Refining Kentucky’s Standards on Lesser-Included Offenses, Alternate Perpetrator Evidence, and KRE 404(b):
Commentary on Jonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Note: This is an analytical commentary on an unpublished memorandum opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (2024-SC-0448-MR, rendered December 18, 2025). Under RAP 40(D), the opinion itself is not binding precedent, but may be cited in limited circumstances when no published opinion adequately addresses the issue. This commentary is for educational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s memorandum opinion in Jonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky affirms a life sentence for a homicide and arson committed in 2014, but its real significance lies in three doctrinal areas:

The threshold for a defendant’s entitlement to lesser-included offense instructions (both homicide and arson, and the related self-defense instruction);
The limits of a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense via alternate perpetrator (“aaltperp”) evidence and how that right interacts with the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, especially relevance and hearsay; and
The admissibility of prior or collateral acts evidence under KRE 404(b), specifically a “controlled burn” request, framed as “complete-the-story” evidence.

Although the opinion is unpublished, it synthesizes and applies a line of relatively recent Kentucky Supreme Court cases—including Allen, Oakes, Hudson, Hedgepath, Gray, Melton, and Bell—in a way that provides a clear, concrete example of how these doctrines play out in practice in a homicide prosecution built on circumstantial proof.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Events

In July 2014, both appellant Jonathan Puckett and victim Thomas Ray (“Tommy”) Pendygraft worked second shift at Wilbert Plastics in Lebanon, Kentucky. Because Puckett did not have a car, Pendygraft sometimes gave him rides.

The core sequence of events, as reconstructed at trial, was as follows:

Payday evening (July 31, 2014): Puckett obtained a ride from his friend, Joseph Chaudoin, to Wilbert Plastics to get his paycheck. That evening, while Pendygraft worked, Puckett broke into Pendygraft’s vehicle, stole Lortab pills, sold some, and gave some to his girlfriend. When confronted on a break, Puckett denied involvement.
Parking lot encounters: Puckett remained around Wilbert Plastics, contacting Chaudoin several times, telling him to “stay up” for a later ride without disclosing his exact location.
Walmart trip: Around midnight, after shift end, Pendygraft and coworkers lingered, then went to his car to smoke marijuana and found Puckett already inside. After coworkers left, Puckett and Pendygraft drove to Walmart. Pendygraft cashed his $404 paycheck and bought items including a lighter and lighter fluid. Puckett remained outside and again contacted Chaudoin about a future ride.
Drive to Booker Road: After a gas station stop and arrangements to buy drugs, they drove to Booker Road, parking near a reservoir around 1:35 a.m. Puckett instructed Chaudoin to wait at a McDonald’s in Springfield for further directions.
Homicide and arson: Sometime close to 2:00 a.m., Pendygraft was killed. His body was left in the car, which was then set on fire.
Post-crime movements: Between 2:05 and 2:15 a.m., a driver, Shelby McCain, saw a man matching Puckett’s description walking on Booker Road toward Highway 55 and, moments later, passed Pendygraft’s car fully engulfed in flames. At 2:17 a.m., Chaudoin and his girlfriend picked Puckett up on Booker Road and drove him home. His girlfriend later testified that Puckett smelled of smoke and gasoline; he immediately placed his clothes in the washing machine and showered. Police later seized these clothes.
Discovery of the body and investigation: The next morning, a passerby discovered the smoldering car and human remains inside. Kentucky State Police (KSP) investigated. Due to the intensity of the fire, the medical examiner could not determine the precise cause or manner of death, though he concluded Pendygraft died before the fire. The arson investigator placed the origin of the fire in the front passenger seat but could not determine ignition source or accelerant.
Puckett’s statements and phone evidence: Puckett gave evolving accounts of his whereabouts, initially denying he had been on Booker Road at all, later conceding he had been there but claiming innocence in the killing and fire. KSP obtained his phone and extracted data, including call logs and recordings from an app that captured some of his phone conversations. These records corroborated his being picked up by Chaudoin, his possession of the stolen Lortabs, his presence with Pendygraft at Wilbert Plastics and Walmart, and his request for a ride after the time of death.
Delay in prosecution: Puckett left Kentucky soon after the investigation began, having absconded from parole, and was later convicted of assault in Texas. After serving his Texas sentence he was extradited back to Kentucky, and only in 2023 was he indicted.

