Refusal to Engage in Reunification Services and Violations of Court Orders Permit Termination Without Less-Restrictive Alternatives and Justify Denial of Post‑Termination Visitation

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re G.J., No. 24-482 (Kanawha County), issued September 30, 2025. Petitioner Father M.J. appealed the circuit court’s July 18, 2024 order terminating his parental rights to G.J. and denying post‑termination visitation. He argued the circuit court should have employed less‑restrictive alternatives and erred in denying him continued contact after termination.

The case arises from a September 2023 abuse and neglect petition filed by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) alleging domestic violence toward the child’s mother, physical and emotional abuse of a sibling (T.J., then 16), and neglect of the children’s basic needs. Central to the appeal were two questions:

• Whether termination of parental rights was permissible without first attempting less‑restrictive alternatives where the father refused services and violated court orders;
• Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying post‑termination visitation in the absence of evidence that continued contact would serve the child’s best interests.

The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the record supported termination under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604 without resort to less‑restrictive alternatives and that the denial of post‑termination visitation was proper given the father’s noncompliance, repeated order violations, lack of accountability, and ongoing safety concerns.

Summary of the Opinion

Proceeding by memorandum decision under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure (oral argument deemed unnecessary), the Court affirmed the circuit court’s order. The key determinations were:

• Termination without less‑restrictive alternatives: Where there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be corrected in the near future, termination “may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” (relying on Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., quoting In re R.J.M.). The father’s refusal to participate in services, violations of no‑contact orders, and denial of wrongdoing supported the finding.
• Denial of post‑termination visitation: Post‑termination contact is discretionary and must be supported by evidence that visitation would not be detrimental and is in the child’s best interests (In re Christina L.; In re Daniel D.). The record showed continued noncompliance, boundary‑violating conduct, and risk factors, with no evidence of benefit to the child; thus, denial was not an abuse of discretion.
• Sibling‑abuse adjudication: The father’s argument that there was no abuse specific to G.J. failed because the statutory definition of “abused child” includes a child whose welfare is harmed or threatened by a parent who inflicts injury on “another child in the home” (W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201).

Applying the clear-error standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (In re Cecil T.), the Court refused to reweigh evidence or reassess credibility determinations (In re D.S.; State v. Guthrie). The permanency plan left G.J. in the custody of the nonabusing mother, consistent with authority to terminate one parent’s rights while leaving the other’s intact (In re Emily).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) — Standard of Review. The Court reiterated that it defers to circuit court factual findings unless clearly erroneous and reviews legal conclusions de novo. This framed the appellate posture: given competent evidence of noncompliance, order violations, and risk, the Court would not substitute its judgment.
• In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) — Less‑restrictive alternatives not required. The controlling syllabus point authorizes termination without intermediate alternatives when § 49‑4‑604’s “no reasonable likelihood” standard is met. This authority foreclosed the father’s argument that the court should have “simply limited contact,” especially given his refusal to engage in services and disregard of orders.
• In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) — Accountability as a prerequisite to remediation. The Court invoked the established principle that failure to acknowledge the problem renders it untreatable. Here, the father denied abuse, minimized conduct (“swatting”), and disclaimed the need for services, supporting the “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
• In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000) — Termination of one parent’s rights while maintaining the nonabusing parent’s rights. This precedent rebutted the father’s reliance on the child’s placement with the mother as a reason to avoid termination; the statute and case law permit asymmetric outcomes when warranted.
• In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) and In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002) (Syl. Pt. 11) — Post‑termination visitation. These cases set the discretionary, best‑interest framework: consider emotional bond and mature child’s wishes; visitation must not be detrimental. With no evidence of benefit and ample evidence of risk and boundary violations, the denial was within discretion.
• In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025) and State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) — Appellate deference to credibility and weight of evidence. These authorities reinforced that the Supreme Court would not reassess credibility or reweigh conflicting evidence presented to the circuit court.
• W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604 — Dispositional provisions for termination. The “no reasonable likelihood” standard and best‑interest requirements grounded the circuit court’s termination decision.
• W. Va. Code § 49‑1‑201 — Definition of “abused child.” The Court underscored that abuse of a sibling can establish abuse as to another child in the home where the parent’s conduct creates harm or threat of harm.
• Rule 15, W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proceedings; In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025) (n.21) — Emerging standards for post‑termination visitation. While not applied retroactively here, the Court noted provisional amendments to Rule 15 adopting standards for post‑termination visitation “outside of a fact‑based context,” foreshadowing a more structured analysis in future cases.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Adjudication and evidentiary foundation. The circuit court received testimony from a CPS worker and in camera testimony from the older sibling, T.J., describing intoxicated, aggressive behavior and belt strikes. The father admitted to corporal punishment (“swatting” with a belt) and marijuana use, denied domestic violence and drug dealing, and admitted violating no‑contact orders to attend the child’s birthday and sporting events. These facts supported adjudication of abuse and neglect as to G.J. based on direct exposure to abusive dynamics and the statutory inclusion of harm to “another child in the home.”

Dispositional decision: “No reasonable likelihood” and best interests. At disposition, DHS showed—and the father confirmed—that he refused nearly all reunification services (drug/alcohol screening, parenting classes, supervised visitation), withheld his address, and failed to accept responsibility. A forensic evaluator reported no acceptance of responsibility, poor benefit from prior services, and a high risk of relapse. The court found:

• No reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse or neglect could be corrected in the near future;
• Termination was in G.J.’s best interests because of ongoing safety concerns (active addiction, unmanaged domestic violence/anger issues, boundary violations, and detachment from the child).

