Refining Equivocal Self‑Representation Requests After People v Lewis: The Fourth Department’s Framework in People v Davis (2025)

Introduction

People v. Davis (2025 NY Slip Op 04300) is a Fourth Department decision affirming a conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree arising from a foot pursuit in the wake of a reported armed robbery. Beyond the search-and-seizure question, the appeal raised a suite of trial-management issues: a claimed violation of the constitutional right to self-representation, the denial of substitution of assigned counsel, competency to stand trial, Batson procedure, and classic sufficiency/weight-of-the-evidence and sentencing arguments.

The majority opinion, joined by three Justices, upholds the conviction and sentence on all points. Two Justices (Curran, J.P., and Hannah, J.) dissent, concluding that at least one unequivocal request to proceed pro se required a searching inquiry into waiver of counsel and that the trial court failed to conduct the necessary minimal inquiry into a serious breakdown with counsel. The case thus becomes a salient early application of the Court of Appeals’ 2025 decision in People v. Lewis on how to identify an “unequivocal” request for self-representation.

Summary of the Judgment

• Suppression: The court held the officer had a founded suspicion to make a common-law inquiry based on proximity to a reported armed robbery and a companion’s match to a suspect’s description, and later had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant when he fled. The gun that fell during the lawful pursuit was not suppressible.
• Self‑Representation (Pro Se): The court rejected the claim that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request to proceed pro se. Applying People v. Lewis (2025), the court found the defendant’s requests were equivocal because they were tethered to his demand for new counsel—there was no standalone, unequivocal invocation triggering a searching inquiry.
• Substitute Counsel: The court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying substitution. The defendant’s allegations of a conspiracy, including a civil suit against the public defender’s office, did not establish good cause; the court conducted an adequate inquiry under Porto/Sides.
• Ineffective Assistance: The record reflected meaningful representation under Baldi; the defendant did not show the absence of strategic explanations for counsel’s choices.
• Competency (CPL 730.30): No abuse of discretion in declining a sua sponte competency exam: the record showed understanding of proceedings; “conspiracy” comments reflected obstinance, not incompetence.
• Batson: The Batson procedural claim was unpreserved; discretionary review was declined.
• Weight of the Evidence: The verdict was not against the weight; credibility disputes and inconsistencies were for the jury.
• Sentence: Not unduly harsh or severe.

Dissent: The dissent would reverse for a new trial. It reads Lewis as requiring only one unequivocal request to trigger a searching inquiry, finds such a request in the record, rejects any “contextual” approach to dilute it, and alternatively concludes the court failed to make the minimal inquiry required before denying substitution of counsel in light of a breakdown and a civil suit against counsel.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

a) Street Encounters and Pursuit

• People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976): Established a graduated framework for police–citizen encounters in New York. The court invoked De Bour’s “founded suspicion” level to justify the officer’s initial common-law inquiry.
• People v. Atkinson, 185 AD3d 1438 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1092: Supports that proximity to a crime scene combined with descriptive matches can justify a common-law inquiry and that flight, together with other indicia, can ripen suspicion.
• People v. McKinley, 101 AD3d 1747 (4th Dept 2012), lv denied 21 NY3d 1017: Similar application of De Bour levels to justify escalating police conduct.
• People v. Harvey, 70 AD3d 1454 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 15 NY3d 750, and People v. Martinez, 59 AD3d 1071 (4th Dept 2009), lv denied 12 NY3d 856: Flight in response to police approach, when coupled with specific circumstances, can support reasonable suspicion sufficient for pursuit.
• People v. Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759 (1977), People v. Addison, 199 AD3d 1321 (4th Dept 2021), People v. Layou, 134 AD3d 1510 (4th Dept 2015): Appellate deference to trial-level credibility findings in suppression rulings.