B. Charges, Trial, and Verdict

The Washington County grand jury indicted Puckett for:

Murder;
First-degree arson (later amended to second-degree arson at directed verdict stage);
Abuse of a corpse;
Tampering with physical evidence; and
Being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO).

On Puckett’s motion in limine, the abuse-of-a-corpse charge was dismissed as time-barred by the statute of limitations. At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court denied Puckett’s motion for a directed verdict on all counts except to reduce the arson charge from first to second degree.

The Commonwealth’s theory was that Puckett, who owed money to others, killed Pendygraft to obtain his paycheck and possibly also due to the theft of the Lortabs, and then burned the vehicle to conceal evidence. Puckett’s defense was a categorical denial: he maintained he did not kill Pendygraft and did not set the fire.

He sought:

Jury instructions on numerous lesser-included homicide offenses (wanton murder, first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, reckless homicide) and on self-protection (self-defense);
A lesser-included instruction on third-degree arson; and
Introduction of alternate perpetrator (aaltperp) evidence suggesting that one James Douglas Ray, rather than Puckett, was responsible.

The trial court refused to give the requested lesser-included and self-defense instructions and excluded parts of the proffered aaltperp evidence. The jury convicted Puckett of:

Intentional murder;
Second-degree arson;
Tampering with physical evidence; and
Being a first-degree PFO.

The trial court imposed a life sentence on the jury’s recommendation.

C. Issues on Appeal

Puckett raised three principal claims:

The trial court violated his right to a fair trial and to present a defense by refusing jury instructions on lesser-included forms of homicide and arson and on self-protection.
The court violated his right to present a defense by excluding certain aaltperp evidence related to statements by witness Shelly Lyons and KSP Detective Davis (and, similarly, limitations on questioning of KSP Sergeant Gregory).
The court denied him a fair trial by admitting alleged propensity evidence under KRE 404(b)—specifically, a recording of his request for a “controlled burn” on the morning after the homicide.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Puckett’s conviction and life sentence, holding:

No entitlement to lesser-included or self-defense instructions. There was no evidentiary basis from which a reasonable juror could find that Puckett acted with a less culpable mental state than “intentional” regarding either the homicide or the arson, nor any basis for self-defense where Puckett’s sole theory was complete non-involvement.
No reversible error in the exclusion or limitation of alternate perpetrator evidence.
- Part of the Lyons testimony about an alleged statement by Ray (“about to do it just like [he] did in 2014”) was waived because defense counsel conceded at trial that she was not seeking to admit that statement.
- Limiting Detective Davis’s testimony regarding Ray’s refusal to provide DNA was within the trial court’s discretion under the relevance and KRE 403 framework for aaltperp evidence as articulated in Hedgepath and Gray. Even if error, it was harmless given the strength of the Commonwealth’s case and the limited additional probative value.
No abuse of discretion in admitting the “controlled burn” recording under KRE 404(b). The August 1, 2014 phone call requesting permission for a controlled burn was properly admitted as part of the “complete, unfragmented, unartificial picture” of Puckett’s actions and phone activity around the time of the offense, and its probative value outweighed any unfair prejudice.

In each instance, the Court emphasized the abuse-of-discretion standard, the need for concrete evidentiary support before instructing on lesser offenses or admitting speculative aaltperp theories, and the legitimacy of contextual “story-completion” evidence under KRE 404(b).

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Court’s Framing of the Case

The Court set the stage by stating the standard of review for Puckett’s claims:

Jury instructions: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Taylor v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 36 (Ky. 2023)).
Evidentiary rulings: Also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Roberson v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2024)).

An abuse of discretion exists only when the trial court’s decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” The Court reaffirmed that great deference is owed to trial judges as “in the best position to evaluate the evidence” (Bailey v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 296 (Ky. 2006)).

Strategically, this framing is important: it signals that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or second-guess every close evidentiary or instructional call. Instead, reversal is confined to decisions that clearly fall outside the bounds of reasonable judicial judgment.