Under Kristin Y./R.J.M., these findings made resort to less‑restrictive alternatives unnecessary. The father’s proposal to “simply limit contact” was untenable given his refusal to comply with even basic supervision and his history of violating court orders.

Post‑termination visitation: Discretion and the best‑interest standard. Christina L. and Daniel D. allow post‑termination contact in “appropriate cases,” conditioned on evidence that visitation aligns with the child’s best interests and is not detrimental. The record here cut the other way: the father refused supervised visitation throughout the case, repeatedly breached no‑contact orders, and never accepted responsibility. With no affirmative evidence of a close, healthy bond supporting continued contact and substantial evidence of risk, the circuit court’s denial of post‑termination visitation was within its discretion.

Appellate posture and scope of review. The father did not meaningfully challenge the circuit court’s factual findings (noncompliance, order violations, lack of accountability). Given the clear-error standard for facts and the Court’s refusal to reweigh credibility, the affirmance followed established appellate principles.

Sibling-abuse argument rejected. The father’s claim that “nothing suggested” he abused G.J. failed because § 49‑1‑201 extends the definition of “abused child” to those whose welfare is threatened by a parent who harms another child in the home. The Court’s footnote directly invoked this statutory language, disposing of the argument.

3) Impact and Practical Consequences

For parents and counsel: The decision sends a clear signal: declining court‑ordered services, refusing to provide basic information, and violating no‑contact orders all weigh decisively toward termination without intermediate steps. A parent’s persistent denial of wrongdoing (“failure to acknowledge”) is often outcome‑determinative because it renders problems “untreatable,” foreclosing the “reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future.

For circuit courts: The case reinforces that when robust evidence supports a § 49‑4‑604(c) “no reasonable likelihood” finding, the court need not exhaust lesser alternatives. It also affirms broad discretion to deny post‑termination visitation absent affirmative, credible evidence that continued contact would serve the child’s best interests and be non‑detrimental, especially where the parent has a track record of boundary violations.

For DHS and guardians ad litem: The record demonstrates the importance of developing and clearly documenting (1) service offerings and the parent’s responses; (2) concrete instances of court‑order violations; (3) expert assessments (e.g., parental fitness evaluations) addressing accountability and relapse risk; and (4) any evidence (or lack thereof) regarding the child’s bond and wishes relevant to post‑termination contact.

Sibling-abuse doctrine reaffirmed: Practitioners should remember that abuse of one child can support adjudication and disposition as to siblings under § 49‑1‑201’s “another child in the home” language. Arguments that isolate harm to a single child are unlikely to succeed if the underlying parental conduct threatens the welfare of all children in the home.

Looking ahead to Rule 15. Although the Court applied pre‑amendment standards, its nod to the provisional amendments to Rule 15 (as noted in In re Z.D.-1) signals that a more structured, rule‑based framework for post‑termination visitation is now in place. Future litigants should brief both the Christina L./Daniel D. factors and the specific Rule 15 criteria in effect at the time of disposition to ensure a comprehensive, standards‑driven analysis of continued contact after termination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Memorandum decision (Rule 21): A streamlined appellate disposition used when oral argument is unnecessary and no new point of law is announced. It still applies existing law to the facts and is authoritative in the case.
• Standard of review: “Clear error” for factual findings means the appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they lack evidentiary support or are plainly wrong. “De novo” for legal issues means fresh review without deference.
• “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49‑4‑604): A dispositional standard allowing termination when, despite services, the parent is unlikely to correct abusive or neglectful conditions in the near future. Persistent noncompliance, denial of problems, or ongoing substance use/violence commonly satisfy this standard.
• Less‑restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., continued supervised visitation, guardianship). Under West Virginia law, courts are not required to implement these if § 49‑4‑604’s “no reasonable likelihood” threshold is met and termination serves the child’s best interests.
• Post‑termination visitation: Discretionary contact between the child and a parent whose rights have been terminated. It is permitted only if proven to be in the child’s best interests and non‑detrimental, considering factors like emotional bond and the child’s mature wishes.
• “Abused child” includes sibling‑abuse exposure: A child is “abused” if the parent harms or threatens harm to “another child in the home.” Abuse of a sibling can justify intervention and termination as to all children exposed to the offending parent.
• In camera testimony: Testimony heard privately by the judge (often from a child), outside the presence of other parties, to protect the witness and elicit candid evidence.
• Parental fitness evaluation: A forensic assessment of a parent’s insight, risk factors (e.g., relapse), capacity to safely parent, and responsiveness to services; commonly used at disposition.

Conclusion

In re G.J. does not announce a novel rule but sharply applies settled West Virginia law to a stark record of noncompliance and order violations. The Supreme Court affirmed termination without less‑restrictive alternatives where the father refused services, denied responsibility, and undermined court‑ordered boundaries—conduct that made remediation unlikely in the near future and posed ongoing risk. It likewise affirmed the denial of post‑termination visitation, emphasizing that such contact is exceptional and must be supported by credible evidence of benefit and safety.

Two doctrinal points stand out for future cases. First, sibling abuse remains a sufficient statutory predicate for adjudication and termination as to other children in the home. Second, while Christina L./Daniel D. continue to guide post‑termination visitation, the Court’s reference to the 2025 provisional amendments to Rule 15 signals a more standardized approach going forward. For parents, the practical message is clear: engage fully and promptly with court‑ordered services, respect judicial boundaries, and accept responsibility. For courts and practitioners, the decision reinforces that when those conditions are absent, termination—and the denial of continued contact—will be sustained.