b) Right to Self‑Representation (Pro Se) and Waiver of Counsel

• Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975) and People v. McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10 (1974): Ground the constitutional right to self-representation, subject to an unequivocal and timely request and a knowing, intelligent waiver.
• People v. Lewis, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03011 (2025): Key controlling precedent. Clarifies that requests “as an alternative to receiving new counsel” are equivocal (mere leverage), but “a single unequivocal and timely request” triggers a searching inquiry. The majority relied heavily on this; the dissent argued the record contains such an unequivocal request and warned against a “contextual” dilution.
• People v. Gillian, 8 NY3d 85 (2006) and People v. LaValle, 3 NY3d 88 (2004): Requests framed in the alternative to substitution are not automatically equivocal; context matters. The majority reads them through Lewis to emphasize equivocation when self-representation is reserved as a last resort; the dissent leans on LaValle’s caution against deeming such requests necessarily equivocal.
• Matter of Kathleen K. [Steven K.], 17 NY3d 380 (2011) and People v. Dixon, 42 NY3d 609 (2024): Define equivocal requests as those not reflecting an affirmative desire for self-representation, but rather a conditional, final resort.
• People v. Stone, 22 NY3d 520 (2014); People v. Arroyo, 98 NY2d 101 (2002): Acknowledge inherent tension between the right to counsel and self-representation; trial courts face difficult gatekeeping responsibilities.
• People v. Silburn, 31 NY3d 144 (2018): “Actual fixed intention” standard for unequivocal assertions; used by dissent to characterize defendant’s statements.

c) Substitution of Counsel

• People v. Porto, 16 NY3d 93 (2010); People v. Sides, 75 NY2d 822 (1990): A “seemingly serious request” supported by specific factual allegations of serious complaints triggers at least a minimal inquiry; substitution lies in the trial court’s discretion and requires good cause.
• People v. Gibson, 126 AD3d 1300 (4th Dept 2015): Good cause standard applied; minimal inquiry duty emphasized.
• People v. Lewis, 228 AD3d 1226 (4th Dept 2024), lv granted 42 NY3d 1080 (2025), and People v. Hunter, 171 AD3d 1534 (4th Dept 2019): Balance defendant’s request against orderly administration of justice.

d) Competency to Stand Trial

• CPL 730.30(1); People v. Tortorici, 92 NY2d 757 (1999): Presumption of competence; order of examination when the court opines the defendant may be incapacitated.
• People v. Morgan, 87 NY2d 878 (1995): Discretion lies with trial court to order exam.
• People v. Thorpe, 218 AD3d 1124 (4th Dept 2023) and People v. Robinson, 225 AD3d 1266 (4th Dept 2024): Beliefs reflecting mistrust/obstinance, absent functional impairment, do not mandate an exam.
• People v. Winebrenner, 96 AD3d 1615 (4th Dept 2012): Competency can be raised on appeal despite no objection below.

e) Ineffective Assistance, Batson, Weight of Evidence

• IAC: People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 (1981); People v. Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 (1998); People v. Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 (1988): Meaningful representation standard; defendant’s burden to negate strategic explanations. Applied with recent Fourth Department citations (People v. Ruiz, 234 AD3d 1329 (2025); People v. Rogers, 70 AD3d 1340 (2010)).
• Batson: Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986) framework; preservation requirement emphasized in People v. Scott, 81 AD3d 1470 (4th Dept 2011); People v. McPherson, 213 AD3d 1261 (4th Dept 2023); People v. Lewis, 192 AD3d 1532 (4th Dept 2021). Court declined interest-of-justice review (CPL 470.15(6)(a)).
• Weight of the Evidence: People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007); People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987). Credibility determinations respected; applied with People v. Cirino, 203 AD3d 1661 (4th Dept 2022); People v. Wiggins, 225 AD3d 1305 (4th Dept 2024); People v. Harris, 15 AD3d 966 (4th Dept 2005).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The Suppression Ruling

The Fourth Department recognized a two-step escalation consistent with De Bour:

• Step 1 – Founded Suspicion/Common-Law Inquiry: The defendant was near in time and place to a reported armed robbery and walking with an individual matching a suspect description. Those specific, articulable facts justified the officer’s right to approach and ask questions.
• Step 2 – Reasonable Suspicion/Pursuit: The defendant’s flight upon approach, combined with the robbery-related circumstances, elevated the encounter to reasonable suspicion, authorizing pursuit and a temporary detention. During that lawful pursuit, the gun fell from the defendant’s sweatshirt pocket. Because the pursuit was lawful, suppression was properly denied.