B. Lesser-Included Offenses and Self-Defense Instructions

1. Governing Law and Precedents

Puckett sought several lesser-included instructions on homicide and arson, along with a self-defense instruction. The opinion draws on a well-developed line of Kentucky cases about when a defendant is entitled to such instructions.

a. Defendant’s right to have issues raised by the evidence instructed

In Allen v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 252 (Ky. 2011), the Court held that a defendant has the right to have “every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to the defense submitted to the jury on proper instructions.” While lesser-included offenses are not affirmative defenses, the Court in Allen described them as “in fact and principle, a defense against the higher charge,” and thus part of the right to present a defense.

Allen also articulates the central test for when a lesser-included instruction is required:

An instruction on a lesser-included offense is appropriate if, and only if, on the given evidence a reasonable juror could entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the greater charge but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the lesser charge.

b. Evidence-based limitation on lesser-included instructions

In Oakes v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2010), the Court emphasized that lesser-included instructions cannot be given based on hypothetical or “imaginary scenarios.” There must be actual evidentiary support for the lesser mental state or elements. The Court quoted White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. 2006), underscoring that juries must decide cases on “the evidence as presented or reasonably deducible therefrom, not on imaginary scenarios.”

Relatedly, Hudson v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2012), holds that trial courts must not instruct on theories “unsupported by the evidence,” and Mash v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 548 (Ky. 2012), reiterates the “rational juror” standard akin to Allen.

c. Self-defense instructions where defendant denies any involvement

For self-defense, the Court cites Turner v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2018), which in turn relies on a long-standing principle from Fitch v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1937): where a defendant’s position is complete denial of committing the homicide at all, he is ordinarily not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Exceptions are rare and did not apply to Puckett.

2. Application to the Homicide Charges

a. The requested lesser-included offenses

Puckett requested instructions on:

Wanton murder (KRS 507.020(1)(b)): “wantonly engag[ing] in conduct which creates a grave risk of death … and thereby caus[ing] the death.”
First-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.030(1)(a)): intent to cause serious physical injury, but death results.
Second-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.040(1)): “wantonly caus[ing] the death of another person.”
Reckless homicide (KRS 507.050(1)): “recklessly” causing the death of another person.

Each represents a less culpable mental state than intentional murder under KRS 507.020(1)(a), which requires an intent to cause death.

b. The Court’s reasoning

The Court stressed a key factual point: Puckett did not offer an alternative version of events suggesting a lesser mental state—he did not argue accident, panic, mutual combat, or intent only to injure, nor did he present any evidence of provocation or confusion at the time of killing. His defense was binary: “I did not do it.”

In that posture, the evidence, if believed, supported that Puckett:

Traveled with Pendygraft alone to an isolated area near the reservoir in the early morning hours;
Was with him around the time he was killed;
Was seen walking away from the area moments before the burning car was observed; and
Engaged in numerous suspicious post-crime actions (calling multiple people about Pendygraft’s whereabouts, asking about the jail, washing smoky gasoline-smelling clothes immediately, etc.).

Thus, the Court framed the jury’s choice as the familiar Oakes dichotomy: either Puckett intentionally killed Pendygraft (as the Commonwealth argued) or he was not involved at all (as he claimed). Absent any evidence plausibly supporting an intermediate mental state, instructing on wantonness or recklessness would have invited “imaginary” conjecture, exactly what Oakes and White forbid.

Consequently, no reasonable juror could rationally acquit on intentional murder yet convict on one of the less culpable homicide offenses based on the presented evidence. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by refusing those instructions.

3. Application to Arson: No Third-Degree Arson Instruction

Second-degree arson (KRS 513.030(1)) requires that the defendant act “with intent to destroy or damage” a building or vehicle by starting a fire, while third-degree arson (KRS 513.040(1)) requires that he “wantonly cause[] destruction or damage” by fire.

