Refining Confession Admissibility: Interpreting “Slightest Hope of Benefit” and “Remotest Fear of Injury” under OCGA § 24-8-824

Introduction

In Short v. State, decided May 28, 2025, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed a recurring statutory question: when is a custodial confession truly voluntary under OCGA § 24-8-824? The defendant, Angelo Short, was convicted of malice murder and related offences for the stabbing death of 83-year-old Peggy Gamble and a string of subsequent crimes. On appeal, Short challenged the admission of his December 5, 2016 confession on the ground that it was induced either by the “slightest hope of benefit” (promises of a lighter sentence or favorable plea deal) or by the “remotest fear of injury” (threats of physical harm, here arising from his jail conditions). The Court’s ruling clarifies the boundary between permissible interrogation tactics and statutory coercion, establishing a refined precedent for assessing confession voluntariness under Georgia law.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit Short’s confession. Rejecting both of Short’s statutory claims, the Court held that:

None of the officers’ statements regarding plea negotiations, sentencing ranges (e.g., “it could be 25 years”), or their “input” to the district attorney rose to the level of a prohibited promise of reduced punishment.
Discussion of a possible death-penalty prosecution, or later assurances that a confession “normally kind of takes the death penalty off the table,” were either equivocal or occurred after the confession was already given—and thus did not actually induce the confession.
Alleged threats from other inmates and a promise of protective custody by law-enforcement officials did not establish a causal link between a “fear of injury” and the decision to confess.

Because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Short’s statement was made voluntarily, without improper hope or fear, the Court affirmed both the admission of the confession and the resulting convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (2014) – sentencing merger of malice and felony murder.
Manner v. State, 302 Ga. 877 (2017) – harmlessness of nomenclature errors in sentencing.
State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806 (2025) – defining “slightest hope of benefit” as promises of reduced criminal punishment.
Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708 (2021) – burden of proof and totality-of-circumstances in OCGA § 24-8-824 reviews.
Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315 (2019) – requiring that a promise actually induce the confession.
State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98 (2009) – explaining “remotest fear of injury” as threats or torture.
Chulpayev v. State, 296 Ga. 764 (2015) – separate analysis of statutory and constitutional voluntariness.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) – evidentiary hearing requirement for voluntariness challenges.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rests on two pillars: (1) a clear textual understanding of OCGA § 24-8-824, and (2) application of the “totality of the circumstances” test under Georgia precedent.

1. “Slightest Hope of Benefit”: Relying on Leverette, the Court reaffirmed that only explicit promises of reduced punishment—“shorter sentence, lesser charges, or no charges at all”—violate the statute. General encouragements to “tell the truth,” speculation about what a prosecutor “might” offer, or nonspecific exhortations to cooperate do not trigger exclusion.

2. “Remotest Fear of Injury”: As defined in Lynch, this phrase covers physical or mental torture or threats. Here, Short’s testimony about jailhouse threats and a promise of protective custody was insufficient to show that his December 5 confession was actually coerced. The officers did not use the jail fear as leverage at the time of confession, and the recorded interviews lack any direct causal link.

3. Standard of Review: The State bore the burden to prove voluntariness by a preponderance. Because the pertinent facts were largely captured on video and audio, the Court applied a mixed review—accepting the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but reviewing de novo the legal application of OCGA § 24-8-824.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision provides law enforcement and trial courts with definitive guideposts on admissibility of confessions under Georgia law:

Confession-inducing statements about plea deals must involve clear, binding promises of reduced punishment to run afoul of OCGA § 24-8-824.
References to potential death-penalty risk or sentence length, made as general warnings, will almost never constitute an improper “hope of benefit.”
Alleged third-party threats (e.g., fellow inmates) require proof that law-enforcement officers exploited that fear to obtain confessions.
Trial courts should continue rigorous Jackson-Denno hearings whenever voluntariness under OCGA § 24-8-824 is disputed, carefully parsing audio/video records and witness testimony.

Going forward, defense counsel must present concrete evidence of promise or threat directly linked to the confession itself, while prosecutors can rely on thorough documentation of Miranda warnings, clear waiver forms, and recorded interviews to defend admissibility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

OCGA § 24-8-824 (“Statutory Confessions Rule”): Requires that any confession be voluntary, i.e., made without promise of benefit or fear of harm.
Slightest Hope of Benefit: A promise of lighter charges or sentence; casual suggestions or “tips” about plea negotiations do not qualify.
Remotest Fear of Injury: Coercion by threats or torture, physical or mental; general safety concerns alone are insufficient.
Jackson-Denno Hearing: Pretrial proceeding where the court determines whether a confession was voluntary under state statute and federal due process.
Miranda Warnings: Constitutional advisements of right to remain silent and to counsel; separate from the voluntariness required by OCGA § 24-8-824.

Conclusion

Short v. State refines Georgia’s statutory standard for confession admissibility by drawing firm lines around what constitutes an impermissible “hope of benefit” or “fear of injury.” The decision underscores that:

Only explicit promises of reduced punishment disqualify a confession under OCGA § 24-8-824.
Generic warnings of sentencing risk, and after-the-fact assurances, do not render a confession inadmissible.
Allegations of third-party threats must be directly tied to coercive conduct by law enforcement to succeed.

By clarifying these standards, the Court has provided litigants, trial judges, and law-enforcement agencies a durable framework for assessing confession voluntariness in Georgia, ensuring that the balance between effective criminal investigation and fundamental fairness is maintained.