference with work.
Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc., 94 F.4th 218 (2d Cir. 2024), Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2001), and Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012): Supported the notion that repeated, unwanted, and unnecessary touching by a supervisor can create an objectively hostile or abusive environment, warranting jury resolution.
King v. Aramark Servs., Inc., 96 F.4th 546 (2d Cir. 2024): The continuing-violation doctrine permitted consideration of otherwise time-barred incidents of harassment for both § 1983 and NYSHRL claims, which expanded the evidentiary window for Arnold’s HWE proof.
Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004): Set the constructive discharge standard—intentional creation of intolerable conditions forcing resignation—which the court held was not met.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024): Clarified that Title VII plaintiffs need not show “significant” employment harm from a transfer, only “some” harm to a term or condition. The panel expressly sidestepped applying Muldrow here, holding the disparate treatment claim failed for lack of evidence of discriminatory intent regardless of the adverse-action standard.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) and Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101 (2d Cir. 2022): Guided the analysis of intent and comparators. A sexist statement must be tied to a policy, practice, or decision to constitute probative evidence of discriminatory intent, and comparator evidence must show similarly situated colleagues “in all material respects.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2020), Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011), and Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004): These authorities set the high bar for municipal liability. A policy or custom must be so persistent and widespread as to carry the force of law; deliberate indifference requires a “stringent” showing that a policymaker’s conscious choice caused the violation. Because the chief’s response to Arnold’s formal complaint stopped the harassment, the record did not meet this standard.
Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc., 62 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023) and Matzell v. Annucci, 64 F.4th 425 (2d Cir. 2023): Provided the standards for reviewing summary judgment and Rule 12(c) judgments, respectively.
Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1995): Authorized affirmance on any ground supported by the record, which the panel relied on to affirm the constructive discharge dismissal on an alternative rationale.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Hostile Work Environment: Repeated Unnecessary Physical Contact Can Be “Severe or Pervasive”

The Second Circuit found that Arnold offered admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that her workplace was “permeated” with sex-based intimidation sufficient to alter her employment conditions. The record included:

Arnold’s sworn affidavit and deposition (both cognizable at summary judgment), describing that “throughout the course” of her career, Captain Nightingale, a senior officer, repeatedly engaged in “unwelcome and offensive touching” of her arms, shoulders, back, and, on one occasion, above her groin, and that these touches were “unnecessary” to perform his job duties.
Corroborating testimony from male officers that they had never experienced or observed Nightingale touching male officers in the same manner, supporting a gender-based inference.
Evidence that the conduct was frequent and noticeable enough to become a “running joke” in the department and that it began years before Arnold started contemporaneous documentation in 2017.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Arnold’s favor, the panel held the district court erred by resolving severity/pervasiveness as a matter of law. The court emphasized a holistic assessment of frequency, physicality, and workplace effect, and noted that the continuing-violation doctrine (King) permitted consideration of older incidents otherwise outside limitations periods.

2) Constructive Discharge: Higher Threshold Not Met

Although reviving the hostile work environment claims, the court affirmed dismissal of constructive discharge. Under Petrosino, the question is whether defendants intentionally created conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign. The record did not support that intentionality or the level of intolerability. This underscores a common distinction: while harassment may be severe or pervasive enough to support an HWE claim, it may fall short of the heightened bar for constructive discharge.

3) Disparate Treatment (Denial of Training/Instruction): Failure of Proof on Discriminatory Intent

Arnold alleged she was denied training and instructional opportunities because of her sex, asserting claims against the Town (under the NYSHRL) and Nightingale (under § 1983). She also argued that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow—holding that Title VII does not require “significant” harm for an adverse action—her claims should proceed. The Second Circuit avoided resolving Muldrow’s scope here by concluding that, regardless of the adverse-action threshold, Arnold failed to present sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent:

Stray remark: Nightingale’s statement that “women shouldn’t be cops,” while plainly offensive, was not linked to any “workplace policy, practice, or decision” concerning Arnold’s training (citing Young). Without a nexus, the comment did not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory purpose for the specific adverse decisions alleged.
Comparator proof: Arnold did not identify male officers similarly situated to her “in all material respects” who received the opportunities she was denied (citing Radwan). Absent robust comparator evidence, the inference of discriminatory motive was insufficient.

Result: Summary judgment for defendants on the disparate treatment claims was affirmed.

4) Monell Liability: Conclusory Policy Allegations and Insufficient Deliberate Indifference

Arnold advanced two Monell theories: (i) a widespread policy or custom of sex discrimination, and (ii) deliberate indifference by a municipal policymaker, Police Chief Winn.

Policy or custom (Rule 12(c) dismissal affirmed): The complaint’s assertions of a Town-wide policy or custom of discriminating against women were “conclusory,” lacking facts to plausibly show practices “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law” (Lucente). Mere allegations of isolated mistreatment, without breadth, recurrence, or similar incidents involving other employees, are insufficient.
Policymaker deliberate indifference (summary judgment affirmed): Monell requires a “stringent standard of fault” (Cash). A municipality can be liable where senior personnel know of a pattern of unconstitutional acts yet fail to take remedial steps (Lucente), but Arnold did not dispute that Chief Winn addressed her only formal complaint in 2019 and that Nightingale’s conduct stopped thereafter. That cessation undermines any claim that the chief made a “deliberate choice” that effectively became municipal policy or caused a subsequent violation (Amnesty America). In short, the remedial action defeated the deliberate-indifference theory.