Puckett argued he was entitled to a third-degree instruction because the arson investigator could not exclude faulty wiring as a possible cause of the fire, i.e., there was uncertainty about the ignition source. The Court rejected this argument for two reasons:

As with homicide, Puckett offered no evidence that he started the fire at all, much less that he did so wantonly rather than intentionally. His sole position was non-involvement, leaving no factual basis for an intermediate mental state.
The inability of the investigator to exclude faulty wiring is not affirmative evidence that Puckett acted wantonly. The jury was free to weigh that testimony against the other evidence suggesting intentional arson (e.g., timing, concealment of the body, circumstances). They evidently credited the prosecution’s theory of an intentional fire.

Again invoking Hudson, the Court held that the trial court had no duty to instruct on an offense “unsupported by the evidence.” The reasonable juror could either believe Puckett intentionally set the fire or that he did not set it at all; there was no evidentiary foothold for a finding of mere wantonness.

4. Self-Defense Instruction

Puckett also tendered an instruction on self-protection (self-defense), though the opinion notes that he made no specific appellate argument regarding his entitlement to that instruction beyond referencing its inclusion in his tendered packet.

Citing Turner and Fitch, the Court reaffirmed the rule that where a defendant completely denies committing the homicide, he is, with rare exceptions, not entitled to a self-defense instruction. The rationale is straightforward: self-defense is a justification that admits the act but lawfully excuses it under the circumstances. A defendant cannot simultaneously maintain “I didn’t do it” and “I did it, but I was justified,” without some evidentiary basis supporting the latter theory.

Nothing in Puckett’s case fit any exception; he maintained non-involvement. The Court therefore concluded he was not entitled to such an instruction.

Takeaway: This opinion underscores that in Kentucky, a defense strategy of total innocence sharply limits access to lesser-mental-state and self-defense instructions. Defendants must present some affirmative evidentiary basis for a lesser mental state or justification to warrant these instructions.

C. Alternate Perpetrator Evidence and the Right to Present a Defense

1. Legal Framework for Aaltperp Evidence

Puckett’s second assignment of error was that the trial court violated his right to present a defense by limiting alternate perpetrator evidence related to James Douglas Ray. Two distinct doctrines are in play:

Constitutional right to present a defense (Sixth Amendment and due process), and
Ordinary evidentiary rules of relevance, hearsay, and KRE 403 balancing.

In Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 2014), the Court recognized that a defendant may, in some circumstances, offer aaltperp evidence “even when its admission would contradict the Rules of Evidence.” This reflects constitutional concerns that rigid application of evidence rules not arbitrarily bar exculpatory evidence showing someone else may have committed the crime.

However, Hedgepath does not create an anything-goes exception. The Court cited Gray v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2016), for the controlling standard:

The “critical question” is relevance: does the evidence make a consequential fact more or less likely?
The trial court evaluates such evidence under KRE 403, mindful that “speculative, far-fetched theories” may confuse or mislead the jury.
The defense must offer “something more than simple relevance” to overcome the dangers of confusion or deception. There must be a concrete, non-speculative connection between the third party and the crime.

Thus, aaltperp evidence is not automatically admitted merely because it suggests someone else could have been the perpetrator. It must clear the relevance and probative-value thresholds, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by risks such as confusion or prejudice.

2. The Lyons Testimony and Waiver

Defense witness Shelly Lyons testified about an incident in which Ray arrived at her home covered in blood, and her husband took a gas can and left with him. She placed that event in 2016 at a home on Horan Lane and was confident it did not occur in 2014.

During her testimony, the Commonwealth objected to a statement Lyons attributed to Ray—namely, that he was “about to do it just like [he] did in 2014”—as hearsay. Defense counsel conceded that Lyons could not testify to Ray’s statements and expressly stated that she was not seeking to introduce Ray’s statement about 2014.

The Supreme Court treated this as a waiver of any claim that the trial court erred in excluding that statement. Citing Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 314 (Ky. 2023), and federal cases (Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)), the Court distinguished between:

Forfeiture – failure to make a timely assertion of a right; and
Waiver – the intentional relinquishment of a known right.

Waiver precludes appellate review; the court will not scrutinize a ruling that defense counsel expressly accepted or invited. Here, by acknowledging the hearsay problem and deliberately choosing not to seek admission of Ray’s 2014 reference, Puckett’s counsel waived that argument.

