Introduction

The case of Jason Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water (No. 19-1388) presents a critical examination of the application of Title VII's religious accommodation provisions under the "undue hardship" standard. Jason Small, an electrician turned dispatcher due to an on-the-job injury, faced scheduling conflicts with his religious obligations. His request for temporary reduced pay while seeking reassignment was denied, leading to his suspension and subsequent lawsuit. This commentary delves into the intricacies of the case, the Supreme Court's disposition, and the dissenting opinion that challenges existing legal standards.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of the United States denied Jason Small's petition for a writ of certiorari, thereby upholding the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The lower courts had ruled that Small's request for religious accommodation did not meet the "undue hardship" threshold as defined by the precedent set in TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. v. HARDISON (1977). Despite the lack of evidence that Small's accommodation would impose significant hardship, the courts maintained that any non-de minimis cost exempted the employer from providing the requested accommodation. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, dissented from the denial, arguing that the Hardison standard inadequately protects religious exercise under Title VII.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The cornerstone of the lower courts' reasoning was the Supreme Court's decision in Hardison v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). In Hardison, the Court held that Title VII does not require employers to incur more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee's religious practices. This precedent significantly lowers the threshold for employers in religious accommodation cases, allowing minimal flexibility.

Additionally, the dissent references other statutes like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which employ a more stringent "undue hardship" standard. These laws require employers to demonstrate significant difficulty or expense before refusing accommodations, contrasting sharply with the Hardison standard under Title VII.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Gorsuch's dissent critiques the Hardison decision for its minimalistic approach to religious accommodations. He asserts that the term "undue hardship" is absent from the statutory language of Title VII and that the Court's interpretation undermines the statute's intent to protect religious exercise. Gorsuch highlights that other civil rights laws have adopted a more demanding standard for accommodations, suggesting inconsistency and unfair treatment under Title VII.

The dissent further argues that the courts have improperly extended the Hardison ruling, leading to uneven and inadequate protections for employees seeking religious accommodations. By allowing employers to decline accommodations based on trivial costs, the Hardison standard fails to uphold the equitable treatment promised by Title VII.

Impact

The denial of certiorari maintains the status quo, effectively upholding the ongoing application of the Hardison standard. This continuation reinforces the lower courts' lenient approach towards employer obligations in providing religious accommodations. However, the dissent signals potential avenues for future challenges and legislative action aimed at rectifying the perceived shortcomings of the Hardison precedent.

Should the Supreme Court revisit this issue, a shift towards a more robust "undue hardship" standard akin to other civil rights laws could significantly enhance protections for religious employees. This would align Title VII with contemporary interpretations of workplace fairness and religious liberty.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

The denial of certiorari in Jason Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water upholds the enduring influence of the Hardison standard within Title VII jurisprudence. However, Justice Gorsuch's dissent underscores a significant tension between statutory language and judicial interpretation, highlighting the inadequacy of the current framework in protecting religious freedoms effectively. This case illuminates the pressing need for either judicial reconsideration or legislative reform to ensure that Title VII's accommodation requirements align with the original intent of safeguarding employees' religious practices without imposing undue hardships.