On credibility, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s assessment, finding the officer’s testimony not “incredible as a matter of law” despite inconsistencies.

b) Self‑Representation and the “Equivocal Request” Problem

Applying People v. Lewis (2025), the majority concluded the defendant’s assertions—explicitly tied to a demand for substitute counsel—were not standalone invocations of the right to proceed without counsel. Statements like “I don’t want to represent myself but will if you won’t assign new counsel” are paradigmatically equivocal because they reflect self-representation as a conditional last resort or bargaining chip. On that view:

• No duty to give a “searching inquiry” (Faretta/McIntyre colloquy): The inquiry is triggered only when the defendant makes an unequivocal, timely request to proceed pro se.
• Contextual markers of equivocation: Repeated insistence on new counsel, couching self-representation as “I have no choice,” and lack of a “standalone request” confirming an affirmative, fixed desire for self-representation.

c) Substitution of Counsel

The trial court allowed the defendant to air concerns, including accusations of a wide-ranging conspiracy and a civil lawsuit against the public defender’s office. It rejected the allegations, found no conspiracy, and declined substitution. The Fourth Department held that the court balanced the defendant’s complaints against the need for efficient administration and acted within its discretion. The record did not establish “good cause” as required by Porto/Sides, and the minimal inquiry undertaken sufficed under the circumstances.

d) Competency (CPL 730.30)

Despite the defendant’s “conspiracy” rhetoric, the record showed understanding of proceedings and the ability to assist in his defense. The remarks evinced frustration and mistrust—obstinance—rather than incapacity. Under Tortorici/Morgan, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining a sua sponte exam.

e) Remaining Issues

• IAC: On the totality, counsel rendered meaningful representation under Baldi; the defendant did not meet the Benevento/Rivera burden.
• Batson: The defendant failed to object to the court’s Batson procedure, rendering the issue unpreserved; appellate discretionary review was declined.
• Weight and Sentence: The evidence supported the verdict; any inconsistencies were for the jury. The sentence was within permissible bounds.

3) The Dissent’s Counter-Analysis

The dissent relies on the same controlling People v. Lewis but reads the record differently:

• At least one unequivocal request was made: The defendant said he was “comfortable” and would “rather represent” himself, adding “I’m making that clear.” Under Lewis and McIntyre, a single unequivocal request triggers the duty to conduct a searching inquiry. The dissent cautions against rejecting such statements by recontextualizing them—what it characterizes as the “contextual approach” disfavored by Lewis.
• No abandonment: After the court foreclosed both substitution and self-representation, the defendant never withdrew his request; compliance under protest is not acquiescence, and Lewis does not require repeated reassertions.
• Substitution error in the alternative: Counsel acknowledged a near-total breakdown in communication and flagged the defendant’s hostility, while a civil suit was pending against counsel/the office. Under Porto/Sides, this “seemingly serious request” required at least a minimal inquiry into the nature of the breakdown and the potential conflict; the dissent finds the record devoid of that inquiry.
• Legal-skill rationale is improper: The trial court’s skepticism about the defendant’s ability to try a case cannot alone defeat an otherwise valid Faretta waiver, so long as the waiver is knowing and intelligent (Hall; Ryan; McIntyre).

Remedy: The dissent would reverse and order a new trial because the absence of the mandated searching inquiry after an unequivocal pro se request is structural error.

4) Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

a) Self‑Representation after Lewis: The Threshold for “Unequivocal”

Davis is an early appellate application of People v. Lewis (2025) and highlights a sharp, practical dividing line:

• Majority’s approach: Requests tethered to demands for new counsel are equivocal unless the defendant makes a clear, “standalone” invocation unconditioned on substitution. Absent that, no searching inquiry is required.
• Dissent’s caution: Courts should not “contextualize away” a plain, affirmative statement. If the defendant says, “I want to represent myself” in unequivocal terms, even once, the court must conduct a searching inquiry—even if dissatisfaction with counsel is the broader motive.

Practice implications:

• For judges: When a defendant mentions self-representation at all, it is prudent to ask clarifying questions to determine whether the request is unequivocal and unconditional. If it is, pivot immediately to the searching inquiry to safeguard the record.
• For defense counsel: If a client seeks to go pro se, make the record unmistakable: “I unequivocally and unconditionally assert my right to self-representation; this request is not contingent on substitution.” If the client instead wants new counsel, avoid commingling the relief.
• For appellate preservation: While Lewis suggests a single unequivocal request suffices to trigger inquiry, practitioners should reiterate the request and object to any denial without a Faretta colloquy to foreclose abandonment arguments.

b) Substitution of Counsel: Minimal Inquiry Matters

Davis affirms significant discretion in denying substitution where allegations center on broad conspiracy and distrust. But the dissent signals a meaningful appellate risk where:

• There is a near-total communication breakdown acknowledged by counsel, and/or
• A civil action against assigned counsel or the defender’s office exists.

In such scenarios, a targeted “minimal inquiry” on the record—probing the extent of breakdown, whether the civil suit creates a practical conflict, and whether any issues are remediable—is the safer course. Summary denials risk reversal under Porto/Sides.