3. Detective Davis, Ray’s DNA, and KRE 403

Later, defense counsel questioned KSP Detective Davis about investigating other potential suspects, including Ray. Davis testified that he did investigate Ray’s possible involvement. When defense counsel tried to ask whether Ray had been asked to provide DNA samples, the Commonwealth objected. The trial court sustained the objection, reasoning that any testimony about Ray consenting or refusing to provide DNA would be hearsay if it relayed Ray’s out-of-court statements.

On appeal, Puckett argued that this limitation violated his right to present a defense and that, under Hedgepath, the trial court should have admitted the evidence even if technically inconsistent with ordinary evidentiary rules.

The Supreme Court, applying Gray and KRE 403, concluded:

The trial court was obliged to evaluate the relevance and risk of confusion of such evidence.
The only concrete evidence regarding Ray was:
- Lyons’s account of an incident occurring in 2016 (two years after the crime), in a different context; and
- The fact that police had investigated individuals other than Puckett, including Ray.
Ray’s alleged refusal to provide DNA, layered on top of Lyons’s distant-in-time anecdote, would risk pushing the jury toward speculative, far-fetched theories about Ray’s involvement, with minimal additional probative value.

The Court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that this would unduly confuse or mislead the jury, particularly given the tenuous temporal and factual link between Ray and the 2014 homicide. Thus, under KRE 403 and Gray, excluding that specific statement was not an abuse of discretion.

4. Harmless Error Analysis (RCr 9.24)

The Court added an alternative holding: even if exclusion of Davis’s testimony about Ray’s DNA were error, it would be harmless under RCr 9.24. Citing Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678 (Ky. 2009), and Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), an evidentiary error warrants reversal only if it “substantially swayed” the judgment.

The Court observed that:

The jury already heard aaltperp evidence:
- Lyons’s testimony about Ray appearing covered in blood and her husband leaving with a gas can; and
- Testimony that KSP investigated individuals other than Puckett, including Ray. Sergeant Gregory specifically testified that Ray was interviewed, though no warrants for his DNA or phone were obtained.
The jury, having heard this, still rejected the aaltperp theory in favor of the strong circumstantial case against Puckett.
There was no “substantial possibility” that adding one more hearsay-based detail (Ray’s refusal to give DNA) would have changed the verdict.

Thus, even if the evidentiary call was flawed, it could not have substantially influenced the outcome and does not justify reversal.

Takeaway: Puckett exemplifies a two-tiered approach:
(1) Aaltperp evidence must do more than offer a thin, speculative suspicion of someone else; and
(2) Even where trial courts err at the margins, appellate relief will be denied if the omitted evidence is unlikely to have altered the jury’s decision in light of the full record.

D. KRE 404(b) and “Complete-The-Story” Evidence: The Controlled Burn

1. The Disputed Evidence

On August 1, 2014, the morning after the murder and car fire, Puckett made a phone call to request permission for a “controlled burn.” The Commonwealth gave KRE 404(b) notice that it intended to introduce evidence of multiple controlled burns Puckett had sought approval for between May and August 2014. After a hearing, the trial court limited the Commonwealth to introducing only the single August 1 call, via a recording from Puckett’s phone.

On appeal, Puckett argued that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it suggested to the jury that he had a propensity for setting fires and thus should not have been admitted.

2. Legal Framework: KRE 404(b) and Bell

KRE 404(b) bars evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered solely to show that a person acted in conformity with a bad character or predisposition. However, such evidence may be admitted if it is:

Probative of a legitimate issue other than character (e.g., motive, intent, plan, identity, absence of mistake); and
Its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

The Court quoted Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994), which encapsulates the rule: evidence of other conduct is admissible only if (1) it is relevant to an issue independent of character, and (2) its probative value outweighs unfair prejudice.

3. “Complete, Unfragmented Picture” – Melton and Adkins

The Supreme Court grounded its analysis in the principle that the Commonwealth, like the defense, has the right to present a “complete, un-fragmented, un-artificial picture of the crime” and the ensuing investigation. This “complete-the-story” notion was recently reaffirmed in Commonwealth v. Melton, 670 S.W.3d 861 (Ky. 2023), and earlier in Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779 (Ky. 2003).