Evidentiary and Procedural Takeaways

Affidavits at summary judgment: Defendants sought to limit review to Arnold’s deposition, but the court clarified that both her sworn affidavit and deposition are admissible forms of evidence at the summary judgment stage.
Continuing-violation doctrine: The panel explicitly applied King to permit consideration of otherwise time-barred incidents of harassment for § 1983 and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims. This can be case-dispositive where earlier episodes show pervasiveness.
Nonprecedential but instructive: Although a Summary Order, the panel’s reasoning provides practical guidance likely to be cited persuasively in district courts across the Second Circuit.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Employees and Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Hostile environment proof: Repeated, nonessential, and unwanted touching by a supervisor—especially when corroborated by coworkers and undirected at male colleagues—can readily create a triable hostile environment. Document incidents contemporaneously where possible; affidavits may supplement deposition testimony at summary judgment.
Use of older incidents: Invoke the continuing-violation doctrine to include earlier episodes that illustrate frequency and pervasiveness. King confirms this approach for § 1983 and NYSHRL harassment claims.
Intent for disparate treatment: Stray or generalized sexist remarks will not carry a discrimination claim without a clear nexus to the adverse decision. Develop evidence tying the remark to the decisionmaker, timing, and the specific denial of an opportunity. Robust comparator evidence must show similarity “in all material respects.”
Monell hurdles: Municipal liability is demanding. To plead a policy/custom, marshal multiple, similar incidents demonstrating pervasiveness beyond a single employee’s experience. For deliberate indifference, show policymaker knowledge and an inaction that allowed misconduct to continue, causing a subsequent violation; if remedial steps halted the conduct, the claim will likely fail.

For Municipalities and Employers

Prompt, effective remediation matters: The panel’s reliance on the cessation of misconduct after the chief’s response to a formal complaint highlights that timely remedial action may defeat Monell deliberate-indifference theories.
Training and supervision: Recurrent “unnecessary” physical contact—even lacking overtly sexual content—can create litigation risk. Train supervisors and line officers on boundaries and document prompt corrective actions.
Decision documentation: Where training or assignments are denied, articulate, document, and consistently apply neutral criteria. That record can rebut inferences of discriminatory intent and neutralize “stray remark” risks.

Unresolved or Clarified Doctrinal Points

Muldrow’s reach: The Second Circuit declined to decide whether Muldrow’s more lenient adverse-action standard controls § 1983 and NYSHRL disparate treatment claims or how it applies to denials of training/instruction. This remains an open question warranting close attention in future cases.
Standard for NYSHRL harassment: The panel applied the familiar “severe or pervasive” formulation to both § 1983 and NYSHRL hostile work environment claims. Practitioners should track evolving case law regarding whether and when NYSHRL standards may diverge in light of statutory amendments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hostile Work Environment: Harassment is actionable if it is severe or pervasive enough to change the terms and conditions of employment. Courts look at frequency, severity, physicality, humiliation, and interference with work—assessing the total picture, not isolated incidents in a vacuum.
Continuing-Violation Doctrine: When a hostile environment is a series of related acts, a plaintiff may rely on earlier incidents that would otherwise be time-barred, provided at least one act falls within the limitations period.
Constructive Discharge: A high bar requiring proof that the employer intentionally created working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign.
Adverse Employment Action (Disparate Treatment): Traditionally, a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment. After Muldrow, Title VII does not require “significant” harm for transfer claims, but the Second Circuit here did not decide the standard’s application beyond Title VII.
Direct Evidence vs. Stray Remarks: Direct evidence ties discriminatory statements directly to the decision at issue (policy, practice, or decision). Stray remarks lacking a nexus to the adverse action typically carry little probative weight.
Comparator Evidence: To show disparate treatment, plaintiffs should identify colleagues who are “similarly situated in all material respects” (same role, performance, supervisors, and relevant circumstances) who received favorable treatment.
Monell Liability: Municipalities are not vicariously liable for employees’ constitutional torts. Liability attaches only if the injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom, or by a policymaker’s deliberate choice amounting to official policy. “Deliberate indifference” is a stringent, causation-focused standard.

Conclusion

Arnold v. Town of Camillus offers a comprehensive map of contemporary harassment and municipal-liability litigation, even in a nonprecedential format. It highlights that:

Repeated, unnecessary physical touching by a supervisor—especially coupled with corroboration and differential treatment compared to male colleagues—can support a jury finding of a hostile work environment under § 1983 and the NYSHRL.
Constructive discharge remains a distinct, higher hurdle, demanding proof of intentionally engineered intolerable conditions.
Disparate treatment claims require more than offensive statements; plaintiffs must connect remarks to specific decisions and present materially similar comparators to show discriminatory intent.
Monell liability is exacting. Conclusory policy allegations fail, and a policymaker’s remedial steps that halt misconduct typically defeat deliberate-indifference theories.

The decision’s practical lessons—especially regarding evidentiary sufficiency, the continuing-violation doctrine, and the criticality of prompt remedial action—will shape how parties litigate, prove, and defend harassment and municipal-liability claims in the Second Circuit going forward.