In Puckett, the Court accepted the Commonwealth’s original trial-level argument that the August 1 controlled burn call was part of a larger pattern of phone calls that shed light on Puckett’s behavior immediately after the crime. The phone records, including this call, served to:

Chronicle Puckett’s numerous contacts on August 1—calls to:
- Chaudoin and his girlfriend;
- His mother (asking if she had heard about anything at the reservoir);
- The Marion County Detention Center (asking if Pendygraft was in custody);
- Pendygraft’s cell phone (leaving voicemail messages); and
- Others, explaining his whereabouts and inquiring about Pendygraft.
Provide context to his mental state and concern about what had happened, which the jury could view as consciousness of guilt.

The controlled burn call was presented as one part of this broader call pattern, not as a stand-alone “bad act” to show fire-setting propensity. While on appeal the Commonwealth additionally suggested the call showed lawful compliance with burning regulations (and hence was not a “bad act” at all), the Supreme Court refused to entertain that new framing, citing Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2000), which bars parties from advancing one theory below and an opposite theory on appeal.

4. Balancing Probative Value and Prejudice

The Court agreed with the trial judge that:

The call was probative as part of the continuous narrative of Puckett’s conduct on the day after the murder and arson.
Any unfair prejudice from the jury hearing that Puckett planned a controlled burn the next day was limited, particularly because:
- He sought permission—suggesting lawful behavior rather than secretive misconduct; and
- The call was one among many phone records that collectively depicted his post-crime mindset and movements.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the call as part of a “complete picture” outweighed any prejudice, and admitting it under KRE 404(b) was permissible.

Takeaway: Puckett reinforces that carefully cabined “other acts” evidence can be admitted to contextualize the crime and investigation, so long as it is properly tied to a non-character purpose and does not dominate the proof in a way that suggests the jury should convict because “this is the kind of person who does these things.”

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Lesser-Included Offenses and Mental States

Lesser-included offense: A crime whose elements are entirely contained within a more serious crime. For example, reckless homicide is “lesser” than intentional murder because if someone intentionally kills, they necessarily cause death, but the reverse is not always true.

Mental states in Kentucky homicide law (simplified):

Intentional: The person’s objective is to cause the result (e.g., death).
Wanton: The person is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk but consciously disregards it, creating a grave risk of death.
Reckless: The person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that they should have perceived.

A defendant only gets a lesser-included instruction if the trial evidence reasonably supports a scenario where the jury could acquit on the higher mental state (intentional) but convict on the lower one (wanton or reckless). Pure speculation is not enough.

2. Self-Defense vs. Complete Denial

Self-defense admits that the defendant committed the act (e.g., shot the victim) but claims it was legally justified (e.g., to prevent imminent serious harm). When a defendant insists “I was not there, I did nothing,” they are generally not entitled to instructions that assume they did act but were justified, absent special circumstances or evidence supporting such a scenario.

3. Alternate Perpetrator (“aaltperp”) Evidence

“Aaltperp” is shorthand for evidence that someone else committed the crime. While defendants have a constitutional right to present such a defense, they must offer more than mere suspicion or rumor. Courts require:

A concrete link between the third party and the crime (e.g., motive, opportunity, incriminating statements closely tied to the crime, physical evidence).
That the probative value not be outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury or sidetracking the trial into collateral mini-trials about unrelated incidents.

4. Hearsay and Waiver

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts (e.g., “Ray said he did it” offered to prove that Ray in fact did it). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.

Waiver occurs when counsel consciously chooses not to pursue admission of certain evidence or agrees that evidence is inadmissible. Once waived, a defendant usually cannot raise that ruling as error on appeal.

5. KRE 404(b) and Propensity

KRE 404(b) prevents the prosecution from arguing: “He did something bad in the past, so he must have done this bad thing too.” But the prosecution may use other acts to show things like:

Motive (e.g., financial need, vendetta);
Intent or absence of mistake/accident; or
Context—how events unfolded, how the investigation proceeded.

Courts must carefully weigh whether the risk the jury will use the evidence for an improper “bad character” inference outweighs its legitimate value.

6. Harmless Error (RCr 9.24)

Even if the trial court makes a mistake (e.g., wrongfully excludes or admits evidence), an appellate court will only reverse if the error likely affected the outcome. If the evidence against the defendant is strong and the challenged ruling would not reasonably change the verdict, the error is deemed “harmless,” and the conviction stands.

7. Abuse of Discretion

This is a deferential standard of review. An appellate court does not ask, “What would we have done?” but “Was the trial judge’s decision so unreasonable or legally unsound that it falls outside the range of acceptable choices?” If reasonable judges could disagree about a close call, there is no abuse of discretion.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. No “Free” Lesser-Included Instructions in All-Murder/Denial Cases

Puckett reinforces a pattern visible in Allen, Oakes, and Mash: Kentucky appellate courts will support trial judges who refuse to issue “compromise” or “mercy” instructions in the absence of concrete evidence supporting a lesser mental state. Defense counsel cannot rely on lesser-included instructions as a default fallback in intentional-murder cases where the defense is pure innocence.

Practically:

Defense strategy must be carefully considered. Presenting no alternative theory of what happened (e.g., accident, lesser intent, provocation) may foreclose lesser-included options.
Trial judges are encouraged to scrutinize whether the record truly supports lower culpability; if not, they may safely present the jury with a binary choice: guilty as charged or not guilty.

2. Aaltperp Evidence: Higher Bar for Speculative Third-Party Blame

The decision underscores that Kentucky’s commitment to the right to present a defense (including aaltperp theories) is not absolute. Under Hedgepath and Gray, defendants must offer more than:

Vague suspicions;
Unconnected prior bad behavior by a third party at a different time; or
Hearsay statements that only weakly tie the third party to the crime.

The Court’s willingness to deem additional aaltperp details harmless—even if erroneously excluded—also signals that unless third-party evidence is strong and specific, appellate courts are unlikely to disturb convictions where the primary case is robust.

3. KRE 404(b) and Narrative Coherence

Puckett continues the trend in Melton and Adkins of endorsing “complete story” evidence, even when it might tangentially suggest a prior act with potentially negative inferences. For prosecutors:

So long as the evidence is tightly linked to the narrative of the offense or investigation and not primarily aimed at painting the defendant as a “bad person,” it is more likely to survive KRE 404(b) scrutiny.

For defense attorneys:

The focus must be on showing that the other-acts evidence is not truly necessary to tell the story and that its main effect is to inflame the jury’s sense of character-based animus.

4. Unpublished but Illustrative

Because this opinion is designated “Not to be Published” under RAP 40(D), it is not binding precedent. However, where no published Kentucky case squarely addresses a fact pattern or combination of issues (e.g., a homicide/arson trial with late indictment, extensive phone data, and limited but emotive aaltperp evidence), Puckett may be cited for its persuasive reasoning, provided counsel tenders a copy to the court and parties.

VII. Conclusion

Jonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth is an instructive application of several important Kentucky doctrines:

It confirms that lesser-included homicide and arson instructions, as well as self-defense, require affirmative evidentiary support for a different state of mind or justification; they are not automatic entitlements in every serious case.
It clarifies that the constitutional right to present a defense, including aaltperp evidence, remains cabined by principles of relevance and reliability, and that speculative, remote, or hearsay-based third-party theories may be excluded without violating due process, particularly where their marginal value is small and any error is harmless.
It strengthens the “complete-the-story” approach to KRE 404(b), recognizing that some contextual acts—like the controlled burn call—can legitimately inform the jury’s understanding of a defendant’s conduct and mindset around the time of the offense.

Even as an unpublished decision, Puckett provides a clear roadmap for trial courts managing complex homicide trials involving circumstantial evidence, contested jury instructions, and contested evidentiary calls on both defense and prosecution proof. It encourages trial judges to insist on evidentiary grounding for alternative theories and lesser offenses, while simultaneously allowing a coherent, contextual narrative of the crime and investigation to reach the jury.

Refining Kentucky’s Standards on Lesser-Included Offenses, Alternate Perpetrator Evidence, and KRE 404(b): Commentary on Jonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky